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Introduction
Joel A. Mintz
It has been more than a decade since the Florida Legislature enacted
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act.
A product of contention and uneasy compromise, this pathbreaking statute,
commonly referred to as Florida's Growth Management Act, has engendered
much controversy. For all the diverse stakeholders whose concerns the Act
touches, its implementation has led to both triumphs and disappointments.
The land use planning process created by the statute remains very much a
"work in progress," whose specific requirements are still being adopted and
implemented by local government officials, Florida state agencies, land
owners and developers, and concerned priyate citizens.
This Symposium reviews the considerations that led to the statute's
passage in 1985. It summarizes the key elements of the Florida Growth
Management Act and the intricate growth management process which
resulted. The Symposium assays, from a variety of perspectives, the Act's
strengths and shortcomings; and it examines the discrete body of case law
and follow-up legislation the statute has spawned.
In its opening piece attorney Richard Grosso, a seasoned and highly
effective advocate of the growth management cause, describes the require-
ments of the Growth Management Act in considerable detail. Grosso
considers the statute's purposes and procedures. He also surveys some
significant substantive issues that have arisen in its implementation.
Among other matters, Grosso focuses on the adequacy of the support
data used to determine whether locally prepared comprehensive land use
plans are consistent with the statute's mandates, the role of future land use
elements and maps, the appropriateness of local land development regula-
tions as a means of implementing comprehensive plan policies, and the
enforcement of comprehensive plans in the context of challenges to
particular development orders. Before concluding, Grosso evaluates
Florida's ongoing effort to manage its own growth. He notes both the
extent to which the Florida Growth Management Act has transformed land
use planning in certain parts of the state and the "compartmentalization" of
land use regulation that has kept the Act from achieving its highest potential
as a mechanism for rational, managed growth and development.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A.,
1970, Columbia University; J.D., 1974, New York University School of Law; LL.M., 1982,
Columbia University Law School; J.S.D., 1989, Columbia University Law School.
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Two informative student notes provide ecological, historical, and
comparative perspectives on Florida's growth management efforts. Joy
Brockman's essay describes two sensitive ecosystems found throughout
Florida, beaches and sandy shores and coastal wetlands and estuaries, and
notes the problems that development may cause for each. She also
considers the mechanisms that are presently in place under Florida law for
the regulation and protection of these threatened resources.
Vanessa Steinberg-Prieto's note explores the historical evolution of
growth management legislation in Florida. She also discusses the interrela-
tionship of Florida's Growth Management Act and an important federal
environmental statute, the Endangered Species Act, as well as efforts by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency to protect Florida wetlands under section 404 of the Federal Clean
Water Act. Steinberg-Prieto investigates the growth management statutes
of Vermont, Oregon and other states and she considers the effect of a key
provision of Florida's Growth Management Act, and its "concurrency
requirement," on the overcrowding of Florida public schools.
Concurrency, the statutory requirement that local comprehensive plans
require the availability of adequate public facilities and services to support
new development, is the focus of two other contributions to the Symposium
as well. In Waiting for The Go: Concurrency, Takings and the Property
Rights Act, Brenna Durden, David Layman and Sid Ansbacher analyze when
the concurrency requirement constitutes a compensable taking of private
property. Their article considers pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Supreme Court of Florida. It also examines the
impact of the Harris Act, a 1995 Florida statute which created enforceable
rights for property owners where future government actions "inordinately
burden" private property.
Craig Robertson's student note describes the gradual development of
the concurrency doctrine in Florida over the 1970s and 80s. He considers
judicial review of concurrency, and analogous requirements in Florida and
other states. Robertson's note also discusses the effect of concurrency on
school overcrowding; he examines the "even swap" technique employed to
implement concurrency in Jacksonville-a technique that Robertson argues,
with some force, is unauthorized by the Growth Management Act.
Finally, Charles Siemon and Julie Kendig critique the standards
established by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme
Court of Florida respecting judicial review of local government decision-
making regarding land use regulation. Their article includes a close analysis
of the leading Florida case in this area, Board of County Commissioners v.
[Vol. 20
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Snyder, which defines certain local rezoning decisions as "quasi-judicial
actions," subject to greater judicial scrutiny than "legislative acts."
The remaining articles in this Symposium consider a significant subset
of the plethora of legal and public policy issues raised by Florida's Growth
Management Act in the eleven years since its passage. Very clearly, the
writings that constitute this Symposium will not resolve those issues
conclusively. Instead, one may hope that, against a background of
continued rapid population growth-with the stress on natural resources and
the pressure for new construction which such growth inevitably
brings--these essays will focus and inform a thoughtful debate as to the
future direction of land use planning and growth management in the nation's
fourth largest state.
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Florida's Growth Management Act: How Far We Have
Come, and How Far We Have Yet to Go
Richard Grosso*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 591
II. THE BASICS OF THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN
FLORIDA ................................... 592
A. Purposes and Basic Requirements ............. 592
1. Purposes of the Growth Management Act .... 592
2. The Form and Content of Plans ........... 593
3. Internal Consistencies .................. 597
4. Concurrency ......................... 598
B. Procedural Issues ......................... 598
1. Review of the Draft Plan or Amendment ..... 598
2. Review of Adopted Plan or Amendment ..... 600
3. Adoption of the Plan or Amendment and Legal
Effect Thereof ........................ 601
4. Public Notice ........................ 602
C. The Legal Standard ....................... 602
1. "Compliance"......................... 602
2. The Bottom Line: Sanctions ............. 604
D. Exclusivity of Proceedings ................... 605
E. The "Consistency" Requirement ............... 605
F. Administrative Proceedings .................. 606
1. Initiation of Proceedings ................ 606
2. Standing/Intervention ................... 607
3. Indispensable Parties ................... 609
4. Standard of Proof ..................... 609
5. The Hearing ......................... 609
* Legal Director, 1000 Friends of Florida, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. B.S., 1983, Florida State University; J.D.,
1986, Florida State University College of Law. Richard Grosso has been the legal director
for 1000 Friends of Florida since 1990 and is a former senior attorney at the Department of
Community Affairs, and assistant general counsel at the Department of Environmental
Regulation. Mr. Grosso has an extensive litigation and appellate practice in the area of
growth management and land use law, including property rights law. He frequently writes
and lectures on growth management and land use issues, including property rights law.
7
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
6. Evidence ........................... 610
G. Post-Hearing Procedure .................... 610
H. The Evaluation and Appraisal Process .......... 611
I. Significant Substantive Issues: Data and Analysis . . 611
1. Generally ........................... 611
2. Requirements for Plan Amendments ........ 613
3. "Professionally Acceptable" Standard ....... 615
4. Population Projections .................. 615
5. Natural Resource Maps ................. 616
6. Use of Data and Analysis at a Hearing ...... 617
7. Land Supply/Demand .................. 617
Im. FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT AND MAP ............. 618
A. Factors Affecting Land Use Decisions .......... 618
B. The Role of FLUM: Does It "Reflect" the Plan's
Goals, Objectives, and Policies? .............. 619
1. The "Multiplier" Issue .................. 619
2. The FLUM Must "Reflect" Relevant Policies .. 620
3. Urban Sprawl ........................ 622
a. Special Regulations ................ 624
b. Carrying Capacity Approach .......... 624
c. Planning Versus Permitting ........... 625
C. Vested Rights and Property Rights ............. 626
D. Notice/Public Participation Requirements ........ 626
E. Consistency with Chapter 9J-5 ................ 628
F. Authority to Plan for Specific Areas ............ 628
G. Consistency with Other Jurisdictions ........... 628
H. What May Plans Regulate? .................. 629
I. Intergovernmental Coordination ............... 630
J. Obstacles to Bringing an Action ............... 630
K. Settlement and Mediation Process ............. 631
1. M ediation ............................ 631
2. Compliance Agreements .................. 631
3. Attorney's Fees ........................ 634
IV. LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS ................ 635
A. Contents of the LDRs ...................... 635
B. Enforcement of Plans Through LDRs ........... 635
1. Challenging the Complete Failure to Adopt a
Required LDR ....................... 635
2. Administrative Review of LDRs for Consistency
with a Comprehensive Plan .............. 636
590 [Vol. 20
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Grosso
V. ENFORCEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANS THROUGH
DEVELOPMENT ORDER CHALLENGES ................. 639
A. Consistency Requirement .................... 639
1. Statutory Cause of Action ............... 639
2. Procedure ........................... 640
3. Consistency Standard ................... 640
4. Current Issues ........................ 641
a. Relationship with Non-Statutory
Remedies ........................ 641
b. Burden of Proof ................... 642
c. Standard of Review ................ 643
d. Definition of Consistency ............ 644
e. Local Hearing Procedures ........... 644
f. Applicability ..................... 646
VI. So How Is IT WORKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  647
A. Procedural Issues: Planning ................. 647
1. Coordination of Chapters 163 and 380 of the
Florida Statutes ...................... 647
2. Applicability of Chapter 9J-5 of the Florida
Administrative Code to Plan Amendments .... 651
B. Substantive Issue ......................... 652
C. Procedural Issues: LDRs and Development
Orders ................................ 652
D. The Quasi-Judicial Issue .................... 655
VII. CONCLUSION ................................ 658
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Florida adopted the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act (the "Act").1 The Act
requires that each local government in Florida adopt a local comprehensive
plan consistent with the Act.2 The Act calls for the adoption of these
comprehensive plans over a three-year period The last of these plans was
adopted in the middle of 1992. Although a number of plans are still in
litigation and have therefore not been brought into "compliance" with the
1. 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-55 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (1995)).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3181, .3184; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J.11 (1995).
3. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(4).
1996]
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Act,4 most local governments have moved onto the next critical phase of
growth management--the implementation and enforcement of the plans
through plan amendments and individual development orders.
The planning process now shifts from the review of the initial plans to
the refinement and application of the plans through subsequent amendments
and more detailed Land Development Regulations ("LDRs"). Also,
individual development orders issued by local governments must be
consistent with the adopted plans' and LDRs. These orders are subject to
"consistency" challenges under a statutory cause of action.6 In theory then,
all development orders issued by local governments are consistent with the
state's adopted growth management policies. At the same time, many local
governments are revisiting their plans through the amendment process.
The first decade of Florida's modem era of growth management has
produced an incredible, but not an unpredictable, amount of change,
controversy, disappointment, and even some success stories. As growth
management enters its second decade, it seems an appropriate time to assess
where we have come from and where we are headed.
This article will begin by presenting a primer on the basics of the
growth management process in Florida. Next, it will discuss the important
substantive issues which have arisen during the implementation of the
Growth Management Act as a means of providing a practice guide to the
practitioner. Finally, this article will analyze the success or failure of
growth management and will offer some suggestions for changes which the
author thinks are necessary to make growth management in Florida more
effective.
II. THE BASICS OF THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN
FLORIDA
A. Purposes and Basic Requirements
1. Purposes of the Growth Management Act
The purposes of the Growth Management Act are, among other things,
to "guide and control future development,"7 to "overcome present handi-
4. As of this writing, Monroe, Walton, and Polk Counties have not yet brought their
plans into compliance.
5. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1)(a).
6. Id. § 163.3215.
7. Id. § 163.3161(2).
[Vol. 20
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caps; and deal effectively with future problems which may result from the
use and development of land[,]" to "preserve, promote, protect, and improve
the public health, safety, comfort and good order,"8 and "to protect human,
environmental, social and economic resources[." 9 The Act is to be "con-
strued broadly to accomplish its stated purposes and objectives."' 0
2. The Form and Content of Plans
The Act specifies that "comprehensive plans must consist of material
in such descriptive form, written or graphic, as may be appropriate to the
prescription of principles, guidelines, and standards for the orderly and
balanced future economic, social, physical, environmental, and fiscal
development of the area."'" Comprehensive plans must have a capital
improvements element and a future land use plan element. In addition, the
plan must have a traffic circulation element consisting of proposed and
existing thoroughfares and transportation routes. The plan must also have
a sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water and natural groundwa-
ter aquifer recharge element, a natural resource conservation element, a
recreation and open space element, a housing element, a coastal management
element, and an intergovernmental coordination element. 2 In recognition
of Florida's critical need to protect its coastal areas from natural disasters
and environmental degradation, an entire subsection of the Act is devoted
to establishing requirements for coastal management elements."3 Coastal
8. Id. § 163.3161(3).
9. Id. § 163.3161(7).
10. F.A. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(b).
11. ld, § 163.3177(1).
12. Id § 163.3177(6)(c).
13. Id, § 163.3178; see also id. § 163.3177(6)(d), (g). The intent of the coastal
management portions of that law is that local plans "restrict development activities where
such activities would damage or destroy coastal resources, and that such plans protect human
life and limit public expenditures in areas that are subject to destruction by natural disaster."
FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(1).
Section 163.3178(2) of the Florida Statutes requires that the coastal management
element of a local comprehensive plan be based on studies, surveys, and data. Further, it
requires that it be consistent with coastal resource plans "prepared and adopted pursuant to
general or special law." Id. § 163.3178(2). In addition, the plan must contain, among other
things:
(a) A land use and inventory map of existing coastal uses, wildlife
habitat, wetland and other vegetative communities, undeveloped areas, areas
subject to coastal flooding, public access routes to beach and shore resources,
historic preservation areas, and other areas of special concern to local govern-
ment.
1996]
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management elements which must be designed to "restrict development
activities where such activities would damage or destroy coastal resources.
..,,I4 Local governments are also authorized to adopt optional elements
including a mass transit element, a port, aviation, and related facilities
element, a recommended community design element, and a general area
(b) An analysis of the environmental, socioeconomic, and fiscal impact
of development and redevelopment proposed in the future land use plan, with
required infrastructure to support this development or redevelopment, on the
natural and historical resources of the coast, and the plans and principles to be
used to control development and redevelopment to eliminate or mitigate the
adverse impacts on coastal wetlands; living marine resources; barrier islands,
including beach and dune systems; unique wildlife habitat; historical and
archaeological sites; and other fragile coastal resources.
(d) A component which outlines principles for hazard mitigation and
protection of human life against the effects of natural disaster, including
population evacuation, which take into consideration the capability to safely
evacuate the density of coastal population proposed in the future land use plan
element in the event of an impending natural disaster.
(e) A component which outlines principles for protecting existing beach
and dune systems from human-induced erosion and for restoring altered beach
and dune systems.
(f) A redevelopment component which outlines the principles which
shall be used to eliminate inappropriate and unsafe development in the coastal
areas when opportunities arise.
(h) Designation of high-hazard coastal areas, which for uniformity and
planning purposes herein, are defined as category I evacuation zones. However,
application of mitigation and redevelopment policies, pursuant to s. 380.27(2)
and any rules adopted thereunder, shall be at the discretion of local government.
Ci) An identification of regulatory and management techniques that the
local government plans to adopt or has adopted in order to mitigate the threat
to human life and to control proposed development and redevelopment in order
to protect the coastal environment and give consideration to cumulative impacts.
Id. § 163.3178(2)(a), (b), (d)-(f), (h), (j).
Also, under § 163.3178(8) of the Florida Statutes, each county that is required to
prepare a coastal management element must establish a county-based process for identifying
and prioritizing coastal properties so they may be acquired as part of the state's land
acquisition programs. The process must include the establishment of criteria for prioritizing
coastal acquisitions which, in addition to recognizing pristine coastal properties and coastal
properties of significant or important environmental sensitivity, recognize hazard mitigation,
beach access, beach management, urban recreation, and other policies necessary for effective
coastal management. Id. § 163.3178(8).
14. Id. § 163.3178(1).
[Vol. 20
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redevelopment element. 5 In comprehensive plans for a city or country
covering a population greater than 50,000, the mass transit element and the
coordination of port, aviation, and similar facilities are mandatory. 6
The Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") adopted an administra-
tive rule to implement the statutory requirement for "principles, guidelines
and standards" by requiring that plans contain specific types of goals,
objectives, and policies. A goal is defined as "the long-term end toward
which programs or activities are ultimately directed."' 7 An objective is "a
specific, measurable, intermediate end that is achievable and marks progress
toward a goal.""8  Policies answer the question of how "programs and
activities are conducted to achieve an identified goal."' 9 The Act, and the
administrative rule which guide the Department in its review of comprehen-
sive plans include very specific requirements for the subject matter and
intended result of the adopted plans.20
15. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7).
16. Id. § 163.3177(6)(i).
17. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.003(54) (1995).
18. Id. at r. 9J-5.003(86).
19. Id. at r. 9J-5.003(95).
20. Among the most notable substantive requirements, the plans must:
1. Conserve, use, and protect natural resources, including water, water recharge areas,
marshes, soils, floodplains, and other natural resources. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d).
2. Conserve, develop, utilize, and protect natural resources within their jurisdictions. IRL §
163.3161(3).
3. Include an objective which protects the functions of natural resources. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)4. (1995).
4. Include an objective which addresses protecting the functions of natural groundwater
recharge areas and natural drainage features. Id. at r. 9J-5.011(2)(b)5.
5. Include a policy which regulates land use and development to protect natural drainage
features. Id. at r. 9J-5.011(2)(c)4.
6. Include an objective which protects surface waters. Id. at. r. 9J-5.013(2)(b)2.
7. Include an objective which protects soils and native vegetation. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(2)(b)3.
8. Include an objective which conserves, appropriately uses, and protects wildlife habitat.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.013(2)(b)4. (1995).
9. Include a policy which restricts activities and land uses known to adversely affect the
quality and quantity of identified water sources. Id at r. 9J-5.013(2)(c)1.
10. Include a policy which protects native vegetative communities from destruction by
development activities. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(2)(c)3.
11. Include a policy which restricts activities known to adversely affect the survival of
endangered and threatened wildlife. Id at r. 9J-5.013(2)(c)5.
12. Include a policy which protects the natural functions of existing soils, wildlife habitat,
wetlands, and floodplains. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(2)(c)6.
13. Include a policy which designates and protects environmentally sensitive lands. FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.013(2)(c)9. (1995).
1996]
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The goals, objectives, policies, standards, findings, and conclusions
within the proposed comprehensive plan must be supported by relevant and
appropriate data which is gathered in a professionally accepted manner.2"
The data and analysis which need not be adopted as part of the plan will be
discussed at length below. It is the goals, objectives, and policies which
constitute the operative, adopted parts of the plan since they have the force
of law. Essentially, these requirements mean that comprehensive plans must
firmly establish the fundamental value judgments which will govern land use
decisions within a given jurisdiction.
Interpreting these provisions, several administrative orders have ruled
that a policy in a plan which states simply that the local government will
subsequently adopt an LDR that addresses a specific rule requirement is
unacceptable. The plan itself must contain a policy which provides some
guidance, value or "policy" judgment on each issue required to be addressed
in chapter 9J-5 of the Florida Administrative Code. Simply deferring to
LDRs does not provide the same level of attention to the issue because
LDRs, which can be amended, revised, or repealed without the procedural
safeguards that apply to plan amendments, do not have the same legal status
as policies within a plan. Furthermore, deferring the establishment of
meaningful standards to the LDRs would not fulfill the requirements of
14. Include an objective which coordinates future land uses with soil conditions and
topography. Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)l.
15. Include an objective which encourages the elimination or reduction of uses inconsistent
with the community character. Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)3.
16. Include a policy which provides for the compatibility of adjacent land uses. Id. at r. 9J-
5.006(3)(c)2.
17. Include an objective addressing the extent to which future development will bear a
proportionate cost of facility improvements necessitated by the development in order to
adequately maintain adopted level of service standards. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(3)(b)4.
18. Include a policy assessing new developments and appointing a pro rata share of the costs
to finance public facility improvements necessitated by their development. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.016(3)(c)8. (1995).
19. Include an objective which encourages the redevelopment and renewal of blighted areas.
Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)2.
20. Include an objective discouraging the proliferation of urban sprawl. Id. at r. 9J-
5.006(3)(b)8.
21. Include a policy addressing the provision for drainage and stormwater management. Id.
at r. 9J-5.006(3)(c)4.
22. Include an objective to coordinate future land uses with the appropriate topography and
soil conditions, and the availability of facilities and services. Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)l.
21. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(e). The "professionally acceptable" standard is discussed
in a Department Declaratory Statement in Clay County v. Department of Community Affairs,
13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1457, 1462 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1991).
[Vol. 20
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section 163.3177(9)(e) of the Florida Statutes or rule 9J-5.005 of the
Florida Administrative Code. However, leaving it to the LDRs to establish
the specific performance standards for the granting of special exceptions
does not necessarily render a plan not "in compliance."
These issues concern the level of detail and specificity which must be
included in a plan so that is to be found in compliance. Most local
governments have fought attempts to require a great level of detail in plans.
They did not want to give away their ability to exercise discretion when
later deciding the content of more specific land development regulations, or
in deciding whether a specific development proposal was consistent with
that plan. Obviously, the more vague the plan, the greater range of
decisions that will be consistent with that plan. This is still the preferred
approach of local governments who typically want greater latitude to
approve, or disapprove, of development proposals, without strictly comply-
ing with a predetermined standard. However, judicial interpretations of the
"consistency" requirement have begun to greatly diminish the ability of a
local governments to disapprove of something which is "consistent" with
their plans. Therefore, this has removed much of the discretion the
governing body believed it had reserved for itself. This development, which
will be described in greater detail below, has called into question the
practice of leaving too much room for interpretation in plans.
3. Internal Consistencies
Coordinating the elements of the plan is a "major goal" of the planning
process, and the various elements of a plan must be consistent with each
other.23 This means that adopted goals, objectives, and policies are not just
binding on decisions concerning land development regulations and
development orders. The balance of a plan's provisions, and subsequent
plan amendments, must also be internally consistent with adopted goals,
objectives, and policies.24 Thus, the plan's adopted goals, objectives and
policies must guide future amendments to the plan.
This "internal consistency" requirement is strongest as it applies to the
role of the Future Land Use Map ("FLUM"). The FLUM must "reflect [the
plan's] goals, objectives, and policies within all elements .. ".."25 This
22. Friends of Lloyd, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3643, 3645
(Dep't of Community Affairs 1991).
23. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(2).
24. Id. § 163.3187(2).
25. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(5)(b) (1995).
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provision establishes the critical role of FLUM decisions in determining
whether the plan implements and complies with stated planning objectives.
As the majority of planning activity currently taking place involves the
adoption of amendments to FLUMs, this is possibly the most important
requirement in the rule and will be discussed in greater detail below.
4. Concurrency
The Act's concurrency provisions require that every plan include 1) a
requirement that adequate public facilities be available when a development
order is issued and 2) that this requirement be enforced at the development
order stage.26 An early decision of a hearing officer strictly interpreted the
Act's initial concurrency provisions. Transportation concurrency has clearly
proven to be the most difficult issue, and the Act has been revised in several
ways over the past three years to allow for a more flexible application of
this policy. Since a number of recent articles have quite adequately
discussed the concurrency requirement,27 it will only be mentioned briefly
in this article.
The hottest issue regarding the Act at this time is school concurrency.
The Act does not require that there be adequate public school facilities to
save new development but does allow a local government to require school
concurrency if it has a study to show how it can be implemented.
B. Procedural Issues
1. Review of the Draft Plan or Amendment
Plans developed to initially meet the requirements of the Act were first
transmitted as draft plans for review by the DCA.28 This procedure was
also required for all amendments.29
The Act requires a local planning agency hearing and recommendation
prior to a local government transmittal hearing.30 The First District Court
of Appeal has stated that the requirement concerning the local planning
26. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
27. See generally David L. Powell, Recent Changes in Concurrency, 68 FLA. B.J. 67
(Nov. 1994).
28. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3).
29. Id. § 163.3184(10).
30. Id. § 163.3174(4)(a).
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31agency can be met de facto and strict compliance is not necessary. '
However, notice must be given seven days prior to the local governing
board's transmittal hearing.32
Prior to a 1993 law,33 the Environmental Lands Management Study
("ELMS"), which largely implemented the Final Report of the Third
Environmental Lands Management Study Committee, the DCA automatical-
ly reviewed each proposed or "transmitted" amendment. Working with
other review agencies, the DCA reviewed the draft plan within ninety days
of receipt and issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments
Report ("ORC Report"), which identified deficiencies in the draft plan or
amendment and provided specific guidance on how the deficiencies should
be corrected. Now, the Act requires a copy of a "proposed" amendment to
be transmitted to the DCA and also to the appropriate regional planning
council and water management district, the Department of Environmental
Protection, and the Department of Transportation.34 The legislature also
deleted the requirement for an automatic review and gave the DCA the
discretion to decide, within forty-five days of the transmittal of the plan or
amendment, whether to conduct a review. 35  However, the DCA must
conduct a review if requested to do so by a regional planning council, an
affected person as defined in section 163.3184(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
or the local government, as long as such request is received within forty-five
days of the transmittal of the proposed amendment.36
Once the DCA issues the ORC Report, a local government has sixty
days to review the ORC Report and adopt the plan or amendment.37 A
plan or amendment thereto is adopted by ordinance.38 For amendments
adopted pursuant to an Evaluation and Appraisal Report ("EAR"), legislation
adopted in 1992 extended this time period to 120 days.39
31. B & H Travel Corp. v. Department of Community Affairs, 602 So. 2d 1362, 1366
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Most local governments governing boards have appointed a
local planning agency and usually a body of lay volunteers. In addition, some governing
boards sit themselves as the local planning agency.
32. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(15)(b)1.
33. Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws 1887.
34. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(4) (1995).
35. Ch. 93-206, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1902. In 1995, the legislature changed the 45-
day review period to 30 days. See Act of June 15, 1995, ch. 95-322, 1995 Fla. Laws 2867.
36. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(5) (1995).
37. Id. § 163.3184(7).
38. Id. § 163.3184(15)(a).
39. Id § 163.3184(7).
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Legislation adopted in 1995 exempted small scale plan amendments
from review and challenge by the DCA.4 Such amendments can only be
challenged by affected persons."
2. Review of Adopted Plan or Amendment
After a local government adopts its plan or amendment, it is again
transmitted to the DCA for review. The DCA then has forty-five days to
review the plan or amendment and publish a Notice of Intent finding the
plan in compliance, or not in compliance, with the Act.42 The DCA's
statement of intent must be based upon matters raised in its ORC Report, or
adopted plans or amendments, or portions thereof, that were not previously
transmitted for an ORC review. 43 This forty-five day requirement has been
held not to be jurisdictional and the DCA's failure to strictly comply does
not preclude a formal challenge to the plan or amendment.'
Prior to the ELMS bill, the DCA, if requested to do so, had to "partici-
pate" in the local plan or amendment adoption hearing in order to find a
plan or amendment not in compliance. This requirement gave rise to a
number of unsuccessful claims of non-participation by local governments,
but was interpreted to require little more than mere attendance at the
hearing. It was later deleted in the ELMS bill.45
The ELMS bill evidences the intent only to allow for a shorter
amendment process and does not foreclose the DCA, or any affected person,
from challenging the adoption of an amendment which had not previously
been reviewed. In cases where a review of the transmitted plan was not
conducted, the compliance determination must be based solely on the plan
or amendment as adopted.
40. Ch. 95-322, § 3, 1995 Fla. Laws at 2875 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3187(3)(a)
(1995)) (stating that "[a]ny affected person may file a petition with the Division of
Administrative Hearings pursuant to § 120.57").
41. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3187(3)(a)-(c) (1995).
42. Id. § 163.3184(8)(a).
43. Id. § 163.3184(8).
44. Caliente Partnership v. Department of Community Affairs, 604 So. 2d 886, 887 (Fla.
1992).
45. See Department of Community Affairs v. Charlotte County, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
2760 (Admin. Comm'n 1990).
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3. Adoption of the Plan or Amendment and Legal Effect Thereof
The procedures for adopting plans and amendments are contained in
sections 163.3181 and 163.3184 of the Florida Statutes, and chapter 9J-1 1
of the Florida Administrative Code. Prior to the 1993 law,46 plans and
amendments were effective and governed the adoption of land development
regulations and the issuance of development orders inmmediately upon
adoption.47 Now, however, plan amendments are not effective until the
issuance of a final order by the DCA or when the Administration Commis-
sion ("Commission") finds the amendment to be "in compliance."4 It is
important to note that chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes does not give the
state, either through the DCA or through the governor and cabinet, the
authority to adopt, repeal, amend, or render ineffective, an adopted plan or
plan amendment. The "teeth" of the Act is in the authority of the governor
and cabinet to levy "sanctions." These sanctions are mostly financial and
are levied against a local government which either does not adopt a plan that
is in compliance, or which adopts an amendment which causes its plan to
lose compliance.49
The commission may order that the local government is not eligible for
grants administered under certain programs, including the Florida Small
Cities Community Development Block Grant Program; the Florida
Recreation Development Assistance Program; and revenue sharing. In
addition, the commission may direct the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund to consider the noncompliance of the plan when determin-
ing whether to issue permits under section 161.053 of the Florida Statutes.
Sanctions can also include ordering state agencies not to provide funds to
improve roads, bridges, or water systems within the boundaries of those
local governments which have not complied with the Growth Management
Act in the plan adoption and amendment stages.50
The governor and cabinet may impose economic sanctions against the
local government if they determine that the plan or amendment is out of
compliance. 5' These sanctions take the form of ineligibility for state grants
under a number of specific programs. Any funds so withheld must be
deposited into the Growth Management Trust Fund created by section
46. Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws 1887.
47. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1)(a) (1995).
48. Id § 163.3189(2)(a).
49. Id § 163.3184(11).
50. Id. § 163.3184(11)(a).
51. Id.
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186.911 of the Florida Statutes. An additional sanction can be a direction
to The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") that the noncompliance
be "a consideration" when deciding whether to grant coastal permits or
interests in sovereignty lands. 2
The effect of a recommended or final order finding a plan amendment
not in compliance is that any previous plan provisions are not reinstated.
Only a local government can adopt a legally effective plan provision. 3 A
local government may choose to make its amendment effective and subject
itself to the imposition of sanctions after the entry of a final order of
noncompliance. This decision must be made by resolution at a duly noticed
public meeting. 4
4. Public Notice
The local governing body is required to hold at least two advertised
public hearings regarding a comprehensive plan or plan amendment.5 The
first public hearing must be held at the transmittal stage while the second
public hearing must be held at the plan adoption stage. 6 A comprehensive
plan may be adopted only after the required public hearings have been held
and advertised according to section 163.3184(15) of the Florida Statutes.
For plan amendments which will change the allowable use of land, the
notice requirements include no less than a quarter-page advertisement in a
standard size newspaper of general interest and with general distribution in
the county. The advertisement may not be placed where legal notices and
advertisements appear.5 7
C. The Legal Standard
1. "Compliance"
The legal standard for judging the content of a plan or plan amendment
is that it must be "in compliance" with chapter 163 of the Florida Stat-
utes.58 Under the terms of the Act, a plan or amendment is "in compli-
52. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1 1)(b).
53. Sheridan v. Lee County, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 654, 722-23 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1994).
54. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(2).
55. Id. § 163.3184(15)(b).
56. Id § 163.3184(15)(b)1.-2.
57. I9 § 163.3184(15)(c).
58. Id. § 163.3184(1)(b).
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ance" if it is consistent with sections 163.3177 and 163.3178 of the Florida
Statutes, the State Comprehensive Plan59 as codified in chapter 187 of the
Florida Statutes,60 the relevant regional policy plan adopted by rule
pursuant to section 186.508, and the Minimum Criteria Rule contained in
chapter 9J-5 of the Florida Administrative Code.61
A local comprehensive plan will be considered consistent with the state
plan and the applicable regional plan if the local plan, as amended, is
"compatible with" and "furthers" those plans.62 "Compatible with" means
"not in conflict with" and "furthers" means "to take action in the direction
of realizing .... In determining consistency with the state or regional
plans, "the state or regional plan shall be construed as a whole and no
specific goal or policy shall be construed or applied in isolation from the
other goals and policies in the plan."'6
Plan amendments must be "in compliance" when judged individually
and must not cause the plan as a whole to become out of compliance.65
All plan amendments must meet the requirements of chapter 9J-5 of the
Florida Administrative Code.66 This was a big issue which arose in the
context of a challenge by the DCA to FLUM amendments adopted by Dade
County. The county argued that the amendments could be found out of
compliance only if they had the effect of rendering the entire FLUM out of
compliance. The DCA and citizen's groups argued that a FLUM amend-
ment for an individual parcel of land could be out of compliance as an
individual planning decision, regardless of its impact on the rest of the
FLUM. While the hearing officer sided with the county, the parties
subsequently settled and the governor and cabinet entered a stipulated final
order. That order and the other orders of the Commission, as well as
subsequently enacted legislative changes, make it clear that the department's
interpretation is the law. However, the plan in its entirety must still be
59. FLA. STAT. ch. 187 (1995).
60. FLA. STAT. § 186.508 (1995).
61. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 9J-5 (1995).
62. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(a).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Department of Community Affairs v. City of Jacksonville, No. 90-
7496GM, 1994 Fla. ENV LEXIS 53, at *41 (Dep't of Community Affairs Feb. 24, 1994).
65. See the following cases for examples of when an amendment is not in compliance:
Cooper v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 14 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3589, 3590 (Admin.
Comm'n 1992); Department of Community Affairs v. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 4744, 4745 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1993); Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 12 Fla.
Admin. L. Rep. 4758 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1990).
66. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. rr. 9J-5.005(8), 9J-1 1.006(3) (1995).
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considered in an amendment compliance review when judging the effect of
textual changes to a plan.67
If a plan amendment is inconsistent with the existing comprehensive
plan, chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes, rule 9J-5 of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code, the regional policy plan, or the state comprehensive plan,
neither amendment nor the comprehensive plan, as amended, is in compli-
ance with the Act.
6
Compliance decisions are made based on the circumstances (as
evidenced by the data and analysis) as they exist at the time the plan or
amendment is adopted. A subsequent change in circumstances, or in the
interplay of the plan's textual provisions with the plan's land use designa-
tions, or any other change in how the plan as a whole would be expected to
operate, can cause a plan to lose compliance.
2. The Bottom Line: Sanctions
The Administration Commission was given the authority to levy
sanctions against local governments for the complete failure to submit and
adopt a comprehensive plan, and for adopting a plan that is not in compli-
ance. The Commission has only the authority to impose economic sanctions
or to require the noncompliance of a plan to be considered when the state
is considering the issuance of permits necessary for coastal construction.69
There were three local governments which were sanctioned for failing
to submit their plans for review.7" In one of the earliest reported cases
under the new Act,7' the sanctions, and the statutory provision upon which
they were based, were upheld against an unlawful delegation argument. In
that case, the First District Court of Appeal held that the Commission,
through a chapter 120.57(1) hearing process, may validly apply "incipient"
policy concerning sanctions for three local governments which had failed to
submit their plans on time.72 The court ruled that the policies could be
applied to the three municipalities, but remanded the case back to the
commission to provide the municipalities an opportunity to challenge the
67. Department of Community Affairs v. Lee County, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3755,
3757 (Admin. Comm'n 1990).
68. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3189(2)(a), .3184(10).
69. Id. § 163.3184(11).
70. See Florida League of Cities v. Administration Comm'n, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
1149 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1990).
71. Florida League of Cities v. Administration Comm'n, 586 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
72. See il at 412-13.
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underlying basis for the finding of non-submittal in a formal administrative
hearing.
Although all plans are now in, this issue will become relevant again as
local government EAR amendments become due for adoption.
Only two local governments, the City of IslandiaP and Escambia
County,74 have ever been sanctioned for adopting a plan that was out of
compliance with the Act.
D. Exclusivity of Proceedings
The Act clearly states that it has established the sole process for the
adoption, amendment, and review of comprehensive plans.75 The courts
have respected this admonition. When Lee County tried to enjoin affected
persons from challenging its amended plan, the circuit court ruled that only
the hearing officer for the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH")
had jurisdiction to decide whether the amendments were "substantially
similar" to those which had been agreed to in a settlement agreement.76
The court rejected the notion that the agreement was a contract which it
could enforce and instead deemed it a stipulation of the parties which the
hearing officer should abide by in his decision on the merits." The First
District Court of Appeal issued a related order that encouraged the hearing
officer to take this approach.78
In another case, the First District Court of Appeals ruled that a circuit
court had no jurisdiction to prevent the DOAH from conducting a compli-
ance hearing under the Act.79
E. The "Consistency" Requirement
Once a comprehensive plan is adopted, all development and actions in
regard to development orders taken by government agencies regarding land
73. Department of Community Affairs v. City of Islandia, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3132,
3134-35 (Admin. Comm'n 1990).
74. Department of Community Affairs v. Escambia County, No. 92-010, 1992 Fla. ENV
LEXIS 115, at *244 (Admin. Comm'n July 22, 1992).
75. FLA. STAT. § 163.3211.
76. Lee County v. Department of Community Affairs, No. 91-6639 (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct.
Feb. 10, 1992).
77. Id.
78. Department of Community Affairs v. Lee County, 588 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
79. Department of Community Affairs v. Escambia County, 582 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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covered by the plan must be consistent with the plan."0 Therefore, all
decisions concerning specific developments must be consistent with the plan
as a whole. This essentially means that goals, objectives, and policies
included in an adopted plan are binding, not merely advisory. This is
demonstrated by the express terms of the Act, including the definitions of
"goal," "objective," and "policy," and by sections 163.3177(2), and
163.3194 of the Florida Statutes, and rule 9J-5.006 of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code. All adopted provisions in a plan are legally enforceable, and
not merely aspirational statements. To implement this requirement, courts
will review consistency challenges to a development order of consistency
with "strict scrutiny."'" This strict scrutiny review considers all parts of
an adopted plan, including the FLUM, the density and intensity standards,
and the textual goals, objectives and policies. 2 The consistency require-
ment, which has caused something of a revolution in land use law in
Florida, will be discussed in detail below.
F. Administrative Proceedings
1. Initiation of Proceedings
If the plan or amendment is determined by the DCA to be not in
compliance, the DCA is required to file a petition with the DOAH for the
assignment of a hearing officer and scheduling of a formal administrative
hearing. 3 Affected persons may intervene in support of the plan, in
support of the DCA's challenge to the plan, or raise new issues challenging
the plan. Any new issues must be raised within twenty-one days of the
publication of the DCA's Notice of Intent.8 4 Under the DOAH's procedur-
al rules, intervenors not raising new issues may intervene up to five days
prior to hearing.
If the DCA finds the plan or amendment to be "in compliance,"
affected persons may challenge that determination by filing a petition for
administrative hearing with the DCA within twenty-one days of publication
of the notice. 5
80. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1)(a).
81. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993).
82. B.B. McCormick & Sons, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 559 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
83. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(10)(a).
84. Id
85. 1d § 163.3184(9)(a).
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The following charts were printed
in the Miami Herald on April 18th,
1995 in commemoration of Earth
Day's 25th Anniversary. They
depict the rapid increases of land
development and the conversion of
undeveloped land to agriculture in
south Florida from 1900 to 1995.
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Before drainage, the .-
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4 million acres, beginning
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1973. After the first
Earth Day, agriculture and
rangeland areas were
expanding, urban areas
growing and the extensive
system of canals to control
water supply was in place.
The Kissimmee River had
been channelized in the
1960s.
A <I-,
"A ,V
A.
SOURCE: South Florida Water Management District
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TODAY, half of the Everglades, Q -.
or 2 million acres, has been
developed. The Everglades
Forever Act, passed by Congress .
in 1994, proposes to restore -
what's left of the ecosystem,
though the feasibility study is not
expected to be concluded for sev-
eral more years.
Key , ., Y>; ,. r
West,
PATTERSON CLARK / Herald Staff
19
29
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
(I
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Grosso
2. Standing/Intervention
In enacting the Act, the legislature expressed its intent "that the public
participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent
possible." 6 This intent is reflected in the broad standing allowances that
are provided for in the Act.
Section 163.3184(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes which governs standing
to initiate and intervene in "compliance" proceedings, reads as follows:
"Affected person" includes the affected local government; persons
owning property, residing, or owning or operating a business within the
boundaries of the local government whose plan is the subject of the
review; and adjoining local governments that can demonstrate that the
plan or plan amendment will produce substantial impacts on the
increased need for publicly funded infrastructure or substantial impacts
on areas designated for protection or special treatment within their
jurisdiction. Each person, other than an adjoining local government, in
order to qualify under this definition, shall also have submitted oral or
written comments, recommendations or objections to the local govern-
ment during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing
for the plan or plan amendment and ending with the adoption of the
plan or plan amendment.
The administrative and judicial interpretations of this standing provision
have generally been read broadly. For instance, an Administration Commis-
sion final order ruled that this list of persons or entities, who are included
within the definition of "affected person," is not exclusive, and granted
standing to an owner of property directly adjacent to property covered by
the Plan. 7 The Commission found .that this owner, whose property would
have been adversely affected by the Plan, (i.e., adverse traffic impacts,
adverse impact on natural resources, increased hurricane evacuation times,
etc.) had standing. 8 Furthermore, a nonprofit public interest corporation
which was established to promote sound planning has been found to be an
"affected person" both as a corporation which does business in various local
governments and as a representative of its members who would have
86. 14 § 163.3181(1).
87. Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2867, 2889 (Admin. Comm'n
1991).
88. Id
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standing to bring such a challenge in their own right.89 The Commission
found that the organization's members did not have to submit oral or written
objections themselves in order for the organization to have standing. In
addition, the term "[a]ffected persons" has been read to include unincorpo-
rated associations. 0
There are two decisions which can be read to inhibit overly-broad
interpretations of the Act's standing provisions. A 1990 recommended order
adopts a hearing officer's holding that a business, for the purpose of this
section, is an activity engaged in for a pecuniary gain or the other compen-
sation.9 More recently, the First District Court of Appeal ruled that
holding periodic meetings with its members and appearing at local
government public hearings does not constitute the conduct of a business in
a local jurisdiction which would confer standing on a public interest group
as a party in its own right.92 Rather, the organization will have to base its
standing on the associational standing which has developed under chapter
120. In addition, it must actually prove on the record its allegations that it
has members who reside in, own property in, or operate a business within
a local jurisdiction.
Finally, nothing in section 163.3184(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes
prohibits an affected person from raising issues in a section 163.3184
proceeding that he or she did not raise in his or her oral or written
objections during the local government plan review and adoption proceed-
ings. Once an affected person establishes standing by showing that he or
she submitted timely objections, there is no basis for estopping him or her
from raising additional issues in the section 163.3184 proceeding.93
89. Department of Community Affairs v. Board of County Comm'rs of Monroe County,
11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4004 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1989) (granting 1000 Friends of
Florida's Petition to Intervene).
90. See Falk v. City of Miami Beach, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4548 (Dep't of
Community Affairs 1990); Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. Broward County, 502
So. 2d 931, 934-35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
91. Department of Community Affairs v. City of Islandia, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3136,
3143 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1990).
92. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Department of Community Affairs, 657 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
93. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(8) (limiting notice of intent issued by the DCA on a plan or
plan amendment to issues that the DCA raised earlier in its ORC Report). See Manasota 88
v. Department of Community Affairs, 14 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1447 (Div. of Admin. Hearings
1992) (holding that petitioner failed to prove standing to initiate formal procedings). Note
that this opinion was filed prior to the 1992 amendments to § 163.3184(10)(a).
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3. Indispensable Parties
A petition challenging the DCA's determination that a local government
plan or amendment is "in compliance" must include both the DCA and the
local government as respondents.94
4. Standard of Proof
When the DCA is challenging a plan or amendment it, and parties on
its side, must prove its case by a "preponderance of the evidence."95 When
a plan or amendment is initially determined by the DCA to be in compli-
ance, the challenger must meet a more difficult standard of proof-that the
compliance determination is not "fairly debatable." 96 In all cases, the issue
of whether a plan or amendment is internally consistent is governed by the
"fairly debatable" rule.97 The "fairly debatable" standard is "a deferential
one that requires affirmance of a local government's action if reasonable
persons could differ as to its propriety."9'  "If reasonable minds could
conclude that the [city's] determination that its plan amendment is 'in
compliance' is correct, the plan amendment must be found to be 'in compli-
ance.'
' 29 9
5. The Hearing
Administrative hearings in "compliance" cases are full-blown trials
similar to some bench trials in circuit court. Expert witnesses and evidence
are submitted and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal. The Florida
Evidence Code and other procedural requirements are loosely adhered to,
and the atmosphere is generally more relaxed than in a formal courtroom
setting. The plan or amendment and the supporting data and analysis are
94. Monroe County v. Department of Community Affairs, No. 93-6448GM (Div. of
Admin. Hearings Nov. 30, 1993) (order granting Motion to Dismiss). In Monroe, a hearing
officer dismissed the petition of Monroe County challenging the DCA's determination that
the City of Key West's plan was in compliance on the basis that the city was an indispens-
able party. Id. The petition was dismissed with leave to amend. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(10)(a).
96. Id.
97. Ra
98. B & H Travel Corp. v. Department of Community Affairs, 602 So. 2d 1362, 1365
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Environmental Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. Broward
County, 586 So. 2d 1212, 1215 n.4 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
99. Boaz Bar-Navon v. Brevard County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2151, 2162 (Div. of
Admin. Hearings 1993).
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typically the most important documents introduced into evidence, however,
other relevant information may also be admitted.
6. Evidence
It is not necessary to submit evidence other than the plan or amendment
itself to support a challenge to a plan or amendment. 1' ° Contents of
settlement discussions and proposed settlement positions are not relevant
evidence in a compliance hearing."' Plans must be evaluated solely based
on what they allow or disallow. Deed restrictions are ineffective to demon-
strate that a parcel will develop at less than the maximum allowable density
under the plan."°
G. Post-Hearing Procedure
After the close of the hearing, each party may submit to the hearing
officer a "proposed" recommended order which includes the findings of fact
(based on references to specific evidence or testimony) and conclusions of
law that the party thinks the hearing officer should make. The hearing
officer's recommended order specifically rules upon each party's proposed
findings of fact.103 When the recommended order is issued, its factual
findings (e.g., parcel x is a habitat for woodpeckers) are binding upon the
agency issuing the final order, but, its legal conclusions (e.g. the land use
element is consistent with section 163.3177(6) of the Florida Statutes) may
be changed by the final order.
In cases where the DCA's initial determination is that the plan or
amendment is not in compliance, the recommended order is forwarded to the
governor and cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, for the
entry of a final order."4 In cases where the DCA's initial determination was
that the plan or amendment was in compliance, the recommended order is
forwarded to the DCA for review. If, after reviewing the recommended
order, the DCA determines that the plan or amendment is in compliance, the
100. Sheridan v. Lee County, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 654 (Div. of Admin. Hearings
1994).
101. Department of Community Affairs v. Escambia County, No. 92-010, 1992 Fla.
ENV LEXIS 115, at *74 (Admin. Comm'n July 22, 1992).
102. Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4758 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1990).
103. See Wong v. Career Serv. Comm'n, 371 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
104. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(10).
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DCA will enter a final order to that effect within thirty days of the issuance
of the recommended order.'0 5 If the DCA determines the plan or amend-
ment is out of compliance, the DCA will send the recommended order to the
governor and cabinet for entry of the final order."° Whenever a recom-
mendation of noncompliance is forwarded to the Commission, the DCA
must provide a recommendation on remedial actions and sanctions within
fifteen days. 7 Unless the time requirement is waived or extended by the
parties, the Commission must enter a final order within ninety days of
receipt of the recommended order.08
H. The Evaluation and Appraisal Process
Under the Act, planning is an ongoing and continuing process.l °9
This is reflected in the requirement that local governments prepare
Evaluation and Appraisal Reports ("EAR") to assess the extent to which the
plan's goals, objectives, and policies have been met, and to recommend
necessary changes to the plan to react to changing circumstances. After the
submission of the EAR, each local government must adopt an amendment
or set of amendments to the plan based upon the EAR. While the EAR
itself is subject only to a sufficiency, but not a compliance, review, the
amendments must be in compliance with the Act and based upon the EAR.
The first EAR report was due to be submitted to the DCA on November 1,
1995."' Thereafter, an EAR must be prepared and submitted every five
years.11
I. Significant Substantive Issues: Data and Analysis
1. Generally
All elements in a comprehensive plan, including "all goals, objectives,
policies, standards, findings, and conclusions" must be "clearly based" upon
105. Id. § 163.3184(9)(b).
106. Id. § 163.3184(10).
107. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-39.005(1) (1995).
108. Id. at r. 28-39.005(3).
109. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1).
110. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-33.005 (1995).
111. The requirements for EARs and EAR amendments are specified in § 163.3191 of
the Florida Statutes and chapter 9J-33 of the Florida Administrative Code.
1996]
35
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
relevant and appropriate data.112 This support data is used in the determi-
nation of compliance and consistency. This compliance review requires an
evaluation of "whether the data [was] collected and applied in a profes-
sionally acceptable manner.""' 3 The science/art of planning fundamentally
requires that data be gathered and analyzed before determining what the plan
should be. Thus, an adopted plan was easily found to be not in compliance
when the City Commission first voted to designate the entirety of its
jurisdiction (which consisted almost entirely of submerged Biscayne Bay
bottom) as appropriate for residential development at six units per acre, and
then hired a consultant to prepare a plan for submittal to the DCA."4
The data used shall be the best available existing data. 5 Appropriate
data is the best data, or the most specific data, and what is appropriate for
any case will vary with the nature of the amendment. The discretion which
local governments have under the Act includes the ability to determine
which two or more professionally acceptable data sources on the same issue
to use as the basis for a plan or amendment. 1 6 However, if an uncontro-
verted, professionally acceptable source of information on a relevant
planning matter exists, the "best available data" requirement means that a
plan, and subsequently a compliance decision, must consider and be based
on that information. Essentially the requirement is a "call to action" which
requires a local government to react in a meaningful way to that data which
does exist; it does not allow a local government to wholly fail to implement
any planning strategy on the basis that more data may be forthcoming in the
future.'"
7
Chapter 9J-5 of the Florida Administrative Code places great emphasis
on the need for scrutiny of data and analysis to support an assumption that
a particular strategy in a plan is reasonably calculated to work. For
example, the Code requires that "[a]ll background data, studies, surveys,
analyses and inventory maps not adopted as part of the comprehensive plan
... be available for public inspection while the comprehensive plan is being
considered for adoption and while it is in effect."' 8  The Code also
112. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(8), (10)(e); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(a)
(1995).
113. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(a) (1995).
114. Department of Community Affairs v. City of Islandia, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep, 3132
(Admin. Comm'n 1990).
115. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(c) (1995).
116. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(e).
117. See Department Community Affairs v. Monroe County, No. 91-1932GM, 1995 Fla.
ENV LEXIS 129, at *2 (Admin. Comm'n 1995).
118. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(1)(c) (1995).
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requires that "[a]ll goals, objectives, policies, standards, findings and
conclusions within the comprehensive plan and its support documents ...
shall be based upon relevant and appropriate data."'19 Where underlying
data is crucial to a determination as to how a goal, objective, or policy will
operate, such data must be submitted for a compliance determination or
administrative hearing."
The Act contemplates that the level of required specificity and detail
of data and analysis is to be based upon a flexible standard applied
depending upon the appropriate circumstances. It requires the district courts
to take into account the five factors in rule 9J-5.002(2) as it "applies the rule
in specific situations with regard to the detail of the data and analysis
required.""12 As a whole, the statutory and rule requirements concerning
data and analysis clearly indicate that the type of required data will vary
depending on the relevant planning issues and circumstances."
2. Requirements for Plan Amendments
No language in chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes or chapter 9J-5 of
the Florida Administrative Code absolutely requires the collection of new
data and analysis to support plan amendments, unless the local government
annexes land over which it has not previously exercised planning jurisdic-
tion. The courts have expressly recognized that data and analysis may
support more than one land use designation."
Although the Act does not require site-specific information gathering
as part of the review of a plan amendment, such information, when it is
available, must be considered. When Broward County's entire plan was
challenged based on an allegedly deficient wetland map, the hearing officer
119. Id. at r. 9J-5.005(2)(a).
120. See Sheridan v. Lee County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 654, 723-24 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1994).
121. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(i).
122. In addition to the important substantive data and analysis requirements, plans must
include a number of additional elements. Plans must also:
1. contain an assessment of the impacts of development based on the proposed adverse
impacts on water quality as a result of facilities proposed in the plan;
2. contain an objective addressing the protection of the functions of natural drainage
features; and
3. contain a policy for "[il]imiting the specific and cumulative impacts of development or
redevelopment upon wetlands, water quality, water quantity, [and] wildlife habitat." FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. rr. 9J-5.01 l(1)(f)2., (2)(b)5., 9J-5.012(2)(b), (3)(c)l. (1995).
123. Wilson v. City of Cocoa, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3848 (Dep't of Community
Affairs 1991).
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found that reliable site specific data concerning each wetland did not exist
and upheld the plan." The city's failure to base the plan on incomplete
information was justified.
A challenge to a set of map amendments adopted by Dade County
highlights this issue. When Dade County adopted the amendments, site
specific information concerning the three parcels at issue was available.
Dade County's Planning Department ("Department") explicitly analyzed this
data, which was transmitted to the Department along with the adopted
amendments. During the review of the amendment, the Department found
the amendments were not in compliance and brought an administrative
challenge. The hearing officer, after making findings of fact that were
favorable to those proposed by the Department, and its co-parties concluded
as a matter of law that consideration of site specific information was not
required and that an amendment was objectionable only if it caused the
entire comprehensive plan to come out of compliance. This recommenda-
tion was inconsistent with previous recommended and final orders which
had interpreted the Act."z  The parties, however, reached a settlement
before the case was heard by the Administration Commission, which
subsequently entered a Stipulated Final Order stating that the Recommended
Order had no effect.
The most relevant and important case on the issue of admissibility of
evidence in a compliance proceeding is Department of Community Affairs
v. St. Lucie County. 2 6 In St. Lucie County, the hearing officer agreed
with the county that information concerning the effect of previously issued
development orders on the actual remaining supply of land was relevant to
the compliance review.'27 This information concerned areas of the county
which had in fact received development for densities which were lower than
those allowed on the face of the plan. These prior approvals reduced the
number of dwelling units available for development approval under the plan.
This evidence was admitted and considered, although it was not included in
the plan, or its data and analysis, because it revealed the "reality" of the
124. Sunshine Ranches Homeowner's Ass'n v. Broward County, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
3545, 3567 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1990), affd sub nom. Environmental Coalition of
Fla., Inc. v. Broward County, 586 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
125. See Department of Community Affairs v. Sarasota County, No. 91-6018GM, 1993
Fla. ENV LEXIS 6, at *1 (Admin. Comm'n January 26, 1993); Department of Community
Affairs v. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4744 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1993);
Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2867 (Admin. Comm'n 1991). These
cases have held that amendments must be supported by data and analysis.
126. 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4748, 4750 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1993).
127. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4763.
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land supply/demand issue.'8 On the merits, the hearing officer found that
the previously issued development orders had not reduced the amount of
available land to an acceptable amount.' The opinion however, makes
it clear that while compliance decisions are to be based upon what a plan or
plan amendment allows on its face, data about the underlying situation must
also be considered.
A 1991 order of the DCA described the proper relationship between
plan amendments and the data and analysis requirements. Every plan
amendment, of any scope or impact, need not solely comply with every
data, analysis, goal, objective, and policy requirement. However, each
amendment, as a distinct planning decision, must comply with each
requirement which it implicates, "[t]he nature of the criterion and the plan
amendment are critical. For instance, all plan provisions, including
amendments, must be supported by data and analysis. A plan amendment
that is unsupported by the data and analysis is inconsistent with this
criterion.' 30
3. "Professionally Acceptable" Standard
A Declaratory Statement issued by the DCA to Clay County discussed
the requirement that data be gathered and applied in a professionally
acceptable manner, and found that the county's population projections failed
to meet this standard.33 The reason for this determination is discussed
below.
4. Population Projections
Chapter 9J-5 states that a local government must base its population
projections upon those provided by the Bureau of Business and Economic
Research at the University of Florida ("BEBR") unless it can demonstrate
that its own projections are also professionally acceptable. The Clay County
population projections were not professionally acceptable because they did
not identify the source of baseline data, describe methodology, or justify
departure from the BEBR projections. Also, the population projections were
128. Id. at 4776.
129. Id. at 4777.
130. Wilson v. City of Cocoa, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 3848 (Dep't of Community
Affairs 1991).
131. Clay County v. Department of Community Affairs, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1457,
1462 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1991).
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based on subjective estimates, not objective data, and contained mathemati-
cal errors. 1
32
A local government is not required to update its population projections
every time it amends its FLUM. Between the adoption of the original plan
and the submittal of its EAR, a local government may amend its plan
without having to base the amendment on the 1990 Census data.
33
5. Natural Resource Maps
The First District Court of Appeal, in Environmental Coalition of
Florida v. Broward County,' 34 found a wetland's map was "based upon
the best available data" even though it was incomplete because no complete
map existed at the time of plan adoption and a map proffered by a
challenger was justifiably rejected as unreliable.'35 This case stands for
the proposition that a comprehensive plan should be based on whatever data
a local government does have, even if that data is not complete. 136 In this
case, an environmental group challenged the plan alleging that the wetlands
map was not based on "the best available data."'37 The group wanted the
county to adopt a map based on the findings of a local botanist with whom
they had consulted. However, the map received strong criticism from the
commenting agencies. Therefore, the County Commission determined that
the map was unreliable and instead relied on an incomplete map prepared
by the county's Planning Council.
The hearing officer, and subsequently the appellate court, found that
since the county did not have maps depicting wetlands the county had
reasonably rejected the environmental consultant's map as unreliable.'38
Thus, the county acted reasonably in adopting the incomplete wetland's map
along with a policy which committed the county to conduct further studies
and supplement the map.'39 The court found that the hearing officer's
factual findings clearly explained why the county had logically rejected
certain data based on the "[c]ounty's inability to obtain additional reliable
132. Id.
133. 1000 Friends of Fla. v. City of Daytona Beach, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2445, 2454
(Div. of Admin. Hearings) (recommended order), aff'd, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2459 (Dep't
of Community Affairs 1994) (final order).
134. 586 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
135. Id. at 1216.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1213.
138. Id. at 1216.
139. Environmental Coalition of Fla., Inc., 586 So. 2d at 1216.
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data in a timely manner.""'' Additionally, the methodology was not
challenged and district courts "may not determine whether one accepted
methodology is better than another." 1
4
'
6. Use of Data and Analysis at a Hearing
The requirement that plans and amendments be based on the "best
available data" precludes the introduction into evidence of data that was not
available at the time of adoption. However, "analysis" of preexisting data,
even if first performed after the date of adoption, may be used as evidence
in a compliance hearing. Data and analysis which is otherwise admissible
need not have been expressly relied upon or addressed by the local
government in adopting its plan. A district court's final order, however,
ruled that data generated after a plan is adopted cannot be used at a hearing
to demonstrate that a plan violates the "best available data" requirement. 42
The order can be read to indicate that it applied to analysis as well, although
the order did not refer to the recommended order discussed above. The
order seems to suggest that "later-available" data and analysis can be used
to demonstrate that the data and analysis employed by the local government
was not collected or applied in a professionally acceptable manner. 43
Where underlying data is crucial to a determination as to how a goal,
objective, or policy will operate, such data must be submitted for a
compliance determination or an administrative hearing.'"
7. Land Supply/Demand
This issue is best understood and most relevant within the context of
its role as the initial step in the future land use planing process and is
therefore discussed under that heading below.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Zemel v. Lee County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2735, 2739 (Dep't of Community
Affairs 1993).
143. Id. at 2738-39.
144. Sheridan v. Lee County, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 654, 722-23 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1994).
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Il. FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT AND MAP
A. Factors Affecting Land Use Decisions
Possibly the most essential part of a comprehensive plan is the future
land use element. The Act requires plans to include:
A future land use plan element designating proposed future general
distribution, location, and extent of the uses of land for residential uses,
commercial uses, industry, agriculture, recreation, conservation,
education, public buildings and grounds, other public facilities, and
other categories of the public and private uses of land. The future land
use plan shall include standards to be followed in the control and
distribution of population densities and building and structure intensities.
The proposed distribution, location, and extent of the various categories
of land use shall be shown on a land use map or map series which shall
be supplemented by goals, policies, and measurable objectives. 145
Future land uses are to be allocated "based upon surveys, studies, and
data regarding the area, including the amount of land required to accommo-
date anticipated growth; the projected population of the area; the character
of undeveloped land; the availability of public services; and the need for
redevelopment." 146  Specific data and analysis requirements in other
sections of the statute supplement the general data and analysis requirement.
chapter 9J-5, which concerns identification and analysis of natural resources
and other areas with development constraints, the suitability of land for
various uses, and the availability of facilities, services and infrastructure also
supplements the general data and analysis requirement.
47
Plans are, in turn, required to include goals, objectives, and policies
which, among other requirements, protect, conserve and appropriately use
natural resources and other areas with development constraints,1 48 coordi-
nate land uses with topography, soils, and the availability of infrastruc-
ture,' 49 and provide for the compatibility of adjacent land uses."5
These requirements reveal an understanding that not all land is equally
suitable for all uses and that undeveloped land cannot be assumed to be
145. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. rr. 9J-5.006(2)(a), (b), 9J-5.013(l) (1995).
148. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d).
149. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)l (1995).
150. Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(c)2.
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available for a specific land use simply by virtue of the fact that it is vacant
and previously zoned for such use.
The Act also includes a little known provision which has never been
applied or interpreted, requiring all land uses identified on adopted FLUMs
to be "consistent with applicable state laws and rules."' However, an
interesting argument could be made that if a certain use could not receive
a permit which is necessary under Florida law, such as an environmental
resource permit under chapters 373 or 403, or a coastal development permit
under chapter 161, then it should not be allowed in the plan.
B. The Role of FLUM: Does It "Reflect" the Plan's Goals,
Objectives, and Policies?
1. The "Multiplier" Issue
Future land uses are allocated based upon "surveys, studies, and data
regarding the area, including, [among other things], the amount of land
required to accommodate anticipated growth[.] '"' 2 This roughly translates
into a requirement that future land uses demonstrate the "need" for a given
amount any specific type of land use allowed in a plan or amendment.
While this issue is discussed in greater detail below, a few basic issues
should be discussed here.
First, maximum land use densities must be used to judge whether plan
amendments are supported by data and analysis.'53 Therefore, the ex-
pressed intent or likelihood of the landowner to build at a lesser density,
based on factors such as the surrounding densities or historic building at less
than maximum, will not justify an analysis of the amendment based on a
lower number. Only binding, actual restrictions in the plan itself can be
considered.
Importantly, the Act does not establish the specific nexus which must
exist between documented demand and the supply provided in the plan. In
a technical memorandum published in the early stages of plan reviews, the
DCA stated that once a plan allows more than 125% of the documented
need, this may indicate that the required relationship does not exist."M
Also, the DCA's view of plans adopted early in the process took this
151. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d).
152. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(2)(c) (1995).
153. Sheridan v. Lee County, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 654, 722-23 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1994).
154. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMuNITY AFFAIRS, TECHNICAL MEMO 11 (1989).
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approach rather scrupulously, and the agency routinely sought to have local
governments reduce densities outside of existing urbanized areas in order to
reduce the "overall location." This produced some intense political and
legal controversies as well as an impressive series of successful defenses of
DCA's policies.'55 In later years, the DCA applied this requirement more
liberally.
The clearest administrative order on the subject found a FLUM
amendment increasing development potential from sixty-five units (cluster-
ing required) to 163 units (without clustering) on a 164-acre agricultural
parcel outside of a proposed urban service area was unsupported by the data
and analysis. There was currently three times the number of acres
designated for residential development as were needed to accommodate
projected needs.' 56 This case, concerning St. Lucie County, held that a
previously approved, currently existing oversupply of land must be
considered when proposing amendments to increase density to avoid
exacerbating the problem.
2. The FLUM Must "Reflect" Relevant Policies
The required link between the textual provisions of a plan and the
actual land uses allowed on the ground is supplied by rule 9J-5.005(5)(b)
which mandates that all maps depicting future conditions, including the
FLUM, "reflect" the plan's goals, objectives, and policies. "The Future
Land Use Map is a critical component of the plan .... [It] provides an
essential visual representation of the commitment to uphold local compre-
hensive plan goals, objectives, and policies, as supported by appropriate data
and analysis ....157
Based on this rule, a challenge to Sarasota's plan was successful when
the FLUM allowed extensive development on septic tanks in flood plains.
This was found to be inconsistent with and not reflective of the plan's
objective'58 to coordinate land uses with topography and soil types. The
155. See, e.g., Charlotte County v. Department of Community Affairs, 12 Fla. Admin.
L. Rep. 79, 88 (1990) (noting that relatively high densities in agricultural and rural areas
prematurely converted land to urban uses); Department of Community Affairs v. Escambia
County, No. 92-010, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS 115, at *87 (Admin. Comm'n July 22, 1992).
156. Department of Community Affairs v. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
4744, 4746-47 (Dep't of Admin. Hearings 1993).
157. Austin v. City of Cocoa, No. 89-31, 1989 Fla. ENV LEXIS 147, at *7 (Admin.
Comm'n Sept. 29, 1989).
158. The plan was adopted in compliance with the requirement in FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)l. (1995).
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FLUM was not in compliance because, as a practical matter, it undermined
the plan's stated objectives.
Similarly, a FLUM amendment which increased density on a 2.3 acre
parcel to allow High Density Multi-Family Development within the Coastal
High Hazard Area was inconsistent, beyond a fair debate, with an adopted
objective to direct population concentration landward of the Coastal High
Hazard Area ("CHHA"). The amendment was not in compliance despite the
obvious possibility that the subject property or any of the other lands in the
CHHA would not actually develop to the maximum densities allowed.159
It was the potential for this to happen which caused the amendment to
violate the Act.
In a case which was controversial for other reasons, a FLUM amend-
ment which converted agricultural land outside of an Urban Service
Boundary ("USB") to a residential use was not in compliance with rule 9J-
5.006(3)(b)1 because it failed to reflect policies which called for discourag-
ing urban sprawl, maintaining agricultural lands, promoting land use
compatibility, and other objectives.' 6 The amendment was contrary to
those provisions and thus was not in compliance, even though the evidence
did not prove that agricultural lands adjacent to the subject property would
no longer be used for agricultural purposes upon the conversion of the
subject property or that such a phenomenon had previously occurred in the
county. The likelihood of such impacts was evidenced and recognized by
objectives and policies in the plan.
The possibility or speculation that the property owner would choose not
to develop the property for residential uses or that adjacent owners of
agricultural land would not feel market pressure to convert their land could
not save the amendment. The amendment constituted a planning decision
which ran counter to the objectives and policies previously adopted in the
plan and thus violated the Growth Management Act. Indeed, one of the
main reasons the amendment was not in compliance was because it
exacerbated a previously existing problem in the County. In this case, the
existing problem was an oversupply of land for residential use:
While the existing provisions of the Plan are not subject to review,
when asked to consider an amendment providing for an increase in
residential property, the existence of excessive residential property
should not be ignored. In this case, to ignore the realities of the
159. Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2867 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1991).
160. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4775-78.
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excessive allocation of land for residential purposes in the County
contained in the Plan and approve the classification of additional
property as residential, would simply exacerbate an already existing
excessive allocation.' 6'
These cases and others 62 make it clear that a FLUM amendment that
runs counter to the established policies in an adopted plan is particularly
vulnerable to an administrative challenge. Indeed, it is most likely the real
world impact of such an amendment which determines whether or not it is
in compliance. These cases, and the terms of chapter 163, make it clear that
a compliance decision is not based on segmenting any distinct part of a plan
to determine whether, on its face, it says the right things. A compliance
decision is a determination of whether a plan establishes appropriate end
results, requires specific strategies that are reasonably calculated to achieve
those results, and, most importantly, translates these strategies and results
into what will actually happen on the ground.
3. Urban Sprawl
The requirements concerning future land uses and "need" merged
together to create the "urban sprawl" issue, one of the most controversial
issues surrounding growth management. Chapter 9J-5 requires that plans
include an objective to "[d]iscourage the proliferation of urban sprawl.' 63
The DCA's efforts to strictly require FLUMs to "reflect" such an objective
created an uproar, leading to agency secretaries being hung in effigy,
challenges to unadopted interpretations concerning urban sprawl,"6 and
challenges to adopted rules which sought to more specifically define the
term.
The DCA was extremely successful in the early application of the Act
in challenging relatively high densities1 65 through settlement or final order,
resulting in plan amendments significantly reducing densities.'6 The
161. Id. at 4764.
162. See, e.g., Cooper v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 14 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 294 (Div.
of Admin. Hearings 1991).
163. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)8. (1995).
164. See Charlotte County v. Department of Community Affairs, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
79, 87 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1990).
165. These high densities were between one unit per acre and one unit per 20 acres.
166. Densities were reduced to one unit per 20 acres or lower. See, e.g., Department
of Community Affairs v. Escambia County, No. 92-010, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS 115, at *87
(Admin. Comm'n July 22, 1992); Charlotte County, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 91.
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DCA's non-rule application and interpretation of the term "urban sprawl"
was upheld and found not to constitute a rule which was required to be
formally adopted. 67 In this rule challenge, the hearing officer found that
the DCA's interpretation of this term appropriately varied with the
circumstances of each local government and had a basis in chapters 163 and
187 of the Florida Statutes, the State Comprehensive Plan.' 6'
Even though the term "urban sprawl" is not used in chapter 163, or
chapter 187, the rule requirement to discourage "urban sprawl" was found
not to be an unreasonable interpretation of those statutes.' 69 The specific
location of a proposed land use is relevant to the issue of whether it
constitutes urban sprawl. 7 '
The DCA has now adopted a lengthy section of chapter 9J-5 to define
and identify factors that are indicators of urban sprawl.' This section
167. Charlotte County, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 79.
168. See id. at 98.
169. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Brevard, Inc. v. Department of Community
Affairs, 585 So. 2d 965, 970 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
170. Department of Community Affairs v. St. Lucie County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
4744 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1993).
171. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(5)(g) (1995).
The primary indicators that a plan or plan amendment does not discourage the
proliferation of urban sprawl are listed below....
2. Promotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development
to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while
leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for develop-
ment.
8. Allows for land use patterns... which disproportionately increase the cost
in time, money and energy, of providing and maintaining facilities and services,
including roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, stormwater management, law
enforcement, education, health care, fire and emergency response, and general
government.
10. Discourages or inhibits infill development or the redevelopment of
existing neighborhoods and communities.
13. Results in the loss of significant amounts of functional open space.
Id. at r. 9J-5.006(5)(g)2., 8., 10., 13.
Development controls are set forth in rule 9J-5.006(5)(j) of the Florida Administrative
Code. These include: "[a]llocation of the costs of future development based on the benefits
received"; "[t]he extent to which new development pays for itself'; "[land use functional
relationship linkages and mixed land uses"; "[j]obs-to-housing balance requirements";
"[p]olicies specifying the circumstances under which future amendments could designate new
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was upheld against a rule challenge. In Florida East Coast Industries, Inc.
v. Department of Community Affairs,77 the hearing officer found that the
proposed rules were supported by chapters 163 and 187 because a consider-
ation of "urban sprawl" fell within the "myriad of goals, objectives and
policies addressed by the Act."' 73 Also, the officer found that the rule was
not vague because, although it required the exercise of professional planning
judgement, the rule could reasonably be applied by persons of common
intelligence. 74
a. Special Regulations
A "future land use plan may designate areas for future planned
development involving combinations of types of uses for which special
regulations may be necessary to ensure development in accord with the
principles and standards of the comprehensive plan and this act."' 75 This
contemplates that a local government would expressly provide in its plan
that a certain land area or areas will be subject to specific regulations. This
would be appropriate where the local government had reason to believe that
special regulations would be necessary to ensure development in a manner
that would be consistent with particular objectives in its plan. Examples
include the Wekiva River Protection Zone in Lake County and the Econfina
River Protection Zone in Seminole County.
b. Carrying Capacity Approach
The "based upon" factors identified in section 163.3177(6)(a) of the
Florida Statutes, essentially establish the environmental, technical, and
infrastructural limitations of an area as the primary basis for land use plans.
The Monroe County (Florida Keys) Comprehensive Plan explicitly uses the
"carrying capacity" approach to planning. A recent DOAH's order affirmed
the use of a "carrying capacity" based plan to implement the future land use
lands for the urbanizing area"; "[p]rovision for new towns, rural villages or rural activities
centers"; "[riestriction on expansion of urban areas"; "[u]rban service areas"; "[u]rban growth
boundaries"; and "[a]ccess management controls." Id. at r. 9J-5.006(5)(j). Rule 9J-
5.006(5)(h) reflects the factors included in the evaluation of land uses. These include:
extent, location, distribution, density, intensity, compatibility, suitability, functional
relationship, land use combinations, and demonstrated need over the planning period. See
id. at 9J-5.006(5)(h).
172. 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1631 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1994).
173. Id. at 1661.
174. Id. at 1662.
175. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a).
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requirements.176 The order rejected the argument that a Comprehensive Plan
must accommodate all of the projected population regardless of the impact
on the other factors established in the Act, such as the natural character of
'the land and the availability of infrastructure. In this case, Monroe County's
limited ability to evacuate its citizens in the event of a hurricane, to properly
treat wastewater, and to protect special habitat areas through permitting
standards rendered it unrealistic to plan for the amount of population growth
which might otherwise have been projected. Not only did the hearing
officer affirm the use of an annual permit cap as a means of coordinating
growth with these limitations, he also ruled that the Monroe County
comprehensive plan allowed too much growth based on these limitations.
Because of its unique environmental sensitivity and geography, Monroe
County represents the first and most acute application of the carrying
capacity approach. However, there are many distinct geographic areas in
Florida such as drainage basins, bays, and peninsulas, for which this
approach is appropriate. The Monroe County order clearly establishes that
chapter 163 does not require, in all cases, that a community accommodate
all of its projected population regardless of its development constraints.
Thus, the Act provides the most appropriate legal mechanism to implement
the concepts of ecosystem management and sustainable development.1"
c. Planning Versus Permitting
The Act emphasizes the establishment of the appropriate type and
density of land use, not permitting standards to duplicate those of regional
and state agencies. Indeed the Act does not allow the DCA to require a
local government to duplicate or exceed a permitting program that is
implemented by another agency.7 In the author's opinion, the DCA
routinely violates the spirit of this intent by allowing densities that are not
inherently suitable for a given area based on the adoption of "performance
standards" within the plan that are intended to mitigate the impacts of the
density. The local government is usually willing to accept the tradeoff
because the DCA has no direct role at the later stages of the development
process when the performance standards are being interpreted, applied, and
often ignored through the issuance of development orders.
176. Department of Community Affairs v. Monroe County, No. 91-1932GM, 1995 Fla.
ENV LEXIS 129, at *4 (Admin. Comm'n 1995).
177. Department of Community Affairs v. Monroe County, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4004
(Dep't of Community Affairs 1989).
178. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(6)(c).
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C. Vested Rights and Property Rights
The Act specifically identifies those rights which are vested from the
requirements of new comprehensive plans:
[n]othing in this act shall limit or modify the rights of any person
to complete any development that has been authorized as a development
of regional impact pursuant to chapter 380 or who has been issued a
final local development order and development has commenced and is
continuing in good faith.179
While the application of new growth management rules makes vested rights
a crucial issue in the implementation of the Act, the Act itself has generated
very little case law on the subject.
The vast majority of administrative opinions on vested rights arise from
petitions for declaratory statements that were filed by developers seeking to
determine whether previous "binding letters" under chapter 380 informing
them that they were exempt from the Development of Regional Impact
("DRI") requirements vested them from the requirements of the new chapter
163. Generally, the answer was no. 8' In a 1990 ruling which reflected
a facial "takings" challenge to an adopted plan, the purposes of the Act were
discussed and cited with approval.' 8'
D. Notice/Public Participation Requirements
The adequacy of the public participation procedures leading up to the
adoption of a plan or amendment is a relevant "compliance" issue.8 2
179. Id. § 163.3167(8).
180. See, e.g., Petition for Declaratory Statement by Sarasota County, 14 Fla. Admin.
L. Rep. 772 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1992); Petition for Declaratory Statement by
Orlando Central Park, Inc., 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 944 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1990);
Huckleberry Land Joint Venture v. Department of Community Affairs, 11 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 5706 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1989); American Newland Assocs. v. Department
of Community Affairs, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5205 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1989);
Gulfstream Dev. Corp. v. Department of Community Affairs, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1047
(Dep't of Community Affairs 1988); General Dev. Corp. v. Department of Community
Affairs, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1032 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1988).
181. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1036-37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
182. Austin v. Department of Community Affairs, No. 89-31, 1989 Fla. ENV LEXIS
147 (Admin. Comm'n Sept. 29, 1989), held that the public participation requirements of §
163.3181 is included within the scope of compliance review under § 163.3184(l)(b), although
not expressly referenced in the definition of compliance. Id. at *4-6.
[Vol. 20626
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Some courts strictly construe notice requirements. In Benson v. City of
Miami Beach,"8 3 the Third District Court of Appeal invalidated the plan
for the City of Miami Beach because notice of its intended adoption was not
provided in a newspaper of general circulation in Dade County."s
Not all courts, however, strictly construe compliance requirements. In
Gong v. Department of Community Affairs,"8 5 a less strict view of the
Act's notice requirements was taken concerning the City of Hialeah's plan.
In this case, both the hearing officer and the DCA found a plan amendment
to be in compliance, even though the public notice did not strictly comply
with section 163.3184 of the Florida Statutes.'86 The orders held that the
petitioners failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the noncompliance
and that, despite the technical defects, the notice did comply with the Act
as a whole. 8 7
The statutory requirements of public participation do not require the
consideration or response of local government to public comments to meet
any minimum qualitative standard, unless the response is so meritless as to
have precluded consideration of the comment. Further, when a local
government official responds with an opinion, "[n]othing in the law requires
that the opinion reflect the provisions of a plan or its data and analysis, or
even that the opinion be informed."' 8
A public participation challenge was also rejected where the petitioners
suffered little, if any, prejudice from the defect when a local government
failed to include the petitioner's parcels in the map which appeared in the
public notice for a "transmittal" hearing and petitioners had five months to
participate and change the vote as to their property prior to the final
adoption of the map.8 9 Plan amendments will not be found out of
compliance by an unnecessarily restrictive reading of the map notice
requirements in section 163.3184(15)(c) of the Florida Statutes, when the
defect occurs months before the final adoption and the adoption notice is
adequate."
183. 591 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla.
1992).
184. Id. at 943.
185. 17 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 309 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1995).
186. Id. at 312-14.
187. Id. at 314.
188. Wilson v. City of Cocoa, 13 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3848,3571 (Dep't of Community
Affairs 1991).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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If the defect is not prejudicial, the plan will not be rejected. In one
case, the petitioners experienced problems in examining the adopted
plan. 91 The court stated the conduct did not rise to the level such that the
petitioners were unable to reasonably advance their opposition to the
adopted plan. In this case, the procedural infirmity and the inconvenience
to the petitioners was not so prejudicial as to cause the plan to be reject-
ed. 92
E. Consistency with Chapter 9J-5
Although the chapter refers to itself as a "minimum criteria" rule, it has
in practice been interpreted as a "consistency" rule. This means that so long
as the purpose of a specific rule provision is served by the plan as a whole,
a plan or amendment can still be found "in compliance" even if a particular
rule provision has not been strictly met.
93
The statutory definition of "consistent" in section 163.3177(2) of the
Florida Statutes does not apply to internal consistency. A plan is internally
consistent as long as its various elements do not conflict with each other.
There is no reason to insist that all objectives and policies of a plan take
action in the direction of realizing the other objectives and policies of the
same plan. 94
F. Authority to Plan for Specific Areas
The Act specifically authorizes planning agreements between local
governments.' 95 Absent a joint agreement with the county, a city may not
amend its FLUM to plan for a property which it has not yet annexed.
19 6
G. Consistency with Other Jurisdictions
Nothing in chapter 163 or 9J-5 requires adjacent land uses in neighbor-
ing counties to be identical. Therefore, decisions made in one county with
191. Problems were due to the illness of the town clerk. See Harris v. Town of
McIntosh, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2977, 2983 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1993).
192. Id. at 2983-84.
193. B & H Travel Corp. v. Department of Community Affairs, 602 So. 2d 1362, 1366
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
194. See Hiss v. Department of Community Affairs, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2408 (Dep't
of Community Affairs 1994).
195. FLA. STAT. § 163.3171(3).
196. Pope v. City of Cocoa Beach, 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4758 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1990).
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respect to its plan are not binding on the adjacent local government."9 A
plan was found to have met the data and analysis requirements, as well as
the requirements for consistency with the plans of adjacent local govern-
ments, when it discussed in its data and analysis, a planned bridge shown
on the plans of adjacent local governments but did not plan for or depict the
bridge as part of its future transportation network. 9
H. What May Plans Regulate?
As described above, the Act requires plans to include:
A future land use plan element designating proposed future general
distribution, location, and extent of the uses of land for residential uses,
commercial uses, industry, agriculture, recreation, conservation,
education, public buildings and grounds, other public facilities, and
other categories of the public and private uses of land. The future land
use plan shall include standards to be followed in the control and
distribution of population densities and building and structure intensities.
The proposed distribution, location, and extent of the various categories
of land use shall be shown on a land use map or map series which shall
be supplemented by goals, policies, and measurable objectives. 99
In a declaratory statement, since overturned on other grounds, the
DCA determined that comprehensive plans may control the placement and
maintenance or upgrading of electric power lines as a "use of land," even
though such activities are not "development" as defined in the Act.2" The
reasoning of that declaratory statement, and the express identification of
agriculture as a use of land which shall be shown on a land use map or map
series which shall be supplemented by goals, policies, and measurable
objectives make a strong argument that plans can and should manage the
impacts of agricultural uses, even though agriculture is excluded from the
Act's definition of "development."
197. See Davis, Dekle & Acree v. Department of Community Affairs, 16 Fla. Admin.
L. Rep. 2480 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1994).
198. See City of Cape Coral v. City of Fort Myers, No. 89-2159GM, 1992 Fla. ENV
LEXIS 36, at *1 (Div. of Admin. Hearings Apr. 8, 1992).
199. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a).
200. Polk County v. Department of Community'Affairs, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2515,
2520 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1994).
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I. Intergovernmental Coordination
Intergovernmental coordination has always been a primary stated
objective of the Act, but is commonly understood to be a weak link in the
process. The 1993 ELMS legislation adopted a phase out of the DRI
process in Florida, along with a significant increase in the intergovernmental
coordination requirements for local plans designed to provide the extra-
jurisdictional reviews for all projects that is currently provided only for
DRIs. 201 The question remains unresolved whether these changes will
result in more meaningful coordination among the various levels of
government in Florida. This legislation may not change the political
realities attendant with the sovereignty of each municipality and county in
Florida. Whenever a local government that is making a land use decision
has the ability to increase its tax base while straining the infrastructure or
service capacity of an adjoining local government or causing other adverse
impacts, the inherent disincentives to real coordination may be too much to
overcome absent aggressive oversight by the state.
J. Obstacles to Bringing an Action
When a final order of the Administration Commission requires specific
plan amendments, the doctrine of res judicata will bar a local government,
in a subsequent compliance challenge, from arguing that the plan is in
compliance without such amendments.2
Lack of standing may also bar a party once a compliance agreement
has been entered. The Supreme Court of Florida has ruled that once a
county entered into a compliance agreement with the DCA to bring its plan
into compliance, it had no standing to seek a declaratory judgement that
chapter 163 is unconstitutional.2 3
201. See FLA. STAT. ch. 163.
202. Hiss v. Sarasota County, 15 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 839, 879 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings 1993).
203. Santa Rosa County v. Administration Comm'n, No. 84-545, 1995 Fla. ENV LEXIS
55, at *4-5 (Fla. 1995).
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K. Settlement and Mediation Process
1. Mediation
In 1993, the Florida Legislature established a process designed to
"speed up" the administrative hearing process.2" At any time after a
matter has been referred to the DOAH, the local government proposing the
amendment may demand formal mediation.'5 Neither the DCA nor any
other party appears to have this same right. The local government or any
affected person who has intervened may demand informal mediation or
expeditious resolution of the amendment proceedings by serving written
notice.2" The hearing officer must set the matter for final hearing no
more than thirty days after receipt of any such request.2' Once such
hearing has been set, "no continuance... and no additional time for post-
hearing submittals, may be granted without the written agreement of the
parties absent a finding.., of extraordinary circumstances.""2 '
Final orders in cases proceeding under the mediation subsection must,
absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances or a written agreement of
the parties, be entered within forty-five days of the issuance of the
recommended order.2°
2. Compliance Agreements
The Act establishes a very detailed settlement process.210 The DCA
and the local government may voluntarily enter into a compliance agreement
to resolve one or more of the issues raised in a compliance proceeding. 21,
"Affected persons who have initiated a formal proceeding or intervened may
also enter into the compliance agreement.' 12 "All parties granted interve-
nor status shall be provided reasonable notice of, and a reasonable
204. See Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws 1887. This law implement-
ed the majority of the recommendations of the Third Environmental Lands Management
Study Commission.
205. FLA. STAT. § 163.3189(3)(a).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 163.3189(3)(b).
208. Id. "Extraordinary circumstances do not include matters relating to workload or
need for additional time for preparation or negotiation." Idl
209. FLA. STAT. § 163.3189(3)(c).
210. Id. § 163.3184(16)(a).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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opportunity to participate in, the negotiation process. 2 3  Negotiation
meetings must be open to the public.2 4  The DCA must provide each
intervenor with a copy of the compliance agreement within ten days after
the agreement is executed.2 5
The compliance agreement shall list each portion of the plan or plan
amendment which is not in compliance, and shall specify remedial
actions which the local government must complete within a specified
time in order to bring the plan or plan amendment into compliance,
including adoption of all necessary plan amendments. The compliance
agreement may also establish monitoring requirements and incentives
to ensure that the conditions of the compliance agreement are met.216
Upon filing "of a compliance agreement executed by the agency and
the local government with the [DOAH], any administrative proceeding...
regarding the plan or plan amendment covered by the compliance agreement
shall be stayed., 217 "Prior to [the] execution of a compliance agreement,
the local government must approve the compliance agreement at a public
hearing advertised at least [ten] days before the public hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the area in accordance with the
[statutory requirements]. '"2'
Compliance agreement amendments can be adopted without first being
transmitted as proposed amendments and subjected to an ORC Report.219
Within ten working days after adoption of a compliance amendment, the
local government must transmit the amendment to the DCA and one copy
to any party to the administrative proceeding. 22  Then the DCA will
"issue a cumulative notice of intent addressing both the compliance
agreement amendment and the plan or plan amendment that was the subject
of the agreement ....
"If the local government adopts a comprehensive plan amendment
pursuant to a compliance agreement and a notice of intent to find the plan
amendment in compliance is issued, [the DCA must] forward the notice of
213. Id.
214. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(16)(a).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. § 163.3184(16)(b).
218. Id. § 163.3184(16)(c).
219. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(16)(d).
220. Id.
221. Id. § 163.3184(16)(e).
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intent to the DOAH '" z At least three different approaches had been taken
by hearing officers. Some ruled that the petitions of non-signing intervenors
are not dismissed.2" However, the Department has consistently ruled that
after it finds a plan as amended pursuant to a compliance agreement to be
"in compliance," the petitions of any intervenors are completely dismissed
and the petitioners must file a new petition directed to the new statement of
intent in order to protect their rights to challenge the plan.' Yet a third
approach did not dismiss the intervenors but judged their challenges using
the "fairly debatable" standard.2 Legislation adopted in 1995 ended the
debate by clearly stating that existing intervenors are not dismissed but that
they must file an amended petition directed to the plan as amended if the
amendment mooted or changed any previously raised issue or gave rise to
a new issue.26 The legislation also provides that their challenge will be
governed by the "fairly debatable" standard.
If the local government adopts a comprehensive plan amendment
pursuant to a compliance agreement and a notice of intent to find the plan
amendment not in compliance is issued, the DCA shall forward the notice
of intent to the DOAH. The DOAH will then consolidate the proceeding
with the pending proceeding and set a date for hearing in the pending
proceeding.227 Affected persons who are not a party to the underlying
proceeding may challenge the plan amendment adopted pursuant to the
compliance agreement by filing a petition."8
If the local government fails to adopt a comprehensive plan amendment
pursuant to a compliance agreement, the DCA shall notify the DOAH,
which shall set the hearing in the pending proceeding at the earliest
convenience." Additionally, at least one hearing officer has ruled that,
based on the "cumulative notice" language of the statute, when the DOAH
issues a cumulative notice of intent to find a plan or amendment in
222. Id. § 163.3184(16)(f).
223. See Department of Community Affairs v. Hillsborough County, No. 89-5157GM
(Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Dec. 8, 1992) (recommended order); see also Department of
Community Affairs v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 93-4224GM (Fla. Div. of Admin.
Hearings Apr. 19, 1994) (admin. order); Department of Community Affairs v. City of
Jacksonville, No. 90-7496GM (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Apr. 2, 1993) (admin. order).
224. Department of Community Affairs v. DeSoto County, No. 91-6039 (Div. of Admin.
Hearings Jan. 19, 1993) (recommended order of dismissal).
225. See generally FLA. STAT. § 163.3184.
226. Id. § 163.3184(16)(f).
227. Id. § 163.3184(10)(a).
228. See id.
229. Id.
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compliance following the adoption of remedial amendments, an affected
person can challenge any part of the plan including parts that had been in
the plan and remained unchallenged since its original adoption.230
3. Attorney's Fees
Any award of attorney's fees or costs in administrative compliance
proceedings is governed by section 163.3184(12) of the Florida Statutes
which provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that
he or she has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay, or for economic advantage, competitive
reasons, or frivolous purposes or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
these requirements, the hearing officer, upon motion or his own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.23
The DCA interpreted this provision in a case in which the DCA
affirmed a hearing officer's denial of a motion for attorney's fees. 32 The
DCA reasoned that, although each of the petitioners' challenges had been
rejected on the merits, an award of fees and costs was not proper because
the petitioners "were motivated only by a desire to improve the quality of
life in their city. 33 The DCA found that the petitioners had no ulterior
motive. They filed their petitions because they felt that it was in the best
interests of the City of Key West that they do so."'
The preceding discussion of the basic substantive procedural issues
demonstrates that comprehensive planning is a simple concept but complex
in application. The next section describes the basic requirements and
230. Department of Community Affairs v. City of Key West, No. 92-0515GM (Fla. Div.
of Admin. Hearings Nov. 30, 1993) (admin. order).
231. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(12).
232. Frame v. Department of Community Affairs, No. 89-3931GM (Fla. Dep't of
Community Affairs June 20, 1990) (final order).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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procedures for the implementation of plans through land development
regulations.
IV. LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS
A. Contents of the LDRs
Within one year after submission of its initial draft plan to the DCA,
each local government was required to adopt LDRs that are consistent with
and implement the comprehensive plan. The procedures for adopting LDRs
are set out at section 163.3202 of the Florida Statutes, and rule 9J-24 of the
Florida Administrative Code. Substantive requirements specifying the
content of LDRs are contained in section 163.3202(2) of the Florida
Statutes.
B. Enforcement of Plans Through LDRs
There are two enforcement mechanisms for determining whether LDRs
conform with the Act. First, the DCA can pursue judicial proceedings to
require local governments that have failed to adopt LDRs to do so. 13
Second, citizens with the requisite interest2 6 can initiate administrative
proceedings to determine whether LDRs that have been adopted are
consistent with the adopted plan. 7  Distinct from its role regarding
comprehensive plans, the DCA does not automatically review local
government action to determine that required LDRs have been adopted, or
that they are consistent with the plan.2
38
1. Challenging the Complete Failure to Adopt a Required LDR
The Act establishes a detailed procedure for determining whether a
local government has adopted required LDRs.3 9 Under this process, the
DCA requires local governments to submit LDRs for review only if it has
reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a failure to adopt required
235. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215.
236. The Act grants standing to "substantially affected persons" as defined by chapter
120 of the Florida Statutes. Because there are no final decisions interpreting the standing
requirements for LDR challenges, the practitioner should consult cases that interpret standing
under chapter 120. See, e.g., Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 406
So. 2d 478, 481-82 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
237. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3213(3).
238. Id. § 163.3213(5).
239. See id. § 163.3202; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-24.004 to .006 (1995).
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regulations.240 The DCA will consider reasonable grounds to exist only
if it receives a letter stating that required regulations have not been
adopted.24 When it receives such a letter, the DCA directs the local
government to submit LDRs for review.242 If the local government has
not adopted the LDRs, it is required to advise the DCA, and establish a
schedule for adopting the regulations within 120 days.243 If the local
government does not respond to the DCA's request to submit the LDRs for
review, the DCA will institute an action in circuit court to require the
response.2'
Once LDRs are submitted, they are reviewed to determine whether
there has been a complete failure to adopt required regulations.245 This
review is conducted for that purpose only, and does not involve any
determination of whether the LDRs which have been adopted are consistent
with the adopted comprehensive plan.246 If the DCA determines that there
has been a failure to adopt, it notifies the local government and specifies
required regulations that need to be adopted.247 The local government
then has thirty days to adopt the required regulations. If it does not, the
DCA can then initiate a proceeding in circuit court.248
There is very little case law in this area. Usually, a local government
is able to point to some provision in its LDRs which arguably addresses any
part of its plan, which thereby converts the challenge into one concerning
the consistency, rather than the existence of the LDR.
2. Administrative Review of LDRs for Consistency with a
Comprehensive Plan
Proceedings to determine whether LDRs adopted by a local government
are consistent with its comprehensive plan are administrative proceedings,
conducted in accordance with the Florida Administrative Procedure Act,
chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes.249 The DCA does not automatically
review LDRs. Review occurs only if a substantially interested person files
240. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(1).
241. Id. § 163.3202(4).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3213(3).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. § 163.3213.
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a petition for review with the local government.2-" After the deadline for
adopting LDRs passes, a substantially affected person can challenge them
within twelve months of adoption. A substantially affected person
commences such a challenge by filing a petition with the local government,
directing a copy to the DCA."
The local government then has thirty days to provide a written response
to such a petition with a copy sent to the DCA. 2 However, the thirty-
day period can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties.' The
substantially affected person may submit a petition to the DCA within thirty
days from receiving the local government's response.' If there is no
response, such a petition can be submitted to the DCA within ten days from
the end of the thirty-day response period.255 A copy of the petition must
be submitted concurrently to the local government. 6
If the DCA determines that the petition is sufficient, it notifies the local
government within twenty-one days. 7 The DCA can then request further
information necessary to review the regulations, conduct informal hearings,
receive oral and written testimony, and conduct whatever inquiry it deems
necessary.25 The DCA issues its decision with regard to the consistency
of the LDRs not earlier than thirty days and not later than sixty days after
receiving the petition.259
If the DCA determines that the LDRs are consistent with the compre-
hensive plan, the substantially affected person can request a hearing from the
DOAH within twenty-one days.2 ° If the district court of appeal finds the
LDRs inconsistent with the plan, it requests a hearing with the DOAH. The
hearing before DOAH must be held in the affected jurisdiction, but no
sooner than thirty days after the DCA's determination. The necessary
250. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213(3).
251. Id. Requirements for the content of this petition are set out at rule 9J-24.007(3)
of the Florida Administrative Code.
252. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-24.007(4) (1995).
253. Id.
254. Id. at r. 9J-24.007(5).
255. Id.
256. Id. The requirements for the content of this petition are set out in rule 9J-24.007(6)
of the Florida Administrative Code.
257. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-24.007(7) (1995).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. ld. at r. 9J-24.007(10).
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parties to the hearing are the petitioner, any intervenor, the DCA, and the
local government.
26
'
The hearing officer conducts a formal proceeding in accordance with
section 120.57(1) of the Florida Statues. 62 If the hearing officer deter-
mines the LDR is inconsistent with the plan, the final order is submitted to
the Administration Commission for the sole purpose of determining what
sanctions may be appropriate.263
The most detailed discussion of the relationship of comprehensive plans
and land development regulations is included in an order from the DCA
which upheld Lee County's wellfield protection ordinance.2' 4 The DCA
found that an ordinance which protects most of the wellfields in Lee County
was consistent with a comprehensive plan which required, without qualifica-
tion, the protection of wellfields.2 65  However, in a case which took a'
stricter view of the required relationship between plans and LDRs,
substantial portions of Lake County's vested rights ordinance were found
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan because the plan did not authorize
the vested rights granted by the LDRs .2' A relatively small number of
orders or decisions on LDR challenges leave this a very unsettled area of the
law. As a practical matter, the deadlines and the time frames for the
adoption of LDRs came and went while the initial plan adoption was still
being debated, negotiated, and litigated. The adoption and enforcement of
consistent LDRs which implement comprehensive plans continues to be a
weak link in the planning process.2 67
261. Id.
262. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-24.007(10) (1995).
263. Id. at r. 9J-24.007(12).
264. See Responsible Growth Management Coalition, Inc. v. Lee County, 14 Fla.
Admin. L. Rep. 2110 (Div. of Admin. Hearings 1991).
265. Id. at 2127.
266. Department of Community Affairs v. Lake County, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4031
(Div. of Admin. Hearings 1994).
267. Other LDR cases include: Challenge to Consistency of Ordinance No. 16-1992
with Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, 16 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4702 (Dep't of
Community Affairs 1994); Citizen's Political Comm. v. Collier County, 14 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 4702 (Dep't of Community Affairs 1992).
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V. ENFORCEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANS THROUGH
DEVELOPMENT ORDER CHALLENGES
A. Consistency Requirement
As mentioned earlier, the Act's bottom line requires that all public and
private development be consistent with adopted, effective comprehensive
plans.2 68  The Act defines development order as "any order granting,
denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development
permit."'2 69 The Act defines development permit as "any building permit,
zoning permit, subdivision approval, rezoning, certification, special
exception, variance, or any other official action of local government having
the effect of permitting the development of land."27
1. Statutory Cause of Action
The Act authorizes
[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party [to] maintain an action
for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent
such local government from taking any action on a development order
... which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a
particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehen-
sive plan .... 27,
"Suit under this section [is the sole remedy] available to challenge the
consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan."272
"Aggrieved or adversely affected party" means any person or local
government which will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected
or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan, including
interests related to health and safety, police and fire protection service
systems, densities or intensities of development, transportation facilities,
health care facilities, equipment or services, or environmental or natural
resources. The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with
268. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161(5), .3194(1)(a).
269. FLA. STAT. § 380.031(3) (1995).
270. Id. § 163.3164(8).
271. Id. § 163.3215(1).
272. Id. § 163.3215(3)(b).
1996]
63
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
other members of the community at large, but shall exceed in degree the
general interest in community good shared by all persons. 3
2. Procedure
As a precondition to filing a complaint for injunctive or other relief, the
complaining party, within thirty days after the alleged inconsistent action has
been taken, must file a verified (sworn) complaint "setting forth the facts
upon which the complaint is based and the relief sought. 274 The verified
complaint has been interpreted by the courts to be jurisdictional.275
Further, the complaint must be filed within thirty days of the decision,
whether or not the decision has been reduced to writing. 76 After receipt
of a verified complaint, the local government has thirty days to respond. If
an adequate response is not forthcoming, the legal action must be instituted
within thirty days of the expiration of the local government's response
period. 77 In a 1993 decision which may have reflected what the legisla-
ture intended, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the statutory
consistency cause of action is available only to aggrieved third parties and
that an applicant for a development order who wishes to challenge the local
government's decision thereon may not invoke this procedure, but has as the
only remedy, a petition for writ of certiorari.278
3. Consistency Standard
The statute defines "consistent" but does not assign the burden of proof
in consistency challenges. Florida courts have confused and struggled with
these issues. The statutory definition of "consistent" is as follows:
a development order or land development regulation shall be
consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses, densities or
intensities, and other aspects of development permitted by such order or
regulation are compatible with and further the objectives, policies, land
273. Id. § 163.3215(2).
274. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4).
275. See Leon County v. Parker, 566 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990),
quashed, 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993).
276. Board of County Comm'rs v. Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed, 630 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1994); Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 623 So. 2d. 593, 595-
56 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
277. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(4).
278. Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993).
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uses, and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan and if it
meets all other criteria enumerated by the local government. 9
Further,
[a] development approved or undertaken by a local government
shall be consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses,
densities or intensities, capacity or size, timing, and other aspects of the
development are compatible with and further the objectives, policies,
land uses, and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan and if
it meets all other criteria enumerated by the local government.
280
In addition,
A court, in reviewing local governmental action or development
regulations under this act, may consider, among other things, the
reasonableness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements
thereof, relating to the issue justiciably raised or the appropriateness and
completeness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements
thereof, in relation to the governmental action or development regulation
under consideration. The court may [also] consider the relationship of
the comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof, to the
governmental action taken or the development regulation involved in
litigation, but private property shall not be taken without due process of
law and the payment of just compensation.28 '
4. Current Issues
a. Relationship with Non-Statutory Remedies
The Act does not discuss the relationship of the statutory "consistency"
cause of action, which has been interpreted to be de novo in nature, with the
certiorari and declaratory action remedies that have traditionally been used
to challenge local land use decisions. These remedies are probably still
available on the same theories previously available but "consistency" per se
may not be raised in those actions. 8 2 Most courts have recognized the
exclusivity of the statutory "consistency" cause of action and have not
279. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(a).
280. Id. § 163.3194(3)(b).
281. Id. § 163.3194(4)(a).
282. See Gregory v. City of Alachua, 553 So. 2d 206, 208-09 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
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allowed parties to raise consistency as an issue in a petition for writ of
certiorari. 2s' Nevertheless, a number of "consistency" cases have errone-
ously been decided by courts by way of petition for writ of certiorari.
The statutory requirement for the filing of a verified complaint as a
precondition to maintaining a "consistency" suit does not toll the thirty-day
requirement for the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. Thus, if a third
party has a basis to challenge the development order because it is inconsis-
tent with the comprehensive plan and also on the basis that the local
government's record does not include evidence which demonstrates
entitlement to the development order under the applicable regulations, that
party would at the same time raise the former issue in a verified complaint
filed with the local government, and the latter issue in a petition for writ of
certiorari filed with the circuit court.
b. Burden of Proof
The Act does not establish the required burden of proof. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in a now famous case, Board of County
Commissioners v. Snyder,284 quashed a Fifth District Court of Appeal
ruling285 that upon a rezoning applicant's prima facie showing that a
requested rezoning is consistent with the plan, the burden shifts to the local
government to show "by clear and convincing evidence that a specifically
stated public necessity requires a more specified restrictive use."286 The
Supreme Court of Florida overruled the requirement for clear and convinc-
ing evidence and placed the burden of proof on the party challenging the
denial of the rezoning to show that the denial was inconsistent with the
plan.287 At least one district had previously held that the proponent of the
development order always bears the burden of proof in a "consistency"
challenge.288
283. See, e.g., Turner v. Sumter County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 649 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
284. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
285. Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 81 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
286. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475.
287. Id. at 476.
288. See Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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c. Standard of Review
Both before and after the passage of the Act, courts have struggled with
the issue of which standard of review to apply. This issue may be the most
problematic and controversial one presented by "consistency" challenges.
In Snyder, the Supreme Court of Florida established new rules for the
judicial review of local government zoning decisions in the era of compre-
hensive planning." 9 The court redefined local government rezoning
decisions as quasi-judicial, raised the level of scrutiny courts should apply
to rezoning decisions, and required greater consistency between rezonings
and comprehensive plans." ° The standard of review is "strict scrutiny,"
under which a court will review a development order to determine whether
it complies with the entire comprehensive plan.291 However, the court
upheld the discretion of local governments to act within the range of options
established within their comprehensive plan.2" Snyder continued the
judicial trend toward reasoning that most zoning and other development
order decisions implement previously determined policy decisions (those
made in the comprehensive plan) and are thus quasi-judicial, or at least no
longer purely legislative in nature.
This is a great departure from the traditional view that rezonings are
legislative. The Snyder court, as well as other courts, have determined that
quasi-judicial decisions of local governments should be reviewed by courts
using a "strict scrutiny" standard, not the "fairly debatable" standard histori-
cally employed to review local legislative decisions.293 Site plan approv-
als, variances, special exceptions and the like, have more or less uniformly
been treated as quasi-judicial and reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal in the Snyder decision limited its
analysis to small, site-specific rezonings, and ruled that large-scale,
jurisdiction-wide rezonings still involve policy making on a general scale,
and are, therefore, legislative. 94 Since all rezonings must be consistent
with adopted plans, the distinction is not immediately obvious; the
distinction seems to be one of scale and not one of concept. Moreover, the
Snyder opinion gives no real guidance as to the dividing line between
289. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474-75.
290. Id. at 475-76.
291. Id. at 475; see also B.B. McCormick & Sons, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 559 So.
2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
292. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475.
293. See id.; see also B.B. McCormick & Sons, Inc., 559 So. 2d at 255.
294. See Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 80.
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individual, quasi-judicial rezonings, and large scale rezonings which would
continue to be viewed as legislative decisions. There is little judicial
guidance for determining which rezonings are subject to Snyder and which
are not.
d. Definition of Consistency
Snyder emphasized the statutory definition of "consistent" and rejected
any presumption that a landowner was entitled to the most intensive use
potentially allowed on the face of a comprehensive plan. The statutory
definition295 contemplates that any zoning decision which provides for a
level of development that is within the range of densities allowed by the
plan would be consistent with that plan.
e. Local Hearing Procedures
The trend to characterize decisions which implement comprehensive
plans as quasi-judicial has raised a number of controversial procedural issues
which are discussed below.
Ex Parte Communications. The Third District Court of Appeal has
held that ex parte communications have been held to give rise to a
presumption that the party against whom the decision was ultimately made
was prejudiced thereby, which would seem to render the decision inval-
id.296 However, legislation adopted by the 1995 Florida Legislature has
attempted to overrule Jennings. This legislation grants counties and cities
the option of establishing a process to disclose ex parte communications in
and on the public record so as to rebut any presumption of prejudice.297
The Act applies to "elected or appointed public official[s] holding a county
or municipal office."29 Therefore, communication between staff members
and involved parties are not ex parte, while communication between the
local community's attorney and the involved parties would be governed by
ex parte rules.
Quasi-judicial Procedures. Although the court in Snyder stated that
findings of fact should be encouraged, it declined to require local govern-
ments to make formal findings of fact to support a zoning decision.299
295. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3).
296. Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
297. See Act of June 17, 1995, ch. 95-352, § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws 3060, 3060-61 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 286.0115 (1995)).
298. Id.
299. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
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Courts and commentators have reached no consensus on whether sworn
testimony, cross examination or other trappings of quasi-judicial proceedings
are essential requirements of due process in rezoning hearings. This is
possibly the most confused issue because a local decision is reviewable both
de novo, based on the "consistency" issue by an action for declaratory relief,
and via appeal by way of a writ of certiorari. For de novo action, the
existence of a complete record below is not necessary to further review,
whereas a complete record is required for certiorari review.
What is Competent Substantial Evidence? One of the primary implica-
tions of characterizing a decision as quasi-judicial is that stricter rules will
apply in terms of who is competent to testify and what they can testify
about. Generally, in a quasi-judicial hearing an expert or experts will be
required to establish a competent record. However, the testimony of lay
persons can constitute competent evidence on certain issues. Lay persons
can provide competent testimony based on their own personal observations.
For instance, the Second District Court of Appeal held that lay persons
could competently testify on issues of natural beauty and recreational
advantages of an area." This court opined that "[t]he local, lay individu-
als with first-hand knowledge of the vicinity... were as qualified as expert
[area] witnesses to offer views on the ethereal, factual matter of whether the
[application] would materially impair the natural beauty and recreational
advantages of the area.""3 1 In this case the court found the local residents
had expertise equivalent to the engineers and planners, and held that the
local agency, as finder of fact, could base its decision on the "expert"
testimony of the residents."°
The Second District Court of Appeal has also found lay testimony
regarding aesthetics, compatibility, and high residential vacancy rates to be
valid. 3 In a non-Florida case, a local planning board found the personal
observations of local residents concerning the location of a high water line
to be more persuasive than the testimony of an expert." 4 On appeal, the
court found the local government board could accept the testimony of the
residents based on their personal observations, even though the testimony
was in direct conflict with the testimony of the "expert witnesses" supplied
300. Board of County Comm'rs v. City of Clearwater, 440 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. City of St. Petersburg v. Cardinal Indus. Dev. Corp., 493 So. 2d 535, 538 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
304. See Mack v. Municipal Officers, 463 A.2d 717, 720 (Me. 1983).
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by the applicant. 5 The Third District Court of Appeal invalidated the
denial of a rezoning because a lay-person had testified about a matter
deemed to require planning expertise.3°6 However, just recently, the Third
District granted a petition to hear the case en bane and reversed the three
judge panel.3"7 The Miami Herald summarized the holding by stating that
"citizens don't have to be experts to [speak up] about unwelcome develop-
ment in their neighborhoods, removing a legal muzzle that Dade's
homeowner activists say threatened to render them powerless.""30
f. Applicability
Snyder was a rezoning case but its discussion and analysis of the
consistency requirement would appear to make it applicable to challenges
to any development order under the terms of chapter 163 of the Florida
Statutes. However, at least one Florida trial court has ruled that the strict
scrutiny standard of review, as used in land use cases, does not apply to a
case in which the applicant is seeking a special exception, rather than a
rezoning." 9
The procedural and substantive issues which govern development orders
have significantly increased the scope and complexity of local public
hearings and legal challenges. Although not mentioned in the Snyder
opinion, even comprehensive plan amendment decisions have been treated
by some jurisdictions as quasi-judicial.3 "0  The evolution of the law
concerning enforcement of development orders, and the existing interpreta-
tions of the requirements for plans and LDRs brings us full circle and
requires a reassessment of the relationships between plans, LDRs and
development orders. The following section of this article analyzes the
current status of the planning and development process and offers sugges-
tions about how to better integrate the various steps in the process and
provide for simpler and more meaningful governmental and citizen review.
305. Id.
306. Blumenthal v. Metropolitan Dade County, No. 95-52, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 6702,
at *8 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1995), reversed, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 1996, at IB (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996).
307. Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 1996, at lB.
308. Joseph Tanfani, Homeowner Opinions Do Count, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 1996,
at lB.
309. Citivest Constr. Corp. v. City of Tampa, 662 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
310. See, e.g., Martin County v. Yusem, No. 93-3025, 1995 Fla. ENV LEXIS 78, at *1
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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VI. So How Is IT WORKING?
Growth management in Florida was meant to be an integrated program
which effectively and efficiently combined and coordinated the various
environmental and land use processes that exist at the different various
levels of government in Florida. Growth management has successfully
raised the minimum standards of practice in Florida, instituting the most
rudimentary planning practices in Florida's rural and small communities, and
providing a mechanism to improve enforcement of planning requirements
in older, more sophisticated jurisdictions. However, growth management
clearly has not reached its full potential. Some of the problems are simple
glitches in the procedural aspects of the statute. The resolution of others
may require fundamental changes to current enforcement mechanisms. In
addition, a number of important substantive changes should be made to the
Act. Changes to other state laws may be necessary so that Florida truly has
an integrated growth management program where the relative roles of
planning and permitting are clearly delineated and understood. Only in this
way will all private and public players be playing by the same rules.
Finally, Florida's implementation of growth management has suffered from
a significant information gap about the true costs and benefits of land use
controls. These issues are discussed below.
A. Procedural Issues: Planning
1. Coordination of Chapters 163 and 380 of the Florida Statutes
The proper relationship between chapters 163 and 380 of the Florida
Statutes was not analyzed or determined with the adoption of chapter 163.
While the Act expresses the appropriate intent for close coordination, certain
specific statutory provisions prevent this from happening.
A significant problem concerns the comprehensive plans for local
governments which have all or part of an Area of Critical State Concern
("ACSC") within their jurisdiction. ACSCs are those parts of the state
which have been determined to be the most sensitive to development and
require the highest level of protection and state oversight of planning.
However, a perhaps unintended consequence of chapter 163 is that it takes
significantly longer to put into place a chapter 163 comprehensive plan in
these areas. This is because the Act states that a plan for an ACSC cannot
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become effective until the Administration Commission formally adopts a
rule which approves of the plan.
31
'
Given the liberal opportunities for rule challenges provided in Florida's
Administrative Procedures Act and the fact that proposed rules cannot
proceed to final adoption until the completion of the rule challenges," the
very areas which are most in need of improved comprehensive plans have
experienced delays in the effectiveness of their plans. Monroe County, the
Florida Keys, 313 has clearly provided the best example of this paradox.
The Monroe County Board of County Commissioners adopted a plan in an
attempt to comply with the Act in 1990, when it was due. The county did
not contest the subsequent "not in compliance" determination and entered
into a settlement agreement which contemplated a complete rewrite. Finally,
a plan was adopted on April 13, 1993, but again was found not in
compliance. While other local plans became effective upon adoption, even
though their full compliance with the Act was subsequently challenged,
Monroe County's plan did not become effective then and is still not
effective as of this writing due to unresolved challenges to the Administra-
tion Commission's proposed rule which approved of the plan with changes.
While every party to the combined chapters 163 and 380 of the Florida
Statutes litigation, except the county, agreed that the plan was not fully in
compliance, there is little question that the plan improves the county's
ability to protect its natural resources and otherwise manage its growth.
Thus, it is with some frustration to all parties, including the county, the
DCA, and the environmental intervenors that this improved plan cannot
become effective until the chapter 380 rule challenge process has been
completed. The implementation of improvements to the Polk County
comprehensive plan, as it relates to the Green Swamp ACSC, has suffered
from similar delays. Seemingly adopted to prevent a local government in
an ACSC from adopting and enforcing a plan amendment which weakens
environmental protections without the safeguard of state oversight, this
provision has instead delayed the effectiveness of required improvements to
such plans.
Chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes should be amended so that the plan
amendments adopted by local governments to bring their plans into
compliance which chapter 163 are effective upon the issuance of a final
order of the DCA or Administration Commission finding them to be in
311. See FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1995).
312. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4), .56 (1995).
313. Pursuant to § 380.0552 of the Florida Statutes, Monroe County is a designated
"Area of Critical State Concern."
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compliance. The ability to preclude the effectiveness of a plan amendment
that would weaken the protections in an ACSC plan is now accomplished
by the stay on the effectiveness of plan amendments until a final order
finding them in compliance. Additionally, the Administration Commission
would retain its authority under chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes to adopt
its own amendments to a comprehensive plan in an ACSC.
The DCA has jurisdiction over both chapter 163, comprehensive
planning activities, chapter 380,3"4 DRI and ACSC activities. These
statutes evince a legislative intent that they be viewed and implemented
together as two stages of one orderly planning and development process.
For instance:
In conformity with, and in furtherance of, the purpose of the Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, chapter 380,
it is the purpose of this act to utilize and strengthen the existing role,
processes, and powers of local governments in the establishment and
implementation of comprehensive planning programs to guide and
control future development.315
The legislature contemplated a high level of coordination between the
comprehensive planning and DRI processes. Chapter 380 also suggests a
direct connection between the DRI and comprehensive plan processes.
Section 380.06(6)(b) prohibits "favorable consideration" of a plan amend-
ment solely because it is "related" to the DRI, which suggests that the
reviewers of the comprehensive plan amendment know of the DRI
application and what it contains. The statute's use of "related" means that
the legislature intended, or wanted to allow, the two plans to be considered
together. In section 380.06 (6)(b)(2) of the Florida Statutes, the fact that a
DRI would "necessitate" a comprehensive plan amendment could only
indicate that the two plans are intended to work together. Because the DRI
necessitates the amendment, reviewers of the amendment would need to
know why, and they would have to look to the DRI to find those answers.
The legislative intent of chapter 163 is also furthered by a high level
of coordination between these two programs. For comprehensive plan
amendments intended to accommodate DRI's, the "best available" and
"appropriate" data would, in most cases, be the DRI information. The DRI
contains the most specific and reliable information available at the time
314. This chapter is known as the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management
Act of 1972. See FLA. STAT. § 380.012 (1995).
315. Id. § 163.3161(2) (emphasis added).
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about the projected impact of the plan amendment, and therefore constitutes
the "best available" and "appropriate" data.
Both Acts require the government to deal "effectively ' 31 6 with future
problems which could result from the use and development of the land.
Governmental decisions must be based upon the most specific and reliable
available data. Because the information contained in an application for DRI
development approval contains the most specific information about the
developer's actual intentions, its use will allow the government to deal most
effectively with future problems. When an amendment to a comprehensive
plan is proposed for the purpose of accommodating a proposed DRI, the
plan of development in the Application for Development Approval and the
DRI information must be considered the best available data as to the future
land use for the subject area. The plan of development in the ADA and the
DRI information are the best information available about how the amend-
ment, in reality, will impact the operation of the plan.
More importantly, future problems concerning the development of land
are likely to be ineffectively dealt with, or avoided. This occurs when a
plan amendment is approved based on an assumption or conclusion drawn
from the face of the amendment, which is refuted by more specific
information disclosed by the related DRI application or development order.
If the amendment is approved based on one set of "facts," but the DRI
review proceeds on a different set of "facts," the two processes are not
working together. This creates an inexcusable and avoidable inconsistency
that can have different results.
First, the DRI application could be denied because it is inconsistent
with the comprehensive plan, thus wasting the time and resources of all
public and private entities involved. Alternatively, the amendment could be
approved because the basis of the "facts" showed it met the terms of chapter
163, and the DRI application also could be approved because the basis of
the "facts" showed it met the terms of chapter 380. Since the "facts" from
the DRI Development Order really determine what will happen in the
affected area, the chapter 163 review was meaningless and the substantive
requirements of that Act would not have been met. Neither of these
scenarios, one wasteful and one bordering on fraudulent, can be viewed as
acceptable or consistent with the law.
Despite these considerations, a final order from the DCA ruled that
when a plan amendment and DRI application are submitted concurrently, the
plan amendment is judged solely upon the information contained in the
316. Id. § 163.3161(3).
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application, and the data and analysis and the DRI information is not
relevant or admissible in the plan compliance proceeding.317 While this
order remains the DCA's only actual ruling on the issue, a recent reorgani-
zation has the potential to significantly increase the level of coordination
between the comprehensive planning and DRI programs.
It would be consistent with Florida's new emphasis on streamlining
governmental processes and would simply make common sense to require,
when DRI applications and a related plan amendment are pending before the
DCA at the same time, that the more specific information in the DRI
application be considered as the "data and analysis" for the comprehensive
plan amendment. This would prevent a scenario where the plan amendment
is approved, or denied, based on a set of assumptions that is belied by the
reality of the DRI plans.
An even better response to the disconnect between the comprehensive
planning and DRI programs would be to accelerate the complete phase out
of the DRI program and replace its essential functions with an increase in
the requirements for comprehensive plan amendments. Such an approach
would require the same type of data analysis and substantive conditions for
plan amendments as are currently required for DRIs. While it might be
appropriate to have some threshold for very small plan amendments, it
would be important to review sub-DRI-threshold plan amendments for inter-
jurisdictional impacts.
2. Applicability of Chapter 9J-5 of the Florida Administrative
Code to Plan Amendments
Chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes and rule 9J-5 of the Florida
Administrative Code were written for the purpose of determining whether
adopted provisions included everything that needed to be included in a plan.
They were not written in a manner which emphasizes the adoption or denial
of discreet plan amendments as an individual planning decision. Although
it will always be necessary to maintain a set of requirements which preclude,
or more accurately, strongly discourage, local governments from deleting
important and necessary parts of their plans, the Act and the rule should be
rewritten to more appropriately govern the act of amending an existing plan.
Legislation adopted in 1995 has directed the DCA to analyze this issue and
make a set of recommended changes on or before December 15, 1995.18
317. 1000 Friends of Fla. v. Department of Community Affairs, No. 93-4863GM, 1994
Fla. ENV LEXIS 67, at *9 (Dep't of Community Affairs June 16, 1994).
318. Act of June 15, 1995, ch. 95-322, 1995 Fla. Laws 2867.
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The author recommends that changes be made to rule 9J-5 which require
more detailed, including original, data gathering an analysis and which insert
into the compliance review process the same essential substantive require-
ments that now apply to DRIs.
B. Substantive Issue
The consistency requirement does not apply to state agencies. Thus,
an agency may issue a permit under a program it administers which is
inconsistent with the relevant local government comprehensive plan. Indeed
the case law prohibits an agency from considering a local plan unless the
statutory authority it is implementing specifically makes the local plan a
relevant consideration.319 This is a major omission which significantly
reduces the impact of an adopted local plan and which creates some
resentment that the state requires local governments to adopt plans that they
are not required to comply with.
Just as problematic is the ability of a state agency to develop a project
that is inconsistent with a local comprehensive plan or beneficial growth
management practices. The Board of Regents decision to site Florida's tenth
state university in the far reaches of rural southwest Lee County, is perhaps
the best or worst example. The Department of Transportation has "plenary"
authority to site and build new or expanded roadways and its decisions do
not have to be consistent with local comprehensive plans.32 Also, the
DCA itself may find it difficult to explain the importance of discouraging
urban sprawl from its future new home in the southeast reaches of Leon
County. Given the significant growth-related impacts of public infrastruc-
ture planning decisions, the lack of a state consistency requirement makes
it difficult to justify strict applications of growth management policies to
single-family home developments, and undercuts public confidence in the
fairness of the process. The state must lead by example. When it acts
either as developer or regulator, it must be consistent with the plans it has
required local governments to adopt.
C. Procedural Issues: LDRs and Development Orders
The implementation of plans, through land development regulations and
development orders, raises the most current issues surrounding growth
319. Council of the Lower Keys v. Charlie Toppino & Sons, Inc., 429 So. 2d 67, 68
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
320. See Department of Transp. v. Lopez-Torres, 526 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1988).
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management. There are several very important conflicts and holes in the
existing processes which should be corrected. First, the statutory "consisten-
cy" cause of action expressly applies only to consistency with comprehen-
sive plans and it is not clear that violations of LDRs which are more
specific interpretations of the terms of the plan, can also be raised in a
section 163.3215 consistency challenge. In order to promote cohesiveness
and clarity in the enforcement of a local government's adopted growth
management policies, it should be clear that violations of either the plan or
the LDRs can be enjoined under the consistency requirement. It makes no
sense whatsoever for an affected person to have to challenge an inconsistent
development order in an original action to enjoin a violation of the plan, and
by way of certiorari to enjoin a violation of the LDRs. The legislature
should amend the Act to establish the statutory cause of action in section
163.3125 as the exclusive mechanism for challenging the issuance or denial
of a development order on any basis.
The second issue to be discussed is the distinction which the Florida
Supreme Court has found to exist in the "consistency" cause of action which
creates a separate process for challenging inconsistent development orders
for applicants and "third parties." '321 As it is currently being interpreted
and practiced, the following scenario has unfolded. When a local govern-
ment is considering a quasi-judicial decision, there will typically be an
applicant and a third party who opposes the request. Where either party is
going to challenge the decision on the basis that it is not supported by
competent substantive evidence on the record, it departs from the essential
elements of applicable law, or suffers from a procedural flaw, judicial
review is by petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court. The process
and standards, which are well known, are the same for each party.
However, if either party wants to challenge the decision on the basis
that it is inconsistent with the plan, they must follow divergent paths.
According to the supreme court's Parker decision, the disappointed
applicant's remedy is also a certiorari action except that they may also raise
the theory that the development order is inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan. The third party, however, must follow the statutory procedure and file
a verified complaint with the local government. If that does not result in an
appropriate action, the third party must then bring an original action in the
circuit court with the sole issue being consistency with the plan. Other
issues must be raised in a petition for certiorari which must be filed within
the same time frame as the verified complaint. While a certiorari proceed-
321. Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993).
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ing is appellate in nature, and is based exclusively on the record that had
been previously established, the third party's consistency challenge is an
original action. The Act is silent on how or even whether the record below
can be used in this original proceeding.
The first issue this raises is why there should be one process for the
applicant's consistency challenge and another for that brought by a third
party. The second issue is whether there should be one process to challenge
a development order on some theories and another to challenge on the
theory of consistency. In the author's view, Florida should combine the
common law and statutory processes and theories for challenging develop-
ment order decisions into a single cause of action. Given the recent
emphasis on alternative dispute resolution, it is probably best to use the
statutory cause of action's verified complaint process as an initial step and
then allow the subsequent initiation of formal proceedings. The issue then
becomes whether the judicial review should be de novo or on the record.
Given that most local governments have now instituted procedures to
implement Snyder, complete and reviewable records are typically being
made at the local level despite Snyder's failure to require local governments
to include findings of fact in their development orders. However, third
parties are increasingly disadvantaged at the local hearing level as the
complexity of the procedural and substantive requirements increases.
Without attorneys and experts to represent them at the public hearing, it is
difficult for affected persons to make an adequate record. Under the
existing process, they can wait and see what happens at the public hearing.
If their position wins, they will have saved the money that might otherwise
have been spent on experts and attorneys. If their position loses, they can
then hire experts and lawyers for purposes of the consistency challenge. If
they do not have the ability to make a record at a subsequent de novo
hearing, they will always need to make one at the public hearing, when the
decision of the local government is still in doubt.
Of course, as a practical matter, it is still important to make a case at
the public hearing in an attempt to persuade the local commission of the
correctness of one's position, and public policy would seem to encourage
putting all relevant information and argument into the record prior to the
initiation of litigation. Notions of administrative and judicial economy
would suggest that judicial review be based on the record below and that
there not be a second opportunity to make a record. On the other hand,
those same considerations might suggest discouraging a process that
increases the time and financial resources required to conduct a local
government public hearing.
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Among the options is to create a land use board of appeals to which
local government decisions are appealable de novo, but where the record
below is entered into the record and can support findings of fact. This
would relieve local governments from having to institute strict quasi-judicial
procedures but would not penalize those who do so. The incentive to do so
would still exist in the opportunity to set a clear and compelling record
which might discourage a lawsuit. The lack of a requirement to use quasi-
judicial procedures would not invite arbitrary decisions given the clear
consistency requirement and the availability of other landowner remedies
like the property rights law. Third parties, although able to make a record
at the administrative challenge level, should have to appear and submit
objections at the local level in order to have standing to bring such a
challenge. Further, although the Snyder opinion specifically declined to
require local governments to include findings of fact, state law should
require this as a means of providing an articulated basis for the decision.
This would give both potential litigants and reviewing bodies a much better
idea of the merits of the local government's decision.
D. The Quasi-Judicial Issue
Appeals from a decision of a land use board of appeals would be, to
the relevant district court, another way in which enforcement of plans could
be more meaningful. This method would increase the specificity of
comprehensive plans and plan amendments. The clearer the plans are, the
less question there can be about the consistency of development orders. The
substantive requirements for plan amendments discussed above, if imple-
mented, would lend important structure to development order decisions, and
narrow the issues to be resolved. Better planning would lead to better
development order decisions and fewer legal challenges.
As discussed above, a number of courts have begun to take a view of
site-specific comprehensive plan amendments which likens them to quasi-
judicial rezonings under the Snyder case.3" This has added an extremely
interesting and generally confusing twist to the plan amendment process, and
has blurred the distinction between the planning and zoning processes. The
procedural and substantive requirements for adopting and amending
comprehensive plans are specifically laid out in the Act. Despite this fact
and despite the "exclusivity" clause in the Act, some litigants and courts
322. See Florida Inst. of Technology, Inc. v. Martin County, 641 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, 642 So. 2d
609, 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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have argued that the process is also governed by the quasi-judicial
principles established in the Snyder case for rezoning decisions. While the
Snyder opinion is largely based on the understanding that planning and
zoning are separate acts, the quasi-judicial approach emphasizes the site-
specific nature of either decision to argue for a higher level of judicial
review.
This author maintains that Snyder held site specific rezonings to be
quasi-judicial because the legislative decision is now made at the planning
stage. Thus, extending Snyder to plan amendment decisions would mean
that, since the jurisdiction-wide plans have now all been adopted, local
governments no longer have the ability to act in a legislative capacity
relative to specific areas. Also, the quasi-judicial view, if it holds, would
ignore the specific set of procedural and substantive standards for the plan
amendment process which has been established by the legislature, grafting
on top of that a requirement to adhere to the procedures and standards which
are required of a quasi-judicial decision. The Snyder approach is simply not
a good fit for plan amendments as they are currently constituted. For
instance, how can a court strictly scrutinize a decision declining to adopt a
plan amendment for whether the decision is consistent with the comprehen-
sive plan? Under the terms of Florida's Growth Management Act, these
decisions are required to be consistent with chapter 163, of the Florida
Statutes. There is no entitlement anywhere in statutory or common law for
a landowner to receive a plan amendment. Thus, there is no basis to
"strictly scrutinize" a decision declining to approve such an amendment. As
long as a plan amendment decision is consistent with chapter 163, of the
Florida Statutes, it should be upheld.
The push to view plan amendment decisions as quasi-judicial has
resulted in a number of consequences which run counter to the understood
concepts and procedures which were intended to guide growth management
in Florida. First, this approach greatly inhibits the ability to implement the
Act's emphasis on public participation and intergovernmental coordination.
Prohibiting a county commissioner from speaking to a representative of a
state or regional agency with expertise relative to a pending plan amendment
proposal precludes just the sort of information sharing which is necessary
and encouraged to make comprehensive planning work.
Next, because the very concept of comprehensive planning recognizes
that a decision on a single parcel of land has jurisdiction-wide implications,
it does not lend itself to a standard of judicial review which focuses
primarily on the rights of particular individuals. For instance, as a local
government attempts to maintain a relationship between land supply and
demand for purposes of directing growth to and away from specific areas,
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a decision granting a plan amendment for one parcel is a decision not to
grant it to another. The decision to grant or deny a plan amendment may
actually be a decision about whether to set a precedent or to open an entire
area up to urban level development, which will then require commitments
of public resources to provide necessary services and facilities. This is why
the Act's standing provision is as broad as it is. This is a legislative
decision. It affects the entire community. It should be treated by the courts
as such.
The quasi-judicial debate forces us to examine the changing roles and
relationships between the map amendment and the rezoning processes. The
classic and doctrinally correct view of making a generalized plan followed
by the distinct act of rezoning specific parcels applies best as a jurisdiction-
wide plan. One consideration which supports this view is that most FLUM
amendments are decided on the basis of fairly site-specific data and analysis.
Indeed, it is often the case that an application for a plan amendment is
accompanied by an application for rezoning and other quasi-judicial
approval, such as a site plan approval. When viewed in the context of the
legal requirements for data and analysis support and full compliance review
for plan amendments, an argument can be made that FLUM amendments
serve essentially the same purpose as rezonings used to serve. Of course not
all FLUM amendments are the same. For instance, the process used by
Dade County is probably not going to be the same as in Glades County.
However, it is tempting to want plan amendments to be treated as rezonings
have been treated in the past. However, while it is possible for FLUM
amendments to serve this function, some changes are needed to Florida's
current substantive requirements for plan amendments.
First, while the law allows a site-specific analysis of parcels for which
a plan amendment is proposed, it expressly does not require a local
government to collect or consider any data which does not already exist.
This should change, or the Act should be amended to state clearly that in
the absence of supporting data, an amendment may not be approved. FLUM
amendments, and other related amendments should be required to analyze
and be based upon the extrajudicial impacts, the projected financial costs
and benefits to the public, and the effect on the local government's ability
to meet all of its adopted planning goals, objectives, and policies.
Second, changes should be made to require more specificity in terms
of analysis and application of existing or generated data for plan amend-
ments. This is particularly important concerning the mapping of develop-
ment and preserve areas. The approval of FLUM amendments should
include up front commitments by the developer related to these issues. As
the Snyder line of cases continues to move in the direction of "if the plan
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says it, you get it," the need for more certainty and commitments at the
amendment stage increases dramatically. Moreover, the state-level review
of plan amendments provides the best opportunity for each governmental
agency which would have jurisdiction over some phase of a development
project to coordinate their information and substantive requirements to
facilitate the adoption of a "plan" which anticipates and avoids regulatory
problems and which maximizes the benefits of coordinated governmental
input.
One way to increase the quality and specificity of data and analysis for
plan amendments, as well as for the resulting decision, is to significantly
improve intergovernmental coordination. While the Act currently provides
for such coordination, in practice, the potential of intergovernmental
coordination has never been achieved. Local governments and the DCA
continue to over-rely on the expediency of negotiated plan amendments
which have not been critically analyzed by third parties and other agencies
with expertise. If local governments and the DCA increased the use of
planning and design meetings at which all relevant agencies and persons are
at the table, potential development order and permitting problems could be
more easily anticipated and avoided. A true commitment to planning still
does not exist in Florida even though the legal framework and judicial
precedent clearly exist to plan effectively. What is needed now is for local
governments to be more wiling to make more specific decisions earlier in
the process. For their part, state agencies must significantly increase the
amount of information they make available to local governments and to
commit resources and actions to the local planning process without
completely deferring to their narrow regulatory programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
South Florida, in particular, requires comprehensive planning solutions
to critical problems which threaten major consequences such as the
restoration of the Everglades, a secure future water supply, the loss of its
agricultural lands, the overwhelming cost of providing services to develop-
ment at the western fringe, and the restoration of the environmental systems
in the Florida Keys. Recently, decisions have been made to allow residential
development in the Agricultural Reserve in Palm Beach County, to intensify
residential densities in an area of western Broward County that is being
studied for Everglades restoration options, and to widen Highway US 1 into
the Keys from two lanes to four. The failure of the state, in the form of the
DCA, to seek the reversal of these decisions, each of which will have
profound growth management implications, calls into serious question the
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long term usefulness of growth management to this region. The burden
increasingly falls upon citizens to enforce the Act and turn growth
management into a reality. The complex processes, burdens of proof, and
political and financial realities do not portend well for the prospects. Some
of the changes recommended in this article are intended to make the process
simpler and more effective.
Growth management continues to suffer from the compartmentalization
that it was intended to remedy. Until it is viewed and practiced as a
continual process from the initial planning concept to the final development
order, it will be more costly and less effective than it should be. We have
in so many ways come so far in this state. We cannot measure success,
however, by how far we have come, but instead we must always focus on
getting to where we need to be.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida faces ongoing growth pressures that burden available infrastruc-
ture. In 1972, the Florida Legislature developed comprehensive land use
planning laws to address these problems.' In 1975, the legislature passed
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,2 which
required comprehensive land use plans. The 1985 legislature substantially
amended the 1975 comprehensive planning act and renamed it the Florida
Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
Regulation Act ("Growth Management Act").3 Among other things, the
1985 Growth Management Act requires local comprehensive plans to require
adequate infrastructure to accommodate development.4 This requirement
is called "concurrency."
This article addresses the development of infrastructure concurrency
requirements. Particularly, this article examines whether delays of, or bars
to, property development due to concurrency requirements constitute a
compensable taking of private property rights. The Bert J. Harris, Jr.,
Private Property Rights Protection Act ("Harris Act"), 5 adopted by the
legislature in 1995, might substantially expand local government exposure
for those acts which fall short of a taking of all rights in a property. This
article concludes by considering the potential impacts of the Harris Act.
IX. CONCURRENCY
The Growth Management Act sets general, statewide, regional, and
local requirements for land use planning. A key component of the Growth
Management Act mandates sufficient, concurrent infrastructure before
development is authorized.6
The Growth Management Act states in pertinent part that "[i]t is the
intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services needed to support
development shall be available concurrent with the impacts of such develop-
ment."7 According to the Florida Administrative Code, public facilities and
1. Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-295.
2. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-205 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1995)).
3. State Comprehensive Plan, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-57 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§§ 163.3161-.3243 (1995)).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177-.3178, .3180, .3202 (1995).
5. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)).
6. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g).
7. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h).
[Vol. 20
85
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Durden / Layman / Ansbacher
services include: roads; sanitary sewer; solid waste; drainage; potable water;
parks and recreation; mass transit, if applicable; and public transit.'
In addition, any local government may extend the concurrency
requirement so that it applies to other public facilities within its jurisdiction,
such as schools. 9 Each local government also must adopt a Concurrency
Management System ("CMS"),'0 which must include a monitoring system
and provide that concurrency be determined for a project by the time a
permit for containing a specific plan of development is applied for.
Concurrency timing is set out for each public facility. The most
restrictive timing is for sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, and potable
water facilities. To obtain a permit for these facilities, the local government
is required to make the necessary facilities and services available to the new
development at the time of issuance of a certificate of occupancy or its
equivalent." Another way the local government may obtain a permit is by
showing, at the time the permit is issued, that the necessary facilities and
services are guaranteed, through an enforceable development agreement, to
be in place at the time of the certificate of occupancy.' The least
restrictive timing requirement is for parks and recreation facilities. These
facilities may be unavailable for as long as five years after the issuance of
a permit.'
3
The timing requirement for roads is between the first two standards.14
Many exceptions, however, may apply.' 5 Generally, the required timing
is: 1) at the time the permit is issued, the roads are in place or under
construction; 2) the permit is issued subject to the condition that the roads
are scheduled to be in place or under actual construction not more than three
8. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(2)(a) (1995).
9. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(2)(b).
10. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055.
11. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(3)(a)l.
12. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(3)(a)2.
13. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(2)(b). The Florida Administrative Code states:
A development order or permit is issued subject to the conditions that the
necessary facilities and services needed to serve the new development are
scheduled to be in place or under actual construction not more than one year
after issuance of a certificate of occupancy or its functional equivalent as
provided in the adopted local government 5-year schedule of capital improve-
ments.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(3)(b)2.a. (1995). This section of the Florida
Administrative Code is derived from § 163.3180(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes.
14. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(2)(c).
15. See id. § 163.3180(5).
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years after issuance of a certificate of occupancy, as provided in the five-
year schedule of capital improvements;1 6 or 3) at the time of issuance of
a permit, the roads are the subject of a binding agreement which requires the
roads to be in place or under actual construction after no more than three
years.'
7
There are numerous exceptions. A major statewide growth manage-
ment policy promotes compact urban development.' 8 Concurrency, as
applied to roads, works against this policy. The more the population is
spread out, the less congestion exists. Legislation in 1993 created formal
roadway concurrency exceptions to try to solve this problem.' 9 These
exceptions are either area-specific or project-specific20 and are as follows.
Exception One: Urban Redevelopment Project. A proposed urban
redevelopment project located within an "Existing Urban Service Area," as
established in the local comprehensive land use plan, is not subject to the
concurrency requirements for up to 110% of the roadway impacts generated
by prior development.2 ' These projects are approved even if the redevelop-
ment reduces the level of service below the adopted standard. 2
Exception Two: De Minimis Project. A proposed development may
be deemed to have de minimis impact and may not be subject to concur-
rency, so long as the additional impacts do not significantly degrade the
existing level of service and the project is not very dense or intense.23 The
cumulative impact of all de minimis development must be monitored and
can exceed no more than three percent of the maximum service volume at
the adopted level of service if the road is over capacity.24
Exception Three: Long-term Transportation CMS. This exception
formalizes a ten-year to fifteen-year plan.25 The Florida Department of
Community Affairs ("DCA") approved such a plan for Pasco County, where
roads are severely overloaded. To correct existing deficiencies on roads and
to set priorities for reducing the backlog on roads, local governments are
16. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(3)(c)2. (1995).
17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(8).
19. Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act
Amendments, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of FLA.
STAT. ch. 163 (1995)).
20. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b).
21. Id. § 163.3180(8)(b).
22. Id. § 163.3180(5)(b).
23. Id. § 163.3180(6).
24. Id.
25. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(9).
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authorized to adopt a long-term CMS with a planning period of up to ten
years.26 The comprehensive plan must: 1) designate specific areas where
significant backlogs presently exist; 2) provide a financially feasible system
to ensure that existing deficiencies are corrected within the ten-year period;
and 3) demonstrate the roads required to correct existing deficiencies, as
well as to accommodate new development.27 The comprehensive plan also
must state that a plan amendment shall be required to eliminate, defer, or
delay construction of any road which is needed to maintain the adopted
level-of-service standard, and which is listed in the long-term schedule of
capital improvements, if established." Local governments with a severe
backlog may request DCA approval for a planning period of up to fifteen
years for establishing a long-term CMS.29
Exception Four: Transportation Concurrency Management Area
("TCMA"). This provision promotes infill development or redevelopment
within selected urban areas and it allows the level of service to be averaged
within a TCMA.3° A TCMA is a compact geographic area with existing
or proposed multiple, viable alternative travel paths or modes for common
trips.3 A local government must justify the level of service chosen, show
how urban infill or redevelopment would be promoted by the TCMA, and
demonstrate how mobility will be accomplished.32
Exception Five: Transportation Concurrency Exception Areas
("TCEA "). There are three types of TCEAs. The first type is intended to
promote urban infill development in built-up areas which already have roads
in place.33 In this type of TCEA, no more than ten percent of the land
within an infill TCEA may be developable vacant land.34 Specific
development density and intensity thresholds also must be met.35 The
second type of TCEA promotes urban redevelopment and may be located
only in an area which contains no more than forty percent developable
vacant land.36 The third type of TCEA is intended to promote develop-
26. Id. § 163.3180(9)(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 163.3180(10).
29. Id. § 163.3180(9)(b).
30. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(7).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l. (1995).
34. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l.a. (1995).
35. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l.b.
36. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)2. (1995).
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ment in central business districts designated for downtown revitalization.37
There must be data and analysis supporting the creation of these exception
areas, where fairly dense and intense development may be allowed. 8 Dade
and Broward Counties are trying to designate TCEAs.
Exception Six: Projects that Promote Public Transportation.39 This
is a project-specific exception. To reduce the adverse impact of transporta-
tion concurrency, local governments may exempt projects that promote
public transportation by establishing policies in the comprehensive plan for
granting such exceptions.40 Examples of such projects are office buildings
that incorporate transit terminals or fixed rail stations. To receive the
benefit of this exception, local comprehensive plans also must demonstrate
supporting data and analysis showing consideration of the project impact on
limited access highways and establish how a project will qualify.4'
Exception Seven: Part-time Projects. Another project-specific
exception is for part-time projects.42 This section excepts developments
located within urban infill, urban redevelopment, existing urban service, or
downtown revitalization areas which pose only special part-time demands
on roads.43 Examples of these types of developments include stadiums,
performing arts centers, racetracks, and fairgrounds.
Exception Eight: Private Contributions. The comprehensive planning
statute also entitles a local government to allow a landowner to proceed with
development of a specific parcel of land notwithstanding a failure of the
development to satisfy transportation concurrency. 44 This provision seeks
to limit local government liability for temporary takings due to development
delays. The local government must have an adopted comprehensive plan in
compliance with DCA standards.45 The local government also must
provide a means by which the landowner will be assessed a fair share of the
cost of providing the transportation facilities necessary to serve the proposed
development.46 On the other hand, the landowner must make a binding
37. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)3. (1995).
38. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(b)2. (1995).
39. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(28); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(7) (1995).
40. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b).
41. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(7) (1995).
42. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(c).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 163.3180(11).
45. Id. § 163.3180(11)(a).
46. Id. § 163.3180(11)(d).
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commitment to the local government to pay the fair share of the cost of
providing the transportation facilities to serve the proposed development.47
Concurrency standards authorize local governments to condition or bar
development. The local government may allow growth only when sufficient
infrastructure exists. The following section addresses when a development
moratorium, based on a lack of concurrency, may be a compensable taking.
III. THE TAKING BACKGROUND
In the early 1900s, courts began to struggle with the tension between
the desire of local governments to regulate the use of land and the
constitutional property rights of landowners. Few localities previously
adopted zoning regulations. Such regulations tend to reduce the value of at
least some property. There was much uncertainty as to whether they were
constitutional. In response, the United States Department of Commerce
encouraged the adoption of zoning codes through its promulgation in 1921
of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which provided a method for
states to adopt statutes empowering local governments to enact zoning
regulations."
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
provide the bases for these issues. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that
citizens' private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.49 The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . .. ."'
The Florida Constitution also guarantees all natural persons the right
to "acquire, possess and protect property" and further provides that no
person will be deprived of property without due process of law." Article
X, section six of the Florida Constitution is complementary to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It provides that
"[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with
full compensation therefor paid to each owner...., 52
47. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(11)(e).
48. See Kenneth Hart, Note, Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the Consistency
Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 766, 768 n.6 (1974).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Id. amend. XIV.
51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
52. Id. art. X, § 6.
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A review of the key cases in this area is instructive. In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,53 a Pennsylvania statute prohibited coal mining that
caused the subsidence of any structure used for human habitation. The
statute admittedly destroyed previously existing property and contract rights
of the coal mining companies. The court stated that
The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.4
The Court held that the statute caused an unconstitutional taking and that the
coal mining companies should be compensated.55
The next key case in this area addressed a zoning ordinance. The
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5" held that zoning regula-
tions which reduced the potential value of property do not constitute an
impermissible taking of property." In 1922, Euclid adopted a zoning
ordinance.58 A portion of the plaintiff's property was zoned residential and
the plaintiff wanted to develop the entire property for industrial use.5 9 The
evidence showed that the property was worth $10,000 per acre as industrial,
but only $2500 per acre as residential.' The Court found that the zoning
restrictions were permitted under the police power of the state to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.61
A seminal New York case involved a situation similar to a concurrency
moratorium. In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,62 a local
ordinance which prohibited development until essential services of public
sanitary sewers, drainage facilities, parks and recreation facilities, roads, and
firehouses were available, was deemed not to be a taking.63 The court
53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
54. Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 416.
56. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
57. Id. at 397.
58. Id. at 379.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. at 384.
61. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
62. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
63. Id. at 305.
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found that the purpose of the ordinance was not exclusionary, but to provide
for orderly growth.64 Even though the concurrency regulations might have
the effect of restricting development of up to eighteen years, the ordinance
was not found to have caused a taking because the restriction was temporary
and served the public good.65
Subsequent United States Supreme Court cases undermine Ramapo.
The Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,6 held
that an historic preservation ordinance, which prohibited development in a
manner requested by the developer, as applied to Penn Station, did not
constitute a taking, since all use of the property was not denied because the
statute made air rights transferrable.67 The Court closely examined whether
the landowner would receive a reasonable return on its investment, using the
phrase "investment backed expectations. ' ' 8
Temporary takings, which are most applicable to cases dealing with
concurrency, were considered in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. Los Angeles County.69 In 1957, the church purchased land
on which it operated a campground called "Lutherglen" and a retreat for
handicapped children.70 The land is located in a canyon along the banks
of a creek which operates as a natural drainage channel.7' In 1978, a flood
destroyed the buildings on the property.Y2 As a result of the flood, Los
Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction
of any building in an interim flood protection area, including the church's
property. 3 The church immediately filed suit seeking damages.74 The
Court held that landowners were entitled to damages for the t~mporary tak-
ing.' The substantive holding of the Court was that when the government's
activities deprive a landowner of all use of property, no subsequent action
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the regulation was effective.76
64. Id. at 297.
65. Id. at 301-02.
66. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
67. Id. at 138.
68. Id. at 136.
69. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
70. Id. at 307.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, 482 U.S. at 308.
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. at 321.
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Contrast this holding to the holding in Ramapo, in which the court held
that a "temporary" moratorium of up to eighteen years was not a compensa-
ble taking.77 The First Evangelical Church of Glendale Court would have
found that ordinance to cause a temporary taking.
Another landmark Supreme Court case is the decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.7 In 1986, developer David Lucas purchased
two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near Charleston,
South Carolina.7 9 Lucas intended to construct single family residences on
the lots.80 Two years later, in reaction to the devastation caused by
Hurricane Hugo, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act ("BMA"),"1 which prohibited construction of homes on
Lucas' lots.
82
Lucas' suit claimed that although the BMA was a lawful exercise of
South Carolina's police power, the legislation effectively extinguished his
property's value, entitling him to compensation irrespective of whether the
legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police power objectives.83
The trial court agreed and ordered that Lucas be compensated in the amount
of $1,232,287.50.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and found
"'that the [BMA was] properly and validly designed to preserve... South
Carolina's beaches,"' a threatened public resource.85 Since the regulation
was designed to prevent serious public harm, the state court reasoned that
no compensation was due the landowner under the state's takings clause. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in the case.
With respect to the merits of the regulatory taking claim, the Court noted
that there are at least two categories of regulatory actions which are
compensable without any inquiry into the public interest advanced in support
of the restraint.8 7 The first category of permissible regulatory takings
occurs when a property owner suffers a physical invasion of her property. 8
77. Id.
78. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
79. Id. at 1006-07.
80. Id. at 1007.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
82. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
83. Id. at 1009.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1009-10 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
86. Id.
87. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
88. Id.
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The second occurs when a regulation denies all economically beneficial use
of land. 9 The Court stated that the only exception to the second category
is when the regulatorily-proscribed use would amount to a nuisance at
common law.90 The Court also noted that it was highly unlikely that
common law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable
or productive improvements on Lucas' land.9' Accordingly, the Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its deci-
sion.92
The most recent Supreme Court case in this area is Dolan v. City of
Tigard.93 In Dolan, an operator of an electric and plumbing supply
business wished to raze an existing building and replace it with a larger
structure.94 The city imposed conditions requiring that the landowner
dedicate ten percent of the property for flood plain and improvement of
storm drainage, and dedicate a fifteen-foot strip for a pedestrian and bike
pathway.95 The Supreme Court held that this action constituted a taking
because there must be a "rough proportionality" between dedication
requirements and the impact of the development.96 The Supreme Court
refused to hold that rough proportionality did not exist in this case, but
rather, that it had not been proven.97 To prove "rough proportionality," a
local government must show some sort of individualized determination that
any required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development." The burden of persuasion on this issue rests
on the government. 99
Recent Supreme Court of Florida cases on this issue also are instruc-
tive. In Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,"° the court
stated that government must pay for property under two circumstances:
[W]hen it confiscates private property for common use under its power
of eminent domain[, and] ... when it regulates private property under
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1022.
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
93. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
94. Id. at 2313.
95. Id. at 2314.
96. Id. at 2319, 2321.
97. Id. at 2321.
98. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.
99. Id. at 2319.
100. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
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its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively
deprives the owner of the economically viable use of the property,
thereby unfairly imposing the burden of providing for the public welfare
upon the affected owner.""1
The court noted that "[a]lIthough regulation under the police power will
always interfere to some degree with property use, compensation must be
paid . . .when that interference deprives the owner of the substantial
economic use of his or her property."'" "[Wlhen compensation is
claimed due to governmental regulation of property, the appropriate inquiry
is directed to the extent of the interference or deprivation of economic
use."
' 103
Joint Ventures owned over eight acres of vacant land adjacent to Dale
Mabry Highway in Tampa.1°4 The owner agreed to sell the property
contingent upon the buyer's ability to obtain the necessary development
permits.0 5 The Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT") then
determined that six-and-a-half acres of this vacant tract was needed for
stormwater drainage associated with a planned highway widening."° In
November 1985, the FDOT recorded a map of reservation, which precluded
the issuance of development permits for the property. 7 At an administra-
tive hearing, Joint Ventures contested the FDOT's reservation and the
hearing officer found in favor of the FDOT.V 8
On appeal, "Joint Ventures argued that the moratorium imposed by [the
applicable Florida Statute] amounted to a taking because the statute
deprived [Joint Ventures] of substantial beneficial use of its property."' 9
In opposition, the FDOT contended that the statute was not a taking, but a
mere regulation and valid exercise of its police power."' The court made
short work of the FDOT's claims, stating:
If landowners were permitted to build in a transportation corridor during
the period of DOT's preacquisition planning, the cost of acquisition
101. Id. at 624.
102. Id. at 625.
103. Id.; accord Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1986).
104. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 623.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 623-24.
109. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 624.
110. Id.
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might be increased. Rather than supporting a "regulatory" characteriza-
tion, these circumstances expose the statutory scheme as a thinly veiled
attempt to "acquire" land by avoiding the legislatively mandated
procedural and substantive protections of chapters 73 and 74.111
The court further stated, "[w]e perceive no valid distinction between
'freezing' property in this fashion and deliberately attempting to depress
land values in anticipation of eminent domain proceedings. Such action has
been consistently prohibited."
' 2
Joint Ventures generated a plethora of subsequent cases in which the
Fifth and First District Courts of Appeal conflicted as to whether maps of
reservation create presumptive takings.!13 The Supreme Court of Florida
resolved this question in Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority
v. A.G.W.S. Corp.114 In A.G.W.S., the Expressway Authority filed a map
of reservation over vacant land while Joint Ventures was pending." 5 The
property owners claimed that this action amounted to a temporary tak-
ing."6 The circuit court agreed, granting the landowners' motion for
summary judgment on liability." 7
In a sharply divided opinion, the Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision of the trial court."' The appellate court also
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether all owners
of lands affected by reservation maps are entitled to per se takings
judgments." 9 In answering the certified question, the supreme court held
that Joint Ventures did not create a per se taking standard.' 20 It further
held that a landowner must show that the map of reservation deprived
substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of land before a
taking has occurred.''
111. Id. at 625.
112. Id. at 626.
113. See Department of Transp. v. Miccosukee Village Shopping Ctr., 621 So. 2d 516
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Department of Transp. v. Lake Beulah, 617 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
114. 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
115. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So. 2d 52,
54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed, 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 52.
119. Id.
120. A.G.W.S., 640 So. 2d at 58.
121. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Florida's subsequent decision in Palm Beach
County v. Wright" followed A.G.W.S. The trial court and the Fourth
District Court of Appeal struck down a bar of land use activities under a
comprehensive plan that would impede roadway construction in designated
transportation corridors."2  Both lower courts held that Joint Ventures
supported a finding of a temporary taking. 24
The state supreme court, however, reversed, holding that the case was
distinguishable from Joint Ventures on several points. 25 Principally, the
court held that the thoroughfare map conditioned development, but did not
completely bar it.116 Additionally, the reservation map was considered
only a flexible guidance tool.2 7
A seminal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides a good
checklist for determining whether all economically viable use of property
has been taken under Florida Law. Reahard v. Lee County128 suggests that
a taking claim requires one to analyze the economic impact on the owner
and the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner's investment
backed expectations. Factors to consider are: 1) the history of the property;
2) the history of development; 3) the history of zoning and regulation; 4)
whether the development changed when title passed; 5) the present nature
and extent of the property; 6) whether the expectations of the landowner are
reasonable under state common law; 7) reasonable expectations of neigh-
bors; and 8) the amount of diminution of investment-backed expectations of
the landowner. 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF WHETHER CONCURRENCY'S PROHIBITION ON
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY REPRESENTS A TAKING
When property cannot be developed because of concurrency regula-
tions, the following "takings" issues should be considered:
1. Analyze whether the concurrency ordinance provides for at least
some development. Some concurrency ordinances allow for minimal
development, such as single family homes, even though concurrency levels
122. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
123. Id. at 51.
124. Id. at 51-52.
125. Id. at 54.
126. Id. at 53.
127. Wright, 641 So. 2d at 53.
128. 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 1136.
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of service may be exceeded. If the development allowed is reasonable, it
is less likely that a taking has occurred.
2. Analyze the reduction in value of the property and the investment
backed expectations of the owner. If the value of the property analyzed is
tremendously reduced and the investment backed expectations of the owner
are reasonable, it is more likely that a taking has occurred.
3. Determine how long the development will be prohibited by the
concurrency regulations. The longer the prohibition, the more likely that a
taking has occurred.
4. Consider whether the concurrency problem is related solely to the
owner's project or to the government's failure to provide for growth. The
greater the impact that the individual owner's project has on the services, the
less likely it is that a taking has occurred.
5. Analyze whether the unavailable services are closely related to
health, such as availability of water and sewer, or "softer services" such as
recreation. The more closely the unavailable services are related to health,
the less likely it is that a taking has occurred.
V. THE HARRiS AcT
In 1995, the Florida Legislature passed, and Governor Lawton Chiles
signed into law, the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection
Act. 3 ' The Harris Act might benefit landowners when imposition of
concurrency regulations creates less than a complete taking of property. 3 '
The Harris Act creates rights for property owners for those governmental
actions which "inordinately burden" property.' A cause of action under
the Harris Act does not require a taking of all compensable rights in the
property. 13
3
The Harris Act operates prospectively to those government actions
occurring after the end of the 1995 legislative session, or after May 11,
1995.13' No law, rule, or ordinance that exists, or has been previously
noticed for adoption, is covered. 35 Later amendments to existing laws,
130. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)).
131. Id.
132. Ch. 95-181, § 1(2), 1995 Fla. Laws. at 1652.
133. See, e.g., Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1136 (stating Florida's prior standard that
compensation is due only where governmental action "takes" all or substantially all property
rights).
134. Ch. 95-181, § 1(12), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1657.
135. Id.
1996]
98
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
rules, and ordinances, however, fall under the Harris Act.136 The Harris
Act also covers actions by all local, state, and regional governments, 37 but
it does not affect federal acts or those actions delegated from the federal
government.'38 In addition, the Harris Act does not cover actions that
abate nuisances, temporary impacts, or impacts caused by Harris Act relief
issued to other landowners.
The first two limitations are products of taking jurisprudence. Takings
generally are compensable when they effect a public good, but not when
they prevent a harm. Conversely, the temporary impact bar differs from the
common law entitlement to compensation for temporary takings. 39 This
should substantially limit the effect of the Harris Act on moratoria.
Transportation-based development bars are lifted once the infrastructure is
available.
The Harris Act also exempts maintenance and expansion of transporta-
tion facilities."'4 This also should limit the Harris Act's impact on
concurrency moratoria. As stated above, property owner claims under traffic
corridor expansions constitute a major portion of Florida's taking law.
Recent case law regarding development exactions indicates issues that might
otherwise arise.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,141 the United States Supreme Court held
that a city could not require a developer to provide a public greenway and
bike path. The Court held that the dedications far exceeded the degree of
public infrastructure impact shown for the proposed development.' 42 The
Court also held that the local government must demonstrate both an
"essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the development and
the exaction. 143 Failing that, the government might be liable for a taking.
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Department of Transporta-
tion v. Heckman,'" reviewed Dolan in considering the FDOT's appeal of
an inverse condemnation judgment. The trial court held FDOT liable for the
City of Oakland Park's requirement that the appellee property owners grant
a seven-foot wide right of way across their property in return for a waiver
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1(3)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
138. Id.
139. See First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (holding temporary taking of all rights can give rise to compensation).
140. Ch. 95-181, § 1(10), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656.
141. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
142. Id. at 2322.
143. Id. at 2319, 2321.
144. 644 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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of development and platting requirements. The city then conveyed the
parcel to FDOT for the expansion of U.S. Highway 1. The appellate court
cited to Dolan, but did not find any agency between FDOT and the city.'45
Its reversal was, therefore, wholly unrelated to the merits.
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal considered another inverse
condemnation case in Sarasota County v. Ex."4 The Exs claimed that the
county had no authority to require a right of way grant in exchange for a
permit. The Ex court did not reach the merits either. Instead, it held that
the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 47
Roadway expansions are prevalent causes of development exactions.
One can reasonably expect concurrency moratoria where already overbur-
dened roadway corridors are subjects of further development requests.
Without the exception, limitations based on traffic concurrency would be a
ripe area for litigation.
A. Protected Rights
The Harris Act protects the "existing use" of property.' An "exist-
ing use" is "an actual, present use or activity on the real property,t 149 or
such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable
for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and
which have created an existing fair market value in the property [that
is] greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or
activity on the real property."'
The first definition is relatively simple to determine. The second definition,
however, merges several criteria to create a new standard. There is no direct
authority on which to base a determination of when property use is
reasonably foreseeable and non-speculative. Former Florida Department of
Community Affairs Secretary Tom Pelham suggests that local governments
should draft guidelines for determining such uses under the pertinent
comprehensive land use plan or zoning code.'
145. Id. at 530-31.
146. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
147. Id. at 10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.14 (1995)).
148. Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Thomas Pelham, Coping with the Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA.
PLANNING (Fla. Chapter Am. Planning Ass'n), July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 15.
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Pelham also notes that the second prong of the "existing use" definition
requires appraisers to speculate.' The Harris Act fails to answer the
question of how one determines whether the reasonably foreseeable, non-
speculative land use has a higher fair market value than does a current use.
B. Vested Rights
The Harris Act contains three standards to determine a vested right to
a specific use.'53 A right may vest under common law equitable estoppel,
substantive due process, or a state vested rights statute.1
54
Florida courts have stated that equitable estoppel bars the government
from rescinding a vested right held by a property owner who has: "(1) in
good faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) ... made
such a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive
obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable.., to destroy
the right .... "155
The Growth Management Act, most likely to apply to local concur-
rency issues, contains the following vested rights provision:
Nothing in this act shall limit or modify the rights of any person to
complete any development that has been authorized as a development
of regional impact pursuant to chapter 380 or who has been issued a
final local development order and development has commenced and is
continuing in good faith.'56
One article on the Harris Act notes that substantive due process allows
courts to develop a standard that goes beyond traditional estoppel. 7
These commentators cite an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
support of this proposition. 5
Thomas Pelham recommends that local governments draft ordinances
defining "vested rights."'5 9 He also suggests that doing so may provide
152. Id. at 15.
153. Ch. 95-181, § l(3)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
154. Id.
155. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976)
(quoting Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963)).
156. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8).
157. David L. Powell et al., Florida's New Law to Protect Private Property Rights, 69
FLA. B.J. 12, 14 (Oct. 1995).
158. Id. at 14, 17 n.17 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18
F.3d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994), vacated, 42 F.3d 626 (1lth Cir. 1994)).
159. Pelham, supra note 151, at 15.
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a reasonable analysis of the property rights impacts of the new regula-
tion. 60 Local vested rights ordinance standards do not create vested rights
under the Harris Act.161 Most local government codes already contain
vested rights provisions. Those which do not, should. The Harris Act
requires examination of vested rights. 62 The local definition might better
allow a court to analyze whether regulation is compensable. This would be
so regardless of the definition's direct applicability.
C. Inordinate Burdens
The Harris Act contains two alternative standards to determine
inordinate burdens. Under the first standard, the landowner must show: 1)
the government action so restricted existing uses or a vested use that the
property owner cannot realize its use or vested use of the property; 2) the
loss is permanent; and 3) the loss must affect the entire property. 63
The second test requires a landowner to show that the government
action caused the property to bear a disproportionate share of regulatory
burden. A governmental action can result in a claim because the landowner
bears too great a share of a burden that the government imposed for the
good of the general public."6
D. Implementing The Harris Act
The Harris Act requires the injured property owner to notify the
offending governmental entity within one year. 65 The government then
has 180 days to issue a good faith settlement offer.' 66
One commentator notes that appropriate settlement offers fall into one
of two categories: 1) compensation for the lost value or 2) enactment of an
exception to the governmental action that devalued the property. 67
160. Id.
161. Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 1(11), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656-57.
166. Ch. 95-181, § 1(4)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653.
167. Robert C. Downie, Property Rights: Will Exceptions Become the Rule?, 69 FLA.
B.J. 69, 70 (Nov. 1995) (explaining Ch. 95-181, § 1(4)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653).
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A property owner may sue in circuit court if no settlement is
reached. 6' The procedure is parallel to a takings case. 69  The court
first determines if an inordinate burden occurred. 7 If so, then a jury
determines compensation.'1
7
Attorney's fees awards' standards differ from those applicable in
takings litigation. Condemnation statutes 72 generally entitle landowners
to reasonable legal fees. 73 The government almost never is entitled to
recover fees. 74 The Harris Act entitles a landowner to fees if the local
government did not issue a good faith offer.'7 5 The government is entitled
to fees if the landowner rejected a good faith offer.176
E. The Attorney General's Opinion
As of January 1996, no reported court decisions have expressly
addressed the Harris Act. Nonetheless, the Florida Attorney General issued
an instructive opinion regarding the Act's scope. 171
St. Johns County asked the Attorney General whether the Harris Act
confers rights on owners of property that is indirectly affected by a
governmental action or regulation. 7 The answer was that the Act does
not. 79 The opinion focused on the Harris Act's definition of "inordinate
burden."' 180 The term refers to actions that "'directly restricted or limited
the use of real property ....
The opinion also contends that courts should narrowly construe the
Harris Act. 82 The Harris Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immuni-
168. Ch. 95-181, § 1(5)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1654.
169. FLA. STAT. § 73.071 (1995).
170. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
171. Id. § 1(6)(b).
172. FLA. STAT. chs. 73, 74 (1995).
173. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1995).
174. A local government is limited to rights under § 57.105(1) to seek attorney's fees
for defending a frivolous claim. See FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
175. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(c)2., 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
176. Id. § 1(6)(c)1., 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
177. 95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), available in WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
750474.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652).
182. 95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), available in WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
750474.
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ty."8  The opinion states "like a waiver of sovereign immunity, any
ambiguity in the provisions of the act should be construed against an award
of damages and such damages should be awarded only when an award
appears consistent with the Legislature's intent."' 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida in Palm Beach County v. Wright"s5
limited property owners' ability to prove that transportation related
development limitations constitute compensable takings.'86 A property
owner may demonstrate entitlement to compensation. The owner must meet
an exacting factual burden of proof to do so.
The Harris Act, on the other hand, likely will have limited impact on
private property rights under concurrency. The Harris Act only applies to
applications of statutes, rules, and ordinances enacted after May 11, 1995.
Concurrency requirements date from the 1985 growth management
legislation. A concurrency moratorium probably would not fall under the
Harris Act.
Nonetheless, if one can demonstrate that a concurrency moratorium is
of general application, one might argue that the Harris Act applies. In
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder,'87 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that quasi-legislative rezonings are of a
generalized nature-applying to a substantial number of properties.'88
Quasi-judicial rezonings apply only to a small number of parcels or
landowners' 8 9
The Harris Act does not define the term "application." The state
supreme court's use of the word in Snyder might help:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of
persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where
the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct
alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1968)).
185. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
186. Id. at 54.
187. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
188. Id. at 474.
189. Id.
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functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy setting, are
in the nature of ... quasi-judicial action .... 19
Accordingly, one might allege that a general concurrency moratorium
is quasi-legislative. It does not "apply" generalized law as might a quasi-
judicial action. Therefore, the Harris Act arguably would apply.
The Attorney General's opinion interpreting the Harris Act indicates
that this view might not prevail. Attorney General Butterworth noted that
the Harris Act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.' He conclud-
ed that any ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of sovereign immuni-
ty 19
2
Another exemption that might apply relates to maintenance and
expansion of transportation facilities.'93 Concurrency moratoria address
the opposite issue. One might claim that the exemption excludes con-
currency moratoria because it only expressly addresses growth and
maintenance.
The Harris Act might lessen the burden of proof that property owners
must meet to obtain compensation for concurrency moratoria. Court
interpretations will control the degree of impact. Florida's continued
population growth puts increased burdens on extant infrastructure. Thus, the
scope of the Harris Act implementation or concurrency might be sweeping.
190. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d
65, 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)).
191. 95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), available in WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
750474.
192. Id.
193. Ch. 95-81, § 1(10), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656.
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Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.'
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.2
Although seemingly contradictory, these two quotations from Justice
Oliver Wendall Holmes in the classic taking case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon3 demonstrate the dynamic tension that exists between the need for
government regulation of the use of land to protect the rights of the general
public and the need to protect the rights of individual property owners from
government regulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bert J. Harris Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act ("Act")4
was enacted by the Florida Legislature during its 1995 legislative session
and signed into law by the governor. The Act reflects a strong national
trend in many states, as well as in Congress, towards a search for statutory
and constitutional definitions to create a bright line between valid govern-
ment regulations and takings that neither Justice Holmes nor any court has
yet been able to definitively articulate.
The Act creates a new statutory cause of action and remedy that allows
for private property owners to be compensated by a governmental agency
that inordinately burdens, restricts, or limits an existing or vested use of real
property. If the court determines that such an inordinate burden has
occurred, the remedy is compensation for the fair market value of the
property due to the loss created by the government action. The jury
determines the fair market value of the property. The express intent of the
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
2. Id. at 416.
3. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
4. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)). House Bill 863
was passed by a vote of 111 to 0 in the House and 38 to 1 in the Senate. This enactment
also contains the "Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act," which is
apparently an attempt to avoid the very litigation which the authors believe the Private
Property Rights Act will foster. See Ch. 95-181, §2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1651, 1657 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995)).
5. See generally John Martinez, Statutes and Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face
of Uncertainty, in 1995 ZONING AND PLANNING HANDBOOK 129 (Alan M. Forrest ed. 1995).
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legislature was to create "a separate and distinct cause of action from the
law of takings' 6 and to provide "for relief, or payment of compensation,
when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance ...as applied, unfairly
affects real property."7
There have been numerous articles, seminars, conferences, and
presentations regarding the true meaning and legislative intent of the Act.
There were many participants in its drafting. Legislators themselves rarely
"write" legislation, but rather, they rely on their staff and other experts
(often lobbyists) to reflect their intent. The analogy between sausage
making and law making is not inappropriate.8
The purpose of this article is not to look back at how the Act was
written, but rather to look ahead to the consequences of its implementation.
The authors of this article were close observers of, but not participants in,
the legislative process that brought forth the Act. They cannot claim special
knowledge of the actual intent of those involved in creating the Act.
Moreover, the most fundamental maxim of statutory interpretation is that
one must first read the words of a law as enacted by the legislature to find
their meaning before resorting to explanations of the drafters or other
collateral sources.9 Thus, this article will analyze how the words of the
new legislation might be interpreted and applied to the delicate balance
between private rights and legitimate public purposes.
Although the Act has been described by some of its authors as not
being a radical departure from prior law and "an attempt to provide new and
measured relief for landowners without undermining Florida's landmark
environmental and growth management laws,""° its impact on local
government is likely to be quite severe. The severity of the impact,
however, will not be measured by case law as much as by the unmeasurable,
but real chilling effect the Act will have on governmental regulation of land
6. Ch. 95-181, § 1(1), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
7. Id.
8. This oft quoted, and unflattering, comparison has been attributed to Otto von
Bismarck. Thomas F. Gustafson, former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives,
described the Act as "the king sausage of all time" at a Florida Institute of Government
Conference on Florida's New Property Rights Law, December 1, 1995.
9. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982);
S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978); Tropical Coach Line,
Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1960).
10. David L. Powell, et al., Florida's New Law to Protect Private Property Rights, 69
FLA. B.J. 12, 17 (Oct. 1995)
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use." In addition, the broad scope of the Act, the discretion left to the
courts under vaguely defined concepts, and the prospect of significant
monetary consequences, create a strong incentive for government to
compromise its regulatory authority for case by case settlements with
complaining property owners.
There is little doubt that complaining property owners, through this Act,
have greater potential to achieve monetary and nonmonetary benefits related
to the use of their property not heretofore available. The public-at-large also
will pay for those benefits in many forms, including perhaps less environ-
mental protection, fewer restrictions on land use and in some instances, the
payment of increased taxes to pay for compensation to the private property
owners.
II. CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE ACT
A. Property Rights Protected: The Future is Now
Many of the statutory definitions in this legislation are unique to this
Act. The definitions are a mix of common law principles and new, broadly
described concepts which promise to be the subject of litigation before their
meanings can be more accurately determined.'2 However, a careful reading
and analysis of these critical definitions lead to the conclusion that, contrary
to Florida common law, "existing uses" equal future uses and "vested rights"
equal new rights.
The unique definitions are the key to opening the door to an under-
standing of how the Act will be implemented. Although it is up to the
courts to decide, interpret, and expand upon the Act's meaning,13 attorneys,
planners, elected officials, and landowners will be making decisions without
11. Christopher Wren, City of Fort Lauderdale Planning and Zoning Manager, has
expressed his reluctance in endorsing certain neighborhood association requests to restrict
commercial development. His concern is that the city will be vulnerable to increasing
litigation as a result of landowners' claims for compensation that will result from regulations
that restrict the use of their property. As Mr. Wren has stated: the Act has "handcuffed me
from doing what I consider proper planning." Peter Mitchell, New Property-Rights Law
Sends City Planners Scrambling for Cover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at Fl.
12. One commentator describes these definitions as "a grab bag of takings jargon."
Charles Siemon, Remarks at the Meeting of Government Attorneys of Broward County (Oct.
23, 1995).
13. Robert M. Rhodes, Balancing Private Property Rights with Local Government
Regulations, Teleconference Remarks at Florida Institute of Government Conference (Oct.
6, 1995) [hereinafter Teleconference Remarks].
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the luxury of court interpretations of what will surely be fact-based
decisions. As in takings cases, it will be difficult to draw broad generaliza-
tions from these decisions. 4
B. Critical Definitions
1. Existing Use
The Act defines "existing use" as comprising of two types. The first
type is that of "an actual, present use or activity on the real property."15
This includes "periods of inactivity which are normally associated with, or
are incidental to, the nature or type of use or activity."16 The second type
includes land uses which are: 1) reasonably foreseeable; 2) nonspeculative;
3) suitable for the subject real property; 4) compatible with adjacent land
uses; and 5) which have created an existing fair market value in the property
greater than the fair market value of the actual present use or activity. 7
For decades, it has been apparent in Florida that the local government
comprehensive plan would become the dominant force in land development
permitting decisions. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act
of 19758 mandated the adoption of plans that would be financially
feasible, internally consistent, and implemented by land development
regulations, and ensured that the comprehensive plan would set policy to be
followed by specific development permitting activities.
Because the second type of "existing use" specifically omits "actual,
present use or activity on the real property" and instead focuses on
"foreseeable" or potential future use, the Act raises the possibility that the
comprehensive plan's future land use plan element will define the second
type of existing use. The one purpose of the future land use plan element
is to reflect the nature or type of use or activity that is, in the future,
suitable for the land and compatible with adjacent land uses. It certainly
will be argued that investment decisions can and should be made based upon
14. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
The Court held that takings cases are decided by "engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries." Id.
15. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)0b). For a discussion of the drafting history of the term
"existing use," see Thomas G. Pelham, Florida Legislature Enacts Private Property Rights
Protection Act, FLA. PLANNING (Fla. Chapter Am. Planning Ass'n), May-June 1995, at 1.
16. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b).
17. Il
18. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243
(1995)).
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a reasonable expectation that the comprehensive plan will be implemented
and that this expectation directly affects the present day valuation of land
through consideration of its future use. 9
Therefore, what may be permitted in the future land use plan element
of an adopted comprehensive plan may be transformed to an existing use in
terms of the Property Rights Act. One consequence of the Act is to
accelerate the applicability of the Future Land Use Plan Element, which
could undermine its effectiveness as a timing tool and thus as a planning
tool.
A participant in the Act's drafting has referred to the definition of
"existing use"2 as the "When Harry Met Sally" or the "I'll have what he's
having" provision, in that it is intended to give a property owner the rights
to the same use of property as that of his neighbor, despite what the plans
or regulations may provide. The impact of this definition goes far beyond
the common law in Florida. For example, Florida common law does not
recognize property rights to existing zoning uses unless those uses have been
determined to be vested under principles of equitable estoppel.2 In so
ruling, the courts have indicated a reluctance to interfere with the local
government power to change zoning to either enlarge or reduce development
potential to meet the needs of the community. 22 Furthermore, the well-
accepted zoning concept of nonconforming uses assumes that government
may change regulations so as to make existing uses unauthorized except to
continue in their existing state, with the expectation that such uses will
gradually be eliminated over time for a more suitable pattern of uses in the
21community. The courts have balanced this principle by holding that
government must have a sufficient reason to justify the zoning change or it
will be found to be either "arbitrary and capricious," or a denial of substan-
tive due process and equal protection under the Constitution.24
19. See William G. Earle, et al., Compensation, in FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 175 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing effect of zoning restrictions on analysis of
highest and best use under eminent domain practice).
20. Rhodes, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13.
21. See generally City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla.
1954).
22. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Sarasota County v. Walker, 144 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
23. See, e.g., 3M Nat'l Advertising Co. v. City of Tampa Code Enforcement Bd., 587
So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Lewis v. City of Atlantic Beach, 467 So. 2d 751,
755 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
24. See Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1995); Lee
County v. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d 996, 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The Act, in contrast, requires compensation for not only actual existing
uses that may be changed, but also for those future uses that are foreseeable,
nonspeculative, suitable and compatible under the Act's unique definition.
Additionally, the weighing of the public good against the burden to the
individual property owners is left to the court, with no statutory presumption
that the government action is valid
Local governments, through their planning and zoning efforts, are
familiar with such terms as "suitability" and "compatibility" and have
developed their own land use definitions for such terms, as incorporated into
comprehensive plans and land development codes.2 6  These existing
definitions may become even more important in assisting a court in
reviewing a claim under the Act. However, the definitions of "reasonably
foreseeable" and "nonspeculative" uses are more problematic. The intent of
the Act's drafters in this regard was apparently to incorporate concepts from
eminent domain valuation law. In eminent domain law, courts have
accepted appraisal testimony regarding highest and best use based in part on
the testifying appraiser's evaluation of whether zoning changes or other land
use changes were reasonably foreseeable." Inclusion of a land use in the
future land use plan element of the adopted comprehensive plan may be
sufficient now to demonstrate that the planned use is reasonably foreseeable
and not speculative. The landowner will argue that zoning and other
development permits for that use, although procedurally necessary, would
be expected to be obtained to remain consistent with the comprehensive plan
and to comply with the Act. Therefore, the planned future use would be
worthy of consideration by the appraiser. The Act may thus effectively
allow uses that under a zoning regulation are either prohibited or permitted
25. The presumption of validity for governmental actions under the state arbitrary and
capricious standard has already been significantly narrowed by the decision of Board of
County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). The "specific" actions that
form claims under the Act apply the law to specific real property and can be expected to be
considered quasi-judicial actions under Snyder. Id. at 474-75.
26. Pelham, supra note 15.
27. Powell, supra note 10, at 14 n.13.
28. See Broward County v. Patel, 641 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 1994) (citing 4 JULIUs L.
SACKmAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12C-03(2), 12C-88-90 (rev. 3d ed.
1994)); Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d 74
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. quashed, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959). The testimony as
to "reasonable probability" that rezoning may be changed in the future cannot be based
merely on speculation, but may include an evaluation of the degree of probability that
reasonably exists. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d at 82-83.
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only under conditional use approval to obtain the status of a compensable
property right, simply by their inclusion in the comprehensive plan.
This change in the law can be expected to create particular
development pressure on the urban fringe of communities where develop-
ment is in transition and undeveloped property is located next to developed
or developing property. 9 Generally, the Act now makes the creation of
zoning districts, or regulatory boundaries and districts, more difficult than
in the past, when the courts gave considerable deference to local government
line-drawing. 0 As early as the first zoning cases, such as Euclid v.
Ambler,31 reasonable classifications which are essential to the creation of
zoning districts were upheld as not violative of the rights of substantive due
process or equal protection. More than ever, attention must be given to the
comprehensive plan to provide a defensible foundation for drawing district
boundaries.
The definition also must give pause to local governments seeking
to provide for higher densities or intensities of development for the future
such as in redevelopment areas. This is because the granting of these future
development rights will have taken on the status of an "existing use," should
the future not unfold as planned or hoped, and the government wishes to
redesign the uses. Finally, because a claim under the Act must be supported
by an appraisal demonstrating that the reasonably foreseeable use has a
greater market value than the present use, there will be a reasonably
foreseeable increase in the market for appraisals and appraisal testimony.
2. Vested Rights
Property rights that are considered "vested" are also expansively
defined under the Act. Vested rights are to be determined not only by
applying the common law principles of equitable estoppel32 and by
29. Pelham, supra note 15.
30. See, e.g., Orange County v. Butler Estates Corp., 328 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of
legislative body if issue meets "fairly debatable" standard); Town of Surfside v. Skyline
Terrace Corp., 120 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that town's ordinance did
not require commercial uses if ordinance can be sustained under "fairly debatable" rule where
adjacent municipality permits commercial operations across street from owner's property),
cert. denied, 123 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1960).
31. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329
So. 2d 10, 15-16 (Fla. 1976). For a general discussion of Florida vested rights law, see
Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M. Sellers, Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights in Land Use,
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applying statutory law which explicitly creates vested rights,33 but may also
be determined by applying "substantive due process under the common
law."34 To the extent that a substantive due process right relies on the
proscription against "deprivation of due process" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, a "specific action" found to be
constitutionally invalid is now by statutory definition a deprivation of a
"vested right." Thus, a private property owner who has experienced a
substantive due process violation under the state or federal constitutions ap-
pears to also have a claim under the Act and may be awarded compensation
under its provisions.
Some of the participants in the drafting of the law go further to suggest
that the Act "enables the judiciary to craft a constitutionally based vesting
test separate from takings theories or remedies, and distinct from equitable
estoppel. This standard could focus on whether an owner has acquired a
constitutionally protected property interest that should not be diminished or
frustrated by governmental action."3 Although this suggestion seems to
be an invitation for the courts to expand both the common law concepts of
substantive due process and vested rights, it should be noted that the
treatment of substantive due process under the Act can be distinguished
from its treatment of inverse condemnation. In the case of inverse
condemnation or "takings," the Act states specifically that the intent of the
legislature was to create a separate and distinct cause of action from the law
of takings and that a claim under the Act need not rise to the level of a
constitutional taking.36 No such separate or distinct cause of action from
the law of substantive due process is created by the Act.
Nevertheless, the application of substantive due process under the
common law is a dynamic, not a static, concept. Some might argue that
in 2 FLORIDA ENVTL. & LAND USE LAW 8-1 (2d ed. 1994).
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8) (providing vesting under Comprehensive Plans);
FLA. STAT. § 373.414(11)-(16) (1995) (providing vesting for Surface Water Management
Permits); FLA. STAT. § 380.05(18) (1995) (providing vesting under Areas of Critical State
Concern); FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1995) (providing vesting under Developments of
Regional Impact). Local government ordinances that implement state statutory vesting
provisions may also grant property rights under the statute. See Powell, supra note 10, at
14.
34. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a); see generally Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59
F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995).
35. Powell, supra note 10, at 14.
36. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1)(a).
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Florida courts have been inclined not to find such deprivations.37 Certainly
the federal courts have indicated a reluctance to find constitutional violations
based on vested rights. 8 The Act's new provision adds one more dynamic
factor to the mix.
39
The Act's compensable remedy for vested rights expands beyond the
injunctive relief traditionally available to successful litigants. While owners
whose rights have been violated under the state constitutional substantive
due process guarantee are theoretically eligible for compensation as a
remedy, the Florida courts, in practice, look further for a constitutional
taking violation before awarding such compensation.'4 Thus, compensation
becomes a more realistic remedy under the Act for substantive due process
violations.
Local governments have increasingly made use of administrative vested
rights proceedings as a method of resolving vested rights issues short of
trial. Claims asserted under the Act, however, may circumvent these local
vested rights remedies by the Act's provision that administrative remedies
are not required to be exhausted after the 180-day statutory period has
lapsed.4' To the extent that local government may require an applicant to
proceed under a vested rights determination before any specific action is
taken by the government, the administrative vested rights remedy may
continue to be applicable and require exhaustion. However, a local
government vesting determination itself may be the specific action under
which a property owner brings a claim.
37. See, e.g., City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied sub nom. 1800 Atlantic Developers, Inc. v. City of Key West, 545 So.
2d 1367 (Fla. 1989).
38. See, e.g., Restigouche, 59 F.3d at 1208; Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d
1369, 1374 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994). Contra A.A. Profiles v.
City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
The federal court's state of flux on this matter is illustrated by the vacation of the case of
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536 (11 th Cir.), vacated, 42
F.3d 626 (lth Cir. 1994).
39. To what extent does the inclusion of the right to substantive due process also include
the right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment? Unless a
fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, generally the courts will review equal
protection claims under the same standards as substantive due process claims. See Executive
100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991).
However, for that more narrow class of persons protected by equal protection guarantees, the
Act apparently provides no additional protection.
40. See, e.g., Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640
So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
41. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a).
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3. Inordinate Burden
The definition of "inordinate burden" requires the court, without
statutory standards or guidance, to make the equitable decision on the proper
balance of public and private interests. As explained by some of the Act's
drafters, the legislature expected and intended that the court would be left
to interpret the meaning of such terms.42 The extent to which the Act
leaves this matter to court interpretation has been suggested to be a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine.a3
There are two classifications of "inordinate burdens" defined in the Act.
The first is an action which: 1) directly restricts or limits the use of real
property; 2) such that the owner is permanently restricted; 3) from attaining
the reasonable investment-backed expectation for; and 4) his existing use or
vested right to a specific use of the property as a whole. The second
inordinate burden occurs if the owner is left with unreasonable uses such
that he bears permanently a disproportionate share of the burden imposed
for the good of the public, "which, in all fairness and justice should be
borne by the public as a whole."'
The definition of "inordinate burden" invites the court to review the
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations for the use of
the property. This investigation into investment-backed expectations is a
well-recognized, but ill-defined, part of the takings law equation.45 Under
takings law, courts have looked to the regulation at the time of the land
purchase, the owner's ability to obtain financing, and other such criteria.
However, the Act specifically indicates that its claims need not be construed
under the takings law.
46
42. Robert M. Rhodes & Dean Saunders, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13.
43. Hamilton Rice, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13. See, e.g., City of
Aubumdale v. Adams Packing Ass'n, 171 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1965). See generally B.H. v.
State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995) (discussing strict
separation of powers rule in Florida Constitution).
44. This language comes directly from Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960), and is cited in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994). See also
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987).
45. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Reahard v. Lee
County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (lth Cir. 1992) (setting forth factors to be analyzed in
resolving federal "takings" disputes), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995); Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981) (discussing "reasonableness" factor of taking regulation).
46. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9).
This section provides a cause of action for governmental actions that may
not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or the United States
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Under the Act, it is intended that the threshold level of an owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectation for the Act's purposes may be
lower than that required to find a taking. There is no nexus required by the
Act between the time of land purchase, or the specific action creating the
burden, and the time of fulfillment of the expectation. Economic expecta-
tions continually evolve and their reasonableness cannot be easily judged at
a fixed point in time. In the case of takings, this difficulty is mitigated
somewhat by the requirement that the result of government action is that no
substantial use of the property can be made,n7 thereby applying to the
extraordinary case. However, the Act does not establish any specific
threshold of property value loss, so that theoretically, an inordinate burden
can apply to any property value loss. Thus, under the Act, the question of
economic expectations will arise more frequently and its importance has
become more significant.
An important aspect of the inordinate burden definition is that the
property owner must be "permanently" unable to attain the reasonable
investment-backed expectation for the use of the property.48 However,
what constitutes a "permanent" restriction is very problematic. For example,
a property which is classified for more liberal uses under the future land use
element of the comprehensive plan than what is permitted by existing zoning
regulations may not be "permanently" restricted because the future land use
plan projects a more liberal classification for the future. The Supreme Court
of Florida has recognized that comprehensive planning under the state's
growth management laws reasonably incorporates such a timing aspect.49
Indeed, comprehensive plans are required to be periodically updated and
land use regulations must be updated to be consistent with the plans under
Constitution. This section may not necessarily be construed under the case law
regarding takings if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a
taking.
Id.
47. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1383 (citing Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation
Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977)).
48. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e).
49. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993). "A
comprehensive plan only establishes a long-range maximum limit on the possible intensity
of land use. . . . The present use of land may, by zoning ordinance, continue to be more
limited than the future use contemplated by the comprehensive plan." Id. (citing City of
Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev.
denied, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985)).
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the state's growth management laws.50  As a result of the permanent
restriction criterion, "rate of growth" .regulations, focusing on the timing of
development, may become the development management tool of choice for
local governments.5 ' For similar reasons, concurrency programs which
should not be adversely affected by the Act if they are properly incorporated
in the comprehensive plan, include achievable and maintainable level of
service standards based on a financially feasible capital improvements
element, and are implemented in accordance with adopted land development
regulations.
4. Specific Action
The trigger for a claim under the Act is when a governmental agency
takes "specific action" which affects real property. The governmental
agency may be a state, regional, or local government (including special
districts).5 2 A specific action includes an action on an application or per-
mit."3 The Act does not create a cause of action as to the mere adoption
of a law, regulation, rule, or ordinance but only as to specific action that is
applied to real property.
The Private Property Rights Act provides that it is to have a prospec-
tive effect; that is, no cause of action exists under the statute as to the
application of a law, rule, regulation or ordinance adopted prior to May 11,
1995 or noticed for adoption or enactment prior to that date. If these grand-
fathered laws, regulations, rules and ordinances are amended, the Act applies
only to the extent that the application of the amendatory language imposes
an inordinate burden apart from the grandfathered law.' However, it can
be expected that the courts will be asked to apply the Act to governmental
actions on permit applications that take place after that date. Property
50. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1)-(4).
51. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEvELOPMENT 565 (2d ed. 1984); Barbara Childs, Constitutionality of
Phased Growth Zoning Ordinances, 8 URB. LAW. 512 (1976); Note, Phased Zoning:
Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1976).
52. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(c). The definition specifically excludes actions of the
United States or any of its agencies or any state, regional, or local agency exercising its
powers through a formal delegation of federal authority.
53. Id. § 70.001(3)(d). Section 70.001(3)(e) excludes from the definition of "inordinate
burden" temporary impacts; the abatement, prohibition, prevention or remediation of a public
nuisance or noxious use; or governmental actions taken to grant relief to a property owner
under the Act. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
54. Id. § 70.001(12).
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owners will argue that an inordinate burden created by the improper or
unauthorized application of a prior-enacted or noticed law, regulation, rule,
or ordinance should trigger a claim under the Act, lest government attempt
to explain all such subsequent actions as simply implementation of prior
law.
For example, a permit application may be denied or delayed at times
or conditions and exactions may be imposed for which there is no clear
authority or legal justification. Applicants suspect that a government entity
has little to lose by stretching the envelope of demands, when at worst the
unauthorized denial, delay, exaction or condition would be invalidated by
the courts. However, under the Act, if this activity is found to be a specific
action creating an inordinate burden under the Act, an injured property
owner has a cause of action for compensatory damages.
5. Real Property
The Act's definition of "real property" focuses exclusively on
property's physical attributes, including land, its appurtenances and
improvements thereto, and other relevant real property in which the property
owner has a relevant interest." This simplified and narrow focus on the
tangible interests in real property, to the exclusion of the intangible interests,
ignores the remainder of the "bundle of rights" which constitutes proper-
ty.56 It is thus unclear to what extent the Act would protect such intangible
interests as the "right to exclude" the public from use of private property.
In recent United States Supreme Court taking cases, this right has been the
bedrock upon which the Court has based its decisions to find a taking for
public use without compensation.57
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES UNDER THE ACT
A. Claims
The Act establishes a 180-day process for resolution of a claim prior
to the time that the owner may bring that claim to a circuit court. Within
a year of the government action complained of, the landowner must file a
written claim with each governmental agency which was either involved in
55. Id § 70.001(3)(g).
56. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
57. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 176); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
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the action or whose participation is necessary for a complete resolution of
all the relevant issues." The claim must be accompanied by an appraisal.
Within fifteen days, the governmental entity must report the claim and
information regarding a government contact person to the Florida Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs. The governmental entity must also provide written
notice of the claim to adjacent property owners and to "all parties to any
administrative action that gave rise to the claim," although no specific time
frame is required for such notice.
59
B. Settlement Offers
During this statutory 180-day period,6° the governmental entity must
make a written settlement offer to the owner. The settlement offer may
provide for adjustment of the regulations that apply to the use, for mitigation
of the regulatory effect, such as transfers of development rights, or for
attachment of conditions to the use. The settlement offer may require that
the use be addressed on a more comprehensive basis. It may also provide
for "no changes to the action of the governmental entity. 6 l
The settlement offer will be considered by the court in determining if
the government has inordinately burdened the real property.62 A jury must
be impaneled to determine compensation in the event of a valid claim. The
jury must also consider the settlement offer. For this reason, a generous
offer can be an opportunity for the government to reduce potential damages
in the event of liability. 63 Finally, the settlement offer will be considered
by the court in any award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, as
58. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a). The section states:
If the action of government is the culmination of a process that involves more
than one governmental entity, or if a complete resolution of all relevant issues,
in the view of the property owner or in the view of a governmental entity to
whom a claim is presented, requires the active participation of more than one
governmental entity, the property owner shall present the claim as provided in
this section to each of the governmental entities.
Id.
59. Id § 70.001(4)(b). Presumably, at the same time, the governmental entity will also
provide notice to those other governmental entities which, in its view, must actively
participate for a complete resolution of all relevant issues. See id. § 70.001(4)(a).
60. The period may be extended by the parties. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(c).
61. Id. § 70.001(4)(c)ll.
62. I. § 70.001(6)(a).
63. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
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mitigated by the knowledge available to the governmental entity and the
property owner during the 180-day notice period.'
It is reasonable to expect a prudent government, therefore, to make a
settlement offer, backed up by its appraiser's valuation of the property. It
can be further expected that the settlement offer will extend compensation
beyond what the government believes its liability might actually be to
reduce the risk in the event liability is found. The owner's risk in not
accepting such a settlement offer is that it will not prevail and the court will
award higher attorney's fees to the government, based on the owner's
unreasonableness in not accepting an offer.65 In either event, the parties
are encouraged to settle, rather than proceed to court, by incentives not
applicable in common law actions. This is precisely why there may not be
a wealth of case law resulting from claims filed under the Act and why
there is likely to be a considerable number of claims filed and resolved in
settlement.66
The Act builds in extraordinary flexibility for the governmental entity
to effectuate a settlement. In addition to issuing a variance, special
exception, or other extraordinary relief, the governmental entity in the
settlement of a claim under the Act may agree to actions which otherwise
would have the effect of contravening applicable statutes.67 However, in
this instance the parties must obtain court approval under a standard which
requires the court to find that such relief "protects the public interest served
by the statute at issue and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the
governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real
property. '6' By permitting a court to effectuate a settlement agreement that
overrides state law, the Act may be permitting an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the courts.
This provision may also engender unnecessary litigation to create court
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The Act provides that "the
governmental entity and the property owner shall jointly file an action...
for approval of the settlement agreement by the court ... "69 Parties with
64. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)1.-2.
65. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
66. See Robert C. Downie II, Property Rights: Will Exceptions Become the Rule?, 69
FLA. B.J. 69 (Nov. 1995).
67. The contravention of local ordinance, however, may not be allowed, as the Act only
specifically allows "contravening the application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to
the subject real property .... " FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)2. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.
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conflicting interests may contest the validity of an agreement under existing
law. Will parties who have entered into an agreement which purports to
have resolved their conflicts, have the necessary controversy or standing to
file such an action without an opposing party?70 To avoid a collusive or
"friendly" lawsuit, the parties could only enter into a settlement agreement
contravening a statute after waiting out the 180-day notice period, while at
the same time remaining in an adversarial posture. The parties could then
institute a lawsuit under the Act and bring it to issue so that the court could
have jurisdiction to consider the jointly filed action for approval of the
settlement agreement.
C. Ripeness Decisions
If the property owner rejects the settlement offer, then the governmental
entities with whom a claim has been filed must issue a "ripeness decision"
which identifies allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.
Once the ripeness decision has been issued, and at the expiration of the 180
days, the owner need not exhaust administrative remedies but may file the
claim in circuit court.7 ' Commentators have heralded this provision as
among its most significant,72 arguing that remedies under takings law have
proven inadequate in large part because of the stringency of court require-
ments that an action be ripe for adjudication.73 The ripeness decision, like
the settlement offer, will be considered by the court in determining whether
the government has inordinately burdened real property, and in determining
attorney's fees that may be awarded to the prevailing party. Likewise, the
jury may consider the ripeness decision in awarding compensation for a
successful claim.74
D. Court Proceedings
The owner must file the claim in the circuit court in the county where
the real property is located. The claim must be filed on each of the
governmental entities that made a settlement offer and a ripeness decision
70. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
71. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a)-(b). The parties may agree to an extension of time.
72. Richard Grosso, Analysis of CS/HB 863 (1995): Florida's New Property Rights
Legislation, Remarks at the Annual Environmental Land Use Law Update (Aug. 17-19,
1995).
73. Wade L. Hopping, Address at the Annual Environmental and Land Use Law Update
(Aug. 18, 1995).
74. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b).
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which were rejected by the owner." It is the court's responsibility to
determine if a property right exists, as defined under the statute, and whether
the government has inordinately burdened the property, apportioning the
responsibility as necessary between each governmental entity involved.76
An opportunity is provided for an interlocutory appeal of the court's finding
that there is an inordinate burden, but a government which does not prevail
in the interlocutory appeal is subject to costs and the reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the property owner.77
If an inordinate burden has been found, the court must impanel a jury
to determine the compensation due to the owner. Compensation is
determined by calculating the difference in fair market value of the property
that is due to the inordinate burden placed on the property at the time of the
governmental action at issue. The jury must also consider the government's
settlement offer and ripeness decision in determining the loss in market
value.7"
The Act provides that "[t]his section does not affect the sovereign
immunity of government."79 It has been argued that, as a later enacted
statute, the Act supersedes sovereign immunity limitations.8" However, the
plain meaning of this sentence would appear to be that whatever sovereign
immunity is available to government is not changed by the Act. Sovereign
immunity for damages in tort is limited by the Florida Statutes."1 Statutes
are to be construed in pari materi, and the Act does not specifically conflict
with the sovereign immunity statute." Furthermore, the compensatory
relief available from the Act arguably is for a new form of statutory
"tort," 83 and thus only limited compensation is available under the Act.
75. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
76. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
77. Id.
78. d § 70.001(6)(b).
79. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(13)
80. Rhodes, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13. See State v. Dunmann, 427 So.
2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1983) (holding that last expression of legislature will prevail in case of
conflict).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1995).
82. Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1990). For further discussion on state
sovereign immunity in tort actions, see District Sch. Bd. v. Talmadge, 381 So. 2d 698 (Fla.
1980).
83. Constitutional takings have been described as "constitutional torts" for many years,
with the courts applying statutes of limitations applicable to tort actions as a result. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This analogy
would also be applicable to the Act, as it so apparently mimics takings law and specifically
includes constitutional due process violations in its coverage.
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E. Further Impacts to Government and Landowners
The processes under the Act are cumbersome for both the government
and the property owner, but most particularly for the government. The Act
anticipates that multiple parties will be involved to resolve disputes under
the Act. Not only must each government agency involved in a challenged
action participate in the Act's processes, but if either the property owner or
one of the named governmental entities believes another governmental agen-
cy's participation is necessary for "complete resolution of all relevant
issues," 4 then those other governmental entities may be brought into the
process. Given the complex nature of development permits, one might
expect that the majority of property rights claims would involve the
Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Community
Affairs, a regional water management district, a local government, and
perhaps several special districts. Adjacent property owners must also be
notified, as well as all parties to an administrative action that gives rise to
the claim. "Parties" to administrative actions may include not only
governmental agencies, but also citizen interest groups, banks or mortgage
companies, development companies, and generally all persons who are
defined as parties under the state Administrative Procedure Act. 5 Al-
though the Act does not provide these administrative parties the full status
of a party under its provisions, the Act's participants will necessarily
consider their interests as well.
Assuming that the process for arriving at a settlement offer is
confidential and privileged, 6 the process for achieving a meaningful
settlement offer places a significant burden on the local government. Unlike
the typical situation where litigation is in process, the government may be
acting without full knowledge of the relevant facts regarding the property
and the property owner's expectations for his land. Because a suit will not
84. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a).
85. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(a)-(d) (1995).
86. The Public Records Act exempts disclosure of work product prepared in anticipation
of imminent litigation or proceedings until the conclusion of the litigation or proceedings.
See FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1995). It is reasonable to assume that once a landowner files a
written claim with the government agency under § 1(4)(a) of the Act, imminent litigation or
proceedings can legitimately be anticipated. However, the records must have been prepared
by the government attorney, or at his express direction, and must reflect a "mental
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy or legal theory of the attorney or the agency." Id.
§ 119.07(1); see also City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 1986);
Smith & Williams, P.A. v. West Coast Regional Water Supply Auth., 640 So. 2d. 216, 217
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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have yet been filed in circuit court, it is doubtful that discovery under the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure will be available to assist the government
in determining the pertinent facts. At a minimum, the government is well
advised to immediately hire an appraiser to review the appraisal submitted
with the written claim. It must investigate the history of the property's use
and to the extent it is possible, the expenditures made by a property owner
so as to determine any reliance expenditures for vested rights purposes, and
to determine which expectations were "investment-backed."
Unlike settlements made during the course of litigation, the Act does
not provide for counter offers and continuing negotiations for settlement.
Thus, if the parties continue to negotiate, it is unclear if further settlement
offers will be considered either by the court or the jury during court
proceedings.
In addition to making a settlement offer, the government entity or
entities must issue a ripeness decision which identifies allowable uses to
which the subject property may be put. The advantage of a ripeness
decision to the property owner appears to be more procedural than
substantive. The ripeness decision ostensibly allows the property owner to
know how his property may be used under the governmental regulations, but
in reality it is more likely to act simply as the property owner's ticket to the
courthouse. Governmental regulation, as a practical matter, more often
describes what a property owner cannot do rather than what he can do.
Obviously, this is of great frustration to the property owner. However, it
reflects the reality that government regulation is to prevent public harm, and
not to be responsible to specify the details of development of private
property, which is an entrepreneurial activity involving more complex
decisions than merely regulatory ones. Moreover, in making allowances for
specific proposals that may be permitted under the proper circumstances, the
government may provide for a great range of conditional uses. Rather than
describing developments which may be appropriate under specific condi-
tions, which would require tpie government agency to plan in some detail for
the property, it is likely that the government may only realistically be able
to repeat back to the property owner the regulation itself.
In the face of numerous parties with differing legal responsibilities and
authorities, the ability to arrive at a settlement offer or ripeness decision
within 180 days will be a considerable task for each of the governmental
entities involved. Arriving at an agreed upon settlement offer or ripeness
decision involving numerous parties will challenge even the most astute,
best intentioned, and best managed governmental entities.
At the same time, the 180-day time period presents its own difficulties
to the landowners. From the landowner's perspective, the time frames in the
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Act are not realistic or conducive to resolving the situation without
litigation. A delay of 180 days to initiate litigation and then more delay to
bring it to a conclusion can be the death knell of any development project.
Such a delay may result in a proposed development missing the market,
losing financing, and losing the value of the money invested in the land or
project. In addition, these costs as reflected in an appraisal, if ultimately
considered by the jury in an award, may involve compensation that could
cripple many governmental budgets. 7 The potential gain could encourage
marginally successful development projects to be shelved by some land
owners, in the hope of achieving a compensatory payoff higher than market
risks might justify by proceeding with the project.
The new cause of action and remedy created by the Act is not
exclusive. The property owner will be able to bring a collateral action on
a claim under the Act, for example, to invalidate an exaction condition to
a permit. If a specific action is found to be a violation of substantive due
process and creates an inordinate burden under the Act, even though not at
the level of a Nollan or Dolan taking, then the property owner would
nonetheless be eligible to bring an action for both compensation and
invalidation of the improper condition, with the ability to elect the most
favorable remedy.
At present, the incentive has been for a developer to move forward with
the project, even if questionable conditions or exactions were required as a
condition of approval. Often the marginal project either did not advance to
completion, or if it did, it survived at the edge of profitability. Now a new
business decision will come into play: whether to continue the quest for the
necessary development permits and proceed with the project, or put it in
mothballs, play the compensation game, and seek compensation with a
property appraisal based on rose colored sales projections without incurring
the risk of up front development or marketing costs.
The administrative and judicial processes set out in the Act will
severely disadvantage third parties. Although the government must give
notice to "contiguous" property owners when a claim is filed," these
87. Current value based on potential profit from a venture is a legitimate method of
appraisal. The appraisal will be of more than the mere dirt (land), but also includes the value
of the right to use the land and the potential to make a profit from its development, which
increases its present value. For a detailed discussion on evaluating the proper interests of
parties along with the proper determination of fair market value in condemnation
proceedings, see Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So.
2d 67, 69-70 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam).
88. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(b).
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owners or other affected parties who are not government entities have no
formal role in the process. Indeed, property owners whose properties may
be negatively affected by a settlement under the Act are specifically
prohibited from bringing their own claims under the Act. The Act precludes
claims based on "impacts to real property caused by an action of a govern-
mental entity taken to grant relief to a property owner under this section." 9
Presumably, settlement offers made under the Act must be approved by
local governments at public meetings. However, the extent to which
affected parties will be able to influence decisions made at that late date is
questionable. For other governmental agencies' actions which are not
formalized at public meetings, such as certain state governmental actions,
affected parties do not have a point of entry under the Act.
The consequences of a successful claim under the Act based on an
unlawful denial, condition, or delay, jeopardizing the success of a viable
development project, may go far beyond what has been contemplated. The
following example illustrates such consequences. With a residential real
estate project, between 20%-30% of the total sales value can be attributed
to the land. If 25% of the total sales price of a dwelling unit were to be
attributed to land, a 100-acre five dwelling unit per acre project with a
$200,000 per dwelling unit sales price would yield $100,000,000 with $25
million attributable to land or $50,000 per dwelling unit. If the land owner
paid $100,000 an acre for land, but could recoup $250,000 an acre at sale
after incurring the costs of land development necessary to allow for the
construction of dwelling units, then the theoretical increase in the value of
the land at sale would be $15,000,000.
A property owner could make a compensation demand for the
difference between value as inordinately burdened and the value of the land
as enhanced by its theoretical land value at retail sale, the reasonable
investment-backed expectation. A jury will determine the total amount of
compensation for the loss in value due to the inordinate burden and will by
necessity rely heavily on appraisal testimony to set an award within a broad
range of values. The property appraiser could use the "development
approach," a long accepted method of valuation of vacant acreage which, by
definition, is not speculative. Instead, it is a method which demonstrates
how present value has been enhanced by what could have been achieved but
for the governmental action creating the alleged inordinate burden.9"
89. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
90. See, e.g., Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d. 219 (Fla. 1955); Boynton v. Canal
Auth., 265 So. 2d. 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see also Earle, supra note 19, § 9.32
at 223. The development method of valuation would avoid the "business damage" exception
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If compensation is awarded to a property owner under the Act, the
government entity which pays compensation then obtains the title and rights
of use in the property interest. The court will determine the form of the
right which is to be transferred and the recipient of that right.91 The
consequences of this provision are very uncertain. For example, will the
rights to build to a certain height limit be able to be effectively used by a
governmental agency? In accruing a number of partial interests in land, will
the government become entangled in various real property and title disputes
as time marches on? Title insurers and county record clerks are sure to
have their duties complicated by such disparate interests.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT WILL THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
ACT MEAN FOR FLORIDA'S FUTURE?
Doctors are taught that in their medical practice they must "first do no
harm." The legislative process involves more experimentation and risk
taking than would be condoned if practiced by a physician, and it is not
uncommon for the legislative cure to be worse than the disease, or for a
faulty diagnosis to result in a legislative cure for the wrong disease.
Will a new cause of action and remedy, creating new legal rights and
legal procedures which force judicial activism, move Florida forward to a
better system of government planning and land development regulation that
protects both the public interest and private property owners' constitutional
rights? The following will consider what could happen.
Landowners with viable development projects that are -funded and
designed to meet near term market conditions will gain no direct benefit
from a new opportunity under the Act to go to court and collect compensa-
tion, which at best would be a break-even proposition. However, a
landowner who is ready to proceed with a development project that meets
the market, is consistent with the applicable comprehensive plan, and is able
to meet applicable land development regulations, could gain a greater degree
of certainty if the Act causes local governments and agencies to more
closely adhere to their adopted plans and regulations.
Government agencies will be, and should be, wary of straying from
their adopted plans and regulations, especially when tempted to deviate for
political or other reasons not related to the plans and regulations. As local
governments go through the statutorily mandated evaluation and review
process, increased attention will be paid to the potential for the plan to
in the Act. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b).
91. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(7)(b).
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create present rights, not simply future rights. The plan will thus take on
increased importance as a regulatory tool, not simply a planning tool.
There is a danger that government entities will "freeze at the stick" and
avoid making decisions out of fear of violating the Act. Certainly,
government agencies have more incentive now to avoid making tough land
use decisions that might attract litigation under the Act. Unjustified delay,
however, may subject a local government to a mandamus action to force a
decision. If an unlawful delay is construed to be a specific action, then the
governmental agency may also run the risk of being required to pay
compensation to cover the loss of property values caused by the delayed
developer that has missed a market opportunity. However, if the Act causes
a greater recognition of the risk of deviating from adopted law, then it may
have the beneficial effect of causing greater respect for the rule of law by
both landowners and government.
As a result of the Act, litigation over the nature of regulation and
property rights will now be more, rather than less, complex. Property
owners now already faced with a menu of causes of action, including
federal, state and administrative claims, petitions for writs of mandamus,
certiorari review, de novo actions, and claims involving jury issues and non-
jury issues, will find litigation management to be more challenging than
ever. For reasons explained above, settlement negotiations will be more
complicated, more legally oriented, more adversarial, and less productive.
It is common in the Florida Legislature for landmark legislation to be
followed by a "glitch bill" to revise it, often before there has been sufficient
time and experience invested in finding meaning and practical application
of the original legislation. The legislature will be in session at the time of
publication of this article. Attempts to tinker at the edges of this Act before
it is understood and implemented could cause more harm than good. The
authors believe that any action on the Act should be limited to its repeal.
Otherwise, the outcome will consist of further confusion and uncertainty.
Both government and landowners must struggle to reconcile their
planning needs and the need to balance property rights with public
protection. It may be many years before the full effect of the Act can be
truly ascertained. The authors hope that reasonable people may meet on
common ground and work together to develop a fair and effective system
of planning and regulation that will make the Act's provisions moot.
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In the United States, the concept of property exists, not as an abstrac-
tion, but as the "yield" of a tension between the individual freedom to own
and use property and the inherent power of the government to regulate for
the public health, safety, and welfare. Unfortunately, the constitutional
framework for the tension between public and private interests in the use of
private property is anything but coherent (what then Justice Rehnquist once
described as "judicial clangor"), leaving most observers, including the
courts, frustrated and confused as to what are property rights. This
jurisprudential environment of uncertainty is debilitating for responsible
public and private resource planning and management,2 as well as for
property owners and developers who are affected by such programs in many
ways.
The environment of uncertainty breeds confusion, polarization, and
conflict. During the last two decades, the "legal defensibility" of land use
regulations has predominated the dialogue of public planning in America to
the exclusion of what planning is most appropriate.3 The public, concerned
about environmental degradation, sprawl, and congestion, has pressed to
expand public control over the private use of property. Property owners,
while accepting the need for public control, have complained of regulatory
abuses and have pressed the courts to rein in government regulations which
have gone too far. The tension found most of its voice in the so-called
"taking issue" where property rights "hawks," or "taking mavens," argued
for just compensation when regulations went "too far." The underlying
objective of the hawks was not, however, to obtain compensation, but rather
1. In his dissent in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981), Justice Rehnquist wrote:
I agree substantially with the views expressed in the dissenting opinions
of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE STEVENS and make only these two additional
observations: (1) In a case where city planning commissions and zoning boards
must regularly confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine
misfortune to have the Court's treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of
Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn; and (2) 1 regret
even more keenly my contribution to this judicial clangor ....
Id. at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. The term "resource planning and management" is intended to refer to the full range
of planning and management initiatives including land use, air, water, wildlife and other
public efforts to plan for the future and to regulate to achieve that future. Some observers
call this "change management." The term resource planning and management is intended
to avoid the pejorative anti-development implications of the phrase "growth management."
3. The planning and legal literature is literally awash with commentary on the subject
and virtually every planning seminar has at least one program which focuses on "how far can
you go?"
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to create a deterrent against regulatory excesses. If a local government faces
the possibility of paying just compensation far exceeding its boundaries, the
theory was, then the government will be more cautious and may not go as
far as it might otherwise be inclined to go.4 Ultimately, the taking issue
was resolved in favor of compensation. However, the Supreme Court's
holdings in First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles,5
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,6 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' and Dolan v. City of Tigard' have ignored the real weakness in
the system, the lack of effective and efficient judicial review. The
possibility of having to pay compensation for property rights does not act
as a deterrent in the absence of meaningful review of government actions.
Simply put, contemporary planning jurisprudence makes the question of
remedy all but moot.
It should be self-evident that the compact between the government and
the governed, on which this nation is founded, depends on the effectiveness
of constitutional adjudication. Rights do not exist in a vacuum and the
history of civil rights in this nation shows beyond peradventure that rights
which cannot be enforced in court are no rights at all. In the land use field,
property rights have become practically non-existent to the extent that, as of
May, 1995, fifteen state legislatures had given up on the courts as the
guardians of property rights, and have enacted laws which address the issue
of property rights by limiting the power of government.9 The culprits in
this sad story are the so-called "ripeness doctrine,"'" whereby justice
delayed is justice denied, and the practical effect of the "fairly debatable
rule." Both of these judicial standards which are applied to local govern-
ment property regulation have contributed to the lack of effective judicial
4. In his highly influential dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981), Justice Brennan observed: "After all, if a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner? In any event, one may wonder as an empirical matter
whether the threat of just compensation will greatly impede the efforts of planners."
Id. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. 482 U.S. 304 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
6. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
9. Jane C. Hayman & Nancy Stuparich, Private Property Rights: Regulating the
Regulators, 70 FLA. B.J. 55 (Jan. 1996).
10. The ripeness doctrine is derived from the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340 (1986).
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review of such regulation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," Justice
Holmes observed that there is a tension between public and private interests
in private property and that there must be limits. Justice Holmes wrote,
"[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone."'
12
The trouble is, limits are meaningful only if they are easily enforceable
in court, the missing ingredient in contemporary planning law. The legal
fiction that local planning and zoning decisions involving individual parcels
of land, in the context of a particular development proposal, are legislative
acts entitled to a presumption of validity, has compounded the problems
with the practical effect of the "fairly debatable rule." Indeed, the "anything
goes,"' 3 fairly debatable rule so badly imbalanced public and private
interests in regard to the use of land that it is practically impossible to
redress even outrageous abuses of the zoning power. 4
Worse still, the lack of a judicial enforcement of constitutional rights
ensures that there is no "incentive" for local governments to do a "good" job
of planning and regulating because it does not matter. Doing a "good" job
is simply not required to win in court; thus, legal defensibility is "all that
matters." The result is that public planning is under funded and does not
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
12. a d at 413.
13. The "anything goes" epithet was originally coined by Judge Goldberg of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in response to a series of Equal Protection cases following the
Supreme Court of the United States' opinion in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976), in which Judge Goldberg's invalidation of the city of New Orleans' hot dog vendor
regulation was overturned. The Dukes case is a classic illustration of the limited scope of
review available to ensure that local government does not abuse constitutionally protected
rights. After the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Judge Goldberg's decision
for the circuit court, Judge Goldberg commented: "With its holding in Dukes the Supreme
Court has made it clear that in a case such as this, we must apply the test of 'minimum
rationality' and that this test means little more than 'anything goes."' Arceneaux v. Treen,
671 F.2d 128, 136 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (citing Dukes, 427
U.S. at 305). Further, Judge Goldberg stated: "[t]he Supreme Court chose to uphold this
officially sanctioned wiener cartel, opining that '[t]he city could reasonably decide' that the
exempted vendors 'had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm that
distinguished the Vieux Carre."' Id. at 136 n.2.
14. A town recently argued, with a straight face, that a police power regulation should
be sustained if the town could establish a "hypothetical" justification for its actions because
it did not matter whether the justification was real or not. See Trial Memorandum of the
Town of Sunnyvale, Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, No. 87-3704-K (Tex. 192d Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 12, 1991).
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have the political support needed to ensure that the growth and development
of our cities is balanced and beneficial. American planning has not lived up
to its capability, not because planners were unable to anticipate the terrible
social and economic cost of mindless sprawl, but because planning was
made irrelevant in a society that takes it cues from its legal institutions. The
courts said "anything goes"; and local governments, which were delegated
the state's police power, took the courts at their word, ignored planning, and
embraced "anything goes," literally and figuratively. Indeed, even though
the zoning enabling acts of most states required that zoning be "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan," few if any communities had
adopted comprehensive plans by the 1970s.
There are, however, three lines of cases, two from the Supreme Court
of Florida, and one from the Supreme Court of the United States which
could, if rationally and coherently applied to the realities of contemporary
resource planning and management, establish a more certain and predictable
environment for planners and developers alike. The first line of cases arises
out of the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions in City of Miami Beach v.
Lachman"5 and Burritt v. Harris.16 The second line of cases is derived
from the same court's more recent landmark holding in Board of County
Commissioners v. Snyder,17 where the court employed a functional analysis
to hold that individual rezoning actions are not legislative acts. The third
line of cases relates to the Supreme Court of the United States' recognition
of a substantive limitation on the police power within the Just Compensation
Clause of the Constitution of the United States, starting with Agins v. City
of Tiburon." Together, these three lines of cases, if rationally and fairly
implemented, offer an alternative solution to the property rights debate,
which would preserve for local governments the power and authority to go
as far as necessary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, but no
further. This article discusses the law of planning and zoning as it exists
under the auspices of the "fairly debatable rule" and analyzes how the
previously mentioned three lines of cases can be effectively implemented.
15. 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
16. 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
17. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
18. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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II. SUPREME COURT LINE OF CASES
A. The Fairly Debatable Rule
[Dieference does not mean abdication.
-Justice Thurgood Marshall 19
In its landmark decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,20
the Supreme Court of the United States validated the concept of zoning as
a proper exercise of the state's police power and established the constitution-
al standard for the substantive validity of local government planning and
zoning actions.2' The Court stated: "it must be said before the ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."22 Two years later, the Court reaffirmed that
"a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare" was the
substantive raison d'etre of a valid zoning action:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use,
is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.23
The application of this standard to particular zoning actions has,
unfortunately, been complicated and obscured in part by two forces-the
legal fiction that a rezoning is a legislative act, and the so-called "fairly
debatable rule." In Euclid, the Court, after establishing the constitutional
standard for determining the substantive validity of a zoning regulation,
noted that: "[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control."24  There are very few statements which have been so widely
19. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at 395.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (quoting Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)) (emphasis added).
24. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
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misunderstood and misapplied.25 Some have construed the fairly debatable
standard to mean that all a local government need do is hold a hearing
where there is a debate to sustain the substantive validity of an action.26
Others claim that the fairly debatable rule is an irrebuttable presumption of
validity, requiring that all a local government need do is mouth words of
rationality to sustain even the most extreme regulatory actions.27
In either case, judicial review under the so-called fairly debatable rule
is neither "swift nor just" and too often is little more than a test of whether
the local government staff is smart enough to invoke the correct mantra of
rationality. The "anything goes" character of the fairly debatable rule has
undermined the integrity of planning and zoning and has promoted
increasing polarization and division between the public and private sectors,
ultimately contributing to the erosion of planning and zoning powers in the
guise of property rights legislation. Worse still, the "anything goes"
mentality has created a lack of judicial "incentive" to do a "good" job of
25. As one commentator stated:
Just what does "fairly debatable" mean? As Justice Frederick Hall of New
Jersey said in the Vickers dissent, it can mean whatever you want it to and really
provides no guide whatever since virtually any action can be considered fairly
debatable. Given typically wide and liberal interpretations of the law, it allows
precious few limitations on the average municipality. If it was not debatable, it
probably would not be in the courts in the first place; at least, certainly the city
thinks it is debatable, at a minimum. Localities are likely too smart in this day
and age to act clearly and openly arbitrarily and unreasonably.
DON ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLANNING LAW 47 (1981) (footnote omitted).
26. As one judge stated in his concurring opinion:
I am not prepared to say, then, that a denial of a zoning application, or
similar governmental permission, can never rise to the level of a substantive-due-
process claim. Such claims should, however, be limited to the truly irratio-
nal-for example, a zoning board's decision made by flipping a coin, certainly
an efficient method of decision making, but one bearing no relationship whatever
to the merits of the pending matter.
Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted).
27. This is the practical import of the court's embrace of the "debate" in Corn v. City
of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994),
stating the now dubious proposition that:
Where... citizens consistently come before their city council in public meetings
on a number of occasions and present their individual, fact-based concerns that
are rationally related to legitimate general welfare concerns, it is not arbitrary
and capricious for a city council to decide without a more formal investigation
that those concerns are valid and that the proposed development should not be
permitted.
Id. at 1387.
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planning and regulating, which has deprived public planning of the funding
and political support needed to ensure that growth and development is well-
planned.
The problematic character of the fairly debatable rule is particularly
perplexing because the supreme courts of both the United States and Florida
have made it clear that the courts have an obligation to ensure that private
property rights are not destroyed by regulatory excesses. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,8 decided just two years after Euclid, makes it clear that the
Supreme Court did not intend the fairly debatable rule to mean "anything
goes." In Nectow, a property owner challenged a municipal decision to
draw a zoning district boundary along the edge of his property instead of
along the road on which the property fronted. As a result, the property,
located in one comer of an urban block, was zoned differently from the
balance of the block. After a hearing on the merits in front of a master, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held:
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn some-
where. There cannot be a twilight zone. If residence districts are to
exist, they must be bounded. In the nature of things, the location of the
precise limits of the several districts demands the exercise of judgment
and sagacity. There can be no standard susceptible of mathematical
exactness in its application. Opinions of the wise and good may well
differ as to the place to put the separation between different districts.
Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers in such a
matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no foundation in
reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no
substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public
safety, or the public welfare in its proper sense. These considerations
cannot be weighed with exactness. That they demand the placing of the
boundary of a zone one hundred feet one way or the other in land
having similar material features would be hard to say as [a] matter of
law.
The case at bar is close to the line. But we do not feel justified in
holding that the zoning line established is whimsical, without foundation
in reason. In our opinion it is not violative of the rights secured to the
28. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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plaintiff by the Constitution, either of this commonwealth or by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.29
The Supreme Court of the United States, the source of the "fairly
debatable rule," reversed and invalidated the municipal zoning action
making it clear that the Court did not intend an "anything goes" standard for
judicial review of local zoning decisions." First, the Court paid deference
to the lower court's decision and affirmed the constitutional standard
established in Euclid:
We quite agree with the opinion expressed below that a court
should not set aside the determination of public officers in such a matter
unless it is clear that their action "has no foundation in reason and is a
mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial
relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the
public welfare in its proper sense."31
Then the Court carefully, and in detail, reviewed what it saw as the
controlling facts of the case:
An inspection of a plat of the city upon which the zoning districts
are outlined, taken in connection with the master's findings, shows with
reasonable certainty that the inclusion of the locus in question is not
indispensable to the general plan. The boundary line of the residential
district before reaching the locus runs for some distance along the
streets, and to exclude the locus from the residential district requires
only that such line shall be continued 100 feet further along Henry
[S]treet and thence south along Brookline [S]treet. There does not
appear to be any reason why this should not be done. Nevertheless, if
that were all, we should not be warranted in substituting our judgment
for that of the zoning authorities primarily charged with the duty and
responsibility of determining the question.
32
29. City of Cambridge v. Nectow, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183
(1928).
30. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 189.
31. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 365, 395
(1926)).
32. Id. at 188 (quoting Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927)). The
master's findings were:
that no practical use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes,
because among other reasons herein related, there would not be adequate return
on the amount of any investment for the development of the property .... I am
satisfied that the districting of the plaintiff's land in a residence district would not
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Finally, the Court applied the substantial relationship test and found the
challenged actions wanting:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use,
is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restrictions cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. Here, the express findings of the
master, already quoted, confirmed by the court below, is that the health,
safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of
the city affected will not be promoted by the disposition made by the
ordinance of the locus in question. This finding of the master, after a
hearing and an inspection of the entire area affected, supported, as we
think it is, by other findings of fact, is determinative of the case. That
the invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly
injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary basis for the
support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be
sustained.33
In the context of the state court decision, it is plain that Justice
Sutherland, the author of both the Nectow and Euclid decisions, did not
intend the fairly debatable rule to mean "anything goes."
B. The "Substantially Advances" Rule
History would be a wonderful thing-if it were only true.
-Leo Tolstoy
In Agins v. City of Tiburon34 the Supreme Court of the United States
observed that:
The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects
a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of
that part of the defendant City, taking into account the natural development
thereof and the character of the district and the resulting benefit to accrue to the
whole City and I so find.
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187.
33. Il at 188-89 (citations omitted).
34. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land..
. The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest.35
On its face, the Court's statement suggested the existence of a substantive
limitation on the police power. The suggestion was either ignored,
dismissed as a misnomic reference to the due process requirement that a
regulation bear some substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and
welfare, or explained as a contemporary use of the word "taking" as a
metaphor for invalidity.36 Nectow was, after all, a substantive due process
case, not a taking case.
In 1986, however, the Court restated in Agins the proposition first
recognized in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,37 and then
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.3" Nollan involved more than
a recitation of established principle because it was clear that the Court was
not referring to a due process requirement when it spoke of a "failure to
substantially advance" a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia
wrote:
Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's claim, our opinions do not establish
that these standards are the same as those applied to due process or
equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the
takings field have generally been quite different. We have required that
the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest"
sought to be achieved, not that "the State 'could rationally have
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objec-
tive.) 39
35. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal
Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan.
1990, at 3, 5 (lamenting the Supreme Court's ad hoc, fact-based taking decisions, and their
ripeness doctrine, as preventing the development of a clear body of constitutional law for the
states to follow).
37. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). "We have held that land use regulation can effect a
taking if it 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.... or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."' Id. (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
38. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
39. Id. at 834 n.3 (citations omitted).
1996]
140
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
Further, any doubt as to whether the Supreme Court reads the Just
Compensation Clause to be a substantive limitation on exercises of the
police power (that is, to be valid, a regulation must substantially advance a
legitimate public purpose) was resolved in the Court's decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.0 The Court stated: "As we have said on
numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land."''4 Additional confirmation
of the vitality of the substantially advances standard is found in A.A.
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,42 which held that an exercise of
the police power was a taking in violation of the just compensation clause
because it failed to "substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. 43
The court went on to state:
The Supreme Court has recognized that a taking may occur where
a governmental entity exercises its power of eminent domain through
formal condemnation proceedings .... or where a governmental entity
exercises its police power through regulation which restricts the use of
property.... In the latter situation the government regulation must
"substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest" or deprive an
owner of an economically viable use of the land.'
The emergence of a Fifth Amendment substantive limitation on the
police power may well be the most significant event in contemporary
planning law. Indeed, a constitutional requirement that a regulatory action
actually advance (substantially or otherwise) a legitimate public purpose
implicates a scope of judicial review far more exacting than either the
Florida "bounds of necessity" standard, or the rational justification standard
discussed above, and could relegate substantive due process challenges to
the annals of history.
Undoubtedly, local governments will take the position that the Supreme
Court of the United States does not mean what it says and that a "substan-
tially advances" standard would destroy growth management as we know it.
If the "substantially advances" requirement, under the taking clause,
becomes the nominal vehicle for challenges to local zoning decisions,
growth management will change dramatically. But that does not mean that
40. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
41. Md at 1016 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (citations omitted) (first emphasis added).
42. 850 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
43. Id. at 1486.
44. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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local governments will be helpless to ensure that growth and development
"proceeds in an orderly manner."45  To the contrary, a more exacting
standard of review would motivate local governments to do a better job of
planning, to go beyond the minimums that to a large extent have defined the
quality and character of planning in Florida.
iII. THE MIAMI BEACH AND BURRITT LINE OF CASES
That judicial deference does not mean abdication is also clear from the
precedents of the Supreme Court of Florida. In one of its earliest zoning
cases, the Supreme Court of Florida, in City of Miami Beach v. Lachman,6
made it clear that judicial review was more than a pro forma exercise. The
court held that:
While Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company approved the
zoning and segregation of private property into residential, business, and
industrial districts, it was as equally emphatic that if such zoning did not
have some substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare, it would be held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional. There is no warrant whatever in this, or any other,
case to support the thesis that zoning boards are infallible and that any
kind of zoning proposition [that] they promulgate will be upheld. In
other words, zoning boards are in the same category as all other
administrative boards. Their ordinances and regulations will be given
serious consideration and their judgments great weight, but where it is
conclusively shown that they deprive one of his property without due
process or otherwise infringe on State or Federal constitutional
guarantees unreasonably, such ordinances and regulations cannot be
said to be reasonably debatable and will be stricken down.
We understand the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison to be applic-
able. "When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested
in the legislature by the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to
declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it
without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to
maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing" and applies as imperatively when properly
45. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
46. 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
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invoked against a zoning ordinance as it does against an act of the
legislature.47
There is, in fact, a substantial body of law that suggests that the
standard of review in Florida has been and is more exacting than the
"anything goes" deferential, fairly debatable standard.48 While the fairly
debatable rule is frequently invoked by the Florida courts, sometimes in its
"anything goes" garb, there is a clear line of cases which invokes a very
different, more rigorous standard.
In Burritt v. Harris,49 the Supreme Court of Florida expanded on
Lachman and held that:
The constitutional right of the owner of property to make legitimate
use of his lands may not be curtailed by unreasonable restrictions under
the guise of police power. The owner will not be required to sacrifice
his rights absent a substantial need for restrictions in the interest of
public health, morals, safety or welfare. If the zoning restriction
exceeds the bounds of necessity . . . they must be stricken as an
unconstitutional invasion of property rights.5"
The difference between the standard enunciated in Burritt and the
"anything goes" standard of the fairly debatable mantra is palpable. A plain
reading of the court's holding makes it clear that when property rights are
affected, the standard of justifiable regulation is one of necessity, not choice,
which is the sine qua non of the constitutional imperative for a substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare. It would be difficult
for the court to have been more explicit when it stated: "[i]f the zoning
restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity ... they must be stricken as an
unconstitutional invasion of property rights."'"
On its face, Burritt stands for the proposition in Florida that the
Supreme Court of the United States' statement, "bears some substantial
47. Id. at 150 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This case involved a suit by 10
property owners based on the refusal of the City of Miami Beach to rezone their ocean front
property to allow multifamily homes. The court ultimately found the ordinance "fairly
debatable" and ruled in favor of the City. Id. at 153.
48. See Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
49. 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
50. Id. at 823 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Burritt involved a denial of a
rezoning request by a property owner whose property was zoned residential, but due to its
proximity to an airport, was incontrovertibly unsuitable for residential use. The court found
that the county failed to show that its denial was fairly debatable. Id.
51. Id.
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relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare," means that an "owner
will not be required to sacrifice his rights absent a substantial need for
restrictions in the interest of the public health, morals, safety or welfare." 2
Some commentators have tried to avoid the holding of Burritt v. Harris by
claiming that the holding was overruled in City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin."3
However, it is clear that Aikin did not affect the substantive holding in
Burritt.
The issue in Aikin was simply whether the burden was "upon the
zoning authority to prove the reasonableness and necessity of a zoning
classification" or "upon the petitioner [property owner] to show that the
application for rezoning raised a matter which was not a fairly debatable
issue before the legislative authority." 4 The court held:
We conclude that the opinion last above cited [that the burden is
on the petitioner] correctly states the procedural point, and that the
opinion of this Court in Burritt v. Harris has been erroneously construed
as creating "an innovation in the zoning law of Florida." Other recent
cases recognize no such departure, and continue to apply the well
established body of law in this field55
Any doubt that the Aikin court was receding from its "necessity" holding in
Burritt is disposed of by the court's citation of Smith v. City of Miami
Beach.56 There, the court, far from disavowing the Burritt court's necessi-
ty holding, noted:
It is fundamental that one may not be deprived of his property
without due process of law, but is also well established that he may be
restricted in the use of it when that is necessary to the common good.
So in this case we must weigh against the public weal plaintiffs rights
to enjoy unhampered property acquired since the enactment of the
52. Id at 823 (citing Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 1957)).
53. 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1968).
54. Id. at 316 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). By this holding, the Supreme Court has
created an "innovation in the zoning law of Florida," see id, by casting on the zoning
authority the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the zoning
restrictions under attack "bear[] substantially on the public health, morals, safety or welfare
of the community," Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 1965), if the ordinance is to
be sustained. See Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1965). But see Aiken, 217 So. 2d at 316 (disclaiming that the Burritt decision created an
"innovation on the zoning law of Florida").
56. 213 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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ordinance. Such restrictions must find their basis in the safety, health,
morals or general welfare of the community."
Burritt is not alone. In fact, outside of the zoning area, there has never
been any question in Florida that property rights are well-protected from
overzealous regulation. For example, in State v. Leone,5" decided just five
years before Burritt, the Supreme Court of Florida held that: "While it is
true that the constitutional guarantee of individual rights does not prevent
the exercise of the police power so as to interfere with such rights, it does
operate to limit the exercise of that power." 9 The court further stated that:
[T]he police power may be used only against those individual rights
which are reasonably related to the accomplishment of the desired end
which will serve the public interest. This means that the interference
with or sacrifice of the private rights must be necessary, i.e. must be
essential, to the reasonable accomplishment of the desired goal. Such
interference or sacrifice of private rights can never be justified nor
sanctioned merely to make it more convenient or easier for the State to
achieve the desired end. This is so because one, if not the principal,
reason for the existence of a democratic form of government is to
guarantee to the individual freedom of action in those pursuits which do
not harm his neighbors. If there is a choice of ways in which govern-
ment can reasonably attain a valid goal necessary to the public interest,
it must elect that course which will infringe the least on the rights of the
individual.6
Further, contrary to the fairly debatable mantra mavens, the court's
narrow view of the balance between public and private rights is not
"ancient" law, but rather, good law. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated
in In re Foifeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo:6'
In this case the method chosen by the legislature . . . is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the objective ... to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. This is particularly so because property rights are
protected by a number of provisions in the Florida Constitution. Article
I, section 2 provides that "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the law
and have inalienable rights, among which are the right... to acquire,
57. Id at 283-84 (emphasis added).
58. 118 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1960).
59. IM at 784 (emphasis added).
60. lia at 784-85.
61. 592 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1992).
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possess and protect property . .." Article I, section 9 provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law ... ." Article I, section 23 provides that "[e]very
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life . ... " As we have previously noted,
"[tihese property rights are woven into the fabric of Florida history."
The main thrust of these protections is that, so long as the public
welfare is protected, every person in Florida enjoys the right to possess
property free from unreasonable government interference.62
Nor can these clear precedents be dismissed by suggesting that the property
rights principles in cases like Leone (regulation of drug stores) and Piper
Navajo (forfeiture) have no application in the planning and zoning arena.
Property is property. Nowhere in the federal or state constitutions is there
a footnote that diminishes the fundamental character of real property or its
use.
What this all means is that the fairly debatable rule is nothing more
than a jurisprudential rule of procedure by which the courts judge the
evidence in a substantive due process case to determine whether a chal-
lenged action bears some substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
and welfare.63 Under this regime, a plaintiff has an "extraordinary burden
of proof,"' not because it is hard for a plaintiff to win, but because the
burden is on the plaintiff to initially prove a negative; to succeed, the
plaintiff must show that the regulation does not bear a substantial relation-
ship to the public health, safety, and welfare. It is always difficult to prove
a negative; in some cases, however, it is possible.65 In the absence of a
62. Id at 236 (quoting Shriners Hosp. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990))
(emphasis added).
63. It is important to keep in mind that Euclid was a facial challenge and that the
Court's homily to legislative deference was made in that context. Given the Court's holding
in Nectow, an "as applied" case just two years later, it is surely open to question as to
whether the fairly debatable rule should have ever been employed in an "as applied"
challenge regardless of the legal fiction that rezonings were legislative acts.
64. "One who assails zoning legislation has an extraordinary burden of proving that a
municipal enactment is invalid." S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d
813, 815 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also City of Miami Beach v. Weisen, 86 So. 2d
442 (Fla. 1956); Dade County v. Beauchamp, 348 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1978); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So. 2d 707 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1966).
65. For example, a local government's decision to designate a parcel of land as a rural
services area on fiscal grounds could be shown to not bear the requisite relationship to the
public health, safety, and welfare where a plaintiff demonstrates that all required urban
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prima facie showing of invalidity, a court has an obligation to sustain the
governmental action. However, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing, the burden should shift to the local government to demonstrate that
the challenged actions do in fact bear a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, and welfare. If after hearing the local government's evidence,
the court finds that the evidence is such that reasonable men could arrive at
different conclusions, i.e., the record is not determinative and admits to more
than one conclusion, then the fairly debatable rule dictates that the court
should favor the local government.66 On the other hand, if the manifest
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff or the defendant, then the fairly
debatable rule has no application, and the court should rule according to its
determination.
IV. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. SNYDER
A. Zoning as a Legislative Act
As indicated above, one of the more unfortunate elements in zoning
law has been the legal fiction, apparently derived from Euclid, that zoning
constitutes a legislative act and is therefore entitled to a presumption of
validity. In truth, rezoning which involves an individual parcel of land and
a particular plan of development is not an exercise of legislative power.
Nevertheless, until 1972, courts throughout the United States treated
individual rezonings as if they were an exercise of legislative power at the
highest level, establishing public policies of general application entitled to
abject judicial deference.
Prior to the Civil War, local land use controls were limited in nature
and generally related to fire and building standards. 67 Late in the Nine-
teenth century, local government concern about the compatibility of land
uses began to sharpen and expand.68 By 1920, local governments were
services are already available to serve the property.
66. This aspect of the fairly debatable rule is not easy to understand. Traditionally,
ambiguities of every kind between the government and the governed are resolved in favor
of the governed in respect for the principle of reserved powers.
67. See Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875); City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 7 N.Y.S.
501 (Sup. Ct. 1889), af'd, 31 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1892).
68. Most early regulations focused on excluding nuisances and particularly noxious uses
from residential neighborhoods.
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enacting zoning ordinances directed at excluding anything and everything
likely to be an undesirable use.69 As one commentator notes:
[U]rban America was in something of a crisis in the early 1920's. Like
a patient who could endure his fever until he suddenly learned that there
was now a new remedy for it and who was then impatient to be cured,
urban America was now sure that it would perish if it did not have
zoning .... Zoning was the heaven-sent nostrum for sick cities, the
wonder drug of the planners, the balm sought by lending institutions
and householders alike. City after city worked itself into a state of
acute apprehension until it could adopt a zoning ordinance.7
The validity of zoning, however, no matter how popular, was not
immediately apparent to some courts. For example, the Supreme Court of
Texas announced:
The ordinance is clearly not a regulation for the protection of the
public health or the public safety. It is idle to talk about the lawful
business of an ordinary retail store threatening the public health or
endangering the public safety. It is equally idle in our opinion to speak
of its impairing the public comfort or as being injurious to the public
welfare of a community."
69. See generally Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (upholding a
prohibition on manufacture of bricks in select districts in the city of Los Angeles in spite of
fact that use began prior to time that property was annexed into city and prior to adoption
of regulation, and despite fact that manufacture of bricks was physically connected to
particular property due to presence of specific clay and that relocation of clay would make
manufacture of bricks fiscally prohibitive); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-77
(1915) (upholding prohibition of livery stables; and finding that although livery stables are
not nuisances per se, in particular circumstances and particular localities they may be deemed
nuisances in fact and in law, limited only by condition that such police power not be used
arbitrarily or discriminatorily).
70. Charles L. Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan"
and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial Review of Land
Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REv. 607, 608 (1987) (citations omitted).
71. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 516 (rex. 1921) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court of Kansas similarly held:
Under the welfare provision of the statute, a city may exercise broad police power
in protecting the public health, safety, and comfort, but to prohibit an owner of
property from using it for ordinary business purposes, or for any use not in itself
a nuisance, where there is no express legislative authority, is not within municipal
power.
Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 212 P. 884, 885 (Kan. 1923).
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To other courts, such as the Supreme Court of Illinois, the logic of
zoning was inescapable:
The state imposes restraints upon individual conduct. Likewise its
interests justify restraints upon the uses to which private property may
be devoted. By the protection of individual rights the state is not
deprived of the power to protect itself or to promote the general
welfare. Uses of private property detrimental to the community's
welfare may be regulated or even prohibited. The harmless may
sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibition in order to
abate or destroy the harmful. The segregation of industries, commercial
pursuits, and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised
reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety,
and general welfare of the community. The establishment of such
districts or zones may, among other things, prevent congestion of
population, secure quiet residence districts, expedite local transportation,
and facilitate the suppression of disorder, the extinguishment of fires,
and the enforcement of traffic and sanitary regulations. The danger of
fire and the risk of contagion are often lessened by the exclusion of
stores and factories from areas devoted to residences, and, in conse-
quence, the safety and health of the community may be promoted.
These objects, among others, are attained by the exercise of the police
power.72
In 1926, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved the validity
of zoning in favor of rezoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.73
72. City of Aurora v. Bums, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (ill. 1925) (citation omitted). The court
cited with favor a host of pro-zoning decisions from around the country. Id.; see Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 388 (Cal. 1925),
aft'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925); Brown
v. City of Los Angeles, 192 P. 716 (Cal. 1920); City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
184 N.W. 823 (Iowa 1921); West v. City of Wichita, 234 P. 978 (Kan. 1925); Ware v. City
of Wichita, 214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923); State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 4:40
(La. 1923); Bamel v. Building Comm'r, 145 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1924); Brett v. Building
Comm'r, 145 N.E. 269 (Mass. 1924); Spector v. Building Inspector, 145 N.E. 265 (Mass.
1924); Building Inspector v. Stocklosa, 145 N.E. 262 (Mass. 1924); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 127 N.E. 525 (Mass. 1920); State v. Houghton, 204 N.W. 569 (Minn. 1925), affd,
273 U.S. 671 (1927); In re Cherry, 193 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div.), aff'd, 138 N.E. 465 (N.Y.
1922); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920); Pritz v.
Messer, 149 N.E. 30 (Ohio 1925); Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry & Store Repair Works,
187 P. 829 (Utah 1920); Holzbauer v. Ritter, 198 N.W. 852 (Wis. 1924); State ex reL Carter,
196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
73. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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In Euclid, a property owner challenged a zoning ordinance, on its face, on
the grounds that the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and similar provisions of the Constitution of the State of
Ohio.74 The issue, from the landowner's perspective, was not the authority
of the Village to regulate the use of land,7" but the inherent "arbitrariness"
of the regulations at issue. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
but the Supreme Court reversed.76 The Court held:
We believe it, however, to be the law that these powers must be
reasonably exercised, and that a municipality may not, under the guise
of the police power, arbitrarily divert property from its appropriate and
most economical uses, or diminish its value, by imposing restrictions
which have no other basis than the momentary taste of public authori-
ties. Nor can police regulations be used to effect the arbitrary desire to
have a municipality resist the operation of economic laws and remain
rural, exclusive and aesthetic, when its land is needed to be otherwise
developed by that larger public good and public welfare, which takes
into consideration the extent to which the prosperity of the country
depends upon the economic development of its business and industrial
enterprises.'
On its face, the Euclid Court's holding-coming as it did in a facial
challenge to zoning-was consistent with established balance of powers
principles." Unfortunately, two years later, the same court appeared to
74. Id. at 384. The plaintiff requested an injunction restraining the Village from
enforcing the ordinance and from attempting to impose any of the ordinance restrictions on
the subject property. Id.
75. Indeed, counsel for the landowner stated in his argument:
That municipalities have power to regulate the height of buildings, area of
occupation ... and density of use, in the interest of the public safety, health,
morals, and welfare, are propositions long since established; that a rational use
of this power may be made by dividing a municipality into districts or zones, and
varying the requirements according to the characteristics of the districts, is, of
course, equally well established.
Id. at 373.
76. Id at 397.
77. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 373-74.
78. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953), appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955) (citations omitted) (describing the doctrine of Marbury v.
Madison as: "When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional
because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office").
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invoke the same standard of review in an "as applied" challenge.79 In so
doing, the Euclid/Nectow Court emasculated planning as a logical and
rational predicate to land use regulation, and in the bargain exalted what
noted zoning expert Richard F. Babcock would describe forty years later as
"trial by neighborism."'s That was so because the legal fiction on which
the Euclid/Nectow court relied-that zoning was a legislative act entitled to
judicial deference-distanced zoning from rational thought (planning) and
merit-based decision making.
It is not clear how the legal fiction that zoning was a legislative act
came into being. However, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's
prescription for deference in the context of a facial challenge to a zoning
ordinance, which was established in Euclid, was somehow transmogrified
into the proposition that zoning is a legislative power and individual
rezonings are legislative acts. This transmogrification is particularly
mysterious because the Supreme Court itself, in Nectow, clearly went
beyond abject deference when it invalidated zoning as applied to a particular
parcel of land. s"
Once recognized as a legislative act, zoning was freed from the due
process strictures of fundamental fairness and was subject to great deference
in the event that a property owner was so bold as to question a local
government zoning decision. In the 1950s and 60s, many commentators
pointed to the legislative act fiction as the key problem with zoning
jurisprudence and argued that the fiction should be abandoned. One
commentator noted:
The freedom from accountability of the municipal governing body may
be tolerable in those cases where the legislature is engaged in legislating
but it makes no sense where the legislature is dispensing or refusing to
dispense special grants. When the local legislature acts to pass general
laws applicable generally it is performing its traditional role and it is
entitled to be free from those strictures we place upon an agency that
is charged with granting or denying special privileges to particular
persons. When the municipal legislature crosses over into the role of
hearing and passing on individual petitions in adversary proceedings it
should be required to meet the same procedural standards we expect
from a traditional administrative agency.82
79. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
80. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 141 (1966).
81. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188-89 (holding residential use classification invalid as applied
to a portion of a large tract which was unsuitable for residential development).
82. BABCOCK, supra note 80, at 158.
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B. Zoning Reform
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Oregon decided Baker v. City of
Milwaukie"3 and set in motion a "movement" that, at least while it had
breath, invited substantial and meaningful zoning reform. In Baker, the
court accepted the Haar/Babcock planning-regulation construct, 4 which
accords legal significance to the comprehensive plan as an instrument of
public policy." Zoning without the predicate of a plan lacked coher-
ence. 6 In this regard, Baker was no more significant than Udell v.
Haas87 and other "comprehensive plan" cases of the times. However,
Baker turned out to be notable because the logical extension of the
comprehensive plan theorem was that if planning is a legal prerequisite to
zoning-the establishment of official policy-then zoning in accordance with
the plan was nothing more than an implementation tool and not an exercise
of policy-making power.
C. Zoning as a Quasi-Judicial Act
The 1973 decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Fasano v. Board
of County Commissioners8 8 was a true landmark decision which pierced
through the fiction that rezonings were legislative acts.89 Eventually,
83. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
84. See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive 1lan, 68 HARv. L. REV.
1154, 1175 (1955).
85. Baker, 533 P.2d at 778.
86. Haar, supra note 84, at 1175.
87. 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). "Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of
zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that
the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just
a Gallup poll." Id. at 900-01.
88. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), disapproved by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722
(Or. 1980). See discussion infra note 98.
89. The quasi-judicial approach to rezonings was actually embraced earlier, in the 1972
Supreme Court of Washington decision in Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327 (Wash.
1972). In Fleming, the court stated:
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan
and zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning
code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an
adjudication betweeh the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by
the opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are
readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may permeate
a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of
citizens than on the public generally.
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between ten and fifteen states embraced the Fasano rule90 before events
and time overtook the idea and reversed the tide of reform. The issue in
Fasano was the role of the courts in zoning cases. Building on the planning
construct of Baker, the Fasano court dismissed the fiction of zoning as an
exercise of legislative power. The court stated:
At this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly
view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts
to be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less
than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.
Local and small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all
respects of state and national legislatures. There is growing judicial
recognition of this fact of life:
It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits,
make special exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such
activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial,
or judicial in character. To place them in the hands of
Id. at 331; see Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Colo. 1975) (following
Fleming). Other courts have also classified rezoning as quasi-judicial, but have not directly
addressed the issue. See, e.g., Kelley v. John, 75 N.W.2d 713 (Neb. 1956) (making zoning
from changes from residential to business use an administrative act not subject to
referendum); City of Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1967) (affirming
mandatory injunction requiring approval of application to change zoning); Bird v. Sorenson,
394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964) (upholding change in zoning from residential to commercial as
administrative act not subject to referendum).
The Fasano decision was also influenced by a student comment which had appeared
in the Ohio State Law Journal. See Michael S. Holman, Zoning Amendments--The Product
of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
90. Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981); Cooper v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980); Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan.
1978); Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson, 200 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (establishing
a "change of mistake" rule for evaluating zoning decisions, but was not uniformly followed);
Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, 60 A.2d 743 (Md. 1948) (following change-
mistake rule for rezoning which suggests stricter standard than traditional "fairly debatable"
rule); State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Lowe v. City of
Missoula, 525 P.2d 551 (Mont. 1974), overruled sub nom. Greens at Fort Missoula v. City
of Missoula, 897 P.2d 1078 (Mont. 1995); Winslow v. Town of Holderess Planning Bd.,
480 A.2d 114 (N.H. 1984); Cherney v. Matawan Borough Zoning Bd., 534 A.2d 41 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Young Men & Women's Hebrew Ass'n v. Borough Council, 240
A.2d 469, 429 (Pa. 1968); Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 556 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989);
Kentview Properties, Inc. v. City of Kent, 795 P.2d 732 (Wash. App. 1990); Kaufman v.
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1982); Holding's Little Am. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983) (following Fasano in spirit if not explicitly).
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legislative bodies, whose acts as such are not judicially
reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary
government.9
Importantly, the Fasano court explicitly recognized the distinction
between legislative acts to establish policy and the application of established
policy to specific circumstances. The court noted:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific
piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are
subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional
grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a
determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of
property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority
and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test ....
"Basically, this test involves the determination of whether
action produces a general rule or policy which is applicable
to an open class of individuals, interest, or situations, or
whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy
to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former
determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the
latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial." 92
According to the Fasano court, only the former act should be accorded
a presumption of validity where the burden is on the party challenging the
action of the legislative body to establish the invalidity of the action.93 On
the other hand, if the zoning was not legislative, then the proceedings should
be attended by the rudiments of procedure and be subject to a more
searching review by the courts. The court stated:
Because the action of the commission in this instance is an
exercise of judicial authority, the burden of proof should be placed, as
is usual in judicial proceedings, upon the one seeking change. The
more drastic the change, the greater will be the burden of showing that
it is in conformance with the comprehensive plan as implemented by the
ordinance, that there is a public need for the kind of change in question,
91. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26 (quoting Ward v. Village of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533
(Ill. 1962) (Klingbiel, J., specially concurring)). Richard Babcock, of course, takes full credit
for having spread the gospel; credit that is, in fact, due.
92. Id at 26-27 (quoting Holman, supra note 89, at 137) (emphasis added).
93. Id at 29.
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and that the need is best met by the proposal under consideration. As
the degree of change increases, the burden of showing that the potential
impact upon the area in question was carefully considered and weighed
will also increase.94
The principal thrust of the Fasano opinion was to recharacterize the
nature of a rezoning decision and to redefine the scope and character of
judicial review of such decisions. However, implicit in the court's decision
that land use decisions involving individual parcels of land were "judicial"
in character was a requirement for due process. This can be gleaned from
the court's statement that:
With future cases in mind, it is appropriate to add some brief remarks
on questions of procedure. Parties at the hearing before the county
governing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an
opportunity to present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is
impartial in the matter-i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte
contacts concerning the question at issue-and to a record made and
adequate findings executed. 95
D. The Turn of the Judicial Tide
For Babcock and other reformers, the promised land was at hand as
Fasano swept across the land and more than a dozen states embraced its
apparent logic. Florida was not among the Fasano adherents, and in Florida
Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs,96 the Supreme Court of Florida
rejected the argument that an exercise of the police power focused on an
individual parcel of land was not a legislative act.97 Unfortunately, events
conspired against the movement and ultimately, the "revolution," engendered
by Baker and its most famous progeny, Fasano,98 lost its momentum.
With that loss came the demise of the promise of immediate and meaningful
zoning reform.
94. Id.
95. Id at 30.
96. 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983).
97. Id at 174.
98. Fasano was disapproved by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980),
in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that the substantive criteria for zone changes set
forth in the Fasano opinion "could only apply in addition to, not instead of, other standards
imposed by law." Id. at 727.
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There are almost as many explanations for why the Fasano doctrine
lost its momentum as there are explanations for why the sky is blue. Some
argue that the concept was too threatening to political prerogatives and was
forcibly destroyed by the forces of "evil." Others conclude that the distinct
character of state enabling acts posed an insurmountable obstacle to the
reform movement in many states. Still others believe that the Supreme
Court of the United States' opinion in City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc.,99 was misunderstood and misapplied as a rejection of the
Fasano doctrine.
In Eastlake, a developer challenged a referendum provision which
allowed the zoning of a particular parcel of land to be changed by popular
vote, without regard to procedural niceties or consideration of the mer-
its."0 The developer argued that the lack of procedural safeguards and
substantive standards to guide the application of the zoning power to a
particular parcel of land violated the property owner's due process rights
under the Constitution of the United States.' The Supreme Court
rejected the developer's claim, holding that the State of Ohio considered
zoning to be a legislative act'02 and that due process does not attach to
legislative acts. 3 According to the Court, no federally protected rights
were trammeled by the referendum process."
Another popular explanation is that the transformation of local zoning
hearings into formal adjudications was problematic. Local government
officials were not comfortable serving as "trial judges" and wished to avoid
the obvious adversarial nature of formal adjudicatory proceedings. Local
officials were also hesitant to subjugate their political prerogative to respond
to constituent demands by confining their decisions to admissible evidence.
Still others have concluded that the doctrine simply had a bad sense of
timing and was interdicted by another "reform" movement-Monell v.
Department of Social Services."5 What happened, or at least what makes
sense, is that the liability for "improvident land use decisions" move-
ment o° represented by Monell, and the repeated attempts in the 1980s by
the real estate and development industries (the presumed beneficiaries of
99. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
100. Id. at 671.
101. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 673-74.
103. Id. at 679.
104. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 678-79.
105. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
106. The "taking mavens" and their ilk.
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zoning reform) to induce the Supreme Court of the United States to reach
the so-called "taking issue" had the perverse effect of thrashing zoning
reform. City attorney after city attorney argued that it does not make sense
to accede to the notion that zoning is not a legislative act when the
consequence of that cognition is to expose decision-makers to potential
liability.
Whatever the cause, Fasano lost its momentum and property rights
mavens turned their attention to the so-called taking issue in search of a
balance between public and private interests in the use of private property.
Pointing to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' ode to property rights in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, °7 property rights advocates argued that
when a government goes too far in the exercise of its regulatory power, the
government must pay compensation. The advocates' theory was that a
compensation remedy for regulatory excesses would deter governments from
treading on private property rights and realign the balance between public
and private interests in the use of private property. The "police power
hawks" argued, on the other hand, that Justice Holmes' oft-quoted
statement 10 8 was mere metaphorical dictum and that governmental action
which went too far was invalid and did not constitute a taking for public
use. The results of the debate, played out in a series of cases considered by
the Court,1" ultimately favored the compensation advocates. History,
however, does not confirm that the threat of compensation constitutes an
effective governor for regulatory zeal. Indeed, in retrospect, it is possible
to argue that by and large the entire taking issue debate was much ado about
nothing because, as discussed previously, the deferential standard of judicial
review applied to local government zoning decisions renders the question of
available remedies all but a matter of academic curiosity.
107. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
109. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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E. Florida Joins the Movement
More than a decade after Fasano lost its momentum, and almost twenty
years after Richard F. Babcock's The Zoning Game challenged the legal
fiction of zoning as a legislative act, the Supreme Court of Florida joined
the movement in Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder."' In Snyder,
the court noted: "It is the character of the hearing that determines whether
or not board action is legislative or quasi-judicial. Generally speaking,
legislative action results in the formulation of a general rule of policy,
whereas judicial action results in the application of a general rule of
policy."'' In addition, the supreme court agreed with the court below,
which it quoted as stating:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of
persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where
the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct
alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be
functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy setting, are
in the nature of ... quasi-judicial action ...."'
The Snyders owned a one-half acre parcel of property in unincorporated
Brevard County."' The parcel was designated for residential use under
the 1988 Brevard County Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map. The
property was zoned for general use, allowing the construction of a single
family home. The Snyders filed an application to rezone the property to a
zoning classification which allowed a maximum of fifteen units per acre.
At the time, both the current and the requested zoning classifications were
consistent with the residential comprehensive plan designation. The County
staff initially suggested that the application be denied because the property
was located in the one-hundred-year flood plain. The comprehensive plan
allowed only two units per acre to be built in areas within the flood plain,
and thus, the Snyders' requested zoning was inconsistent with the plan.
However, the county director of planning and zoning pointed out that the
property, when developed, would no longer be within the flood plain. The
110. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
111. Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
112. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65,78 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
113. Id. at 471.
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staff then recommended approval of the rezoning and the Snyders' request
was approved by the planning and zoning board." 4
The Snyders' request then went before the Board of County Commis-
sioners for approval. Many citizens opposed the project at the commission
meeting, for the most part, due to the increase in traffic which would be
caused by the development. The county commissioners voted to deny the
requested rezoning, stating no reasons for their denial."'
The Snyders filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court,
which was denied." 6 They then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
the district court of appeal to review the circuit court's denial of relief,
claiming that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of
law in failing to require the county commission to make findings of
fact.' The Fifth District Court of Appeal granted the petition for
certiorari, quashed the denial of the petition in the circuit court, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion."'
The County appealed the Fifth District's decision to the Supreme Court
of Florida." 9 The first issue addressed by the court was whether the
nature of the County's action was legislative or quasi-judicial. The nature
of the action determines the level of scrutiny by the court. The court
described the levels of scrutiny as follows:
A board's legislative action is subject to attack in circuit court.
However, in deference to the policy-making function of a board when
acting in a legislative capacity, its actions will be sustained as long as
they are fairly debatable. On the other hand, the rulings of a board
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity are subject to review by certiorari
114. Id.
115. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 471.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 472.
119. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of Snyder based on conflict with
Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959); Palm Beach County v.
Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 528 So. 2d 1183
(Fla. 1988); and City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), review denied, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985). See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 470. The
court stated that Schauer found that the amendment of a zoning ordinance which affected a
large number of persons was an act legislative in nature and that the district courts of appeal
had gone further in Tinnerian and Grubbs, holding that board action on specific rezoning
applications of individual property owners was also legislative. Id. at 474.
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and will be upheld only if they are supported by substantial competent
evidence.2
It appears that the court recognized a problem with the current standard
of review for zoning amendments but, rather than modify the existing "fairly
debatable" standard of review, the court chose to reach a standard of review
for individual zoning decisions by analyzing the nature of those decisions.
Citing to West Flagler Amusement Co. v. State Racing Commission,'2' the
court explained:
A judicial or quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable,
and the rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions. On the
other hand, a quasi-legislative or administrative order prescribes what
the rule or requirement of administratively determined duty shall be
with respect to transactions to be executed in the future, in order that
same shall be considered lawful. But even so, quasi-legislative and
quasi-executive orders, after they have already been entered, may have
a quasi-judicial attribute if capable of being arrived at and provided by
law to be declared by the administrative agency only after express
statutory notice, hearing and consideration of evidence to be adduced as
a basis for the making thereof.'
In describing the difference between a quasi-judicial and legislative act, the
court focused on the relation of the governmental decision in time to the
property owners activity and the procedural due process requirements
necessary for the governmental decision." Applying this criterion, the
court determined that comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of
the public are legislative in nature and held that the Board of County
Commissioners' action on the Snyders' petition was a quasi-judicial action
properly reviewable by certiorari. 4
F. The Problem with Snyder
The difficulty with the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Snyder
is that the court, after arriving at the important way station of recognizing
that individual rezonings are functionally not legislative acts, apparently lost
120. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (citations omitted).
121. 165 So. 64 (Fla. 1935).
122. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (quoting West Flagler, 165 So. at 65).
123. Id. at 474.
124. Id. at 474-75.
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its way in concluding that such actions are in the "nature of a quasi-judicial
[action]. '' 1I5 The court's language, "in the nature of," does not actually
hold that individual rezonings are quasi-judicial. However, if a distinction
was intended, it has been lost in the maelstrom which has followed Snyder.
In truth, individual rezonings have never been "quasi-judicial" actions.
A quasi-judicial proceeding is one in which a decision is based on discrete
standards. In the zoning universe, the variance is a classic example of a
quasi-judicial proceeding where a property owner seeks relief from zoning
requirements on the basis of specific standards such as "undue hardship."
In contrast, rezonings, even individual rezonings, are based on general
standards, such as the goals, policies, and objectives of a comprehensive
plan.
Nor should individual rezonings be quasi-judicial. The reality,
however, is that land use planning is not a precise science which can be
reduced to specific standards because the key factor in land use---compati-
bility-is governed by the eye of the beholder, the collective judgment of a
democratically elected governing body. 26 Zoning decisions, even individ-
ual zoning decisions are by their nature inherently "political," that is, infused
with collective values and directions which are politically derived.
Nonetheless, that is the way it should be, because planning and zoning are
essential political issues at the local government level and go to the very
essence of community.
A fundamental flaw in the leap of faith to "quasi-judicial" is that the
very object of the zoning reformers and the principal value of discarding the
legal fiction that zoning is a legislative act is destroyed. This is so because
quasi-judicial proceedings are apparently deemed reviewable only by
certiorari, a judicial review which is every bit as deferential to local
125. Id. at 474.
126. That "compatibility" is often mere perception is easily illustrated. Consider a 500-
acre parcel of land slated for development. The developer lays out a network of local streets
and residential lots with a traditional neighborhood shopping area in the center of the project.
The neighborhood shopping center is opened at the same time that the first phase of
residential lots are available for sale and the project builds out quickly. The residents extol
the virtues of their "neighborhood" telling anyone who will listen that the convenience and
safety of "their" neighborhood shopping center is the element which makes their neighbor-
hood a "community of place." Then take the same parcel of land, the same development
plan and make one small change, build the neighborhood shopping center after all of the
homes have been built and sold. Same shopping center, same homes, same neighbors, and
same compatibility, but with a very different result. In this later scenario, the shopping
center is viewed as an alien which will destroy the fabric of their neighborhood and the
residents will fight the development of the center to the finish.
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decision-makers' prerogatives as is the fairly debatable review. 7 After
all, the standard for certiorari review substitutes a search for any justification
(denominated competent substantial evidence)2 for a search for the
truth.'29 Under the certiorari standard, all a local government need do is
pack the record with unauthenticated documents and "words of rationality"
to survive the limited amount of scrutiny afforded by the competent
substantial evidence standard. The fact is that under the certiorari standard,
the weight of the evidence is irrelevant, leaving local governments just as
free to be arbitrary and capricious as under the fairly debatable rule.
Worse still, certiorari review forces local government officials into a
bizarre netherworld where they serve, at the same time in the same
proceedings, as judges (ruling on questions of evidence and objections),
parties (elected representatives of the people), and jury (impartial decision-
makers), all under the watchful eye of their political constituencies. 3
Under the quasi-judicial paradigm, the city faces a difficult "Catch twenty-
two." When an application for a rezoning is submitted, city staff is faced
with the Hobson's choice of taking a position in regard to the zoning-for
or against one of the parties in the adjudication-or running the risk that the
ultimate decision will not be supported by competent substantial evidence.
The only way to resolve the choice without taking sides is for the staff to
remain neutral and ensure that there is sufficient evidence for and against
the proposition to support whatever decision is made.
127. See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1046-47 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
128. The Supreme Court of Florida has commented on the scope of certiorari review,
saying:
The circuit court, therefore, transcended the scope of its certiorari review by
substituting its judgment for that of the local zoning authority. Because zoning
or rezoning is the function of the appropriate zoning authority and not the courts,
the circuit court was not empowered to disapprove the finding of the Board
unless the record was devoid of substantial competent evidence to support the
Board's decision.
Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1091 (Fla. 1978) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
129. The very idea that judicial review should be based on a record composed mostly
of unsubstantiated, lay opinion and large doses of political science which was compiled in
front of elected officials with only the faintest attention to the rules of evidence, is
remarkable on its face and ludicrous in practice.
130. The political implications and influences of zoning decisions cannot be overstated,
particularly in communities where local elections are held every two years and public
hearings are available on local access television.
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The simple fact is that the zoning reformers, while advocating more
regular proceedings at the local level, were not seeking to transform the
zoning process into formal adjudicatory proceedings. Rather, they were
advocating that the courts, when reviewing the actions of local government,
should discard the legal fiction that rezonings were "legislative acts" and
afford a more exacting judicial review than the "anything goes" presumption
of legislative validity. In other words, individual rezonings should be
reviewed in the courts, de novo. They should not be reviewed under the
"anything goes," fairly debatable standard, but rather, under a more exacting
standard which could be called something like the "rational justification
rule."
Under the "rational justification rule," a court would hold a de novo
proceeding, attended by the rules of evidence, to determine whether a
particular rezoning action "bears a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, and welfare." In the absence of any evidence that the action
is not sufficiently related to the public welfare, the court would defer to the
local government. In other words, a plaintiff would have the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the challenged action did not bear the requisite
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare; or to put it another
way, that the regulation exceeds the bounds of necessity.13' If the plaintiff
makes this initial showing, the burden of proof would shift to the local
government to demonstrate that the action at issue does in fact bear some
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare. After
hearing all of the evidence, the court would then rule based on the manifest
weight of the evidence. If the local government succeeds in demonstrating
by the manifest weight of the evidence that the action in fact bears "some
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare," then the
local government's action would be sustained.
V. CONCLUSION
Effective judicial review is the foundation of any civilized system of
rights. For too many years, planning and zoning regulations have been
immunized from judicial scrutiny. As a result, local government planning
and zoning has become adversarial and divisive. Worse still, property
owners and developers have turned to the legislature to limit the planning
and zoning powers of the government. In Florida, the legislature has acted
by creating a law which is very likely to further muddy the already dark
131. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.
2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
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waters of planning jurisprudence. More laws and more standards are not
needed. What is needed is an effective means of enforcing those laws that
already exist. When, and if, the traditional substantive due process standard
in Florida-the "bounds of necessity" standard, as articulated in Burritt v.
Harris-is freed from the "anything goes" application of the fairly debatable
rule, the "rational justification" standard or the "substantially advances
taking" standard can become the norm of judicial review in Florida. Then
the power and resources needed for effective planning and zoning will be
secure and available. In contrast, if effective and meaningful judicial relief
continues to be illusory in Florida, the march of property rights legislation
will continue, and ultimately, the system will fail. Two decades of planning
preoccupation with "legal defensibility" has set the "default switch" against
enlightened resource planning and management. Something has to give or
there will be more Bert K. Harris 32 acts and more decisions in the vein
of First English, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
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Ecosystem Management in Florida-A Case Study
Mike Batts"
In March of 1994, the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") embarked on an ambitious initiative to demonstrate how ecosystem
management could work in Florida. There were six geographic areas
selected for implementation of the ecosystem management concept:
Apalachicola River and Bay, the Lower St. Johns River Basin, the Florida
Bay, the Wekiva River, the Hillsborough River, and the Suwannee River
This paper is a case study of a project located in the Florida Bay Ecosystem
Management (East Everglades) area that incorporated an ecosystem
management approach in environmental permitting.
Florida Rock and Sand Co., Inc. ("FRS") is a limestone rock mining
and processing company located in south Dade County, Florida. FRS
originally held lands south of its existing operations for future expansion but
was advised in 1985, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to divest this
land and make provisions to expand future mining efforts to the north. This
recommendation was based primarily on the quality of the wetlands. To the
south of the existing operations, a high quality wetland community existed
while north of the operations the wetlands were invaded by nuisance and
exotic vegetation. FRS divested its southern-most land holdings and began
to acquire parcels north of its existing operations for future expansion.
FRS began its mine expansion permitting efforts in 1987 with the Lake
D project, which was proposed for approximately 167 acres of mining
located just north of its current operations. The project was complex,
primarily because of a proposed mitigation plan that contained several
components, some of which were considered questionable by the regulatory
agencies. The agencies questioned whether or not proposed impacts to
environmentally sensitive areas would be adequately off-set by the proposed
mitigation. At that time, ecosystem management was not an initiative by the
DEP and the agency approached the permitting of Lake D more in its
* Vice President, The Phoenix Environmental Group, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; 1990-
92, Environmental Director, Florida Phosphate Council, Tallahassee, Florida; 1984-90, Senior
Environmental Analyst, Department of Environmental Regulation, Tallahassee, Florida. B.S.,
1983, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama; M.S., Environmental Engineering, 1994, Florida
State University. Mr. Batts is chairman of the Biology Section for the Florida Academy of
Science, a member of the Florida Water Environment Association, and a member of the
Florida Association of Environmental Professionals. He has authored papers for and lectured
at various conferences, namely, the 69th Annual Florida Water Resources Proceedings and
the 1995 Emerging Technologies in Hazardous Waste Management Conference.
1. See OFFICE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, FLORIDA DEP'T OF EVRTL. PROTECTON,
TOWARD ECoSYsTEM MANAGEMENT, FIRST INTERiM REPORT 1, 6-8 (1994).
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traditional manner of site specificity. As a result of these concerns, the DEP
took the position that the area of impact would be limited to approximately
fifty acres and additional mitigation may be required. Economically, this
was unacceptable to FRS.
Accordingly, FRS redirected its efforts and totally redesigned the Lake
D project in order to accomplish its corporate objectives for minable
resources as well as adequately off-set wetland impacts. FRS purchased
additional land in an area that would later become integral to the South
Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD") and Dade County's
environmentally sensitive land acquisition program, the South Dade
Wetlands Project. The South Dade Wetlands Project includes approximately
48,000 acres in the areas known as the North C-11 Basin and Model Land
Basin. In FRS' redirected efforts for Lake D, those wetlands within FRS
ownership and within the South Dade Wetlands Project would be enhanced
and donated to the SFWMD in order to off-set impacts from mining.
FRS re-submitted its permit application to the DEP to construct Lake
D in September, 1994. Since FRS was in the permitting process for almost
eight years, availability of minable resources was becoming critical. The
redesigned project included preserving approximately 2000 acres of
enhanced wetlands, created wetlands, and open water in exchange for
permits for 306 acres of mining under a life of the mine concept (a twenty-
five year permit). The DEP, realizing the importance of the enhanced,
created, and preserved 2000 acres of wetlands and open water to Florida's
ecosystem management initiative and the South Dade Wetlands Project,
permitted Lake D in July, 1995 after thorough review.3
FRS developed a fully integrated mitigation plan incorporating wetland
creation, enhancement, and preservation of environmentally sensitive lands
designed to off-set mining impacts. The mitigation component of the
project complemented the DEP's ecosystem management initiative and
provided donated land to the South Dade Wetlands Project.
The DEP and other environmental regulatory agencies incorporated the
ecosystem management initiative in permitting the Lake D project. By
forming a public/private partnership in the early phases of the redesigned
Lake D project, the DEP and FRS were able to amicably coordinate
objectives of protecting and enhancing south Florida's fragile natural
resources and providing minable resources critical to projects with public
2. OFFICE OF THE COUNTY MANAGER, METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA., SOUTH
DADE WETLANDS PROJECT (1995).
3. See In re Application for Permit by Florida Rock & Sand Co., DEP Permit No.
132586929, MS132589199 (Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection July 17, 1995).
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interests (prison construction, transportation infrastructure, and canal
restoration). The Lake D project is one of several private projects that has
combined permitting efforts with ecosystem management (others include
Disney's Wildlife Wilderness Preserve and White Springs Agricultural
Chemicals'-formerly OxyChem--off-site mitigation agreement). The
ecosystem management initiative provides Florida with an excellent tool for
managing environmentally sensitive lands while recognizing the economic
importance of the State's industries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973' makes it
unlawful for any person to "take" an endangered or threatened species of
wildlife.2 Since its adoption, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") has
embroiled judges, environmentalists, and the development community in
bitter controversy. Industry and development interests have continually
attacked the ESA, charging that it favors plants and animals over jobs and
people. Environmentalists and conservationists embrace the Act as the last
1. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 9(a)(1), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994)).
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hope for a significant number of species pushed to the brink of extinction
by the adverse activities of mankind.3
Nowhere in the ESA has the legal battle been more critically focused
than in section 9 and what it means to "take" an endangered species. As
analytically discussed in this article, the term "take" clearly encompasses the
actual killing, injury, collection, or capture of an individual member of a
protected species through the direct application of physical force.4 These,
however, are the limits that the development and land use community has
been willing to concede are section 9's prohibitions. Conservationists and
others opposed to some particular human impacts, on the other hand, have
sought to extend section 9's protections to encompass activities that, while
not resulting in the direct or immediate application of physical force to the
animal, nevertheless results in harm, injury, or death through the adverse
modification, degradation or destruction of habitat. This is where the
agreement that has existed dissolves and where the hard-fought battle has
been waged in earnest. In the summer of 1995, a case dispositive of the
definition of "harm" as used in section 9's prohibition against "taking" an
endangered species was decided.
On June 29, 1995, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
long awaited decision in Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For
A Great Oregon (Sweet Home V). 5 The decision is significant in several
contemporary respects. First, in Sweet Home V, the Court has apparently
concluded, by a 6-3 majority, a colloquial dispute that has persisted for over
two decades regarding the proper scope of section 9's protections. Second,
the decision was rendered at a time when the ESA was under increasingly
vigorous attack from political, legislative, and popular interests; at a time
3. In promulgating the ESA, Congress recognized the serious nature of the rising number
of plant and animal extinctions worldwide:
It has become increasingly apparent that some sort of protective measures
must be taken to prevent the further extinction of many of the world's animal
species. The number of animals on the Secretary of Interior's list of domestic
species that are currently threatened with extinction is now 109. On the foreign
list there are over 300 species. Further, the rate of extinction has increased to
where on the average, one species disappears per year.
S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
This so-called "Extinction Crises" is more fully discussed in DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr, A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 7-17
(1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(14), 87 Stat. at 885 (1978) (redesignated as § 3(19) by Pub.
L. No. 95-632, § 2, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752 (1978); current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(1994)).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
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when the ESA's future was, and indeed remains, uncertain. Thus, Sweet
Home V arguably signals an emerging view in the federal courts calling for
a logical, common sense construction of our nation's environmental laws.
This article examines the existing regulatory scheme associated with
section 9 of the ESA as it developed and exists before and after Sweet Home
V. The dispute over the incorporation of significant habitat protection under
this section is summarized, and this article culminates with a detailed
analysis of the Sweet Home V opinion itself. The effects of the Sweet Home
V opinion upon section 9, as well as other provisions of the ESA, are
examined, and conclusions are drawn regarding the long-term impact of this
case.
II. PROHIBITING THE "TAKE" OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES UNDER
SECTION 9 OF THE ACT
Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA forbids conduct by any person that will
"take" a species protected under the Act:
(1) Except as provided in sections 6(g)(2) and 10 of this title, with
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to
section 4 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to:
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea
of the United States ....
This prohibition differs from other major provisions of the ESA in
several particular respects. Initially, section 9 distinguishes between those
species which are endangered7 and those which are threatened.8 By its
6. Pub L. No. 93-205, § 9(a)(1)(B), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)(B).
7. The term "endangered species" is defined by the Act to mean:
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the
Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this
chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
Id. § 3(4), 87 Stat. at 885 (redesignated as § 3(6) by Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 2, 92 Stat. at
3751; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)).
8. The Act also defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." Id. § 3(15), 87 Stat. at 835 (redesignated as § 3(20) by Pub. L. No. 95-632,
§ 2, 92 Stat. at 3752; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)).
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very terms, the statute applies "with respect to any endangered species of
fish or wildlife . . ."' "throughout all or a significant portion of its
range."10  Thus, only those species qualifying for endangered status are
expressly included under section 9. By contrast, those species listed as
threatened enjoy section 9 protection only by virtue of regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary")." Even then, extension
of section 9 protection to threatened species does not appear to be a
mandatory obligation imposed upon the Secretary. 2 Instead, section
9(a)(1) protection is provided at the discretion of the Secretary who must
deem such action to be "necessary and advisable."' 3
Unlike other provisions of the ESA which apply to federal agencies,
section 9 prohibits acts by "any person." Section 3, in turn, defines
"person" very broadly, including individuals, business entities, and all levels
9. Id. § 9, 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)) (emphasis added);
see also ROHLF, supra note 3, at 59, 73. This language also excludes plants from § 9
protection. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 9, 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1)).
10. Id. § 3(4), (15), 87 Stat. at 885.
11. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31-.48 (1994). In this regulation, the Secretary, with a few noted
exceptions, declares that the provisions and protections (including the prohibition against
"taking" under § 9) found in § 17.21 for endangered species, shall now be applicable for
species listed as threatened under the Act. These regulations are issued pursuant to
regulatory power identified under § 4(d) of the ESA:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to subsection (c)
of this section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The Secretary
may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species any act
prohibited under section 9(a)(1) of this title ....
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. at 888 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994))
(emphasis added).
12. ROHLF, supra note 3, at 74-75. The issue of whether the Secretary must prevent the
taking of a threatened species has not been directly litigated. I&
13. For a more thorough discussion of this issue see ROHLF, supra note 3, at 73-75. It
should be noted that § 4(d) of the ESA which grants the Secretary this regulatory power does
seem to provide a significant degree of discretion. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. at 886
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)). Note that the Secretary must issue regulations for
threatened species only upon deeming such action to be "necessary and advisable to provide
for the conservation of such species." Id. Therefore, the Secretary must make some kind
of finding as to the necessity of such regulations for that species' conservation. Additionally,
§ 4(d) provides that "[t]he Secretary may by regulation" prohibit a taking under § 9(a)(1).
Id. (emphasis added). This is a significant departure from the use of "shall" only one
sentence earlier.
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of government within the reach of section 9.14 The scope of this regulation
is far more extensive and encompasses every conceivable actor down to the
individual.15
Section 9 of the ESA defines the term "take" as "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct."'16 This definition clearly contemplates the
more traditionally understood activities that "take" wildlife by hunting,
killing, and collecting of individual animals. But in defining the ESA's true
intent and scope around the "take" concept (within the purposes of the ESA)
the focus has been on the terms "harm" and "harass." The term "harm" has
been defined in regulations promulgated by the Department: "Harm in the
definition of take in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 7
Similarly, the Department has defined "harass" as used in section 9:
Harass in the definition of "take" in the Act means an intentional or
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt
normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to,
breeding, feeding and sheltering. 8
Substantial controversy has been fomented over the use of these two terms
by the Department of Interior as well as by the courts. 9 The salient issue
14. Section 3(13) of the ESA defines "person" to include:
[A]n individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private
entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or political
sub4ivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1001(a)(13), 102 Stat. 2306 (1988) (original version at Pub. L. No.
95-205, § 3(8), 87 Stat. at 885; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13)).
15. See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 73-75.
16. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3, 87 Stat. at 885 (redesignated as § 3(19) by Pub. L. No. 95-
632, § 2(7), 92 Stat. at 3751; current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)).
17. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. See generally Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings
in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful
Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).
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was always: can a person "take" an endangered species by altering or
destroying its habitat?
Ill. FROM PALLA TO SWEET HOME-RECOGNIZING THE CRITICAL
LINK BETWEEN HABITAT DESTRUCTION AND "HARM"
From its origin, the ESA was intently focused on habitat preserva-
tion.2" Congress identified the two most significant causes of species
extinction as habitat loss and hunting.2 ' Given the ESA's clear focus on
habitat, it seemed logical, and Congress understood, that a species could be
"taken" through the destruction of its habitat. Yet this link between habitat
loss and the "taking" of an endangered species was frequently litigated and
initially eluded the courts.
A. The Early Cases---Froehlke, Coleman, and Hill
In Sierra Club v. Froehlk , the Sierra Club initiated a lawsuit to halt
the construction of Missouri's Meramec Park Dam and Reservoir.'
Brought under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),z Sierra
20. The legislative history underlying the ESA acknowledged habitat loss as "the major
cause for the extinction of species worldwide." H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455. During the floor debates on the 1973
House draft of the ESA, Representative Sullivan proclaimed that:
For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from the destruction
of their habitat. The destruction may be intentional, as would be the case in
clearing of fields and forests for development or resource extraction, or it may
be unintentional, as in the case of the spread of pesticides beyond their target
area. Whether it is intentional or not, however, the result is unfortunate for the
species of animals that depend on that habitat, most of whom are already living
on the edge of survival.
119 CoNG. REC. H30,162 (1973). This overriding concern for habitat is reflected in
Congress' declaration of purpose found in § 2 of the ESA:
The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(b), 87 Stat. at 885 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994)).
The primacy of habitat protection in the scheme of the ESA is more fully discussed in
Katherine S. Yagerman, Protecting Critical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species
Act, 20 ENVT. L. 811, 827-47 (1990).
21. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990.
22. 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Club's complaint was amended, adding a claim under section 7(a)(2) of the
then newly-enacted ESA.24 The Sierra Club asserted that completion of the
reservoir would flood a series of subterranean caverns which were home to
the endangered Indiana bat, thereby violating the ESA because this flooding
would jeopardize the continued existence of this listed species.25
The district court was not persuaded by the Sierra Club's arguments.
Pointing to a dearth of knowledge concerning the bat, the court concluded
that the project did not violate section 7 of the Act.26 Section 9 was not
even addressed in the district court ruling which allowed the development
to proceed. 27
On appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals examined Sierra Club's
ESA claims under both section 7 and section 9 of the ESA,28 upholding the
lower court's dismissal of the section 7 claim. 29 The court also rejected
Sierra Club's section 9 claim noting that the section 9 claim rested upon
Sierra Club's assertion that the dam's construction was an attempt to harm
the bat.3" The Froehlke opinion tied section 9 claims to a scienter
24. Sierra Club, 392 F. Supp. at 143.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 144. While not the focus of this article, § 7(a)(2) remains the centerpiece of
endangered species preservation efforts. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides in relevant part:
Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary,
after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical ....
Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2) (1994)). For a thorough analysis of § 7(a)(2) and the issues surrounding its
implementation, see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation
by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993). For
a more focused discussion of the "critical habitat" provision of § 7, see Yagerman, supra
note 20; see also James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1990).
27. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 130 n.132 (pointing out that at the conclusion of the
district court stage of the Froehlke litigation, the Service had not yet adopted a regulation
defining "harass" as used defining a "taking").
28. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting claims
under both § 7 and § 9 of the ESA).
29. Id. at 1303-04.
30. Id. at 1304. In rejecting Sierra Club's § 9 claim, the Eighth Circuit found that:
The allegation as to violation of Section 9, as we have noted, rests upon
the asserted ground that the erection of the dam is a "clear attempt to harass or
harm" the Indiana bat. We are cited to no portion of the record so stating nor
[Vol. 20
175
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
1996] Plante / Baumann 755
requirement somewhat akin to specific intent." Under Froehlke, a
violation of section 9 would be predicated by a specific intent to "harass"
or "harm" through the proposed activity. While this mental requirement is
easily established in the traditional context of a "taking" by hunting,
trapping, or collecting, this requirement would be insurmountable in cases
where the "taking" indirectly or allegedly resulted only from habitat
degradation. Development is rarely conducted with the specific goal of
harming a listed species. The Froehlke opinion illustrates an initial
reluctance by the federal courts to recognize incidental habitat protection as
being included within the concept of "taking" wildlife under section 9.
The continued vitality of this portion of the Froehlke opinion is in
doubt. Such a stringent intent requirement is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the Act.32 A violation of section 9 requires only a showing of
general intent.3 A successful section 9(a)(1) cause of action need only
show that: 1) the defendant knowingly took an animal within the United
States; 2) the animal taken was actually an endangered or threatened species
protected under section 9(a)(1) of the ESA; and 3) that the defendant did not
have a permit from the Department of the Interior to "take" the animal.34
do we believe that from a fair reading thereof any such attempt may be found.
The purposes of the dam's construction have heretofore been discussed in some
detail and need not be elaborated upon at this point. An attempt to harass may
not reasonably be found therein. This Act, as any other, must have reasonable
construction.
Id.
31. Indeed, the Froehlke court required that the drowning of Indiana bats be a specific
goal of the project before it would find a "taking" under § 9. The court may have assumed
that the bats could simply relocate to avoid the rising water. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392
F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afj'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). Sierra Club apparently
offered no discussion or evidence of the availability or scarcity of other suitable caves. See
id.
32. The legislative history of the ESA contains plain congressional intent. Congress
expressed its desire that criminal violations of the ESA be general rather than specific intent
crimes. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 20, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9476.
33. United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988); United States
v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In United States v. St. Onge, the
defendant, a hunter, mistook a protected grizzly bear for an elk. That he neither knew he
was shooting at a grizzly bear, nor intended any harm to the species, was no defense to a
prosecution for violating § 9. 676 F. Supp. at 1045. Similarly, in United States v. Billie, the
defendant was unsuccessful in his claim that the Government was required to prove that he
knew that the animal he was shooting at was an endangered Florida panther. 667 F. Supp.
at 1493.
34. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. at 1045.
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Harm to the species need not be a specific goal of the violator, only the
factual result of his activity.
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman35 also dealt with the ESA
shortly after its adoption. Coleman focused exclusively on section 7.
Section 9 was not addressed in its holding.36 At issue was the proposed
extension of Interstate 10 through portions of Mississippi that would disturb
and destroy habitat vital to the Mississippi sandhill crane.37 The district
court concluded that the proposed Interstate 10 extension would not violate
ESA section 7(a)(2). 38 The National Wildlife Federation appealed to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and, in the interim, the Department of the
Interior designated the subject area as "critical habitat" of the sandhill
crane.3 9  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found this designation
compelling. The appellate court reversed the lower court, concluding that
the project violated section 7 and threatened the crane with extinction
because critical habitat would be lost, actually resulting in ultimate impacts
prohibited under the ESA.4 °
In 1979, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,41 its first case directly involved with interpreting
the ESA. Faced with a multi-million dollar dam and reservoir project
which, upon completion, promised to eradicate the tiny snail darter, a
species of endangered fish,42 the Court concluded that it "would be hard
pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer" than
those found in the ESA.a3 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA commanded federal
agencies to "insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them
do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species. 44
35. 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
36. Id. at 711-12. The true significance of Coleman lies in the fact that § 7(a)(2) was
selected and used in the National Wildlife Federation's efforts to preserve sandhill crane
habitat, while § 9 was not. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 133-34.
37. Coleman, 407 F. Supp. at 707.
38. Id.
39. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
40. Id. at 374-75.
41. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
42. The Tennessee Valley Authority constructed the Tellico dam and reservoir on the
Little Tennessee River for the express purpose of generating electricity, providing recreation,
and encouraging shoreline development. The dam, once completed, would impound 16,500
acres of land, including the habitat of the tiny endangered snail darter fish. See id. at 156-58.
43. Id. at 173.
44. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1978)).
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Dam or no dam, the Hill Court concluded that ESA section 7 demanded
halting the project's completion to preserve the snail darter.45 Throughout
the Hill opinion, the Court noted the comprehensive nature of the protectio-
ns created for listed species under the Act, measuring the ESA's protective
mechanisms against the backdrop of strong congressional intent directed at
preserving the habitat of such species.46  While not directly concerning
section 9, the "take' provision did receive some attention by the Hill court:
We do not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without
"harming" the snail darter. The Secretary of the Interior has defined the
term "harm" to mean "an act or omission which actually injures or kills
wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to signifi-
cantly disrupt essential behavior patterns, which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within
the meaning of 'harm.'47
These early cases illustrate the use of sections 9 and 7 to protect the
habitat of endangered species. Under Froehlke and Coleman, habitat
protection had arguably been assigned to section 7(a)(2), while section 9 was
interpreted according to the more traditional notions of "taking" by hunting,
trapping, and collecting. Even Hill, while recognizing section 9's habitat
protection functions, nevertheless focused most of its analysis on section 7.
However, a small bird in Hawaii would advance what a rare fish in
Tennessee had started.
45. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. On the nature of Congress' stated intent, the Hill Court
observed that "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that
the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities,
thereby adopting a policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution."' Id.
46. In reviewing the ESA, the court acknowledged the Act's strong emphasis on habitat:
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in
the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute. All
persons, including federal agencies, are specifically instructed not to "take"
endangered species, meaning that no one is "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, capture, or collect" such life forms. Agencies in particular are [to]
... "use ... all methods and procedures which are necessary" to preserve
endangered species . . . . The pointed omission of the type of qualifying
language previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a
conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the
"primary missions" of federal agencies.
Id. at 184-85 (citation and footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 184-85 n.30 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1976)).
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B. Section 9 is Linked to Habitat Destruction-Palila
The rigid bifurcation of protection for the animal and protection for the
animal's habitat under ESA analysis came to an abrupt end in 1978 when
the District Court of Hawaii handed down its decision in Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land & Natural Resources (Palila 1).48 The decision, in
addition to saving a tiny endangered bird, polarized and sparked a controver-
sy ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in its
Sweet Home V decision. An analysis of the Palila cases is necessary to
fully comprehend this landmark Sweet Home V decision.
The palila (Loxiodes bailleui) is a six-inch long, finch-billed bird in the
Hawaiian honycreeper family, a group originally consisting of twenty-three
species and subspecies indigenous only to Hawaii.49 Once common in the
higher altitudes along the slopes of Mauna Kea,50 the palila's range has,
been drastically reduced to a narrow fringe of tropical mamane forest habitat
encircling the mountain." The scientific community attributed the palila's
precipitous decline 2 to the deforestation of the island's groves of mamane
(Sophora chysophylla) and naio (Myoporum sandwicense) trees upon which
the bird relies for its food and nesting sites.53 The destruction of the
mamane forests, in turn, was blamed on feral sheep grazing on the
48. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 988; Jonathan Durrett & Christopher Yuen, Palila v. Department of Land and
Natural Resources: "Taking" Under Section Nine of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
4 U. HAW. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1982) (citing SHERWIN CARLQUIST, ISLAND BIOLOGY 158
(1974)).
50. Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano located on the island of Hawaii. Durrett & Yuen,
supra note 49, at 183 n.9.
51. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 988-89.
52. The palila was listed as an endangered species by the Secretary of the Interior in
1967. Burton E. Dezendorf, Jr., Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources:
A New Interpretation of "Taking" Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 19 IDAHO L.
REV. 157, 158 (1983).
53. Durrett & Yuen, supra note 49, at 183-84. In 1977, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, upon recommendation by the Palila Recovery Team, designated the remaining
mamane-naio forest as the "critical habitat" of the palila. 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1977); 42 Fed.
Reg. 40,687 (1977); see generally Dezendorf, supra note 52. Indeed, the scientific evidence
leads to the conclusion that the palila's survival is inseparably linked to the preservation of
the mamane-naio ecosystem in which it has evolved and adapted to survive. Palila 1, 471
F. Supp. at 989 (citing PALILA RECOVERY TEAM, PALILA RECOVERY PLAN 1 (1977)).
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mamane 4  When the suit was originally filed, the palila, mamane, and
sheep all resided almost exclusively on state-owned land."
In efforts to preserve the mamane ecosystem and the palila, the
Hawaiian government embarked on a campaign to eradicate the human-
introduced herds of feral sheep and goats, only to be halted by recreational
hunting interests. 6 When this conservation effort was stalled by sports
hunters targeting the sheep for recreational hunting purposes, the Audobon
Society, the Sierra Club, and one individual brought suit on the palila's
behalf because the bird itself cannot sue. 7 The court held that the
Hawaiian Department of Land and Natural Resources ("Hawaiian DLNR")
was compelled to remove these herds of sheep from the palila's critical
habitat, agreeing with the position taken by the plaintiffs on behalf of the
endangered bird. 8
The plaintiffs claimed that the Hawaiian DLNR's continued mainte-
nance of population of feral sheep and goats, albeit a limited one, amounted
to a "taking" of the palila through the pervasive and continuing degradation
and destruction of its critical habitat. To this end, the plaintiffs sought the
removal of the animals from state-owned palila habitat.5 9 This removal
would ameliorate the critical habitat degradation attributed to the sheep.
The district court in Palila I developed an extensive factual record and
then made several important findings of fact. First, the court found that the
survival of the palila depended upon the preservation of the mamane-naio
ecosystem.' Second, the continued presence of feral sheep and goats in
54. Palila 1, 471 F. Supp. at 990. The mamane leaves, stems, seedlings, and sprouts
served as an important source of food for the browsing sheep. By consuming the mamane
leaves, stems, seedlings and sprouts, the sheep prevented the regeneration of the mamane
forest and, therefore, contributed to its continued decline. Id.
55. Durrett & Yuen, supra note 49, at 184.
56. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.9. Recreational hunters pressured the Hawaiian
DLNR to maintain some population of feral animals on Mauna Kea as game animals.
57. Id. at 987. Palila I began the modem trend in ESA litigation of naming the
aggrieved species itself as a plaintiff.
58. Id. at 999.
59. Id. at 987.
60. Id. at 989 (finding that the mamane-naio forest is essential for the palila's survival);
see also Dezendorf, supra note 52, at 159. The defendants took issue with this finding,
pointing out that no one can state for certain whether this is true, since no attempts have been
made to breed and keep palila in captivity or in an environment lacking mamane or naio
trees. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.7. The district court summarily dismissed this
contention finding that all available evidence pointed to the conclusion that the palila's
survival is inseparably linked to the mamane-naio forest. Id. (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 40,687
(1977); PALiLA RECOVERY TEAM, supra note 53, at 32).
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the mamane-naio forest was found to be the primary cause of the destruction
of the palila's critical habitat.6' The court also found that DLNR's efforts
to preserve the mamane-naio forest, the palila, and a limited stock of feral
sheep through intensive management efforts was an ineffective solution to
regeneration of the mamane-naio forest.6' As long as the feral sheep and
goats remained, so too would the pressure from hunting interests to increase
that population.63 Indeed, the court pointed to the destructive effect that
even a small population of the animals may have on the ecosystem 4.
Finally, the district court found the complete removal of the feral sheep and
goats from the palila's critical habitat to be feasible. 5 Sport hunters could
hunt these animals elsewhere, and they could still hunt other species in the
mamane-naio forest.66 Moreover, the complete removal of these animals
from the palila's critical habitat could be accomplished with relatively minor
expense to the state.67
61. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 991. The court engaged in an extensive inquiry into the
effect that these feral sheep and goats have had on the ecosystem. Id. at 990. Relying on
this data, the Palila I court concluded that:
The Mauna Kea Plan [proposed by the Hawaii DLNR] also proposes that
any game animals be eliminated only after further studies have been made; but
no further studies need be done. Plaintiffs have shown (and defendants have
produced no substantial evidence to the contrary) that the Palila requires all of
its designated critical habitat in order to survive as a species and that the feral
sheep and goats maintained by defendants are the major cause of that habitat's
degradation.
Id. at 991. Indeed, the Palila I court, relying on a study conducted by a DLNR biologist,
pointed to a direct correlation between the ability of the mamane to regenerate and the
presence of browsing sheep and goats in the area under study. Id. at 990 n. 11. The district
court further observed that:
There are doubtless other factors, such as disease, drought, insects, frost,
or competition from exotic grasses and weeds, which prevent the regeneration
of the mamane forest. Feral pigs and Mouflon sheep (a study on the latter by
the State is due for completion in 1980) may also contribute to the forest's
decline. However, the Palila Recovery Team is convinced that stopping
destruction of the forest by feral sheep and goats would solve 90 percent of the
problem.
Id. at 990 n.13.
62. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 990 n.13.
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 990-91.
67. Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 991.
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In light of these facts, the district court in Palila I briefly considered
the section 9 "taking" claim before concluding:
"Take" is defined in the Act to include "harm" which in turn is defined
in the regulations propounded by the Secretary of the Interior to include
"significant environmental modification or degradation" which actually
injures or kills wildlife. The undisputed facts bring the acts and
omissions of the defendants clearly within these definitions. I conclude
that there is an unlawful "taking" of the Palila.65
As a result, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and their request
for declaratory and injunctive relief were granted.69
An appeal soon followed, and little more than a year later, Palila I was
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Palila I Appeal).7' The sole
issue on appeal was whether the term "harm" as used in defining "take"
encompassed significant habitat modification.7 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 2 In upholding
the district court's interpretation of the term "take" as it relates to habitat
modification, the circuit court relied on the 1978 definitions of both "harm"
and "harass" found in contemporary Department of the Interior regula-
tions. 73
68. Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
69. See Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila I Appeal), 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. Id.
71. The district court in Palila I actually resolved a number of legal disputes concerning
the ESA. The district court held as a matter of law that jurisdiction and venue were proper
under the ESA, and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue on this matter. Paila 1, 471 F.
Supp. at 991-92. The court also addressed the effect of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
upon the enforcement of the ESA against the states. Id. at 992-99. The district court
concluded, as a matter of law, that neither the Tenth nor the Eleventh Amendments bar the
enforcement of the ESA against a state government violating the prohibitions of § 9(a)(1).
Id. at 995, 999. For analysis of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment issues addressed in the
district court's Palila decision, see Jack R. Nelson, Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources: State Governments Fall Prey to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 281 (1982).
72. Palila I Appeal, 639 F.2d at 496.
73. Following the first Palila litigation, the Department of Interior revised its definitions
of "harm" and "harass" to accommodate the district court's decision. See infra Part III.C.
However, in 1979, at the time of the first Palila litigation, "harm" was defined as:
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act or omission
which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an
extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but
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The court observed that a successful Palila I-type section 9 claim
necessitated demonstrating some prohibited impact on the species resulting
from the alleged activity. 4 To this end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that:
The defendant's action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the
critical habitat is a violation of the Act since it was shown that the
Palila was endangered by the activity. Defendants have not shown us
how the district court erred in determining that the acts and omissions
of the state were prohibited by the Act. The district court's conclusion
is consistent with the Act's legislative history showing that Congress
was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is the
destruction of their natural habitat. It was supported by all of the expert
opinions.75
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Palila I Appeal must be assessed with
recognition of the extremely supportive fact-finding on the part of the
district court for its conclusions. The court of appeals found a "taking" of
the bird in a relatively conclusory manner, pointing to the district court's
findings of fact and the failure of the State of Hawaii to show where the
district court erred.76
This procedural affirmance may be attributed to the methodology used
by the district court in deciding the case. The science-driven approach taken
by Chief District Judge Samuel King in the Palila I Appeal decision
provided the model for future habitat-based "taking" cases. Judge King's
fact finding regarding the correlation between the effects of the browsing
sheep and the palila's decline was extensive. With extensive fact finding,
the attendant legal analysis was necessarily brief and conclusory.77 The
Palila I-type "taking" case became characterized by fact specific inquiry
resulting in detailed fact finding at the district court level. Then, given the
strong presumption of correctness accorded to the district court's findings
of fact, review by the appellate court in Palila I Appeal was understandably
and appropriately brief.
are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the
meaning of "harm"....
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1978) (amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981)).
74. Palila lAppeal, 639 F.2d at 497 (citing Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R.
1979)).
75. Id. at 497-98 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)).
76. Id.
77. See Palla 1, 471 F. Supp. at 995.
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The findings by the district court make Palila I Appeal a thoroughly
grounded case. Empirical inquiry established that the species' decline was
directly and almost exclusively linked to habitat degradation. Sometimes
scientific evidence cannot be clearly marshaled." The decisions in both
the district and circuit courts in Palila were fueled by an exhaustive body
of unrefuted scientific data.79 The "critical link" between habitat degrada-
tion and injury to the species is not always a clear one. Cases involving a
species that is subject to a variety of threats, or a species threatened by a
number of different parties (as opposed to just one party in Palila) multiply
the burden for plaintiffs who must assemble the necessary science to support
judicial conclusions that a Palila-type "taking" has been presented.
78. Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), is illustrative of what can
happen to a Palila I-type "taking" claim lacking the persuasive scientific data that fueled the
supportive fact finding in the Palila I district court case. Morrill concerned the effects of
development of private property on the northeastern end of Perdido Key upon the highly
endangered Perdido Key beach mouse. Id. at 425. The land immediately to the south of the
parcel in question was state owned land that had been federally designated critical habitat of
the beach mouse. Evidence indicated that the beach mouse had expanded its range outside
of its designated critical habitat and into the private, undeveloped land to the north. Id.
Development of the defendant's land was alleged to constitute a taking of the endangered
mouse. Il at 426. However, the Southern District Court of Alabama disagreed, concluding
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the critical link between destruction of the habitat
on defendant's property and injury to the beach mouse. Id. at 431. Specifically, the evidence
could not conclusively prove that the endangered beach mice were present on the parcel in
question:
There must be some proof of "the critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species." Plaintiff's only proof as to the link between habitat
modification and injury is dependent upon plaintiffs assertion that the beach
mouse exists on DeWeese's property. For the reasons stated above, the Court
finds that plaintiffs evidence is insufficient in this regard. Moreover, even if the
beach mouse did exist on the relatively small area of suitable habitat found on
DeWeese's property, there is no substantial evidence that the destruction of this
habitat could threaten the species.
Morrill, 822 F. Supp. at 430 (citations omitted). The district court found plaintiffs scientific
studies on the effects of the proposed development upon the beach mouse insufficient.
Morrill, therefore, illustrates how a Palla-type claim can fail if the science is not present to
drive supportive fact finding for concluding a "taking" under the Act. Conversely, Sierra
Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), provides an example
of a district court confronted with a formidable body of scientific evidence leading to very
favorable conclusions of law for those trying to protect the red-cockaded woodpecker.
79. See Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 988-91.
19961
184
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
C. The Federal Government Reacts-The Attempted Dilution of
Palila and the Redefinition of Harm
Palila elevated the use of section 9 from a little-known provision in a
poorly understood statute to a formidable cause of action for the protection
of endangered species and their habitat.80 The reaction to the Palila I
Appeal decision was swift and dramatic. In 1981, the United States
Solicitor's Office in the incoming Reagan Administration and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (a division of the Department of Interior) sought to
undo Palila I Appeal.s' The Solicitor's Office read section 9 and the
Secretary's regulatory definition of "harm" as a prohibition against habitat
destruction only when such destruction could be shown to actually kill or
injure wildlife.82 Accordingly, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service"),
in a controversial effort to nullify the impact of the Palila I Appeal,
revamped its regulations defining "harm." 83  The new definitions were
codified into regulation by the Secretary in 1981, to prohibit only significant
habitat modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. 4 "Harm" rising
to the level of a "taking" could not be shown by habitat modification alone;
for this, the Service asserted, was unsupported by the legislative history of
the Act and violative of the ESA.85
The major impacts of this redefinition were twofold. The first major
change came in the form of a newly-emphasized restriction on the Palila I
Appeal, requiring a demonstration that a habitat modification leading to a
section 9 "taking" must actually kill or injure members of a protected
species. A showing of habitat degradation alone will not amount to
80. Cheever, supra note 19, at 146.
81. In fact, some critics who saw Palla I as being correctly decided, suggested that the
Service, in an apparent attempt to reverse the case through regulation and avoid its results,
was engaging in a constitutionally questionable course of conduct. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749
(1981).
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490-91 (1981). The Solicitor's Office, in the spirit of the times,
attributed Palila I to a "fundamental confusion over the distinction between habitat
modification and takings." Id. at 29,492.
83. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
84. Id.
85. Id. While the legislative history behind § 9 indicates a congressional intent to read
the term "take" broadly, the Service concluded that the history of § 9 did indeed support a
broad reading of the term "take." However, the Service concluded that "take" cannot be read
to prohibit habitat modification absent actual injury. Id.
86. Id. at 54,749. The Service points to the preamble of the original harm definition:
"Harm" covers actions . . .which actually (as opposed to potentially) cause
injury . . . . By moving the concept of environmental degradation to the
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"harm," rising to the level of a "taking" under the Palila I Appeal, unless
actual injury or death to the species is also proven. 7 Thus, "[i]n the
opinion of the Service, the final redefinition sufficiently clarifies the
restraints of section 9 so as to avoid injury to protected wildlife due to
significant habitat modification, while at the same time precluding a taking
where no actual injury is shown.""8 It is, therefore, significant to note that
the Service's actions, while clearly limiting the impact of the Palila I
Appeal, never actually questioned the underlying principle that a "taking"
may result from significant habitat alteration. 9 What the Service sought
to accomplish through this redefinition of "harm," was the addition of a
formidable element of causation into the section 9 "taking" cause of action,
along with the introduction of some notion that the actual modification of
habitat must be more than de minimis. "To be subject to section 9, the
modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly impair
essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury to a protected
wildlife species. 9
0
However, while limiting the impact of the Palila I Appeal, the new
definition of "harm" simultaneously conceded the most significant aspect of
the Palila I Appeal opinion-the notion that a species could indeed be
"taken" through the alteration of its habitat. Recognition of this very basic
premise was far from universal in 1981. 9' Rather, the Service remained
definition of "harm," potential restrictions on environmental modifications are
expressly limited to those actions causing actual death or injury to a protected
species of fish or wildlife. The actual consequence of such action upon a listed
species is paramount.
46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981) (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-13 (1975)). Thus, the requirement
that habitat modification actually kill or injure in order to amount to a § 9 "taking" is nothing
new. Rather, Palila I Appeal has apparently forced the Service to amend its regulations to
better reflect this sentiment as intended in the original "harm" definition. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.; see also Cheever, supra note 19, at 149.
90. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749. The inclusion of "actually" (as in "actually kills or injures")
was intended by. the Service to "bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a
party's actions." This injury could occur through the significant impairment of essential
behavioral patterns such as breeding, feeding, and sheltering. Id.
91. See, e.g., North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The district court in North Slope
Borough only gave a cursory glance at the § 9 claim, concluding that the possibility of a
future taking through modification of the Bowhead whale's habitat did not require the
government to halt the oil exploration being challenged in that case. Id. at 362. Thus, North
Slope Borough first raised the distinction between present harm and potential harm resolved
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myopically confined to the narrow concern over the possibility of a flood
of section 9 litigation claiming "takings" based solely on habitat modifica-
tion, and without any showing of "actual" injury or "harm" to the spe-
cies.92
Though arguably curtailing the overall effectiveness of the Palila I
Appeal as a means of protecting the habitat of a protected species, the basic
principle that a "taking" could result from habitat modification became more
firmly established as a result of the Service's actions. In fact, throughout
its response to public comments on the proposed redefinition, the Service
repeatedly declined the invitation by many to limit harm to direct physical
injury to an individual member of a species:
Congress made its intent to protect species and their habitat very clear.
It did not, however, express any intention to protect habitat under
section 9 where there was no appurtenant showing of death or injury to
a protected species.... Thus, to the extent that comments recommend
further limitations, they misconstrued the intent of the rulemaking.93
The regulations, as amended in 1981, sought both the adoption and reversal
of certain aspects of the Palila I Appeal decision.
D. Congress Reacts-Genesis of the "Incidental Taking"
Exception
The Palila I Appeal also brought swift reaction from Congress. This
reaction became manifest in the Endangered Species Act Amendments of
1982."' The most significant of these changes were the inclusion of so-
called "incidental take" exceptions to the prohibitions of section 7 and
section 9.95
by the court in Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources
(Palila I/), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). On
review in the District of Columbia Circuit Court, the court did not even address the § 9
claim.
92. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749. Additionally, the Solicitor's Office pointed to its own
concerns that perhaps the district court in Palila I had misconstrued the biological evidence
presented and had instead substituted its own judgment in finding "harm" to the palila bird
in that case. Id.
93. Id.
94. Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
95. See id. §§ 3, 6, 96 Stat. at 1416, 1422 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4),
(o)(2), 1539(a) (1994)).
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(1) The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he
shall prescribe-
(A) any act otherwise prohibited by [section 9] of this title for
scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the
affected species, including, but not limited to, acts necessary for
the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations
pursuant to subsection (j) of this section; or
(B) any taking otherwise prohibited by [section 9(a)(1)(B)] of this
title if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.96
Thus, newly-added section 10(a)(1) provides two means by which a
person may avoid the consequences of section 9(a)(1). The first exception
describes "takings" for "scientific purposes," and for the enhancement of the
propagation or survival of the affected species.97 This technically inten-
tioned exception typically encompasses recovery activities such as tagging,
captive breeding, and establishment of experimental populations aimed at
reintroduction of a species into its formerly occupied range.98 However,
section 10(a)(1)(B) permits any taking otherwise prohibited by section
96. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(A), (B) (1994)).
97. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)).
98. Department of Interior regulations detail the criteria considered in issuing or denying
"scientific purpose" permits under § 10(a)(1)(A). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a) (1994). In
addition to general permit criteria found at 50 C.F.R. § 13.21(b) (1994), the Secretary,
through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, must also consider.
(i) Whether the purpose for which the permit is required is adequate to
justify removing from the wild or otherwise changing the status of the wildlife
sought to be covered by the permit;
(ii) The probable direct and indirect effect which issuing the permit would
have on the wild populations of the wildlife sought to be covered by the permit;
(iii) Whether the permit, if issued, would in any way, directly or
indirectly, conflict with any known program intended to enhance the survival
probabilities of the population from which the wildlife sought to be covered by
the permit was or would be removed;
(iv) Whether the purpose for which the permit is required would be likely
to reduce the threat of extinction facing the species of wildlife sought to be
covered by the permit;
(v) The opinions or views of scientists or other persons or organizations
having expertise concerning the wildlife or other matters germane to the
application; and
(vi) Whether the expertise, facilities, or other resources available to the
applicant appear adequate to successfully accomplish the objectives stated in the
application.
50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a)(2)(i)-(vi); see generally ROHLF, supra note 3, at 82-86.
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9(a)(1), so long as the "taking" is incidental to an "otherwise lawful
activity."" That is, the activity may accidentally effect a "taking" under
section 9, but may be exempt from prosecution under section 10 depending
upon case by case circumstances. 10° In any case, no "incidental take"
permit will be issued by the Secretary to any person without the submission
of a satisfactory conservation plan including adequate safeguards to reduce
the impact of the "incidental take." 101
The conservation plan required under section 10(a)(2)(A) must include
and detail the anticipated impact of the activity on listed species in
proximity of the proposed activity, the applicant's efforts to mitigate those
impacts, any alternatives to a "taking" available to the applicant, and any
other necessary and appropriate measures required by the plan."2
Based upon the described activities in the permit application, and the
submitted conservation plan, the Secretary must then make the following
determination before an "incidental take" will be permitted under section
10(a): 1) that any "taking" will in fact be incidental; 2) that the applicant
will minimize and mitigate the impacts of the "taking" to the maximum
extent practicable; 3) that the applicant will ensure that the conservation
plan's implementation is adequately funded; 4) that "the taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild"; 5) that any other necessary and appropriate measures required
by the Secretary will also be met; and 6) that the Secretary is provided with
other assurances that the plan will be implemented. 1°3 Congress' reaction
to the Palila I Appeal decision was observably more tempered than that of
the Service. While section 10(a) provides an exception to the otherwise
absolute and categorical ban in section 9, the standards for that exception are
quite rigorous and protective of the species being impacted."t 4
99. Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. at 1422 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(1)(B)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)).
102. Id.
103. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2). Department of Interior regulations also require the
Secretary, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, to "consider the anticipated
duration and geographic scope of the applicant's planned activities, including the amount of
listed species habitat that is involved and the degree to which listed species and their habitats
are affected." Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. at 1422 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(2)(B)).
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E. Palila ll-Identifying the "Critical Link Between Habitat
Modification and Injury to the Species"
The mamane and naio forests of Hawaii's Mauna Kea and the tiny
palila they harbored were again destined to rise to the forefront of the
persistent controversy over the scope of section 9. Palila v. Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources (Palila 11)1°5 virtudaly dupli-
cated the facts and issues litigated only five years earlier." The palila's
critical habitat was still being grazed by non-indigenous animals, only this
time the adverse impacts were caused by exotic mouflon sheep rather than
the feral animals removed following Palila L"°
The district court in Palila II was presented with the Secretary's
revamped "harm" regulation. Palila II, reduced to its essence, examined
whether the Service's redefinition of "harm," in the Secretary's amended
regulatory definition, embodied a substantial change from the previous
definition.' The district court, in a cogent legal analysis, answered that
question resoundingly in the negative." 9
Throughout the trial, the Hawaiian DLNR emphasized the difference
between "potential" harm and "actual" harm.' They argued that the
plaintiffs could show no present pattern of decline in the palila's numbers;
thus, the Hawaiian DLNR insisted that any harm done to the palila due to
105. (Palila I1), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1988).
106. See Cheever, supra note 19, at 152-53.
107. The distinction between the two was described by the district court. "Feral" refers
to animals that, while once domesticated, now roam wild. On the contrary, mouflon sheep
are wild game animals that were taken from the wilds of Corsica and Sardinia and introduced
onto slopes of Mauna Kea between 1962 and 1966. Like the feral sheep and goats, the
mouflon were maintained in the palila's habitat for sport hunting purposes. Palila II, 649 F.
Supp. at 1074. During the initial Palila I litigation, a mouflon sheep study was still
underway to determine the extent of the mouflon's destructive effects upon the mamane. See
Palila 1, 471 F. Supp. at 990 n.13.
108. See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 63-64.
109. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. The court in Palila II had already stated its
position on this issue at the summary judgment stage of the proceeding. Palila v. Hawaiian
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 631 F. Supp. 787 (D. Haw. 1985). At that time, the
defendants continuously argued that the amendments to the regulation had worked substantial
changes upon the meaning of the term "harm," but the court refused to adopt their
interpretation. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075 n.18. Since the government had apparently
failed to recognize the court's position at this earlier proceeding, the district court in Palila
II saw the need to elaborate on its conclusion that the amendments still prohibited destruction
of habitat. Id.
110. Id. at 1075.
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the mouflon sheep's destructive browsing habits was, at best, a potential
one. 111  The DLNR also observed that the palila, whose population
numbers remained constant throughout the controversy, had not been
actually harmed as required under the Secretary's revised "harm" regula-
tion."' Mere adverse impact to the habitat, they contended, did not
amount to "harn" under the Act and the regulation." 3
The district court emphatically rejected this "shortsighted and limited
interpretation of 'harm"' concluding that:
A finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members of
the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation is
presently driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and
effects a taking under section 9 of the Act.114
Palila II clearly and deliberately expanded the scope of section 9
beyond the bounds set only a few years earlier in Palila I. In evaluating the
significance of the Service's redefinition of "harm," the district court held
that the Service explicitly declined to limit "harm" to "direct physical injury
to an individual member of a wildlife species."'" 5  In fact, the Service
attributed the regulation's revision to the following purpose:
The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude claims of a Section 9
taking for habitat modification alone without any attendant death or
111. Id. Specifically, the Hawaiian Government argued that the mouflon sheep do not
presently harm the palila because the sheep feed primarily on the shoots and sprouts of the
mamane trees. The palila derives its sustenance from the seeds and seed pods of the mature
trees. Therefore, the government argued that the browsing activities did not presently deny
the palila of its food source. The government contended that any harm to the palila could
only be indirect and in the future, as the browsing mouflon, at most, merely prevented
regeneration of the mamane trees over the coming years. Id.
112. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. This apparently was a distinct argument against
the existence of any "actual injury." Since, as the Hawaiian DLNR reasoned, "harm"
required actual death or injury, this showing would be substantially undermined by the fact
that the palila population had remained static and may have even increased in spite of the
continued grazing activity of the mouflon sheep.
113. The Hawaiian DLNR's argument was a linear one. Harm to the mamane and naio
forest did not, in and of itself, equal "actual harm" to the palila. The population of the palila
had not declined since Palila I and had even slightly increased. Preventing "harm" to the
trees was beyond the protection intended under the ESA. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1077 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981)).
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injury of the protected wildlife. Death or injury, however, may be
caused by impairment of essential behavioral patterns which can have
significant and permanent effects on a listed species."
6
Clearly, the Service declined to limit "harm" to direct applications of
physical force or violence aimed at an individual animal."7 Yet, the
Hawaiian DLNR asserted that habitat modification prohibited under section
9 must be limited to occasions where direct physical injury or killing of
individual palila birds was the direct and intended consequence of the
modification-precisely what the Service declined to do in amending the
regulation.
The district court's focus on injury to the species as a whole is
consistent with the revised "harm" regulation after Palila I." What the
Service accomplished through its redefined term is that "harm" via habitat
modification requires two elements: significant habitat modification and
116. Id.
117. At this point in the district court's decision, Judge King took an opportunity to
answer criticisms of his Palila I opinion raised during the 1981 amendments to the "harm"
regulation. Judge King concluded that the Service had misconstrued his earlier ruling in
Palila L Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1076 n.21.
Contrary to the assertions [of the DLNR, the court] did not find that habitat
modification alone caused harm to the Palila. On the contrary, the evidence
considered at the summary judgment hearing overwhelmingly showed that the
feral animals had a drastic negative impact on the mamane forest, which in turn
injured the Palila by significantly disrupting its essential behavioral habits.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 1077. Judge King's response to criticisms leveled at his Pala I decision
by the Service suggests that, from the outset, his focus remained on the injury to the species
as a whole and the purpose of the ESA-recovery of listed species:
By consuming the shoots and seedlings, the [feral sheep] prevented the regenera-
tion of the forest and thus brought about the "relentless decline of the Palila's
habitat."
The record was similarly clear that this loss of habitat was the single most
important factor limiting the Palila population. Continued destruction of the
forest would have driven the bird into extinction. As it was, the bird was, and
still is, at the critical population level, that is, perched on the verge of extinction.
The bird is thus highly susceptible to harm from other environmental factors,
such as fire or drought. At the time then, the continued presence of feral sheep
had a severe negative impact on the Palila by indirectly suppressing the
population figures to a level which threatened extinction and by preventing the
expansion or recovery of the population. These factors supported my decision
to order removal of the feral sheep and goats in Palila L
Id. at 1078 (citation omitted).
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actual injury. If a "critical link between habitat modification and actual
injury to the species" can be shown, the section 9 claim will succeed." 9
This "critical link" draws habitat modification into the folds of the "take"
concept found in section 9. The presence of an actual injury or instances
of habitat destruction likely to significantly and adversely affect a listed
species now can amount to a prohibited "taking."
'120
After Palila II, the "critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species" could be established in one of two ways: 1) by
showing that the activity has an adverse impact on the species or 2) by
showing that the activity prevents the recovery of a species.12' The
district court rejected the contention that the establishment of this "critical
link" required either the proven death or injury of individual members of the
species, or some demonstrated decline in population numbers.'22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling
that the palila had indeed been "taken" within the meaning of the amend-
ments to the Department of Interior's regulation defining "harm. ' 23
Significantly, the court of appeals limited its review to the district court's
focus on the harm to the species as a whole and the question of whether the
district court erred in finding that "harm" included habitat modification that
could drive the palila to extinction. 24  The court acknowledged the
119. Id. As the district court opined, "[t]he redefinition stresses the critical link between
habitat modification and injury to the species. Obviously since the purpose of the
Endangered Species Act is to protect endangered wildlife, there can be no finding of a taking
unless habitat modification or degradation has an adverse impact on the protected species."
Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
120. Palila II reduced the inquiry to a two-part analysis centered on the element of
causation. A significant habitat modification must first be established. Then, this
modification must be linked to the actual death or injury of wildlife. This element of
connectedness distinguishes prohibited "takings" from other incidental activities affecting
habitat without adversely affecting the species.
121. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
122. Id.
123. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila
II Appeal), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 1108. The circuit court concluded that the district court's inclusion within
the definition of "harm" of habitat destruction that could drive the species to extinction fell
within the Secretary of Interior's construction of the term. However, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals declined to decide whether habitat modification not threatening the palila with
extinction, but hindering recovery of the species, was also properly included within the
Secretary's definition. Id. at 1110-11.
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deference given to the Secretary's interpretation of "harm," citing this
standard of review as a principal reason for its holding.'2
5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the district court's
assessment that the inclusion of habitat destruction contributing to extinction
was consistent with the Secretary's "harm" regulation.126 Interpreting
"harm" in this manner advanced the overall objectives of the ESA by
"'[providing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved .... ""' This
interpretation, the court reasoned, also was entirely consistent with
Congress' desire to provide an expansive reading of the term "take," as
evidenced by the legislative history of the Act.12 1 The Palila II Appeal
both affirmed the district court's construction of "harm" to include habitat
modification that threatens a species with extinction and upheld the
Secretary of Interior's definition of "harm" as consistent with the ESA. But
this ruling fell short of a complete answer to the controversy.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to reach the question of
whether the regulation's "actual death or injury" requirement could be
satisfied by a habitat modification that hampered a species' recovery as
opposed to precipitating its extinction." 9 The precise scope of the issue
left unaddressed by the court's declination remains unclear. 3 ' In the first
instance, the opinion passed on the question of whether "harm" included
"habitat degradation that merely retards recovery."'' Yet, only a few
sentences later, the court pronounced its decision to pass on the issue of
125. Id. at 1108 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
131 (1985) (upholding the Secretary of the Army's regulations including hydrologically
connected wetlands within the jurisdictional term "navigable waters," the dredging and filling
of which requires a permit under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act)).
126. Id.
127. Palila IIAppeal, 852 F.2d at 1108 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988)).
128. Id. (relying on S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2989, 2995). In defining "take" in § 3(12) of the ESA, Congress has arguably made its
intentions clear. "'[take' is defined in section 3(12) in the broadest possible manner to
include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or
wildlife." S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995.
129. Palila HAppeal, 852 F.2d at 1110.
130. See id. From the court's statements it is possible to draw two different
conclusions. The circuit court may have only declined to address temporary setbacks to a
species' recovery, while otherwise including habitat modifications presenting a permanent and
total impediment to recovery efforts in its principal holding. Conversely, the court may have
refused to reach the more general issue of whether hindrance to a species recovery can
legally amount to "actual injury" to a species.
131. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
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whether "harm" includes those activities that prevent recovery. 32 The
first passage indicates the court's inclusion within "harm" of those activities
that prevent recovery, suggesting that the court hesitated to extend "harm"
to activities that "merely" present a temporary or short term impairment to
the species' recovery. In light of this statement, the second pronouncement
is enigmatic. It purports to cover "habitat degradation that prevents recov-
ery." '133 It is, therefore, unclear whether the variance between these two
declarations is purposeful.
In reality, the distinction between threats to survival and the impairment
of recovery is a significant one. The goal of the ESA is to "recover"
endangered and threatened species, not merely to maintain these species in
a continuing state of endangerment.' 34 A large category of activities may
hamper the achievement of this goal while still falling short of precipitating
a species' extinction. If such a distinction were acknowledged, a number of
activities could be permitted that, while not threatening a species with
extinction, will nevertheless ensure perpetual enrollment on the growing
roster of endangered and threatened fauna.
F. Post Palila 1-Meeting the "Critical Link" Requirement
Palila II, in practice, reduced the "taking" inquiry to a question of
causation and what level of connectedness must be demonstrated by a
preponderance of evidence to prove a violation of section 9. American Bald
Eagle v. Bhatti135 is illustrative on this point. Bhatti began as a suit to bar
deer hunting on a state reservation to avoid alleged risks to bald eagles
132. Id. at 1111 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved" and "to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and threatened species." Pub.
L. No. 93-205, § 2, 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). Conservation
of endangered and threatened species is defined in the ESA as "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary." Id. §
3, 87 Stat. at 885 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)).
Upon listing a species as endangered or threatened under the provisions of ESA § 4,
the Secretary is directed to develop and implement "recovery plans" for the conservation and
survival of the listed species unless he finds that the development of a recovery plan will not
promote the species' conservation. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 11, 92 Stat. at 3766 (redesignated
as § 4(f) by Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2(a), 96 Stat. at 1411; current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)).
135. 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
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present on the site.13 6 The alleged risk to the eagle came in the form of
the ingestion of lead shot from the carrion of deer that have been shot, but
not recovered by the hunter.137 Analogizing to other environmental
regulations, the plaintiffs asked the court to impose a human health-based
numerical standard of "one in a million risk of harm" for determining when
a "taking" has occurred.3 The First Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to do so, concluding that while such numeric standards are appropriate for
EPA pollution control regulations, they were not proper for determining
"harm" under the Secretary's regulation.'39 Rather, the proper standard for
determining a "taking" under the regulation is the presence of "actual harm,"
which requires a greater degree of connectedness than a calculated
possibility of harm under a numeric standard."a4  While bald eagles can be
harmed by ingesting lead, the plaintiffs were unable to introduce evidence
demonstrating that they had actually consumed harmful levels of lead. 4'
Thus, the court acknowledged that the regulation requires a qualitative,
rather than a bare quantitative standard for making decisions under the ESA.
G. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan-Raising a Direct Challenge to Palila in the District
Court
In 1992, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan (Sweet Home /) 42 raised the controversy surrounding section 9 to
the next level of analysis. While previous courts limited their consideration
to the question of whether a particular habitat modification amounted to
"harm" resulting in a "taking" under section 9, the United States District
136. Id. at 164.
137. Id. The core of the plaintiffs' case was that some of the deer shot at the
reservation would not be recovered and would subsequently die of their wounds. These
"cripple loss deer" would still carry the lead shot from the hunter's gun and the bald eagles,
among other animals, would ingest this lead while feeding on the carcasses. Id.
138. Id. at 165. Similar health-based standards are set by the Environmental Protection
Agency in regulating discharges under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. These
numeric standards set the amount of a pollutant to be tolerated based on the level of risk that
the tolerated concentrations will pose to human health. See, e.g., National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,521-27 (1984).
139. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 165-66.
141. Id. at 166. This case, like Morrill v. Lujan, presents a case where the plaintiffs
were unable to establish sufficient scientific proof of "actual injury" resulting from the
alleged habitat modification. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
142. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992).
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Court for the District of Columbia was asked to consider whether habitat
modification or degradation could be a taking at all. The suit was a direct
attack on the very basis of the Palila line of cases and a direct challenge to
the regulatory structure of section 9 as it had stood for more than a decade.
The case was brought by a number of small land owners, logging and
timber companies, and individuals dependent in varying degrees upon the
logging industry in the Pacific Northwest and in the southeastern United
States. 43 The plaintiffs (the "Chapter") challenged restrictions placed
upon logging activities on private property by the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service in its efforts to avoid Palla-type "takings" of the
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker"4 and the threatened northern
spotted owl 45 in violation of section 9.1' The restrictions allegedly
resulted in a host of economic injuries to the plaintiffs and reached
impermissibly beyond the scope of section 9 protections.1 47
The Chapter attacked two specific regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior for the enforcement of section 9.141 The primary
focus remained on the Secretary's regulation defining "harm" under the Act.
The Chapter insisted that this regulation was, on its face, both contrary to
the ESA and fatally vague under the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due
process of law. 49  The Chapter also attacked the regulation extending
section 9's protections to threatened species of wildlife. 50
143. Id. at 282. The plaintiffs consisted of Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, Betty F. Orem, Erickson Busheling, Inc., Southeastern Lumber Manufactur-
ers Association, Inc., Southern Timber Purchasers Council, Ridgetree Logging Company,
Shotpouch Logging Company, Jean Reynolds, Emmy G. Birkenfield, and Pat McCollum.
See Brief for Petitioners at ii, Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (No. 94-859).
144. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1994). The red-cockaded woodpecker was listed under the
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, the predecessor to the modem ESA. Pub.
L. No. 91-135, §§ 1-12, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed'by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat.
903).
145. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h). "Taking" a threatened northern spotted owl is prohibited
pursuant to Department of Interior regulations promulgated under § 4(d) of the ESA. 50
C.F.R. § 17.31(a).
146. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
147. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions forced them to lay off
employees and down-size their operations. Moreover, the restrictions were purported to have
limited their incomes, reduced the supply of timber and to have imposed substantial
economic hardships upon a number of individuals and families. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 282.
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After agreeing on the absence of any genuine disputes of material fact,
both parties moved for summary judgment on the legal issues presented."'
Because the areas owned by, or of interest to, the plaintiffs contained habitat
and/or populations of the listed wildlife, the plaintiffs were uncertain about
disturbance or harvest in these areas for fear that a section 9 violation would
be charged against them. 52 The suit was filed to avoid an enforcement
action. In a carefully formulated response, the district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
the Department of Interior.' Regarding section 9 of the ESA, the court
found Congress' intentions clear and unequivocal; the term "take" was to be
read "'in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." '' l
The ESA and its legislative history supported this conclusion.5
First and foremost, the Chapter argued that by including habitat
modification and degradation as a form of "harm," the regulatory definition
promulgated by the Secretary in the Code of Federal Regulations"5 6
exceeded the intentions of Congress. 7 This argument was soundly
rejected by the district court through application of the principles espoused
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council. 8 Under
151. Id. at 281.
152. The plaintiffs generally alleged that the Service has placed restrictions on timber
harvesting in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast in order to avoid a Palla-type
"taking" of the owl and other endangered wildlife. Id. at 282. However, the plaintiffs made
no claims or allegations of actual or threatened criminal enforcement of the regulation against
them. Id. at 285. Instead, the Chapter asserted that "[tihe [Service] relies on the regulation
to warn landowners that it considers certain land uses harmful to certain listed species (as
by interfering with breeding or foraging patterns), and that engaging in such activities will
subject the actor to agency enforcement." Brief for Respondents at 4, Babbit (No. 94-859)
(citations omitted). 'These warnings put landowners on "notice," of course, and thus
facilitate criminal enforcement for a "knowing" violation of the Act." Id. at 4 n.5. "As a
practical matter, 'persons whose extended conduct might be found a 'take,' and who thus are
exposed to criminal penalties . . . are under commanding pressure to comply' with the
[Service's] view of 'harm,' either by foregoing such conduct or by applying for an incidental
take permit." Id.
153. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 281.
154. Id. at 283 (citing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2995); see also H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 15 (1973), microformed on
CIS 73-H563-9 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
155. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
156. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
157. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
158. Id. at 285 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
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the well-known Chevron two-step analysis, the clear intent of Congress must
prevail. 59 In the absence of such clear intent, any permissible interpreta-
tion of a federal statute made by the agency charged with its administration
will be upheld.' 6°
The court rejected the Chapter's position based on the second prong of
the Chevron test and supported the Secretary's interpretation.1 6' The
Chapter unsuccessfully raised a triumvirate of arguments for their position
that Congress did not intend the term "take" to reach habitat modification
and that the Secretary's interpretation was impermissible. 62 They argued
that the origin of the definition counseled against this construction, that
another section of the ESA provided a remedy if necessary, and that the
Secretary's definition was impermissibly broad. In rejecting the Chapter's
claims, the court explained why each of these arguments failed.
159. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
160. Id. at 843. In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court reviewed challenges to
Environmental Protection Agency regulations permitting states "to treat all pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as through they were encased within a single
'bubble'." Id. at 840. In the course of that review, the court pronounced the following two-
step analysis guiding the judicial review of agency interpretations of federal statutes:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43. The Chevron analysis is premised upon the long-recognized view that
considerable weight and deference must be paid to the executive department's interpretations
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. Id. at 844.
161. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284. The district court initially examined the
legislative history supporting the ESA, concluding that the Congress' intentions as stated in
the Act and its history clearly support interpreting "take" in the broadest possible manner.
Id. (construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995).
Thus armed, the district court was in a position to discard the plaintiffs' claim under the first
step in the Chevron analysis. Having found a "clear congressional intent" the inquiry into
the Secretary's interpretation should end at that point. However, the district court chose to
bolster its opinion by demonstrating that the plaintiffs' claims fell equally short of the mark
on the second prong of the Chevron test. See id. at 285.
162. Id. at 283-85.
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First, the Chapter questioned the permissibility of the Secretary's
interpretation of "harm" by pointing to the origins of the "take" defini-
tion.163 The original ESA bill, Senate Bill 1983, broadly defined "take"
to include "'destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or
range.""'  However, when Senate Bill 1983 was reported out of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, this provision was deleted.1 65 The
Chapter pointed to this omission as compelling evidence that Congress did
not intend "take" to encompass habitat destruction. '6 The court dis-
agreed.1
67
The district court noted that Senate Bill 1983 was one of two ESA bills
considered by the Senate Committee on Commerce. 6' The other, Senate
Bill 1592, defined "take" in its adopted form. 69 The court reasoned that
this legislative history could stand for no more than the proposition that the
Senate chose one definition over another.' As for any conscious deci-
sion to remove explicit references to habitat destruction from the "take"
provision, the court found this characterization of the legislative history far
too speculative.17 ' The historical evidence supporting the Chapter's
position was insufficient to overcome the traditional deference accorded the
Secretary's interpretation under Chevron.
The Chapter also argued that the Secretary's interpretation of "harm"
was impermissible in light of Congress' alleged desire to address habitat
concerns exclusively through the federal land acquisition provisions found
in section 4 of the ESA."' Pursuant to section 4, the Secretary is given
the authority to utilize land acquisition and other measures to implement
recovery programs for endangered and threatened species. 73 By including
163. Id. at 283.
164. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
165. Id.
166. Id. The premise underlying the plaintiffs' contention was that the reference was
purposefully deleted by the Senate Committee expressing a desire to curtail the definition of
"take" and exclude habitat modification as a course of conduct that may result in a "taking."
Id.
167. Id.
168. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 5, 87 Stat. at 889 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)
(1994)). Section 5 provides, in relevant, part that to carry out a program to conserve
endangered or threatened species, the appropriate Secretary:
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this provision, the Chapter suggested that Congress had provided the
Secretary with the means to protect habitat through public purchase of
private property. 74 This protective measure, the Chapter reasoned, was
intended to be the sole and exclusive means by which the problem of habitat
destruction was to be addressed.'75 Any further protection under section
9 would, therefore, render section 5 a nullity.176 This argument also was
rejected by the district court.177  While the ESA's legislative history
revealed an intent that federal land acquisition play an important role in
habitat preservation, the court was unable to find any indication that land
acquisition was to be the "exclusive protective mechanism for listed species'
habitat. '178
The Act and its underlying legislative history instead lent credence to
the notion that land acquisition was intended to be just one of several
protective mechanisms at the Secretary's disposal. 179  The Act itself
empowers the Secretary to "utilize the land acquisition and other authority"
provided under a number of federal acts to carry out conservation pro-
grams. 80 Specific statements in the legislative history also countered the
Chapter's position.1
8 1
(1) shall utilize the land acquisition and other authority under the Fish and
Wildlife Act of 1956 .... the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act .... and the
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, as appropriate; and
(2) is authorized to acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands,
waters, or interests therein, and such authority shall be in addition to any other
land acquisition authority vested in him.
Id. (citations omitted).
174. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
180. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
181. The district court points to two specific statements found in the legislative history
leading to the passage of § 4 of the Act. In considering § 4, a House Conference Report
provided, inter alia, that "[a]ny effective program for the conservation of endangered species
demands that there be adequate authority vested in the program managers to acquire habitat
which is critical to the survival of the species." Id. at 283 (quoting H.R. CON. REP. No.
740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3001, 3004). The
second statement relied upon by the district court is found in the Senate Committee on
Commerce's Report on Senate Bill 1983, which recognized that protection of habitat was
often the only means of protecting endangered animals occurring on private lands. Id.
(construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2995).
Clearly, these schemes are intended to be mutually supporting (not mutually exclusive) means
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Finally, the Chapter questioned the permissibility of the Secretary's
interpretation on the ground that "harm" was added to the definition of
"take" via a technical amendment which was never debated by Congress.
In light of this, the Chapter reasoned that the expansive interpretation
ascribed to the term "harm" by the Secretary was inappropriate."'2
In rejecting this claim, the district court's reasoning was two-fold.
First, the court reiterated its conclusion that the Secretary's definition of the
term "harm" was entirely compatible with Congress' definition of
"take."' 3 Although the Chapter suggested that the Secretary's regulation
encompassing land use and habitat destruction stood at variance with every
other component of the "take" definition, the'court found the plaintiff s own
argument flawed since it also relied on an overly-broad interpretation of the
Secretary's regulation.' The district court found the term "harm"
sufficiently similar to the terms hunt, harass, and pursue, since the
interpretation of the term "harm" limited its application only to those habitat
modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. 5
The Secretary correctly points out, however, that not all habitat
modification actions constitute "harm" under the § 17.3 definition;
rather, only an action which "actually kills or injures wildlife" falls into
the category of "harm." The Secretary's definition thus requires proof
of actual killing or injury to wildlife, consistent with the ESA's
definition of "take."186
This statement is somewhat disingenuous in light of Palila II which held the
"actual death or injury" requirement satisfied by injury to the species as a
whole and not just injury to individual animals was required to show a
to accomplish the species recovery purposes of the Act. Id. at 284.
182. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
183. Id.
184. Id. The Chapter argued that "harm," unlike every other component of the "take"
definition, was expanded to include habitat destruction and land use, while the other terms
such as "hunt," "pursue," and "shoot" are not provided with such an expansive definition.
See id. (citing Plaintiffs' Mem. for Summary Judgment at 21, Babbit (No. 94-859)). This
argument, relying on the nocitur a sociis principle of statutory construction, played a much
more prominent role in the several appellate opinions that followed. See generally, Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home I), 1 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
185. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
186. Id.
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"taking."' 87 In a relatively conclusory manner, the District of Columbia
district court avoided much of the holding of the Hawaiian district court in
Palila H."'
The district court ultimately resolved this argument on the grounds that
Congress, when reauthorizing the ESA in 1982, was aware of the Palila
decisions and, nevertheless, declined the opportunity to reverse these
decisions through legislation." 9  The court observed that Congress'
reaction to Palila II was instead found in the amendments to section
10(a),' 90 evidencing a congressional desire to accommodate the Secretary's
definition of "harm" and ratify the interpretation found in Palila I. The
court concluded that the Chapter failed to meet its burden under the Chevron
analysis.' 9 ' In accordance with the Supreme Court's Chevron analysis, the
district court deferred to the discretion of the Secretary and upheld the
regulation."9
The Chapter also advanced the theory that the "harm" definition was
fatally vague and, therefore, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 193  Under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, the Due
Process Clause demands that criminal statutes define criminal offenses with
a sufficient degree of definiteness so as to adequately inform ordinary
people of the type of conduct being prohibited and to discourage the
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. 194 In essence, a
187. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources (Palila
I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
188. The D.C. district court points out that the Secretary's regulatory definition has been
consistently upheld by the courts. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284. However, in
supporting this statement, the D.C. district court cites both the district and circuit court
opinions of Palla I and Palila I Appeal, while only citing the circuit court opinion of Palila
IL Id. This would suggest that, when confronted with the Chapter's nocitur a sociis
argument, infra notes 258-61, this court was troubled by the dicta in the Palila II district
court decision.
189. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 284.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 285.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)). In Kolender, the United States Supreme Court described the so-called "void for
vagueness" doctrine as requiring "that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender, 461
U.S. at 357.
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criminal statute must provide citizens with actual notice of prohibited
conduct.195 This claim by the Chapter was also unsuccessful.1 96
Understandably, the Chapter made no allegations that they were
actually threatened with any criminal enforcement or prosecution pursuant
to this regulation, instead raising a purely facial constitutional challenge to
this regulation.197 The Secretary successfully argued that the plaintiffs'
facial challenge must fail because the regulation implicated no constitution-
ally protected conduct unless the Chapter could demonstrate that the
regulatory definition was impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 98
The Chapter could prove neither, despite shopworn claims that their Fifth
Amendment property rights amounted to such constitutionally protected
conduct. 199
Applying the regulation to the facts, the district court in Sweet Home
I found the criminal conduct was defined with adequate certainty to pass
constitutional muster." ° The court observed that the definition of "harm"
was limited to habitat degradation that "actually kills or injures wild-
life." '' Moreover, habitat modifications could only result in a chargeable
"taking" if they were shown to be "significant." '  "Significant habitat
modification or degradation" was, in turn, defined as modifications that
"'actually kill or injure wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 3  A
determination of whether or not this regulation was violated necessitated an
evaluation of three factors: the species involved, the nature and degree of
the habitat degradation, and the needs of that particular species."0' The
court considered that these factors were readily ascertainable in determining
195. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494 (1982)). The Chapter insisted that the Secretary's regulatory definition of "harm"
implicated their private property rights under the Fifth Amendment, and, therefore, they need
not prove the regulation impermissibly vague in all its applications under Flipside. However,
the district court in Sweet Home I agreed with the defendants' argument that "constitutionally
protected conduct" as used in Flipside denoted First Amendment rights--not Fifth
Amendment property rights. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 285. Accordingly, the plaintiffs'
attempts to avoid the Flipside standard for facial challenges was rejected by the court. Id.
200. Id. at 286.
201. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992)).
202. Id.
203. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992)).
204. Id.
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whether section 9 has been violated." 5 The court was convinced that the
regulatory definition provided more than minimal guidelines and was
adequate notice of unlawful conduct.2"
Finally, the district court placed considerable reliance on the fact that
section 9 violations must be knowingly committed. 7 The court opined
that the government would be required to demonstrate the requisite mental
state necessary before obtaining a conviction under this provision.0 8 In
this manner, the district court concluded that the Secretary's regulatory
definition was not fatally vague.2"
The Chapter also attacked the Secretary's blanket regulation which
extended the "taking" prohibition to those species listed as "threatened"
under the Act. As previously discussed, section 9 differentiates between
threatened species and endangered species, explicitly affording protection
only to the endangered species.210 The extension of section 9 protection
to threatened species is accomplished via regulations promulgated by the
Secretary pursuant to authority granted under section 4(d) of the ESA:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations
as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of
such species. The Secretary may, by regulation prohibit with respect to
any threatened species any act prohibited under [section 9(a)] .... 211
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary extended section 9(a)(1) protection
to threatened species of wildlife by means of a single, blanket regula-
tion.7 2
The Chapter opposed this blanket regulation, contending that section
4(d) mandated the adoption of regulations on a species-by-species basis.213
Moreover, the Chapter insisted that rulemaking under this provision could
205. Id.
206. Id. The Chapter also acknowledged the Service's common practice of informing
landowners that their proposed activity would lead to a "taking," thus putting the individual
on notice for the purposes of "knowing" violations of § 9. Brief for Respondents at 4 n.5,
Babbit (No. 94-859).
207. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
208. Id.; see United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988).
209. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
210. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994).
212. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
213. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
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only proceed upon specific determinations by the Secretary that such
regulations are "necessary and advisable." 14 Since no such finding was
evident, the Chapter argued that the Secretary's regulation contravened
section 4(d) of the ESA.215
The court rejected this interpretation as entirely inconsistent with the
"clear and unequivocal" language of the statute.216 Section 4(d) authorizes
the Secretary to prohibit by regulation "with respect to any threatened
species any act prohibited under [section 9(a)(1)]."217  Congress' use of
the word "any" throughout section 4(d) provided this clear intent: "The
word "any" encompasses the entire range of threatened species and
prohibited acts which the Secretary might consider. It allows the Secretary
to prohibit one act with respect to one threatened species or as many as all
acts with respect to all threatened species. 2  Nothing in the language or
the legislative history of the ESA required the Secretary to promulgate these
regulations on a species-by-species basis.219 Section 4(d) admits of broad
discretion permitting the Secretary to issue regulations whenever he deems
it "necessary and advisable" to do so.2'
The district court dismissed the Chapter's theory that section 4(d)
requires the Secretary to make findings that a particular regulation is
"necessary and advisable. 2 1 Section 4(d) of the Act, the court declared,
requires the Secretary to issue regulations, not findings. ' Thus, all three
counts of the Chapter's complaint were rejected by the district court in
Sweet Home I, and summary judgment was issued in favor of the Secre-
tary.2
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The Sweet Home I court relies on Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,
933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for the proposition that a court's decision may rest
solely on the words of a statute where the statute is clear and unequivocal on its face. Sweet
Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286.
217. Sweet Home I, 806 F. Supp. at 286 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at
903 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994)) (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 286-87. As the court notes, the legislative intent, as evidenced by the Senate
report, was for a more sweeping use of the Secretary's regulatory power under § 4(d). See
id. at 287 (construing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2996).
220. Id. at 287.
221. Sweet Home 1, 806 F. Supp. at 287.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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H. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Babbit-The Tortuous Journey Through the Circuit Court
An appeal was immediately taken by the Chapter, initiating the first of
three appellate decisions issued in the Sweet Home litigation.224 Since the
issues appealed were allegations of legal error, the district court's judgment
was scrutinized de novo.z" In an opinion by Chief Circuit Judge Mikva,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
district court's decisions regarding the constitutional "void for vagueness"
challenge to the "harm" regulation and the statutory challenge to the
Secretary's blanket regulation extending section 9 protection to threatened
species. 26 As for the statutory attack on the "harm" regulation, the
appellate court upheld the definition per curiam." 7
First, the panel affirmed the district court's disposition of the "void for
vagueness" attack on the "harm" regulation. 228  The Chapter urged the
court to resolve the alleged vagueness problem in one of two ways: 1) by
interpreting "harm" in a much more limiting manner, finding harm only
upon proof of an intentionally inflicted physical injury to an individual
member of a listed species of wildlife, or 2) by striking down the "harm"
regulation in its entirety, should the limiting construction not be possi-
ble.229
The circuit court declined to grant either of the Chapter's requests on
this matter.23 Like the district court before it, the circuit court was unable
to find the regulation impermissibly vague in all of its applications, as
required by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside.23' This finding was necessary since the
Chapter was asserting a facial "void for vagueness" challenge to the
regulation.232
224. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home II),
1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This is the first of no less than three opinions issued by the
circuit court of appeals on the Sweet Home decision. See also Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home IV), 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(providing history of this litigation in circuit court).
225. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 3.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 4.
230. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 5.
231. See 455 U.S. 489, 497.
232. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 4.
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Arguing against the circuit court's application of the Flipside standard,
the Chapter insisted that this regulation impinged upon "constitutionally
protected conduct," again trying to assert their Fifth Amendment property
rights.233  The Chapter claimed that this "constitutionally protected
conduct" fell under an exception to the Flipside rule and, consequently, they
were not required to establish that the regulation was impermissibly vague
in all of its applications." The circuit court was unimpressed. While not
stating precisely of what "constitutionally protected conduct" consisted, the
panel was confident that the Supreme Court was referring to First Amend-
ment freedoms, which have long received special protection under the "void
for vagueness" doctrine.235 Economic activity, such as that raised by the
Chapter, has traditionally been given less protection under the vagueness
doctrine.236 The court dismissed the "void for vagueness" claim, holding
the Chapter's showing that the regulation would be impermissibly vague in
some hypothetical application was insufficient to meet the standard for pre-
enforcement facial attacks under Flipside.237
Having disposed of the constitutional claim, the appellate court focused
on the statutory challenge to the Secretary's rulemaking power under section
4(d).23 Insisting that the Secretary interpreted this provision in reverse,
the Chapter argued that in enacting section 4(d), Congress intended these
protections to extend to threatened species only on a species-by-species basis
and only upon an explicit finding that such rulemaking was "necessary and
advisable." '239
Consistent with the district court, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeal applied the Chevron doctrine in reviewing the Secretary's
interpretation of section 4(d).240 Contrary to the district court, however,
the appellate court found no "clear and unequivocal" intent in section 4(d);
instead, it found great difficulty divining Congress' true intent from either
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
236. Id. (citing Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497).
237. Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 4.
238. Pursuant to authority vested by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)), the Department of Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service
have erected a regulatory framework by which protections normally reserved for endangered
species have been extended to include threatened species by a blanket rule. These
protections, in turn, may only be withdrawn by special rule, and even then, only for
particular species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(c).
239. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 5-6.
240. Id. at 6.
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the statute or its legislative history.241 The Chapter referred the court to
specific language in the statute and its legislative history supporting its
position.242  However, the court found these passages in the legislative
history conflicting, inconsistent, and generally unclear.243
241. Id. In applying Chevron to the Secretary's regulations in § 17.31(a), the District
of Columbia Circuit reasoned:
As was the case with the "harm" regulation, there is no clear indication that §
17.31(a) violates the intent of the ESA. The statute does not unambiguously
compel the agency to expand regulatory protection for threatened species only
by promulgating regulations that are specific to individual species. In light of
the substantial deference we thus owe the agency under the principles of
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc ... we uphold
the challenged regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
242. Id. Both the Chapter and the Secretary directed the appellate court to specific
passages found in the ESA's legislative history. The crux of the debate centered around the
use of singular or plural language in referring to threatened wildlife within the context of the
Secretary's regulatory power under § 4(e). First, the Chapter pointed to the Senate Report
on the Act and its § 4(e) delegation of authority to the Secretary:
[The section] requires the Secretary, once he has listed a species of fish or
wildlife as a threatened species, to issue regulations to protect that species.
Among other protective measures available, he may make any or all of the acts
and conduct defined as "prohibited acts" . . . as to "endangered species" also
prohibited acts as to the particular threatened species.
Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 6 (citing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2996). However, the government countered with legislative history of its
own:
The Secretary is authorized to issue appropriate regulations to protect endangered
or threatened species; he may also make specifically applicable any of the
prohibitions with regard to threatened species that have been listed in section
9(a) as are prohibited with regard to endangered species. Once an animal is on
the threatened list, the Secretary has almost an infinite number of options
available to him with regard to the permitted activities for those species. He
may, for example, permit taking, but not importation of such species, or he may
choose to forbid both taking and importation by not allowing the transportation
of such species.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at 12) (alteration in original).
243. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Chapter's
argument, pointing out that the legislative history is simply too ambiguous to support its
conclusions. Where the passage from the Senate report does indeed refer to the threatened
species in the singular, the House of Representatives report offered by the Government uses
plural language. Accordingly, the district court concluded that: "The possible conflict
between the two reports, as well as the apparent inconsistency with the above-quoted
paragraph itself as to singular and plural, shows the perils of attempting to use ambiguous
legislative history to clarify ambiguous words within statutes." Id.
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The inescapable fact recognized by the panel was that Congress, in
drafting section 4(d), simply did not speak directly on this issue.2' In the
face of this ambiguity, the administrative agency tasked with implementing
this provision is authorized to fill in the legislative scheme, formulating its
own procedural strategy in lieu of clear legislative directives.245 Since the
Secretary's interpretation, extending section 9 to cover threatened species via
a blanket rule, did not clearly contravene section 4(d), the deference
afforded to the agency's interpretation under Chevron counseled upholding
the regulation.246
The Chapter's claim that an explicit finding of "necessary and
appropriate" was required prior to section 4(d) rulemaking was also
rejected.247 In opposition to this claim an alternate interpretation of
section 4(d) was offered. Section 4(d), as construed by the Secretary,
consists of two distinct grants of power.4  The first authorizes the
Secretary to issue regulations for the conservation of threatened species as
she deems it "necessary and advisable" to do so.249 The second grant of
authority permits her to prohibit via regulation, with respect to any
threatened species, any act prohibited under section 9(a)(1).' Under this
construction, only the former grant of authority is conditioned upon any
explicit "necessary and appropriate" finding by the Secretary. Recognizing
the relative ambiguity of Congress' intent in section 4(d), the panel deferred
to the Secretary's interpretation since it was not clearly in violation of this
ambiguous provision.25'
In any event, the court concluded that the Chapter has imparted an inappropriate
amount of significance to the use of the single as opposed to the plural. Even assuming the
Chapter is correct, and the term "species" as found in § 4(d) is singular, the court reasoned
that this still would not clearly forbid what the Secretary had done. Since Chevron calls for
deference in such a circumstance, the Chapter's arguments fall short of the mark. Sweet
Home II, I F.3d at 6.
244. Id. at 7. The court notes that "regardless of the use of the singular and plyral terms
in the statute, § 1533(d) simply does not speak directly to the question of whether the [Fish
and Wildlife Service] must promulgate protections species-by-species or may extend such
protection in a single rulemaking." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)).
247. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 7.
248. Id. at 7-8; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
249. Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 8 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994)).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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It was, however, the statutory challenge to the regulatory definition of
"harm" that received the most attention by the court. As stated above, the
district court's findings on the propriety of this regulation were affirmed per
curiam, and without comment on the matter.5 2 Two separate concurrenc-
es and a single dissenting opinion were also filed, each examining the
regulation in detail.253
Most significantly, the Chapter again deemed the expansive definition
of "harm" improperly broad in light of the more narrow terms that
accompany "harm" in the "take" definition.2' None of the other terms
found in the "take" definition extended to land use activities indirectly
injuring wildlife. Rather, the other "take" terms like "harass," "hunt,"
"trap," "kill," or "pursue" all involved the direct application of physical
force to the animal. 55 This principle of statutory construction, known as
nocitur a sociis, demands that a general term appearing in a list not be given
an overly expansive interpretation in light of the other terms that accompany
it.216 Thus, a term is properly defined by "the company it keeps." '57
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Circuit Judge Mikva rejected
the Chapter's nocitur a sociis argument. The Chief Judge observed that
other terms in the "take" definition, namely "harass," may be expanded in
a manner limiting the use of private property.258 Judge Mikva also found
252. See id.
253. On the question of the Chapter's statutory challenge to the regulatory definition of
"harm," the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld the regulation per curiam with two
concurrences by Chief Circuit Judge Mikva and Judge Williams, while Judge Sentelle
dissented as to this portion of the opinion. Id. at 8-13.
254. See Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 10-11 (Mikva, C.J. and Williams, J., concurring
separately).
255. See id. at 10.
256. Id. (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
257. Id.
258. Id. In dismissing this argument, the Chief Judge reasoned that: "Despite
appellants' suggestions, however, the other prohibitions can limit a private landowner's use
of land in a rather broad manner. In particular, the prohibition against "harassment" can be
used to suppress activities that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species."
Sweet Home II, I F.3d at 10.
Chief Judge Mikva bolstered his position by pointing to a House of Representatives
Report considering the "take" definition which "includes harassment, whether intentional or
not. This would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of
birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult
for them to hatch or raise their young." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at
11).
Indeed, Judge Mikva, in supporting his contention, points out that the definition of
"harass" is nearly as broad as the definition of "harm," and yet, this definition has not been
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strong support for his position from Congress' inclusion of "incidental take"
exceptions in the 1982 amendments. 2 9
In a separate concurrence, Judge Williams focused exclusively on the
nocitur a sociis doctrine, finding the Chapter's claim much more persu asive
than did Judge Mikva.26 Judge Williams, while nearly willing to concede
to this argument, nevertheless upheld the regulation as valid solely on the
basis of the 1982 amendments to the ESA.26' By allowing permits for the
"incidental taking" of endangered species, Congress was implicitly admitting
that such indirect takings were otherwise prohibited under section 9. But for
this amendment, Judge Williams was fully prepared to join in Judge
Sentelle's dissenting opinion, accepting the Chapter's nocitur a sociis
analysis.
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle did accept this theory and called for the
invalidation of the "harm" regulation.262 Judge Sentelle likened the
Secretary's reading of "harm" to an overzealous enforcement of a "No
Smoking" ordinance:
In my view, the fact that the farmer may be indirectly harming wildlife,
and that the statutory definition includes "harn" helps the agency's
cause but little. To analogize again to the smoking proposition, if
Congress authorized the erection of "No Smoking" signs in public
buildings and thereafter defined smoking to "include lighting, burning,
puffing, inhaling, and otherwise harmfully employing the noxious
nicotine-bearing tobacco products," some zealous bureau might well
attempt to define smoking to include chewing and spitting under the
rubric of "harmful use" in Congress' definition of smoking.... I do
not think those creative regulators would be thinking reasonably if they
should do so, nor do I think the regulators act reasonably in the present
case.
263
Judge Sentelle further based his decision on the notion that "harm" as
defined violated the canon of statutory construction that directs a court to
challenged. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 11 (Williams, J., concurring).
261. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 11. Judge Williams began his concurrence by stating:
"I agree that the 'harm' regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, complies with the Endangered Species
Act-but only because of the 1982 amendments to the ESA." Id.
262. Id. at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
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presume the statute to read in a manner that avoids "surplusage." 264 While
"harm" may be defined to include any "act which actually kills wildlife,"
including habitat modification, this definition, in Judge Sentelle's opinion,
renders the other terms found in the "take" definition mere surplusage, since
they all cover acts which actually kill wildlife.265
In Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbit
(Sweet Home III), the Chapter petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeal for rehearing on the validity of the regulatory "harm"
definition.26 Without the benefit of further oral argument or additional
briefs, the circuit court per Judge Williams granted the Chapter's petition for
rehearing solely on the statutory challenge to the "harm" regulation.267
Judge Sentelle's opinion prevailed on rehearing, and the decision was
partially modified, holding the regulation invalid.268
The Secretary repeatedly argued that the Act, as originally adopted,
supported this expansive reading of "harm" within the context of the "take"
definition. In the alternative, the government pointed to the 1982 Amend-
ments to the ESA and the inclusion of "incidental take" permits as evidence
of Congress' implicit ratification of this definition. Neither contention was
successful.
69
Writing for the panel, Judge Williams immediately recognized as
indisputable the inherent breadth of the term "harm. 270 The United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was
cited as an illustration of the potential for an overly-broad reading of the
term.271 In Lucas, the Court, per Justice Scalia, engaged in a mental
exercise attempting to discern the line between those regulations that
actually prevent harm as opposed to merely conferring a benefit. 2  As a
264. Id. at 13.
265. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 13.
266. 17 F.3d 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
267. Id.
268. Id. However, Chief Judge Mikva criticized the majority for granting this rehearing
and for its reversal without the benefit of additional briefs or oral argument tailored to this
single issue. Id. at 1473.
269. Id. at 1464.
270. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464.
271. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
272. Too often, this "harm prevention" rationale is used to confer benefits upon the
public at large in the guise of preventing use of private property that is noxious to adjacent
property owners. Any given restraint may well be seen by some as mitigating a "harm" to
the adjacent parcels or securing a benefit for them, depending on how the restraint is
perceived and the importance of the use evaluated. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27 (citing
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matter of pure linguistic possibility, Judge Williams pointed to Lucas for the
proposition that the withholding of a benefit may easily be recast into the
infliction of a harm:
In one sense of the word, we "harm" the people of Somalia to the
extent that we refrain from providing humanitarian aid, and we harm the
people of Bosnia to the extent that we fail to stop "ethnic cleansing."
By the same token, it is linguistically possible to read "harm" as
referring to a landowner's withholding of the benefits of a habitat that
is beneficial to a species. A farmer who harvests crops or trees on
which a species may depend harms it in the sense of withdrawing a
benefit; if the benefit withdrawn be important, then the Service's
regulation sweeps up the farmer's decision. 3
The panel's use of dicta extracted from Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion to
fashion an interpretation of "harm" under the ESA suffers from changing
context. The distinction between "benefit conferring" and "harm prevent-
ing" is a reference to the proper scope of the state's exercise of its inherent
authority under the police power.274 However, the case at bar involved the
interpretation of a federal statute by an administrative agency. No police
power concerns of the type dealt with in Lucas were implicated.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Judge Williams perceived a need to
limit the interpretation of "harm" and guard against its apparent propensity
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 49 (1964)).
273. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1464-65.
274. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024. The "prevention of harmful use" was merely an earlier
statement of the police power justification necessary to sustain the regulation of the use of
property in order to prevent the noxious use of private property: "One could say that
imposing a servitude on Lucas' land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from
'harming' South Carolina's ecological resources; or instead, in order to achieve the benefits
of an ecological preserve." Id. Judge Williams, in his analysis, has very likely seized upon
language found in footnote 11 of the Lucas opinion:
In the present case, in fact, some of the "[South Carolina] legislature's
'findings"' to which the South Carolina Supreme Court purported to defer in
characterizing the purpose of the Act as "harm preventing," seem to us phrased
in "benefit conferring" language instead. For example, they describe the
importance of a construction ban in enhancing "South Carolina's annual tourism
industry revenue," in "providing habitat for numerous species of plants and
animals, several of which are threatened or endangered," and in "providing a
natural healthy environment for the citizens of South Carolina to spend leisure
time which serves their physical and mental well being ...
Id. at 1024 n. 11 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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for misuse. This was accomplished by reading "harm" in light of the other
terms that accompany it in the definition of "take" under section 9:
The immediate context of the word ["harm"], however, argues strongly
against any such broad reading. With the single exception of the word
"harm," the words of the definition contemplate the perpetrator's direct
application of force against the animal taken: "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." The forbidden acts
fit, in ordinary language, the basic model "A hit B." 275
Any term that extends "take" beyond the direct application of physical force
to the animal taken, in the panel's view, exceeds Congress' intentions. This
includes the words "harm" and "harass. 276
Judge Williams reasoned that all of the terms found in the "take"
definition contemplate the direct application of physical force, though this
force need not be exerted by a bullet or a blade. 77 Some of the terms like
"pursue" do not actually result in injury, capture, or death, but are
nevertheless included by reason of the definition's reference to "attempted
takings. 278 Others, like "trap," may occur through the planned release of
physical force upon the animal at a future time, even in the absence of the
271perpetrator.  Still, all instances of "taking" a species involve the applica-
tion of physical force under the panel's view.
In the prior appellate decision, Judge Mikva had dismissed this
argument relying on the term "harass."28 Since another term in the "take"
definition could encompass activities lacking any direct application of
physical force, Judge Mikva determined that "harm" was not drawn in
275. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. Recall that the definition of "take" includes "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19))
(emphasis added).
279. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
280. Sweet Home II, 1 F.3d at 10. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Mikva
dismissed the Chapter's nocitur a sociis claim noting that "[d]espite appellants' suggestions,
however, the other prohibitions can limit a private landowner's use of his land in a rather
broad manner. In particular, the prohibition against "harassment" can be used to suppress
activities that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species." Id. Judge Mikva
went on to quote the Secretary's definition of harass, illustrating the similarities between the
definition of "harass" and that of "harm." Id.
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impermissibly broad terms.2 ' This earlier statement was contradicted by
Judge Williams who concluded that "harass" also involved physical force
directed at the individual animal." 2 For example, aiming light or sound
at an animal may constitute "harassment." This, too, is a physical force
under the panel's analysis, as the particles and waves that comprise the light
and sound constitute physical forces being propelled at the animal by the
perpetrator.
83
Judge Williams, in supporting his narrow construction of "harass," also
referred to the restrictive meaning of the term as used in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA").214 In United States v. Hayashi,2 5
the perpetrator was prosecuted and convicted for "taking" a marine mammal
in violation of the MMPA.28 ' Hayashi allegedly "harassed" a pod of
porpoises by firing a rifle twice into the water behind the animals. 287 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, using a nocitur a sociis argument, ascribed
a much more restrictive meaning to "harass" under the MMPA's prohibition
against "takings":
The statute groups "harass" with "hunt," "capture," and "kill" as forms
of prohibited "taking[s]." The latter three each involve direct, sustained,
and significant intrusions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of
a marine mammal; killing is a direct and permanent intrusion, while
hunting and capturing cause significant disruptions of a marine
281. Id.
282. Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
283. Id.
284. Id. The MMPA includes an "anti-take" provision:
There shall be a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals
and marine mammal products, commencing on the effective date of this chapter,
during which time no permit may be issued for the taking of any marine
mammal and no marine mammal or marine mammal product may be imported
into the United States ....
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994). The MMPA in turn states that "[t]he term 'take' means to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal."
Id. § 1362(13) (1994).
285. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993).
286. Id. at 1279. An April 22, 1991 information charged Hayashi with knowingly
taking a marine mammal in violation of the MMPA, and Hayashi was subsequently convicted
by a district court judge in July of that same year. See id. (providing a recount of the
proceedings below).
287. Hayashi and his son, commercial tuna fishermen in Hawaii, were retrieving their
catch when a pod of porpoises began to eat the captured tuna before they could be landed.
Hoping to frighten the porpoises away from their catch, Hayashi fired two rifle shots into the
water behind the animals. The shots did not hit the porpoises. Id.
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mammal's natural state. Consistent with these other terms, "harass-
ment" to constitute a "taking" under the MMPA, must entail a similar
level of direct and sustained intrusion.
88
Like the term "harass" as used in the MMPA, the ESA's definition of "take"
similarly aligns "harass" with other verbs lacking in the concept of habitat
modification that all involve direct applications of force.289
The use of the MMPA in the panel's decision is problematic for two
reasons. First, Hayashi was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals-the very same court that decided the Palila cases. It would be
logical to conclude that the appellate court saw something in the ESA that
was not present in the MMPA. Nowhere in Hayashi was Palila ever
questioned or reversed, Hayashi certainly cannot stand for that proposi-
tion.2" Nevertheless, Hayashi has been used in precisely this manner by
directly questioning the interpretation of the ESA in Palila.
More significantly, there is a substantial difference between the MMPA
and the ESA. The MMPA is almost devoid of the congressional concerns
for habitat loss that predominates the ESA.29' The exigencies leading to
the adoption of the two statutes are highly dissimilar. Congress, in enacting
the ESA, ranked habitat loss or degradation as the primary cause of the
extinction crisis.292 Yet, the predominant threat to marine mammals
288. Id. at 1282 (relying on Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312,
322 (1977)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the "familiar principle" that words
grouped together in a list should be given related meaning. Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1282.
289. See Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1465.
290. Nowhere in either the majority opinion or the dissent in Hayashi does the Palila
line of cases even earn mention. However, many of the same arguments found in Sweet
Home V are presented in the Hayashi opinion. See generally Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Or. (Sweet Home V), 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
291. In contrast to the prominent position occupied by habitat in Congress' findings in
the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b), the MMPA contains only the following broad congressional
finding:
(2) such species and population stocks should not be permitted to diminish
beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element in
the ecosystem of which they are a part, and, consistent with this major objective,
they should not be permitted to diminish below their optimum sustainable
population. Further measures should be immediately taken to replenish any
species or population stock which has already diminished below that population.
In particular, efforts should be made to protect essential habitats including the
rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of similar significance for each species of
marine mammal from the adverse effect of man's actions....
16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1994).
292. See supra note 20.
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addressed by the MMPA was the hunting, capture, and commerce in those
species.293 Indeed, Congress, in enacting the MMPA, has arguably left
habitat protection concerns to the states.294
In spite of these issues, Judge Williams was able to circumvent Judge
Mikva's previous opinion, isolating "harm" from the rest of the terms
defining "take." '295 Judge Williams concluded that the word is indeed
drawn in impermissibly broad terms, deeming the application of nocitur a
sociis necessary to avoid giving the term "harm" a breadth unintended by
Congress. 6 Judge Williams, in turn, denounced the Secretary's construc-
tion of the "take" definition and its inclusion of habitat modification as a
form of harm. 297 He also adopted the Chapter's previously rejected claim
that Congress intended to address the habitat problem on private property
through habitat acquisition and not through the prohibitions of section 9.291
This construction of the Act, in his view, reflected Congress' desire to place
the primary duty of conserving habitat with the federal government. 2 99
Thus, the Secretary's reading contravened this objective by assigning the
duty to preserve habitat to private landowners. 3"
Regarding the effect of the 1982 Amendments to the ESA, Judge
Williams repudiated his former concurring opinion, holding that the
293. The MMPA is replete with provisions regarding the harvest and commerce of
marine mammals and marine mammal products, while otherwise remaining silent on habitat
concerns. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1406 (1994).
294. In discussing the scope of the MMPA's federal preemption of state law, the House
issued the following explanation:
[Subsection (b)] authorizes the Secretary [of Commerce] to develop effective
working cooperative arrangements with state agencies and officials in order to
carry out the purposes of this Act. It is not the intention of this Committee to
foreclose effective state programs and protective measures such as sanctuaries;
it is rather our intention to allow development of a unified integrated system of
management for the benefit of these animals and to encourage the states to take
all actions which are consistent with this objective.
H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1971), microformed on CIS No. 71-H563-25
(Congressional Info. Serv.) (emphasis added).
295. Judge Mikva's disagreement with the Chapter's nocitur a sociis argument relies
heavily on his conclusion that "harm" is not the only term in the "take" definition applying
§ 9 to habitat modification and other indirect impacts. Sweet Home 11, 1 F.3d at 10.
296. Sweet Home I1, 17 F.3d at 1465-66.
297. Id. at 1466.
298. Id. Judge Williams recognizes that the ESA addresses habitat preservation in two
ways-through the federal land acquisition program of § 5 and through the § 7(a)(2) directive
to federal agencies to avoid adverse impacts. Id.
299. Id. at 1466.
300. Sweet Home 111, 17 F.3d at 1466.
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inclusion of so-called "incidental take" permits, in amending section 10(a),
could not stand for the proposition that Congress had ratified the broad
reading of section 9, as advocated by Palila and by the Secretary's
regulation."' Newly added section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA authorized the
FWS to issue permits for "any taking otherwise prohibited" by section 9, if
such taking is incidental to an otherwise lawful purpose.3°  It did not
follow, Judge Williams reasoned, that such incidental takings included
habitat modifications.
30 3
An incensed Chief Circuit Judge Mikva denounced the panel's opinion,
reasoning, and effect:
The majority decision in this case is unfortunate. It scuttles a carefully
conceived Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") regulation and creates a
split in the circuits on an important statutory question.... What was
301. Id. at 1467. Judge Williams recognizes two possible implications resulting from
the 1982 amendments and ultimately rejects both:
First, one might argue that one of the amendments so altered the context of the
definition of "take" so as to render the Service's interpretation reasonable, or
even, conceivable, to reflect express congressional adoption of that view.
Second, one might argue that the process of amendment, which brought the
Service's regulation and a judicial endorsement to the attention of a congressio-
nal subcommittee, constituted a ratification of the regulation. We reject both
theories.
Id.
302. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 16, 87 Stat. at 903 (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B)).
303. Id. Judge Williams rebuts previous claims that the 1982 amendments served as a
ratification of Palila and the Secretary's regulation by focusing on the House Conference
Reports relied upon by the Government in the principle case, and by the district court below:
This provision is modeled after a habitat conservation plan that has been
developed by three Northern California cities, the County of San Mateo, and
private landowners and developers to provide for the conservation of the habitat
of three endangered species and other unlisted species of concern within the San
Bruno Mountain area of San Mateo County.
This provision will measurably reduce conflicts under the Act and will
provide the institutional framework to permit cooperation between the public and
private sectors in the interest of endangered species and habitat conservation.
The terms of this provision require a unique partnership between the public
and private sectors in the interest of species and habitat conservation. ...
Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1468 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2871-72). The focus in these reports,
reasoned Judge Williams, is on the flexibility of the relief available under this new section.
However, this alone, under his view, does not imply an assumption that "takings" under §
9 encompass habitat degradation. Id.
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rightly considered good law in the opinion in this case issued last year,
... is now "altered" on the basis of a confusing and misguided legal
analysis that creates a needless conflict among the circuits. I dis-
sent.
304
In his detailed dissent, the Chief Judge's most telling criticism of the
majority opinion is what he deemed the majority's apparent decision to
"jettison" the Chevron standard.0 5 Specifically, he charged that the
majority opinion invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Services' definition
because it was neither "clearly authorized by Congress" nor a reasonable
and permissible interpretation of the Act. By shifting to the agency the
burden of defending the reasonableness of its interpretations, Judge Mikva
insisted that the panel's decision conflicted with Chevron, which defers to
agency interpretations, unless proven unreasonable or contrary to clearly
stated congressional intent. Indeed, as the Chief Judge recognized,
deference is the whole point of the Chevron standard.3 6 This position
would ultimately prevail among the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court.
In Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbit
(Sweet Home IV), the Government quickly petitioned the appellate court for
a rehearing, suggesting a rehearing en banc. 3°7 This petition was denied
on August 12, 1994.0 Over a dissent by Chief Judge Mikva and three
other circuit judges, Judge Williams, writing for the panel, denied the
petition.3' Judge Williams concluded that the Secretary's definition of
"harm" created serious overlap problems between the various provisions of
the statute.310 Specifically, section 7's prohibition against the adverse
modification of critical habitat would be entirely superseded by the
Secretary's ability to bar habitat modification under section 9.311 Judge
304. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1467.
307. 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
308. Id. at 191.
309. Chief Judge Mikva was joined by Circuit Judges Wald, Silberman, and Rogers in
dissenting from the majority's denial of the hearing en banc. Id. at 191. Silberman filed a
separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 194 (Silberman, J. dissenting).
310. Id. at 192.
311. Sweet Home IV, 30 F.3d at 192 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EvOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 397 (1977)).
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Williams also leveled criticism at the regulation's apparent inclusion of
omissions that actually kill or injure wildlife.312
I. The Circuits Split-Harsh Reactions to Sweet Home in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Chief Circuit Judge Mikva's predictions proved correct.313 Sweet
Home, as decided on rehearing, created a sharp split in position between the
District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, with
the latter remaining true to the Palila line of cases.
Less than a month after the final rehearing of Sweet Home, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington
Northern Railroad.314 In that case, the Ninth Circuit restated its Palila II
decision, citing to it for authority.315 Sweet Home was not mentioned.
A few months later, still in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
District Court for the Western District of Washington was asked to follow
Sweet Home in lieu of Palila J.316 This request was emphatically denied:
The argument that Sweet Home is now binding in the Ninth
Circuit, however, is incorrect. Differences among the circuits are
common, and the District of Columbia Circuit has no power to overrule
another circuit's decision....
Here, a contrary conclusion has already been reached by the court
of appeals whose rulings are binding on this court. The Palila case,
upholding the FWS regulation, is the law of the Ninth Circuit until and
unless changed by the Supreme Court or by the circuit itself.
It follows that the Secretaries did not act arbitrarily, or contrary to
law, in concluding that Sweet Home requires no change in the [Record
of Decision adopting the Management Plan]. If Palila ceases to be the
law of the circuit, either because of Supreme Court review of Sweet
312. Id. at 191.
313. In dissenting to Judge Williams' reversal of the district court on rehearing, Chief
Judge Mikva warned that the decision would create an unnecessary split in the circuits. See
Sweet Home II1, 17 F.3d at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
314. 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994). Burlington Northern involved several collisions
between threatened grizzly bears and freight trains operated by the defendants. A series of
accidental corn spills from railroad cars in northwestern Montana had attracted the bears to
the tracks where seven grizzly bears were ultimately struck and killed by trains. Id. at 1509.
315. Id. at 1512-13.
316. Seattle Audobon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1312 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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Home or otherwise, the administrative decision under review will have
to be reconsidered.317
This reaction was echoed a few months later in the Northern District
of California in Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific
Lumber Co. 18 The division among the federal circuits would only
deepen.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN-BABBIT V. SWEET HOME
CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing a growing split between
the federal circuits, granted the Secretary's petition for a writ of certiorari
and agreed to hear Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon (Sweet Home V)319 on January 6, 1995.320 The Supreme
Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit Court in a six-to-three
vote.32 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, O'Connor,
Ginsberg, and Breyer, upheld the Secretary's regulatory definition of
"harm. ''3  Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion, and
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented.3"
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens deemed certain initial
assumptions to be appropriate in sufficiently framing the legal issue for the
Court.3' First, he assumed that the members of the Chapter had no wish
to harm either the red-cockaded woodpecker or the Northern spotted
owl.3' The various economic interests challenging this regulation only
desired a continuation of their logging activities.326 Justice Stevens
similarly assumed arguendo that these logging activities would nevertheless
have the unintended effect of injuring or killing some members of these
317. Id. at 1313.
318. 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
319. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
320. Id. at 2409.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2418, 2421.
324. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. Justice Stevens attributed the propriety of these
assumptions to the fact that this case was originally decided on cross motions for summary
judgment. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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listed species through the degradation of their habitat. 327 He then reduced
the controversy to its essence:
Under [the Chapter's] view of the law, the Secretary's only means of
forestalling that grave result [as described above]-even when the actor
knows it is certain to occur-is to use his [section] 5 authority to
purchase the lands on which the survival of the species depends. The
Secretary, on the other hand, submits that the [section] 9 prohibition on
takings, which Congress defined to include "harm," places on respon-
dents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds
unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to [section] 10.328
In selecting the latter view and holding the Secretary's interpretation of
the ESA to be a reasonable one, Justice Stevens offered three principal
justifications: the ordinary understanding of the terms used in defining
"take," the ESA's broad objectives and purposes, and the 1982 Amendments
all supported the Secretary's interpretation.329
A. The Secretary's Interpretation is Supported by the Ordinary
Usage of the Word "Harm"
The Sweet Home V majority's first justification for upholding the
Secretary's "harm" regulation was based on the "ordinary understanding" of
the term. Both sides briefed the Court at length on the true meaning of
"harm" as it appears in the ESA; the majority selected the interpretation that
comported with the overall intent of the Act's purposes. The Chapter
contended that the improper breadth of the Secretary's definition was owed
in part to an abstract consideration of the term taken entirely out of context:
When read in its statutory context, "take" necessarily involves action
directed at wildlife. It thus cannot be stretched to cover the types of
ordinary land use activities of concern to Respondents, such as cutting
trees, clearing brush, or constructing or maintaining roads....
In so concluding, the court below recognized, and we concede, that
the word "harm," wrenched from its context and considered abstractly,
is a word of extraordinary elasticity, arguably capable of the meaning
FWS attributes to it.
330
327. Id.
328. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
329. Id. at 2412-23.
330. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859).
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The Chapter reasoned that, when read out of context from the rest of the
ESA "take" definition, "harm" could and was being used to prohibit any
action that might produce any type of negative impact on a listed ani-
mal.331  This, the Chapter argued, permitted the Secretary to refer to acts
or omissions that deprived wildlife of some environmental benefit, such as
a suitable habitat, as "harm" to the species.332 Moreover, the Secretary's
interpretation was not limited to activity or conduct purposefully directed at
injuring in a manner to which the term "harm" normally implies.333 Thus,
by focusing exclusively on the ultimate effect on the animal, while
simultaneously disregarding the character of the conduct prohibited under
section 9, the Chapter concluded that the regulation easily encompassed
many normal activities that are neither directed at wildlife nor cause any
concrete injury to that wildlife.3" This, the Chapter insisted, counter-
manded section 9 as written.335
Conversely, the Government argued that the Secretary's interpretation
did comport with "ordinary usage":
In ordinary usage, the word "harm" in its verb form, means "to cause
hurt or damage to: INJURE," or "to do or cause harm to: injure;
damage; hurt[.]" This common understanding of the word unquestion-
ably encompasses an act that actually "kills or injures wildlife"-the
331. In particular, the Chapter took issue with the fact that the regulation does not
demand "actual physical injury" to an identifiable animal. Id. at 8. Rather, "harm" may
consist of the impairment of essential behavioral patterns resulting from significant habitat
modification. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. Given the uncertainty in evaluating whether a particular
habitat modification will significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, the Chapter
contended that the "harm" regulation as written and as enforced by the Secretary has resulted
in an improperly pervasive land use control. See Brief for Respondents at 8 n.9, Babbit (No.
94-859).
332. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859). This argument is, of course, the
analysis used by Judge Williams in the court below. See Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1464;
see also text accompanying notes 253-57.
333. Brief for Respondents at 9, Babbit (No. 94-859). The Chapter insisted that the
term "harm" generally connotes a purposeful effort to injure:
The command, "Don't harm that child!", for example, would not naturally be
thought of as a directive to restrict the child's television-watching or candy
intake, even though either in excess would cause the child "harm." In active
voice, or in a prohibitory sense--as in ESA [§§] 3(19) and 9(a)(1)-"harm" is
commonly understood to convey a sense of purposeful effort and direct, concrete
injury.
Id.
334. Id. at 7.
335. Id.
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basic definition of "harm" in the first sentence of 50 C.F.R. [section]
17.3.336
Thus, the Government asserted that the basic definition of "harm," that
is, conduct that "actually kills or injures wildlife," is a sound one supported
by the word's ordinary usage.337 This basic definition, the Government
noted, was not what was attacked in the lower courts. Rather, the Chapter
has challenged the validity of the second sentence of the regulation, which
specifies that "harm" may include those activities that, while satisfying the
original definition by actually killing or injuring wildlife, nevertheless occur
through significant habitat modifications that impair essential behavioral
patterns such as breeding, feeding, and sheltering.338 This second sen-
tence, in the Secretary's view "merely elaborates on the basic definition in
the first sentence by explaining its application in one particular context."
339
The Secretary's view ultimately prevailed on Justice Stevens and the
majority in Sweet Home V. First, the majority adopted the Secretary's
"ordinary usage" analysis in rejecting the Chapter's assertions that "harm"
must be limited to "purposeful, direct" injury.34  Justice Stevens could
find no reference in the common definition of the word "harm" suggesting
in any way that only direct and willful action leading to injury may
constitute "harm., 34  Additionally, the holding pointed to the structure of
the ESA's "take" definition in an apparent response to the Chapter's charge
that the term's elastic definition is owed to the Secretary's attempt to read
336. Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Babbit (No. 94-859) (citations omitted) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1034 (1986); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 873 (2d ed. 1987)).
337. Id. at 21.
338. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). The Government subdivided the "harm" regulation
into two distinct components. The first component is the basic definition of "harm" as
expressed in the initial sentence of the regulation: "Harm in the definition of 'take' in the
Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). The
second component of the regulation is the explanatory sentence which comprises the
remainder of the Secretary's definition: "Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." Id. The
Secretary contended that, given the soundness of the basic definition, this second sentence
is also valid, since it includes only those significant habitat modifications that meet the basic
definition-those that actually kill or injure wildlife. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Babbit (No.
94-859).
339. Brief for Respondents at 21, Babbit (No. 94-859).
340. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2413.
341. Id.
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the term out of its context in the Act. To admit the Chapter's contentions
and limit "harm" to direct injuries only would, in the majority's opinion,
deprive the term of any independent meaning and reduce "harm" to little
more than statutory surplusage.342 The opinion concluded that a reluctance
to reach such a result supported the reasonableness of the Secretary's
interpretation.3 4u
B. The Broad Purpose of the ESA Supports the Reasonableness of
the Secretary's Interpretation of "Harm"
The second justification offered by the majority in upholding the
Secretary's interpretation as reasonable was the broad objectives Congress
apparently sought to realize through the ESA:
Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms
Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, we described the
Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation."' 4
Thus, the Act and its legislative history are replete with references to habitat
protection and the role played by the threat of habitat loss in the ongoing
extinction crisis.345
These sentiments echoed the Secretary's position that a contrary
interpretation of "harm," limiting the term to "physical blows to the body
of individual animals," would defeat Congress' wishes.346 Pointing to an
oft-quoted passage from the legislative history of the Act, the Secretary
pointed out that it was Congress' intent that "take" be "defined... in the
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person could 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife. 347
342. Id. Unless "harm" is read to encompass indirect as well as direct injury, Justice
Stevens concluded that the word would have no meaning that is not mere duplication of the
other terms used to define "take" in § 3(19). Id.
343. Id. (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837
n.11 (1988)).
344. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2413 (citation omitted).
345. See id.
346. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Babbit (No. 94-859).
347. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 307, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2995).
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By contrast, the Chapter insisted that the Secretary's reading of "harm"
countermanded the plain intent of Congress:
If Congress had meant "harm" to have such significance, it would have
made the operative term in the statute "harm" instead of "take"-or
found some other way to highlight ESA [section] 9's intended breadth.
Instead, Congress cast the section more narrowly, as a prohibition on
"take," and quietly placed the word "harm" in a list alongside nine other
terms in the definitional section.348
If Congress had wished to reach the use of private property through section
9's "take" provision, the Chapter vigorously asserted that "it would have
addressed the matter forthrightly. '349 Given Congress' keen awareness of
the threat of habitat loss, the absence of any explicit reference to habitat in
section 9 was a significant fact for the Chapter, for it served only to.
emphasize Congress' conscious decision to address habitat loss elsewhere
in the Act.350
The Secretary's view ultimately prevailed upon the majority in Sweet
Home V.35' Harkening back to the Court's 1978 opinion in TVA v. Hill,
the majority underscored the comprehensive nature of the Act's protective
goals:
Both our holding and the language in our opinion [in TVA v. Hill]
stressed the importance of the statutory policy. "The plain intent of
Congress in enacting this statute," we recognized, "was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is
reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute.
352
Section 9 was no different. Although the Court in TVA v. Hill dealt
primarily with the prohibitions of section 7, Hill took particular note of the
Secretary's inclusion of habitat degradation in its definition of "harm" under
section 9.353
The Chapter's arguments for the impermissibility of the Secretary's
definition failed to persuade the Court. The majority was instead swayed
348. Brief for Respondents at 22, Babbit (No. 94-859) (citation omitted).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 22-23.
351. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2407.
352. Id. at 2413 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
353. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184-85; see also supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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by the comprehensive protection provided under the ESA, finding the
Secretary's interpretation permissible in light of this protection.
C. The 1982 Amendments to the ESA Support the
Reasonableness of the Secretary's Interpretation
Finally, the Court examined the 1982 amendments to the ESA to
bolster its reading of the Act.3- Added to the ESA in 1982, section
10(a)(1)(B) authorized the Secretary to issue permits allowing "takings"
otherwise prohibited under section 9 so long as "such taking is incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activi-
ty." '355 The majority stated that this additional exemption to section 9's
prohibitions, "strongly suggests that Congress understood [section]
9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. 356
The Chapter contended that "incidental" take permits were designed
with inadvertent or accidental takings in mind.357 Absent such a provi-
sion, a trapper who intends to capture an unlisted species, but inadvertently
traps and injures a listed one, would be guilty of violating section 9.351
A commercial fishermen whose otherwise lawful trawl nets intended for
shrimp inadvertently ensnares an endangered sea turtle would similarly
violate section 9 without this provision.359  "Incidental" takings, as
understood by the Chapter, must only be those actions directed at unprotect-
ed wildlife, which accidentally "take" a listed species.
The Secretary's view on the true effect of the "incidental" take permit
stood at variance with the Chapter's position. As the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee Report accompanying the amendments
revealed:
[Section 10(a)] addresses the concerns of private landowners who are
faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring federal permits
prevented by the Section 9 prohibitions against taking.
Section 10(a), as amended, would allow the Secretary to permit
any taking otherwise prohibited by Section 9(a)(1)(B) if the taking is
354. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
355. Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2, 96 Stat. at 1411 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(1)(B)). For a discussion in greater detail, see supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
356. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
357. Brief for Respondents at 41-42, Babbit (No. 94-859)
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
1996]
228
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
incidental to, and not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity. By
use of the word "incidental" the Committee intends to cover situations
in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is
engaged in but such a taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
activity.'6
Thus, Congress' intentions, as construed by the Secretary, were to
encompass more than simply accidental or inadvertent violations of section
9. Instead, the Secretary was authorized to exempt certain lawful activities
from section 9 in instances where an unlawful taking was expected ahead
of time, and where such an effect could only be minimized rather than
avoided.362 Implicit in this scheme, however, is the notion that an inciden-
tal take, to every extent practical, will be minimized and remedied
immediately.363
This position was echoed by the Sweet Home V majority. By requiring
the applicant to prepare a "conservation plan" identifying how he plans to
carry forward with his proposed activity while minimizing the impact on the
affected species, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had foreseeable
and anticipated impacts in mind when passing this provision."
The Chapter's construction of section 10(a)(1)(B)'s "incidental" take
permit is "logically" consistent with their highly limited reading of "harm"
under section 9.365 Yet, reading both constructions together, the Chapter's
position is seen as nothing more than a rationalization resting on a creative
assumption. Once permits are obtained to alter a natural area, the Chapter
insisted that no "taking" could occur so long as the activity permitted is in
compliance with the permit. Their argument assumes that any particular
pine tree in which a red-cockaded woodpecker is seen nesting, resting,
feeding, or breeding, or any other of a host of biological gerunds, will be
left undisturbed. The key point advanced was that the woodpecker was not
the target of the logging activity, and no individual woodpecker nest or
361. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2831.
362. Brief for Petitioners at 34, Babbit (No. 94-859) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 567, supra
note 361, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2831).
363. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b).
364. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
365. Succinctly put, the Chapter reads "harm" as limited to purposeful and deliberate
actions directing physical force against a listed species. See Brief for Respondents at 9,
Babbit (No. 94-859). The Chapter's reading of "harm" is reminiscent of the intent
requirement imposed on § 9 by the Froehlke decision issued by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1976. Id. at 18 n.21.
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respite was deliberately targeted. Therefore, no individual birds were
deliberately killed. This ignores reality. The incidental take permit,
according to the Chapter's argument, is needed only in the event that an
"accident" occurs-that a good faith observation failed to reveal a wood-
pecker which, consequently, was destroyed.
The majority, according to Justice Stevens, rejected this argument as
"absurd.366 The argument is nothing more than a rationalism based on
a false premise. What the Chapter virtually willfully ignored is the known
biology of the impacted species; the animal does not live out its life
statically, sitting on just one limb, feeding in just one tree, or sheltering in
a single roost, while its habitat is destroyed.367 Populations are dynamic.
The animal has been directly "harmed," in that when the logging activities
have ended for the day, its ability to live has been directly hampered
through the impairment of essential behavior.36 The static argument fails
in the dynamic reality of the system being impacted by the otherwise
"permitted" or "lawful" activity.
Accordingly, the Chapter's insistence on narrowing section 9 to direct
and purposeful actions taken against a member of a listed species was, in the
Court's view, reduced to an "absurdity" by the inclusion of Section
10(a)(1)(B). 369  Under the Chapter's interpretation, an applicant could
request an "incidental" take permit to skirt liability under section 9 for direct
and deliberate action taken against a listed species. Yet, no one could
seriously request a permit for this bizarre purpose.370 Consequentially, the
majority perceived the need to give "real and substantial effect" to
Congress' amendments. The Chapter's reading of the 1982 amendments
was, therefore, completely rejected.
D. Flaws in the Appellate Court's Opinion
Having found the Secretary's regulation consistent with the ESA, the
Court identified three principal errors in the circuit court's opinion.371
366. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
367. This criticism was more clearly expressed by Justice O'Connor in her separate
concurrence with the majority's decision. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2414-15. It should remain clear that the opinion to
which the majority now refers is that issued by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals by Judge Williams upon rehearing. See Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1463.
1996]
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
First, the holding rejects the circuit court's initial premise which construed
the Secretary's definition of "harm" as exceeding the scope of every other
term found in the "take" definition.372 The majority concluded that
"harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill" all encompass conduct and impacts
that do not necessitate the direct application of physical force to the
animal.37
Elsewhere in the majority opinion, Stevens relied on the Act's
legislative history in determining the intended breadth of the definition of
"harass" was fairly expansive.374 Accordingly, the circuit court's use of
United States v. Hayashi was considered improper.375
The second error committed by the appellate court was the majority's
effort to incorporate an intent requirement directly into the terms defining
"take. 376 Indeed, the circuit court's interpretation of the "take" prohibi-
tion was somewhat reminiscent of the stringent intent requirement placed on
section 9 in Sierra Club v. Froehlke.77 Such a construction would stand
in variance with ESA section 11, under which an act which is merely
"knowing" will be enough to prove a violation. 378  Congress added
372. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 2416.
375. Id. at 2415 n.16. Justice Stevens finds the appellate court's reliance on Hayashi
misplaced. First, Hayashi dealt with a single application of the MMPA's "take" prohibition,
whereas the present litigation had been presented as a facial challenge to the Secretary's
regulation. Moreover, Hayashi construed the term "harass" under the MMPA's "take"
definition, while Sweet Home dealt with "harm," a term that does not even appear in the
MMPA's "take" provision. Finally, Hayashi was decided by the same court that decided the
Palila line of cases. Yet, "neither the Hayashi majority nor the dissent saw any need to
distinguish or even to cite Palila II." Id.
376. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
377. See supra note 27. As discussed above, this specific intent requirement
countermands the clear meaning of the Act. United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044
(D. Mont. 1988). This is strikingly similar to the circuit court's conclusions in Sweet Home.
Only deliberate activities directed at the animal will suffice under this reading. See
generally Sweet Home III, 17 F.3d at 1463.
378. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (relying on Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11, 87 Stat.
at 897-98 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b) (1994)). Section 1 l(a), regarding civil
penalties, encompasses "[a]ny person who knowingly violates... any provision of this Act
...." Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11(a), 87 Stat. at 897 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)
(1994)). Similarly, with reference to criminal penalties, § 11 (b) also applies to anyone who
"knowingly" violates the Act. Id. § 1l(b), 87 Stat. at 898 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1540(b)).
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"knowingly" in place of "willfully" to make criminal violations of the Act
general rather than specific intent crimes.3
Finally, the Court concluded that the circuit court erred in applying the
nocitur a sociis doctrine in such a manner as to reduce "harm" to mere
surplusage, denying the term any independent meaning.30
The statutory context of "harm" suggests that Congress meant that term
to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with but distinct
from the functions of the other verbs used to define "take." The
Secretary's interpretation of "harm" to include indirectly injuring
endangered animals through habitat modifications permissibly interprets
"harm" to have a "character of its own not to be submerged by its
association." 381
This is a vindication of the views of Chief Circuit Judge Mikva who, on
rehearing, found himself in the minority on this issue.
E. Addressing the Chapter's Other Arguments
The remainder of the majority's opinion was devoted to refuting other
arguments used by the Chapter and adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit. First, the Chapter asserted that such a broad reading of "take"
created more than minor overlaps in the statute, as the Secretary claimed,
and in fact threatened to subsume habitat protection measures found in
section 7 and section 5 if given such an expansive reading.382 The
Government, now able to limit the use of private land under the auspices of
section 9, would supposedly lack any incentive to purchase land under
section 5.33 Similarly, section 7, directing federal agencies to avoid
"jeopardizing" the continued existence of a listed species, or adversely
modifying its critical habitat would, in the Chapter's view, be swallowed up
by the prohibition against "takings" which applies to "any person," including
the federal government.3"4 The Court found neither claim persuasive:
379. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9493).
380. Id. at 2415.
381. Id. (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)).
382. Brief for Respondents at 23-25, Babbit (No. 94-859).
383. Id. at 24. Given the expansive application of § 9, the Chapter concluded that there
would be no incentive for the Service to purchase valuable habitat on private land (or
conservation easements), since the same goals could be more cheaply accomplished simply
by limiting the activities conducted on that land. Id.
384. Id. at 25.
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Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many
circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, the
[section] 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller's
activity has harmed any endangered animal, whereas the Government
cannot enforce the [section] 9 prohibition until an animal has actually
been killed or injured. The Secretary may also find the [section] 5
authority useful for preventing modification of land that is not yet but
may in the future become habitat for an endangered or threatened
species . . . . Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid
adverse habitat modifications that [section] 9 does not replicate, and
[section] 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that
"actually kills or injures wildlife. 3 85
Thus, any overlap between sections 5 and 7, and section 9 was deemed
"unexceptional," and merely a reflection of the broad purposes of the Act
as acknowledged in the Hill case.386
The Chapter's analysis of the Act's legislative history was refuted by
the Sweet Home Court. The majority pointed to this history, including the
1982 amendments, as "further support" of the Secretary's permissible
interpretation of the statute.387 Congress intended "take" to be defined as
broadly as possible, and this was soundly reflected in the ESA's legislative
history. Adding the obviously broad term "harm" was a conscious decision
by Congress to "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." '388 The 1982
amendments only bolstered this reading of the Act.38 9
Thus, the ESA delegated broad administrative authority to the Secretary
to interpret and enforce the provisions of the Act, which received a
significant amount of deference by the Court.390 Accordingly, the regula-
tion was upheld and the district court's decision reinstated.
385. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
386. Id. at 2415-16.
387. Id. at 2416.
388. Id. at 2416-17. In examining the legislative history of the Act, Justice Stevens
noted that a floor amendment in the Senate introducing "harm" to the bill was seen as a step
to "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." Id. at 2417 (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 25,683
(1973)).
389. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2417. The Court pointed to statements by Congress
indicating that § 10 was aimed toward the limited permitting of anticipated and foreseeable
"takes" that could not be avoided even after implementation of a habitat conservation plan.
Id.
390. Id. at 2418.
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F. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor joined the Sweet Home V majority in holding the
Secretary's "harm" regulation valid.391 However, while concurring with
the majority's basic decision, Justice O'Connor's agreement was qualified
in two important respects. First, the regulation defining "harm" must be
applied only to significant habitat modifications resulting in actual, rather
than speculative or hypothetical, death or injury to identifiable endangered
or threatened animals.3" Second, the regulation must be applied in light
of ordinary notions of proximate cause and foreseeability.393 These two
limitations were, in her view, clear on the face of the "harm" regulation, and
contrary to the views of the dissent, she found the regulation inherently
sound.3 "4 Both Justice O'Connor and the dissenters appeared to agree that
the "harm" regulation has been improperly applied in the past.395  The
essential difference between the two is in the placement of the blame for
these improper applications of section 9. The dissent, through Justice
Scalia, ascribed these instances of section 9's improper use to flaws inherent
in the Secretary's regulation itself. Justice O'Connor by contrast blamed a
wrongly decided Palila II decision for those erroneous applications of
section 9 ridiculed by the dissent.396 Indeed, she acknowledged that many
391. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
392. Id.
393. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
394. Id. Justice O'Connor, unlike the dissenters, saw "no need to strike a regulation on
a facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, however, and
because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation might validly
apply . . . ." The essential difference between the concurrence and the dissent is that the
dissent found the regulation fatally flawed, while Justice O'Connor found it poorly
interpreted by the courts. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. Justice O'Connor concluded that Palila I was wrongly decided because, in her
opinion, the case failed to present any proximate cause between the grazing activities of the
sheep and actual harm to the palila. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2420. However, as she
noted:
This case, of course, [comes before the Court] as a facial challenge. [The
Court is] charged with deciding whether the regulation on its face exceeds the
agency's statutory mandate. I have identified at least one application of the
regulation (Palila 1H) that is, in my view, inconsistent with the regulation's own
limitations. That misapplication does not, however, call into question the
validity of the regulation itself.
Id. at 2421.
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circumstances of habitat degradation exist where the regulation may validly
apply.397
Justice O'Connor's initial criticism rests on the Palila II decision's
extension of the "harm" definition, which interpreted the actual death or
injury requirement to encompass not just individual animals, but injury to
the species as a whole.39 On this point, she and the dissenters are in
agreement. Admittedly, the death of an individual animal always "injures"
a population to the extent that it has been reduced in size or numbers.
Justice O'Connor opines that such an extension, as accomplished by Palila
II, is inconsistent with the regulation's actual injury or death require-
ment. 99 The Sweet Home V dissent, on the other hand, attributed this
extension to a defect inherent in the regulation itself. Seizing on the
regulation's use of the word "breeding," Justice Scalia concluded that the
regulation facially prohibits significant habitat modifications that actually kill
or injure potential or hypothetical animals. He argues that impairment of
breeding activity fails to injure any living animal; therefore, the regulation
has been improperly written if the prevention of injuries to living popula-
tions was the Service's goal.4"
However, Justice O'Connor was apparently unable to accept Justice
Scalia's reasoning that an impairment of breeding activities harms no living
animals. In her view, impairment is injury; impairment of essential physical
functions such as breeding which renders the animal biologically obsolete
amounts to actual injury under the regulation.4 °1 She concluded that
397. Id. at 2418.
398. Id.
399. Justice O'Connor observes that "the regulation is limited by its terms to actions that
actually kill or injure individual animals." Id. This is in clear variance with the Palila II
opinion which held that the regulation was properly interpreted to include habitat
modification that could drive the palila into extinction. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila IlAppeal), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988).
This reading of the Act was deemed consistent with the overall purposes of the ESA "to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved .... Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(5)(b), 87 Stat.
at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). The overall purposes of the Act were
served, held the court, because the palila's threatened ecosystem was conserved. Id. No
evidence of death to individual palila birds was produced. Moreover, the district court
explicitly held that no such proof was required to satisfy the regulation. Palila (Loxiodes
bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077
(D. Haw. 1986).
400. See Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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interference with breeding and other essential behavioral patterns could
result in a host of actual injuries:
The regulation has clear application, for example, to significant habitat
modification that kills or physically injures animals which, because they
are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or cannot flee or defend
themselves, or to environmental pollutants that cause an animal to suffer
physical complications during gestation. Breeding, feeding, and
sheltering are what animals do. If significant habitat modification, by
interfering with these essential behaviors, actually kills or injures an
animal protected by the Act, it causes "harm" within the meaning of the
regulation. 2
Justice O'Connor would require that a demonstrable injury to
identifiable animals be shown, and this actual injury must be distinguished
from the potential, the speculative and the hypothetical. 3  Activities
degrading an endangered species' potential habitat would be insufficient."
Similarly, the inability to produce evidence of dead or injured animals
would seem to fall short under this reading of the Secretary's regulation.4"5
Yet, both circumstances satisfied the regulation under Palila IL
Justice O'Connor directly questioned the correctness of Palila I on this
point. Injury to the species as a whole, as opposed to an individual
member, and injury to the species' recovery, have both been called into
doubt by her position on the regulation's actual death or injury requirement.
Her strict reading of the actual death or injury requirement overlooks the
plain goals of the ESA to conserve species and their ecosystems.e 6 The
Palila H court's focus on injuries to the collective species links section 9
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2418. Justice O'Connor's first qualification to the regulation was a showing
of actual death to identifiable protected animals. Id.
404. On this point, Justice O'Connor observed:
That a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree, or could,
perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient under the
regulation. Instead, as the commentary [on revising the "harm" definition]
reflects, the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death)
on actual, individual members of the protected species.
Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2419.
405. Id.
406. The ESA's stated purpose is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide
a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species .. .
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(5)(b), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
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with the stated overall purpose of the ESA.4 7 A contrary interpretation
would permit activities that frustrate this overall purpose.408 The court in
Palila II recognized this and properly placed the burden of demonstrating
actual death or injury on the plaintiffs.4" An extensive body of scientific
data pointed to one, and only one cause for this-the browsing activities of
the offending sheep. For the Palila II court, this well-founded body of
unrefuted data obviated any need to produce actual dead or starving palila
birds, but that is not to say that proof of dead animals will not suffice. The
burden of demonstrating actual death or injury may be satisfied in any
number of ways, and if empirical data is presented establishing an adverse
impact to the species, the regulation's actual death or injury requirement is
satisfied.4"' Actual injury to the palila as a species was the ultimate result
407. "The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated
policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). See ROHLF, supra note 3, at 65 (observing that Palila II
links § 9 with the ESA's overall purpose).
408. See Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila
I), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Haw. 1986) (observing that continued destruction of the
forest would have driven the bird into extinction).
409. Id. at 1075, 1077.
410. The Service's comments on the 1981 amendment to the "harm" regulation support
this interpretation. Nowhere in the comments did the Service suggest that "actual death or
injury" required proof of death or injury to individual animals. The Service contended that
"[t]he final definition adds the word "actually" before the words "kills or injures" in response
to comments requesting this addition to clarify that a standard of actual, adverse effects
applies to section 9 takings." 45 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (1981) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Service responded to one comment arguing that habitat modification alone amounted to a
"taking" by noting that the commenter's objection was unclear because the examples and
discussion in the comment repeatedly referred to "injury and harmful effects on the species
which can be caused by habitat modification." Id. (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor now
asserts that the inclusion of "actually" has imposed a more stringent evidentiary requirement.
On that 'point she is correct. However, the opinion places more emphasis on the word
"actually" than the Service has intended. As the Service has noted:
The purpose of redefinition was to preclude claims of a Section 9 taking for
habitat modification alone without any attendant death or injury to the protected
wildlife. Death or injury, however, may be caused by impairment of essential
behavioral patterns which can have significant and permanent effects on a listed
species. Many commenters suggested that the word "actually" be reinserted in
the definition to bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a party's
actions. This has been done.
Id. at 54,748-49 (emphasis added). "Actually" was inserted to preserve a distinction between
habitat modification alone (which is not a "taking") and habitat modification that has a real
impact on the species. As Palila 11 observes, proven injury to identifiable animals is one of
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of numerous impairments of essential behavioral characteristics of its
constituent members. Similarly, that the palila were unable to increase their
numbers was a direct result of increased casualties of individual birds. This
fact frustrated the achievement of the stated goal of conserving and
recovering the palila.4 '
Justice O'Connor also determined that liability under the "harm"
regulation meust be conditioned on a showing of proximate cause and notions
of ordinary foreseeability.4" The decision on whether sections 11 and 9
erect a strict liability regime, as the dissent argued, could wait for another
time.413 Liability, strict or not, does not dispense with ordinary principles
of causation.4" 4 Justice O'Connor could not discern any intent by Con-
gress, in describing the ESA's penalties in section 11, to do away with
traditional principles of proximate causation.415 In the absence of such an
abrogation by Congress, she asserts that section 9 violations must be
established using principles of proximate causation borrowed from common
law tort.4" 6
Imposition of proximate cause principles arguably does no violence to
the "harm" regulation and, as Justice O'Connor claims, is required. Again,
pointing to the Service's inclusion of "actually," she observes that specula-
several ways in which this evidentiary burden may be accomplished. Palila II, 649 F. Supp.
at 1075.
411. Palila II, 649 F. Supp. at 1077.
412. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
413. Id. at 2420.
414. Id. Justice O'Connor observed that "[s]trict liability means liability without regard
to fault; it does not normally mean liability for every consequence, however remote, of one's
conduct." Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 79, at 559-60 (5th ed. 1984) (noting the "practical necessity for the restriction of
liability within some reasonable bounds" in the strict liability context)).
415. Id. at 2420. The penalties found in § 11(1) punish knowing violations of § 9. Pub.
L. No. 93-205, § 11(a), 87 Stat. at 897 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(1)).
416. Justice O'Connor pointed to Congress' silence on this issue, noting that she "would
not lightly assume that Congress, in enacting a strict liability statute that is silent on the
causation question, has dispensed with this well-entrenched principle." Sweet Home V, 115
S. Ct. at 2420 (relying on Benifiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Congress did not intend to abrogate common law principles of proximate cause
to reach "remote and derivative" consequences under Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act)). Justice O'Connor also pointed to the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation & Liability Act ("CERCLA") as an example of a statute where Congress
specifically abrogated a causation requirement. Id. (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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tive or conjectural effects on listed species were explicitly excluded under
the regulation.417
Though proximate cause is not susceptible to a precise definition,
O'Connor concludes that, at the very least, proximate cause "injects a
foreseeability element into the statute. '418 In this manner, many of the
erroneous applications of section 9 probed by the dissent could be avoid-
ed.419 Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserts that this element was ignored
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Palila II, concluding that the case
was wrongly decided on these grounds:
Pursuant to my interpretation, Palila //-under which the Court of
Appeals held that a state agency committed a "taking" by permitting
feral sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full-grown, might
have fed and sheltered endangered palila-was wrongly decided
according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction of the seedlings
did not proximately cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it
merely prevented the regeneration of the forest land not currently
inhabited by actual birds.420
However, section 9 does not deal with torts against the protected
animal. Section 9 directs the Secretary to restrict certain uses of private or
public property having an ascertainable impact on the listed species. To this
end, "actually" clearly injects an element of causation into the "harm"
regulation by stressing the critical link between habitat modification and
injury to the species.421  Nowhere has the Act suggested the use of
417. Id. Justice O'Connor concludes that "[tihe regulation, of course, does not
contradict the presumption or notion that ordinary principles of causation apply here. Indeed,
by use of the word, "actually," the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects,
and thus, itself invokes principles of proximate causation." Id.
418. Id.
419. See Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2418.
420. Id. at 2420-21.
421. Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palla II),
649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Haw. 1986) (holding that the redefinition "stresses the critical
link between habitat modification and injury to the species"). The causation element is found
in the plaintiffs burden to establish this link between the habitat modification and the
requisite injury to the species. The plaintiff must be able to prove the significant habitat
modification leads to the prohibited result. See, e.g., American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d
163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that no "taking" existed where the appellants "have not
shown that the hunt caused actual harm") (emphasis added).
Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), exemplifies this point. The
district court found that no "taking" had occurred because the plaintiff could not meet its
burden under the regulation and prove that the proposed development would lead to the
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common law tort principles in establishing violations. Rather, the Secre-
tary's regulation has imposed a cause-in-fact standard of causation which
distinguishes between mere habitat modification and habitat modification
resulting in a prohibited impact on the listed species.4' This looser
standard of causation again underscores the overall intent of Congress that
the recovery of "endangered species be afforded the highest of priori-
ties."4"
G. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented.424 Considering the Secretary's regulation an unfair conscription
of private property for national zoological use, he concluded that the
regulation contradicts the "unmistakably clear" intent of Congress.4' The
opinion grudgingly concedes to the application of the Chevron doctrine,
nevertheless reasoning that no amount of deference to the Secretary can save
the regulation.
From the outset, the dissent mischaracterized the nature of the
restrictions imposed on private landowners by the application of section
9.426 The opinion makes no consideration that restrictions under the ESA
are ordinarily not permanent. Once a species has progressed toward
recovery, land use restrictions can be re-evaluated according to the purpose
of the Act.427 Where circumstances dictate, these restrictions may be
destruction of habitat which in turn could threaten the listed species. Id. at 432. The court
concluded that "[ilt is this lack of a causal link between the [proposed] project and the
potential harm projected by the plaintiffs expert that distinguishes this case from those cases
cited by plaintiff." Id.
422. Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under
the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 155, 190 (1995).
423. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
424. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia J., dissenting).
425. Id.
426. From the opening passage of the opinion, the dissent's tone echoed in inverse
condemnation. "The Court's holding that the hunting and killing prohibition [of § 9]
incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial
ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use." Id.
427. The nature of § 9's restrictions on land use was recognized by the district court
opinion in Palila II:
The mamane forest can be expected to recover slowly when released from
the current browsing pressures. At some point in the future, the mamane on
Mauna Kea may have recovered sufficiently to support Palila beyond its current
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relaxed, and section 9 protection may be withdrawn partially or altogether
pursuant to the Secretary's rulemaking power under section 4(d).428
The dissent places the responsibility for solving this problem entirely
on the shoulders of the Secretary rather than on those parties who caused the
particular species to be listed. If landowners better recognized the need for
instituting sustainable use practices and concepts of responsible stewardship
on their own lands, and had relaxed economic and political pressures to
intensely harvest resources on public lands, the critical habitat problem
would have been significantly ameliorated. The combination of preserved
public lands and responsibly managed private property would probably have
been sufficient to substantially reduce the number of species listed by the
Secretary or would have reduced the degree of protection necessary to avert
the extinction of these animals. This point is avoided by the minority in
Sweet Home V. It can be argued that the interests which played the most
significant role in adversely affecting habitat and creating this problem are
those same interests which are now being asked to alter their practices to
allow species to recover.
Justice Scalia pointed to what he perceived to be three major failings
of the regulation.429 First, the regulation must fail in his view because of
its inadequate causation requirement. Read this way, habitat modifications
falling under this regulation, need only be the cause-in-fact of actual death
endangered population. Likewise, at some future date, the forest and the bird
population may be sufficiently stable to allow the coexistence of some mouflon
sheep with Palila. At present, however, the Endangered Species Act mandates
the protection of the Palila to the extent possible, in the hope that this bird does
not join the many other indigenous species that have disappeared from these
islands.
Palila (Loxiodes bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I1), 649 F.
Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
428. For threatened wildlife, and for endangered wildlife downlisted to threatened status,
§ 9's "taking" prohibition is applied through a single blanket regulation. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31.
This blanket regulation was upheld below. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home I/), 1 F.3d 1, 5-8 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Secretary can, when
appropriate, withdraw part or all of these protections by special rule for particular species
listed as threatened. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (Special Rules). Similarly, federally issued
permits may be acquired allowing the limited take of endangered or threatened wildlife under
appropriate circumstances. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 10, 87 Stat. at 896 (current version
at 16 U.S.C. § 1539); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22-.23 (1994). The entire regulatory regime is
designed to allow the Secretary to exercise common sense in tailoring restrictions so as to
provide the best protection to the species in the least harsh manner, while always keeping in
mind the goal of ultimately delisting the species through these decisions.
429. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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or injury to wildlife.43 Any significant habitat modification producing
this prohibited result by impairing essential behavioral patterns is unlawful,
regardless of whether that result was foreseeable or intended, and regardless
of how attenuated the causation between modification and injury may
be.431 On this point, Justice Scalia disapprovingly cited Palila II as an
example of a "taking" claim resting on a highly attenuated chain of
causation.432
Second, Justice Scalia objected to the fact that the regulation is satisfied
by any act or omission resulting in actual death or injury.433 This point
430. Id. (citing Davison, supra note 422, at 190). The proper standard of causation
under the regulation has been the source of some confusion. The Service has remained silent
on the issue. The regulation's focus on the ultimate death or injury suggests a "but for" or
"substantial factor" standard of causation borrowed from tort law:
If a specific protected animal was found dead on land that was not part of
modified or degraded wildlife habitat, there would be a finding that the
modification of the wildlife habitat was a "taking" if the dead animal had used
the altered or modified habitat prior to its death and if, using the "but for" or
substantial factor test, the habitat modification was the cause in fact of the
animal's death by forcing the animal to migrate to new habitat where it died or
was killed.
Davison, supra note 423, at 191 (footnote omitted). A number of scenarios could fit this
model. The unsuitability of the new habitat into which the relocated animal is forced to
settle may precipitate its death or injury. Similarly, the introduction of foreign predators into
the habitat (as was the case in the Palila cases) or the displacement of predators into new
habitat bringing about conflict with the protected species, could also satisfy this standard.
See id. at 191 n.182.
431. Id. The Chapter asserted that the regulation's exclusive focus on the ultimate effect
(the injury) while disregarding the character of the conduct sought to be prohibited,
substantially contributed to the improperly broad interpretation of harm. Brief for
Respondents at 7, Babbit (No. 94-859). The narrow focus on the injury ignored the normal
usage of the term which requires some form of purposeful effort to hurt or injure. Sweet
Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421.
432. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2421. The dissenting opinion provides one other
example of what it sees as the remote and tenuous chain of causation permitted under the
regulation:
To define "harm" as an act or omission that, however remotely, "actually kills
or injures" a population of wildlife through habitat modification, is to choose a
meaning that makes nonsense of the word that "harm" defines-requiring us to
accept that a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into
a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby "impairs [the] breeding" of
protected fish, has "taken" or "attempted to take" the fish. It should take the
strongest evidence to make us believe that Congress has defined a term in a
manner repugnant to its ordinary and traditional sense.
Id. at 2423.
433. Id. at 2422.
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was clear on the face of the original "harm" regulation, which covered any
"act or omission which actually kills wildlife . . . ."3 However, the
mention of omissions was deleted from the regulation in the course of the
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm., 435  Despite this deletion, the
Service's comments indicate that "act" is inclusive of both affirmative action
and omissions.436 The dissent apparently disagrees with the propriety of
including omissions under the regulation.437
Finally, the regulation's third inherent flaw under the dissent's analysis
was its inclusion of injuries inflicted not just on individual animals, but on
populations as well.43s Habitat modifications resulting in "harm" through
the impairment of breeding activity, he theorizes, fail to injure any living
creature.439 Only potential living animals may have been harmed by this
conduct, and similarly, only the population at large has been injured since
its future numbers may have been reduced.' 4 The dissent, while properly
understanding the regulation's scope applying to populations, misapprehends
the meaning in application within the context of the Act. Justice Scalia's
effort to limit section 9's application to individual animals runs counter to
the language and purpose of the Act.441
434. Id.
435. Id. at 2422 (relying on 46 Fed. Reg. § 54,750 (1981)).
436. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422. On the deletion of "or omission" from the
regulation in 1981, the Service attributed this change to their position that the term "act" is
inclusive of either commissions or omissions which would be prohibited by § 9. Id.
437. The exact nature of Justice Scalia's objection to this is unclear on the face of the
opinion. While attacking the regulation on its face, this particular objection appears to be
directed toward a specific interpretation of the regulation rather than the regulation itself.
438. Id. at 2422. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she stated that the regulation, on
its face, focused on individual animals, rather than on collective populations. See supra note
399. By contrast, Justice Scalia recognizes the appropriate scope of the regulation, but
concludes that this focus on the species as a whole is impermissible under the Act. Sweet
Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
439. Justice Scalia concludes that "[i]mpairment of breeding does not 'injure' living
creatures; it prevents them from propagating, thus "injuring" a population of animals which
would otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." Id. The Secretary's official
pronouncements in the Final Redefinition of "Harm" accompanying the amendment to the
regulation confirm this reading for the dissent. See Brief for Respondents at 25, Babbit (No.
94-859).
440. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
441. The stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved[, and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species
...." Pub. L. No. 93-205, § (2)(b), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b))
(emphasis added). Similarly, § 9(a)(1)(B) makes it unlawful for any person to "take any such
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Unable to find any of these three criticized features of the "harm"
regulation reflected in the language of the ESA, the dissent conducted a
historical analysis of the term "take." 442  Justice Scalia observed that
"harm" lacks legal significance independent from "take"--the only operative
term in section 9.4 When applied to animals, the dissent holds that
"take" has long since been understood to mean only the reduction of a wild
animal to human control via death or capture. This meaning of "take," the
opinion noted, "is as old as the law itself." 4  This use of the term "take"
was also consistent with the term's usage in other environmental statutes and
treaties.445 Justice Scalia considered his reading of "take" to be consistent
with the structure of section 9, covering all aspects of commercial trafficking
in endangered species and products made from such species; from the
"taking" of such species to their sale, transport, and import or export." 6
Therefore, the dissent holds that the Secretary's definition of "harm," when
read in conjunction with the term "take," must be confined within the long-
understood meaning of "take":
species within the United States .... Id. § 9(a)(1)(b), 87 Stat. at 893 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis added). Nowhere in relevant part does the Act refer
to the animal in any other sense than collectively.
442. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
443. The dissent, rather than attempting to define harm as the Petitioners and
Respondents have done, turns to the term "take," as the only word having legal significance.
One cannot be criminally charged with "harming" a listed species-only of "taking" one.
Id.
444. Id.
445. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, § 15, 103 Stat. 1977 (1989)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Agreement on the
Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, art. I, 27 U.S.T. 3918, 3921.
446. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2422. Justice Scalia considers "take" in view of the
overall structure of § 9(a)(1):
The taking prohibition, in other words, is only part of the regulatory plan of §
1538(a)(1), which covers all the stages of the process by which protected wildlife
is reduced to man's dominion and made the object of profit. It is obvious that
"take" in this sense-a term of art deeply embedded in the statutory and common
law concerning wildlife-describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly
and intentionally (not indirectly and by accident) to particular animals (not
populations of animals).
Id. at 2422 (citations omitted).
However, while the dissent's argument is logically consistent, this point still does not
cure the basic flaw in its premise: the failure to recognize that the entire Act requires
attention to populations as a whole. Section 9, as a whole, must be read in light of the
statute in which it appears.
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The tempting fallacy-which the Court commits with abandon-is to
assume that once defined, "take" loses any significance and it is only
the definition that matters. The Court treats the statute as though
Congress had directly enacted the [section] 1532(19) definition as a
self-executing prohibition, and had not enacted [section] 1538(a)(1)(B)
at all. But [section] 1538(a)(1)(B) is there, and if the terms contained
in the definitional section are susceptible of two readings, one of which
comports with the standard meaning of "take" as used in application to
wildlife, and one of which does not, an agency regulation that adopts
the latter reading is necessarily unreasonable, for it reads the defined
term "take"-the only operative term-out of the statute altogether. 47
Justice Scalia then turned his focus to "harm," read in light of the
operative term "take." Following a list of dictionary definitions of "harm,"
he observed that the more common or preferred usage of the term incorpo-
rated some idea of direct and anticipated hurt or injury." This, he
concluded, was the common thread binding together all ten descriptors in
the "take" definition found in the statute." 9 The application of force, as
Circuit Judge Williams had concluded,450 was not the point. Rather, in the
view of the dissenters, it was this common sense of affirmative conduct
intentionally directed against individual animals.
45
'
447. Id. at 2423.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbit (Sweet Home III),
17 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
451. The majority points out this apparent abandonment of the circuit court's "direct
application of force" argument. Recognizing the flaw in this interpretation, the dissent
instead sought to impose a limitation on § 9 based on a requirement of "'affirmative conduct
directed against a particular animal or animals."' Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 n.15.
Under this reading of § 9, the majority observed that conduct clearly in violation of the Act
would otherwise be permitted:
Under the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a developer could drain a pond,
knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered species of turtles, without
even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit under § 9(a)(1)(B);
unless the developer was motivated by a desire "to get at a turtle," no statutory
taking could occur. Because such conduct would not constitute a taking at
common law, the dissent would shield it from § 9 liability, even though the
words "kill" and "harm" in the statutory definition could apply to such deliberate
conduct. We cannot accept that limitation. In any event, our reasons for
rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation apply as well to the dissent's novel
construction.
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The opinion logically errs by removing "take" from its modem context
within the ESA and reading it in light of Nineteenth Century common law
regulations on hunting. If traditional common law is the subject of the
inquiry, "take" is properly limited in this respect. However, under modem
law, the definition, like the subject matter defined, must remain dynamic,
and be interpreted in the context of the statute in which it appears.
Instead, the dissent read "take" in an outdated manner typified by the
sources relied on for its position. A 1949 dictionary and a series of hunting
regulations and cases offer the only support cited for this position.452 The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar
Bears, and even the Marine Mammal Protection Act, relied on by the circuit
court-these are all programs geared specifically toward prohibiting the
hunting of particular species. None of these provisions share the ESA's
comprehensive focus toward wildlife and habitat protection, and none attest
to the ESA's very clear goal of recovering extremely depleted populations
of wildlife.453 Consequently, the term "take" means something very
different in the context of these statutes.4 4
452. The dissent has drawn the term's definition from the English common law
definition, and relies on some older sources. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896)
(observing that "all the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air,
that is to say, wild animals, belong to those who take them"); 17 OxFORD ENGLISH
DICrIONARY 537 (1989); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2331 (2d ed. 1949).
453. The species protected under the Act are signals of much greater ecological concern
which foretell adverse impacts to human populations. On the need for the ESA legislation,
the Report of ihe House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fishery observed:
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and
as we increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply
(usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and our own-genetic heritage.
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable....
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest of
mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations....
Who knows, or who can say, what potential cure for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which
may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed?... Sheer self-interest impels us
to be cautious.... The institutionalization of that caution lies at the heart of
[the ESA].
H.R. REP. No. 412, supra note 154, at 4-5. The value to be realized through recovery of a
signal species is value to the general community, not just for some ideal view of nature.
454. "Take" must be interpreted within the context of the ESA-a comprehensive body
of legislation directed toward halting the growing trend toward extinction in a holistic
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Obviously, the dissent concurred with the Chapter's use of the nocitur
a sociis principle in reading "harm" linking it to the other nine descriptive
terms in the statute.455  He rejected the majority's conclusion that the
circuit court erred in applying nocitur a sociis in a manner depriving "harm"
of any independent meaning. Under this reasoning the dissent pointed to the
terms "trap" and "capture" as two arguably superfluous terms.
45 6
"Harm" would, therefore, still add something even under this narrow
definition. Poisoning an animal, spraying it with chemicals, or destroying
its habitat to get at it, while not necessarily wounding or killing, would
nevertheless "harm" the animal in the narrow sense defined by the
dissent.457
Justice Scalia also found this interpretation supported by the ESA's
penalty provisions. Section 11 of the Act prohibits "knowingly" committed
violations of section 9.458 Yet, "harm" as defined by the Secretary would
subject numerous routine private activities to strict liability when they
manner. The problems to be corrected by the statutes cited by the dissent simply do not
correlate with the findings of Congress in enacting the ESA:
The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development
untempered by adequate.concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of aesthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people;
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(a)(I)-(3), 87 Stat. at 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)).
455. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424.
456. Id. The majority's reasoning would require the redefinition of these terms to avoid
the surplusage rule relied upon in upholding the "harm" regulation: "If it were true, we
ought to give the word 'trap' in the definition its rare meaning of 'to clothe' (whence
'trappings')-since otherwise it adds nothing to the word 'capture."' Id. However, this
analogy is not entirely consistent with the dictionary definitions of these terms. Contrary to
Justice Scalia's reading, "trap" does have a distinct meaning from capture. Webster's defines
the verb "trap" as "to catch in or take in as if in a trap; to provide or set (a place) with
traps." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1234 (1981). The word also is defined
as a synonym for "snare, entrap, ensnare, bag, lure," and "decoy." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY 727 (1974); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1293 (rev. ed.
1982) (defining "trepan," as "to trap; ensnare"). However, the verb "capture" is defined to
encompass the seizure of something by force or trickery, to take captive. THE MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY 116 (1974).
457. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424.
458. Id.
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"fortuitously" injure or kill protected wildlife, regardless of how remote the
chain of causation. 59 This, Justice Scalia concludes, could not have been
Congress' intent. A "knowing" violation requires that the defendant "know
the facts that make the conduct illegal." '  Under the Secretary's interpre-
tation, a "taking" has occurred regardless of whether or not injury to the
protected animal was foreseeable or anticipated. Under the Act, actual
injury to the animal is the fact that makes the conduct illegal. The
regulation, however, only requires that the conduct be the cause-in-fact of
the injury or death.46' No element of foreseeability has been explicitly
required.462 Therefore, the dissent, like Justice O'Connor, has attempted
to inject some notion of tort law into the ESA, only to wonder aloud why
the concept failed to fit comfortably in the legislative scheme.
Justice Scalia insisted that the Secretary's interpretation runs counter to
the general structure of the ESA.4 6' First, he pointed to the explicit
reference to habitat modification in section 7(a)(2), which prohibits the
adverse modification of critical habitat by federal agencies.4 6 "Critical
habitat" is defined in section 3.46 In spite of the explicit prohibition of
critical habitat modification in section 7, the dissent observed that Congress
remained silent on the issue of habitat in section 9. Congress' decision to
include habitat modification in one instance, while not mentioning it in
another must, the dissent argues, be presumed intentional and purpose-
ful.466 Thus, Justice Scalia found it odd that Congress would carefully
define "critical habitat" explicitly prohibiting its destruction or adverse
modification in section 7, while leaving the Secretary free to evaluate
adverse habitat modification under the guise of "harm" in section 9.467
Justice Scalia questioned the majority's attempt to divide these provisions
into two discrete regulatory realms based on section 7's limited applicability
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See supra note 416.
462. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2424.
463. Id. at 2425.
464. Id.
465. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 2(2), (7), 92 Stat. at 3751 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)).
466. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2035 (1993) ("'Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another . . . .it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")).
467. Id.
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to federal agencies.4 6' Relying solely on the broad definition of "persons,"
to whom section 9 is directed, Justice Scalia concludes that section 7's
prohibition against adverse modification of critical habitat has been rendered
superfluous by the Secretary's interpretation of section 9.469 This conten-
tion was rejected by the majority which held such overlap between sections
7 and 9 reflective of the comprehensive regulatory scheme erected under the
ESA.470
The remainder of the dissent focused on each of the four bases
supporting the majority's decision to uphold the regulation, attempting to
reject each in turn.47 The dissent points to previous holdings by this
Court, in denouncing the "simplistic assumption that whatever furthers the
statute's primary objective must be the law. 472 The ends reached by the
Secretary's regulation could not, therefore, per se justify the means
selected.473 However, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, adherence to
this rule cannot, by the same logic, counsel a reading that is counterproduc-
tive to the statute's overall purposes. 474
468. Justice Scalia concluded that "[i]n fact however, [§§ 7 and 9] do not operate in
separate realms; federal agencies are subject to both, because 'person[s]' forbidden to take
protected species under [§ 9] include agencies and departments of the Federal Government."
Id. at 2426.
469. However, this sense of overlap among various provisions of the ESA offered no
problem for the Court in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The project
was held to violate § 7's prohibitions. Id. at 185 n.30. The Court noted that the project
would probably constitute a § 9 "taking" as well. Id.
470. See supra Part IV.E.
471. Sweet Home V, 115 S. Ct. at 2426.
472. On this point Justice Scalia declared, "I thought we had renounced the vice of
'simplistically ... assum[ing] that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be
the law."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526
(1987)).
473. Id.
474. The dissent's means/ends analysis is weakened by consideration of the Chevron
doctrine. The Secretary is given considerable discretion to construe and administer the ESA.
Chevron dictates that this discretion be given great deference to by courts reviewing the
Secretary's decisions. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, the Secretary's interpretation must advance the purposes
of the Act, and no amount of deference accorded to the Secretary's reading will save an
interpretation that is counterproductive to the goals and purposes of the statute interpreted.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The immediate impact of the Sweet Home V decision was to restore the
Palila cases and dissolve the split between the federal circuits. Since the
case was a facial attack on the Secretary's "harm" regulation, the actual
holding in Sweet Home V is not as significant as other aspects of the
opinion. While the facial attack on this regulation was rejected, an
amendment to the ESA deleting the term "harm" from the statutory
definition of "take," or repeal of or significant amendment to the "harm"
regulation it upholds, would nullify the decision.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion provides some insights as to
where this area of the law may be headed. While upholding the regulation
on its face, Justice O'Connor is one of at least four Supreme Court Justices
who believe that Palila was wrongly decided. Her arguments regarding the
regulation's causation requirement and its alleged focus on individual
animals are best suited to legal challenges to specific applications of the
regulation, and not facial attacks on the regulation itself. Indeed, she recog-
nizes this point and cautions that such challenges must have well developed
factual records to withstand scrutiny in accordance with the Sweet Home V
decision.
The true impact of Sweet Home V lies as much in what was not settled
by the court. The case demonstrates the soundness of the Chevron doctrine
as a standard of review. The properly-exercised discretion of the Secretary
ought to be upheld unless a clear incongruity with the Act can be distilled.
In the instant case, the Secretary's decision reflected a proper understanding
for the ESA and its comprehensive purposes. To conclude that a species
cannot be "harmed" by destroying its habitat, leaving it inadequate shelter
and food, defies common sense. Congress recognized this in enacting the
ESA generally, and section 9 in particular. The Secretary recognized this
too. Therefore, the Chevron doctrine emerges as an important mechanism
for ensuring that our national environmental policy is administered in a
rational manner and in the way expected by Congress. The remaining
controversy over species recovery will diminish only when the raison d'etre
of the ESA is fulfilled.
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This article reviews the significant developments in Florida condemna-
tion law during the period from July of 1994 through July of 1995.
I. THE NEW LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW
Perhaps the most significant development in Florida condemnation law
in the last year was the legislature's amendment of chapter 73 of the Florida
Statutes and particularly those changes which affect the amount of fees and
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costs awarded under the statute.' The new law is now collectively
embodied in sections 73.032, 73.091, and 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.
It represents a complete departure from the law as it existed in 1976, when
the statute actually prohibited fee allocations based solely on a percentage
of the condemnation award.2
The new version calculates fees almost exclusively on this basis, stating
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain
1. 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-162. It should be noted that this article does not discuss the
recently enacted Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, 1995 Fla. Laws
ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)), as that topic is beyond its scope and
treated comprehensively elsewhere.
2. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1976). The preamendment "offer of judgment" portion
of the statute, which acted as a limitation of fees and costs, was contained in § 73.032 of the
1993 statutes. Created in 1990, it is still operative with respect to actions filed prior to the
effective date of the new statute. FLA. STAT. § 73.032 n.1 (1995).
The awarding of costs and fees in condemnation cases has a long history in Florida.
In 1892, the applicable statute contained a precursor to today's offer of judgment by
providing that all costs were to be paid by the condemnor, except those where "the verdict
... [was no] greater than the compensation awarded by the viewers." FLA. REV. STAT. §
1558 (1892). Section 1551 of this version required a 12-man jury and a jury "view." FLA.
REV. STAT. § 1551 (1892).
In 1901, the statute still required a 12-man jury, but it began to allow business damages
to businesses in existence for five years on adjoining land or within two miles of the
acquisition. COMP. GEN. LAWS FLA. § 5017 (1901). In 1906, § 2020 specifically required
the condemnor to pay all costs, including attorney's fees, and in 1920, § 1649 required that
the fee award be included in the verdict.
In 1941, § 73.16 of the Florida Statutes required that all of the condemnee's costs,
including attorney's fees, be set by a jury (except for unsuccessful appeals). FLA. STAT. §
73.16 (1941). By 1963, however, that same section required attorney's fees and costs to be
assessed by the court. FLA. STAT. § 73.16 (1963).
In 1976, fees continued to be assessed by the court, but the judge was given specific
factors to consider. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1976). In addition, the court was prohibited
from "bas[ing] [the fee] solely on a percentage of the award." Id. In 1985, section 73.092
was amended to require the condemnee's counsel to submit detailed statements of the
services performed and the time spent performing them. Ch. 85-180, § 37, 1985 Fla. Laws
1300, 1323 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1985)).
In 1987, the legislature recreated the "offer of judgment." FLA. STAT. § 73.092(6)
(1987). Three years later, the 1990 version of § 73.092 required that the court give the
greatest weight to any "benefit" achieved by the condemnee's attorney, with the court to
consider the remaining factors secondarily. Id. § 73.092 (Supp. 1990). The statute no longer
prohibited fee awards based solely on a percentage of the condemnation award, and it placed
the "offer of judgment" provision into a separate section. Id, § 73.092(6). The 1994
amendment is thus one more link in a long line of legislative tinkering.
[Vol. 20
252
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Gaffrey
proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits
achieved for the client."3
A. Attorney's Fees
By far the most controversial amendment to the statute, and the one
which has attracted the most attention, is the new attorney's fees provision
contained in section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.4 Under this newly
created section, the "benefit" to the defendant now becomes the sole factor
in determining fee awards in virtually all condemnation cases.5
The new statute governs all actions in eminent domain filed after
October 1, 1994. It requires courts to calculate fee awards based upon on
a predetermined statutory schedule: 33% of any "benefit" received by the
condemnee up to $250,000; 25% of any "benefit" between $275,000 and
one million dollars; and 20% of any benefit over that amount.6 The statute
specifically mandates that fees be based solely upon these percentages, and
as such, the circuit courts are prohibited7 from looking to any other factors,
including, for example, the number of hours reasonably expended by the
condemnee's counsel in preparation of the case, the terms of any fee
agreement, or any of the enumerated criteria contained in section 73.092(2),
which now only applies in restricted settings.'
The statute defines the "benefit" to be the difference between the
amount the final judgment9 (excluding interest) and the last written offer
3. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (Supp. 1994).
4. Ch. 94-162, § 3, 1994 Fla. Laws 955, 957 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 73.092
(1995)). The predecessor statute, FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993), still controls actions filed
prior to Oct. 1, 1994, and is still to be used by the court to determine fees in some limited
cases. Id. § 4, 1994 Fla. Laws at 959. See discussion infra note 8 and accompanying text.
5. FLA. STAT. § 73.092.
6. Id. § 73.092(1)(c)(1)-(3). The statute mandates that the court "shall" award fees in
the manner it prescribes. Il § 73.092(1).
7. See Downtown Square Assoc. v. Department of Educ., 648 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
8. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2)-(3). Sections 73.092(2) and (3) are still to be used, but only
in very limited cases, such as when the condemnor has rejected an offer of judgment under
the new statute, and the final judgment equals or exceeds that amount. FLA. STAT. §
73.032(6) (1995). The criteria of § 73.092(2)(a)-(g) and (3) are also to be used to calculate
fees awarded in defeating a taking, or in proceedings considered "supplemental" to an action
in eminent domain, such as apportionment. Id. § 73.092(2)-(3).
9. The statute actually reads, "between the final judgment or settlement." FLA. STAT.
§ 73.092(1)(a). At first glance, this terminology may seem a bit confusing (or at least
redundant), because any "settlement" would necessarily be integrated into a final judgment,
and thus the reference becomes surplusage. However, it must be noted that subsection
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made before the condemnee hires an attorney.'" If no offer is made before
the condemnee retains counsel, the benefit is measured from the first offer
made after an attorney is hired.1 Generally, the amount of the benefit will
include any award made for business damages. However, if the condemnor
has made a written request for the condemnee's business records,12 and the
condemnee fails to provide those records, the court must exclude any award
for business damages from the benefit calculation. 3
Unlike the old statute, which merely required the production of the
owner's "financial records," the newly worded statute requires "those
financial and business records kept by the owner in the ordinary course of
business."14 It is not yet clear what effect, if any, this expanded terminolo-
gy will have on the production requirement.
With respect to the time in which these records are to be produced-
at least during presuit negotiations-the new statute makes no changes, and
still does not require that the records be produced by any specific date.'5
But, if a suit is later filed, and the business owner has still not provided the
records, any business-damage benefits are to be based on the first written
offer the condemnor makes within 120 days after filing the action. 6
In addition, a newly added portion of this section can be used by the
court to extend that 120-day time period even longer. 7 Under the new
statute, if the condemnor requests the owner's records through discovery,
and does so within forty-five days of the condemnee's answer, the time to
make an business damage offer is extended up to sixty days after the
(1)(a)l. specifically governs fees awarded "in prelitigation negotiations" and subsection
(1)(a)2. refers to fees awarded after litigation. Id. § 73.092(1)(a)1.-2. This bifurcation
obviously contemplates fee determinations for cases resolved without a judicial determination
which would result in a "settlement" rather than a final judgment. See also FLA. STAT. §
337.271(6) (1993) (mandating use of criteria found in § 73.092 in fees awarded in presuit
negotiations with Department of Transportation).
10. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(l)(a). The new section implements some curious housekeep-
ing. The old statute referred to "the benefits resulting to the client from the services
rendered." Id. § 73.092(1) (1993). The new statute substitutes in its place "the benefits
achieved for the client." Id. § 73.092(1) (1995). It is too soon to tell what this editing will
accomplish, if anything.
11. lMt § 73.092(1)(a).
12. Id. § 73.092(1)(a)1.-2. The statute refers to the discovery of "financial and business
records kept ... in the ordinary course of business." FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a)1.
13. Ma § 73.092(1)(a)l.
14. Id.
15. Id. Of course, the records would have to be produced sometime prior to litigation.
16. Id. § 73.092(1)(a)2.
17. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a)2.
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condemnor receives the records."8 If the condemnor does not request these
records within these allotted time frames, any benefits for business damage
awards are based on the difference between the settlement or final judgment
and the last written offer made before the condemnee hired an attorney. 9
The new statute still allows the court to consider so-called "nonmone-
tary" benefits in calculating the fee award.20 Such benefits, however, must
be obtained "through the efforts of the attorney."'" In addition, the new
statute requires that all nonmonetary benefits be capable of being "specifi-
cally identified" by the court, and reasonably quantifiable.22
Another amendment, and one which clearly favors the condemning
authority, can be found in section 73.092(1)(a). This portion of the statute
was amended so that "interest"--which is typically awarded in almost every
civil action-is not to be considered when calculating fee awards to the
condemnee's attorney. 3
B. Changes to the Rules Concerning Offers of Judgment
The new statutory fee schedule can be modified, but only by way of a
newly created "reverse" offer of judgment now available to the condem-
nee.24 This new provision authorizes a condemnee to make an offer of
judgment for a given amount (up to a limit of $100,000).25 If the condem-
nor then rejects the offer, and the final judgment equals or exceeds the offer
(exclusive of interest), the statutory fee schedule is no longer applicable, and
the trial court is granted the discretion to utilize the criteria found in sections
73.092(2) and (3) of the Florida Statutes.26
18. Id. The new statute substantially increases the time frame in which a condemnor
may make a business damage offer. The old statute required that such offers be made within
120 days of thefiling of the petition. Id. § 73.092(1)(a)2. (1993). The new statute, on the
other hand, could effectively increase that time up to 145 days after the answer is filed (i.e.,
a discovery request served 45 days after the answer; a response in 30 days; 60 more to make
the offer; and 10 days mailing time). Id. § 73.092(1)(a) (1995).
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(b).
21. d The predecessor statute read, "[t]he court may also consider nonmonetary
benefits which the attorney obtains for the client." Id. § 73.092(1)(b) (1993) (emphasis
added).
22. Id. § 73.092(1)(b) (1995).
23. Id. § 73.092(1)(a). The amendment added the words "exclusive of interest."
24. FLA. STAT. § 73.032 (Supp. 1994).
25. Id. § 73.032(3).
26. Id. § 73.032(6).
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The new statute retains a portion of the predecessor provision, and thus
now permits both27 the condemnor and condemnee to make such offers.28
However, while a condemnee's offer of judgment can impact the new
statutory fee schedule, a condemnor's offer of judgment now only acts as
a limitation on costs, not on attorney's fees (as it did under the previous
statute).29
There are some similarities to both provisions. In either case, the offer
must be in proper form,30 and it must propose to settle all pending claims
(exclusive of fees and costs). 31  If the offer is not accepted in writing
within thirty days of filing, it is deemed rejected.32 If there are less than
thirty days before trial when the offer is made, it is deemed rejected if not
accepted by the time of trial.33 An offer may be withdrawn, in writing,
before a written acceptance has been filed with the court.34 The parties can
apparently make as many offers as they want under the new statute, but each
successive offer "voids" the previous one.35
The condemnor can not make its offer of judgment for at least 120
days after the condemnee has filed an answer, and no later than twenty days
before trial. 6 If the condemnee rejects the offer, and the final judgment
turns out to be equal, or less than, the offered amount, the court may not
award any costs to the condemnee which were incurred after the date the
offer was rejected.37
Similarly, a condemnee's offer of judgment also can not be made
earlier than 120 days after the answer is filed, and no later than twenty days
before trial.38 And, as discussed, if the condemnor rejects the condemnee's
27. The predecessor statute only authorized the condemnor to make an offer of
judgment. Id. § 73.032 (1993).
28. Il § 73.032(2)-(3) (1995).
29. FLA. STAT. § 73.032.
30. See id. § 73.032(4)(a)1.-7. (1995) for the requirements as to the form and mandatory
contents of the offer.
31. Id § 73.032(4)(a)2.
32. Id. § 73.032(4)(c).
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 73.032(4)(d). Once withdrawn, the statute deems the offer "void."
Id. § 73.032(4)(d). Under the old version of the statute, the condemnor (the only party who
could make an offer of judgment), could withdraw the offer any time before being served
with acceptance. Id. § 73.032(l)(d) (1993). Now, either party can withdraw its offer up
until the time an acceptance is actually filed with the court. Id. § 73.032(4)(d) (1995).
35. Id. § 73.032(4)(c).
36. FLA. STAT. § 73.032(2).
37. Id. § 73.032(5).
38. Id. § 73.032(3).
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offer, and the final judgment is at least equal to the offered amount, the
statutory fee schedule is jettisoned, and the court is granted the discretion
to award fees based on the criteria found in section 73.092 of the Florida
Statutes.
39
C. The New "Costs" Provision
The legislature also rewrote the costs section of the statute in 1994.'
The old provision was one sentence long, and merely provided that the
petitioner pay "all" reasonable costs of the proceedings, including attorney's
fees, appraisal fees, and in business damage cases, accountant's fees.4'
The new cost provision is more elaborate, more detailed. It is
segregated into five separate subsections. The first retains the language of
the predecessor statute on "costs," but it now defers directly to the new
attorney's fees provision on that issue.42 A new subsection requires the
condemnee to submit detailed time records for each expert witness
(including the expert's costs), as well as a copy of any contract which exists
between the expert and the condemnee (or the condemnee's attorney).43
The records must be submitted at least thirty days prior to the cost
hearing.44
In assessing the reasonableness of the costs, the court is permitted to
consider any relevant factors, including those fees and costs which would
typically be paid under comparable circumstances to similarly qualified
persons. 45 The court is to make specific findings to justify each sum it
awards as expert's witness fees.46 In assessing costs to be paid by the
condemnor the court is to be guided by the amount the condemnee would
ordinarily be expected to pay if the condemnor was not being held
responsible for the costs.47
39. Id. § 73.032(6).
40. Ch. 94-162, § 2, 1994 Fla. Laws 955, 957 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1995)).
41. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1993). An unjustified rejection of an offer of judgment could
limit cost awards under the 1993 version of the statute. Id. § 73.092(6).
42. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1995).
43. Idl § 73.091(2).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 73.091(3).
46. Id § 73.091(5).
47. FLA. STAT. § 73.091(4). This provision indicates that the "market value" of the
services rendered would provide an adequate guide by which such amounts would be
awarded.
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D. The New Condominium Provision
A newly created section 73.073 establishes the procedures to be
followed with respect to the condemnation of common elements of a condo-
minium.48 The statute requires the condemning authority to identify and
notify all of the unit owners in the condominium of any negotiated sale or
eminent domain exercise.49 It also provides minimum requirements for the
notice, which must include: 1) the name of the condemning authority; 2)
a description of the property; 3) a statement of the "public purpose" for
which the property is intended; 4) an appraisal; 5) a "clear and concise"
statement of the unit owner's right to object to the taking or the appraised
value, detailing the procedures for objection; and 6) a clear and concise
statement of the association's right to convey in the absence of an objec-
tion."o
If the unit owner fails to respond to the notice within thirty days, the
owner is deemed to have acquiesced to the appropriate condominium
association acting as the owner's representative in all subsequent proceed-
ings. 1 Those owners who do make a proper objection preserve their rights
with respect to the taking, to the appraisal of value, and to any other rights
which might appertain to unit ownership." If no unit owners object, the
condemnor can rely on a power of sale vested in the association. 3 And,
in the event litigation becomes necessary, the condemnor need only name
the association and the objecting owners as defendants. 4
II. COMMENTS ON THE NEW STATUTE
Critics have pointed to several problems with the new statute. First,
there may be a serious question as to its constitutionality, particularly with
respect to the so-called "benefit" being the only criteria to be used in
awarding fees. The resolution of this question might very well hinge on
whether the Supreme Court of Florida determines "reasonable" attorney's
fees to be an essential component of the "full compensation" due property
48. Ch. 94-336, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 2382, 2382 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 73.073
(1995)). The new law became effective on October 1, 1994.
49. FLA. STAT. § 73.073(2).
50. Id § 73.073(2)(a)-(f).
51. Ma § 73.073(3).
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 718.112 (1993) (regarding the conveyance powers of the
condominium association).
54. FLA. STAT. § 73.073(3).
[Vol. 20
258
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Gaffiey
owners under section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, and Article XVI,
section 29 of the Florida Constitution. This issue has yet to be decided, and
particularly so with respect to the new "percentage-based" statute. And, if
"reasonable" attorney's fees are included in the constitutional guarantee of
full compensation, then the limitations imposed by the new statute could
reduce the condemnee's award below that guarantee. If so, the statute might
be subject to a constitutional challenge on these grounds.
Others claim the new fee statute might be challenged on both
substantive and procedural due process grounds as well, in light of the fact
that it will most certainly act to deny smaller property owners adequate
access to the courts. The new fee limitations have been variously referred
to by members of the condemnee bar as "arbitrary," "draconian," and
"inflexible." 55 Whatever the outcome, such characterizations indicate that
the new statute is sure to be challenged.
The "offer of judgment" provisions in the new statute may prove even
more susceptible to challenge. As the supreme court has made clear on a
number of occasions-and specifically so in the context of "offer of
judgment" statutes-the legislature does not possess constitutional authority
to implement rules of court; this power rests exclusively with the Supreme
Court of Florida.56 In fact, the predecessor offer of judgment statute has
already been declared unconstitutional by at least one circuit court on
grounds that the "procedural"57 aspects of the statute (drafted by a selected
55. This topic was discussed at some length at the 1994 Condemnation Law Seminar
sponsored by the Eminent Domain Committee of the Florida Bar (Oct. 14 - Nov. 14, 1994).
56. In a trio of fairly recent cases, the Supreme Court of Florida made it clear that to
the extent "offer of judgment" statutes attempt to regulate court "procedures," such statutes
unconstitutionally impinge on the exclusive rule-making authority granted the supreme court
under section 2(a) of Article V of the Florida Constitution. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So.
2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1992); Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar Re:
Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442 (Offer of Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442,
443 (Fla. 1989).
Indeed, as well documented in a recent article in the Florida Bar Journal, § 73.032 of
the Florida Statutes is entirely "procedural," and, under the authority of the cited cases, is
thus unconstitutional. See Richard A. Harrison, Offers of Judgment in Eminent Domain
Cases, 67 FLA. B.J. 23, 23-28 (Jan. 1993).
57. The "procedural" aspects of the statute include: requirements as to the "form" and
contents of the offer, instructions on how and when it is to be accepted, rejected or
withdrawn; directions as to its service; and rules governing its admissibility in court. FLA.
STAT. § 73.032 (1993). As a matter of fact, almost the entire text of § 73.032 is
"procedural" in nature. Moreover, a newly added subsection (1) expressly states that the
section is the "exclusive" offer of judgment provision for all actions in eminent domain,
thereby precluding the use of any other statute or rule of court (i.e., Florida Rule of Civil
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"committee" and then adopted by the legislature) violate Florida's strict
58separation of powers doctrine. The new statute retains many, if not all,
of the procedural aspects of the old section 73.032, and its constitutionality
will most likely be challenged on those same grounds.
In addition (as was discussed), the new statute imposes an upper limit
of $100,000 on any offer of judgment submitted by the condemnee, but
places no such limitation on the condemnor.5 9 This disparity ° is sure to
be exaggerated, and the statute is sure to be subjected to constitutional
challenges based on equal protection and due process grounds in addition
to those already mentioned. And there are some practical problems with the
new statute as well.
For example, it still permits a condemnor to make an offer of judgment
relatively early on in the project; in fact, it may end up submitted even
though the petition may not have a complete (and final) set of construction
plans.6 ' How can a condemnee evaluate an offer without knowing exactly
what to ultimately expect from the condemning authority with respect to the
project? And, because a condemnee's offer cannot be submitted until after
the answer has been filed,62 if it is used at all, it will most likely result in
a (lower) counteroffer, thereby raising the very real threat of a fee-dimin-
ished award-with no risk to the condemnor. In any event, because the
condemnee is not permitted to make an offer of judgment for more than
Procedure 1.442) in the event the statute is declared unconstitutional. Id. § 73.032 (1995).
And, if the statute is declared unconstitutional, condemnees will be left with no power to
avoid the bad "benefit" analysis, and will have almost no protection against the unlimited
resources of the state.
58. Department of Transp. v. Lee, No. 93-04239-14 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. March 20, 1994).
The court determined that under well settled principles of Florida law, the legislature cannot
create rules of court, that responsibility lies exclusively with the Supreme Court of Florida.
Id. Accordingly, the court declared § 73.032 of the Florida Statutes unconstitutional as
applied. Id. The author represented the condemner in the successful constitutional challenge.
59. FLA. STAT. § 73.032(3).
60. Proving that "disparity" might prove more problematic than it appears at first glance,
however. Since the differing provisions also have disparate impacts (an unjustified rejection
of a condemnee's offer results in a modified fee schedule; a rejection of a condemnor's offer
only limits the cost award), any equal protection challenge is certain to be complicated by
these dynamics.
61. FLA. STAT. § 73.032(7). Section 73.032(7) does require the condemnor to provide
the condemnee with any plans which may "exist" at the time of the offer, but those plans
may be incomplete and they are almost never in "final" form. Additionally, although it is
unlikely, the express wording of the statute does actually permit the condemnor to make an
offer when no plans are in existence at all. Id.
62. Id. § 73.032(3).
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$100,000, this provision will only be utilized in small cases involving less
valuable property or very small businesses.
What will be the result of all of these changes? It is really too soon to
tell. Some results are quite predictable, however. Most small cases will be
forced to settle. Many condemnees will be forced to appear pro se63
against the government rather than risk a fee-diminished award. The more
experienced condemnation lawyers will shy from cases where the "benefit-
percentage" potential is not commensurate with the time and effort they
might reasonably expect to expend defending such a case.' Some of the
very large cases will result in windfall fees.
The intent of these legislative changes was to make fee awards in
eminent domain cases more equitable. Unfortunately, the new law
eliminates much (if not all) judicial discretion, and inserts in its place an
unyielding, percentage-based formula which may very well result in
unjustifiably large fee awards in the bigger cases, and little compensation-
perhaps even less than full compensation-in the smaller ones. Only time
will tell; but one thing is for certain, the new statute is sure to be challenged
on a number of fronts.
63. In a case in which the condemnee's attorney could expect to expend 250 hours to
prepare and try an eminent domain action, even a benefit of $50,000 over the initial offer
would yield fees of less than $75 per hour. Why would an experienced eminent domain
attorney take on such a case and perhaps risk an even lesser "benefit," lesser fees, or go
broke in the process? When the action involves even smaller, marginally valuable property
interests, the infirmities of the statute are exposed even further. For example, if the property
involved is only worth around $15,000, any "benefit" cannot reasonably be expected to be
more than a few thousand dollars. This would make the award of attorney's fees-through
a full blown trial-a couple of hundred dollars. How many attorneys are going to take a case
like that to trial-or take it at all? It is likely, therefore, that the property owner is going to
end up representing his or herself in the eminent domain action and will probably settle
without a fight.
64. Condemnation cases are very often complicated matters. It is not uncommon for
both sides to spend several hundred hours in preparation for a trial. Moreover, the
condemnee typically retains counsel well before the condemnation petition is even filed, so
the attorney may very well have already spent a significant amount of time attempting to
settle during presuit negotiations.
Furthermore, the typical valuation case is almost always founded on expert testimony,
so pretrial preparation and discovery can intensify the process. The statute also requires the
parties to participate in mediation. Thus, a complicated case can take years to resolve. In
cases where the potential benefit will be small, there is no motivation for a condemnation
attorney to take the case at the statutory fee; and, if the attorney charges a "reasonable" (i.e.,
hourly) fee, the condemnee's award will no doubt be reduced by that fee. It is enough to
dissuade any property owner to settle or appear pro se.
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III. CASE LAW
A number of significant appellate opinions involving issues of
condemnation law were reported over the last year. The Supreme Court of
Florida itself generated no less than five separate opinions on condemnation
law; and the district courts produced another two dozen more, many
involving questions of "access." Several of the more significant cases are
discussed below.
A. Attorney's Fees
In July of 1994, at the very beginning of the survey period, the
Supreme Court of Florida issued Department of Transportation v. Gefen.65
In Gefen, the plaintiff in an inverse condemnation suit-who had won at the
circuit court level but then lost on appeal-requested that fees be awarded
under section 73.131(2) of the Florida Statutes. In refusing, the court
focused on the specific wording of the authorizing statute and declined the
award of fees even though the plaintiff had initially been successful at the
trial level.66 Because she was ultimately unsuccessful in her action (i.e.,
losing after final appeal), 67 the court found she was unable to avail herself
of the statutory award of fees.68
In Downtown Square Associates v. Department of Transportation,69
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that it was error for a trial court to
consider any factors other than those specifically enumerated in the statutory
criteria of section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.70 Citing several prior
cases, the court reversed the portion of the fee award which was not in strict
compliance with the statute.7'
65. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
66. IU at 1347.
67. The supreme court quashed the original taking. Id. at 1346.
68. Id. at 1347.
69. 648 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
70. Id. at 1265-66. The case involved the 1993 version of § 73.092.
71. Id at 1266. See, e.g., Schick v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So.
2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1992) (stating that if a statute sets forth criteria to be considered in
awarding fees, that specific statute controls); Department of Transp. v. Denmark, 354 So. 2d
100, 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that if a statute does not contemplate other
factors in awarding fees, other factors cannot be considered); Stewart Select Cars, Inc. v.
Moore, 619 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that where the
legislature has set forth certain criteria to be utilized in awarding fees, the trial judge is
bound to use only that criteria). This line of cases, when coupled with the newly restrictive
fee statute, will effectively handcuff trial courts into issuing fee awards based only on "the
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In Whitlow v. South Georgia Natural Gas Co.,72 the First District
Court of Appeal reversed a fee award because nothing in the lower court's
final order disclosed whether it had considered a reduced hourly rate for
various non-lawyer services.73 Citing to section 57.104 of the Florida
Statutes--which requires courts to consider such facts in formulating fee
awards--the court reversed and remanded for further clarification.
74
In Department of Transportation v. D.J.P. Associates, Inc.,7 the
Second District reversed a fee award because of an "ambiguity" contained
in the trial court's order.76 Here, one trial judge had initially conducted the
fee hearings, and had issued a letter to the parties explaining his intentions
with respect to the fee award. Unfortunately, the judge's calculation was
not mathematically accurate; when a successor judge included an enhance-
ment of the hourly award (in order to make the first judge's calculation
work), he created an ambiguity in the order which was sufficient to require
clarification.77 The case stands as a strong reminder to trial courts (and to
litigants) to be sure and use sufficient detail in drafting condemnation fee
awards; and this admonishment becomes even more critical in light of the
restrictive criteria contained in the new statute.
Finally, in Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority v. Latham,78
-a case discussed elsewhere in this article regarding the suppression of
expert testimony on the issue of severance damages,-the Fifth District
Court of Appeal properly awarded a condemnee appellate attorney's fees for
having to defend an appeal brought by the condemnor-even though the
condemnee eventually lost the appeal. The court relied on section 73.131
of the Florida Statutes, which mandates such an award under these
circumstances.79
benefits" achieved, without regard for other criteria.
72. 650 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
73. Id. at 638.
74. Id (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.104 (1989)).
75. 640 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
76. Id. at 1201.
77. Id.
78. 643 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see discussion infra part III.I. and
accompanying text.
79. Id at 11; see also Denmark v. Department of Transp., 389 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1980)
(holding that condemnees are to be awarded attorney's fees even if he/she losses on appeal).
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B. Inverse Condemnation Access
A number of decisions involving a loss of access were reported during
the survey period. While none of these cases seriously impacted on the
well-seasoned rules established in cases like Anhoco Corp. v. Dade Coun-
ty,80 and Palm Beach County v. Tessler,"' some raise interesting issues
nonetheless.
For example, in June of 1995 in Rubano v. Department of Transporta-
tion, 2 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected an inverse condemnation
claim grounded on a temporary loss of access caused by a major road
construction project.83 In Rubano, the construction project temporarily
severed the owners' direct access to the highway by eliminating a protected
U-turn, and by increasing the travel mileage required to reach the owners'
property by one and one-half miles.84 The circuit court determined that the
Department had effected a taking through these activities, but the Fourth
District reversed, believing the temporary rerouting of traffic required by the
construction was noncompensable" In doing so, the court certified the
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great importance.8 6
80. 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962). In Anhoco, the court ruled that although a property
owner would be entitled to compensation for a "total" destruction of his access, a taking does
not occur when the government merely "regulates" that access through the use its police
power, as in prescribing the number and location of driveways, or of other access facilities.
Id. at 798.
81. 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1989). In Tessler, the property owners lost access to their
property which resulted in their customers having to travel 660 yards through a residential
neighborhood to get to their business. The court concluded that the property owners could
recover damages for their loss of access because they had lost "more than their most
convenient means of access." Id. at 850.
82. 656 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1995).
83. Id. at 1265.
84. Id. at 1266.
85. State Dep't of Transp. v. Rubano, 636 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994), aff'd, 656 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1995).
86. Id. at 752-53. The district court only certified as to whether there was a
"compensable taking of access." Id. at 753. The supreme court formulated the following
question on its own volition:
DID THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ENGAGE IN A
COMPENSABLE TEMPORARY TAKING OF ACCESS WHEN IT ELIMI-
NATED PETITIONERS' DIRECT ACCESS TO A STATE ROAD BY
PLACING PETITIONERS' PROPERTY ON A SERVICE ROAD, ELIMINAT-
ED A PROTECTED U-TURN AND REPLACED IT WITH ANOTHER U-
TURN WHICH ADDED ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES OF TRAVEL TO
REACH THE PROPERTIES, AND SEVERED THE CONNECTIONS FROM
[Vol. 20
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/1
Gaffney
The supreme court, in a unanimous opinion, found that none of the
Department's activities constituted a compensable taking of access."7
In a well thought-out, reflective opinion, Justice Anstead addressed
each of the Department's activities. First, he characterized the property
owners' loss of direct highway access as a noncompensable "diversion of
traffic,""8 comparable to that found in Department of Transportation v.
Gejen.s9 Next, Justice Anstead noted that the elimination of the U-turn did
not sufficiently impair the owners' access to the highway so as to be
compensable, 0 and particularly so in light of the fact that the elimination
only affected traffic flow in one direction.9" Finally, the court concluded
that the Department's construction of a "service road," built to allow the
owners continuing access to the highway during construction did not
"completely destroy[]" the owners' access to the highway,' and thus were
noncompensable.
Similarly, in Port St. Lucie Shopping Center Associates v. Board of
County Commissioners,93 the Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to
find that the closure of a median cut, requiring eastbound motorists to make
a U-turn at the next traffic light, caused an abutting property owner to incur
a substantial "loss of access," thus, the closure was noncompensable.94
On the other side of the issue, in Department of Transportation v.
Kreider,9" the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order
of taking which found that a departmentally-constructed retaining wall had
caused a property owner to incur a "substantial loss of access" by: 1)
removing the property owner's eastbound access to the highway; 2)
INTERSTATE 95 TO STATE ROAD 84?
Rubano, 656 So. 2d at 1265.
87. IM at 1271.
88. Id. at 1267.
89. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a redirection of traffic, as opposed to an
actual deprivation of access, is not compensable).
90. Rubano, 656 So. 2d at 1268 (citing Division of Admin. v. Capital Plaza, 397 So. 2d
682 (Fla. 1981) (holding that construction of median which impedes or impairs traffic flow
does not necessarily warrant compensation because property owner has no property right to
maintenance of traffic flow past his property).
91. IM at 1269.
92. Id The court found petitioner's reliance on Anhoco misplaced, holding that the
property owner incurred compensable taking when its rights of access were "completely
destroyed," and not merely regulated. Id.
93. 638 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
94. Id at 202.
95. 658 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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substituting a burdensome96 alternate route which increased travel well over
one mile; and 3) blocking the owner's visibility from the road.97
The court pointed out that before and after Tessler, the supreme court
has narrowly applied the concept of "compensable loss of access,"9 and
noted that the trigger to a Tessler analysis is the destruction of direct access
to an abutting road.99 Applying Tessler, the court had no difficulty in
concluding that the property owner had incurred a "substantially diminished"
access.10
o
C. Regulatory Takings
In an inverse condemnation case which did not involve "access," City
of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm,1" the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed an order of taking which had issued after a two-decade dispute over
a construction project." In rejecting the takings claim, the court found
no evidence that the defendant City denied the petitioner all use of the
subject property. Even though the trial court may have found the City's
actions to be variously "illegal," "arbitrary and capricious," and "not taken
to promote the public's health, safety and welfare," this did not establish a
taking. 3 The court held these characterizations might very well identify
a deprivation of "due process," but they do not establish a "taking," which
specifically requires a showing that the regulation or restriction has denied
the property owner "all economic, beneficial or productive use of theproperty."' 104
In dealing with the twenty-year old litigation, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal issued an extended opinion containing a relatively thorough
96. In determining that the route was "more burdensome than... Tessler," the court
mentioned the factors of "time, distance, and difficulty of navigation." Id. at 550. The court
also noted that this case was unlike the typical "traffic flow" case, in that the alternative
route was a "one way 'road to nowhere'." Id.
97. Id. at 549.
98. l
99. Kreider, 658 So. 2d at 549.
100. Id. at 550.
101. 641 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1197
(Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2583 (1995).
102. Id. at 1379.
103. Id. at 1385-86.
104. Id. at 1385. In finding as it did, the court rejected the petitioner's contention that
its inability to maintain financing over the long haul of the litigation-even if caused by
dilatory, unlawful acts of the City-constituted a compensable "taking." Id. at 1386-87.
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treatment of the law of inverse condemnation. 5 After twenty years, the
facts of Yardarm are somewhat complicated, but the dispute started when
the owners sued the City because it had revoked the permits it had
previously issued, claiming the revocation was due to "administrative
oversights."'" Two years later, a circuit court ruled that the City did have
the right to rescind the permit.'07 The property owners did not appeal and
instead resubmitted the plans in order to receive a new permit. The City
denied the permit and once more the property owner sought relief. This
time the court ruled in favor of the property owner, and the City once more
issued a permit.'
Allegedly in some financial difficulty at this point, the property owners
nevertheless began work on the project. Unfortunately, they soon discov-
ered that the permit they had received was incomplete, so they once again
sought approval from the City, which eventually issued permits for
everything but the construction of an all-important dock.'09
During the next decade, the City and property owners fought over the
project continuously, and over the course of the ensuing litigation, the
property owners were eventually forced to file for bankruptcy and lost the
property through foreclosure. The owners then sued the City, claiming that
the City's extended obstruction of its construction project had worked an
inverse condemnation of its property."0
The court first addressed the threshold question as to whether an actual
"taking" had occurred. In determining that a compensable regulatory
"taking" had not occurred, the court reaffirmed the well-established principle
of law requiring the property owner in such cases to establish the complete
deprivation of substantially all use of the property."' Here, the court
noted that while the City may have acted "arbitrar[ily] and capricious[ly],"
and not in the best interests of the public, these are references which
typically denote a violation of due process and not necessarily a taking."'
The court determined that the property owner's ability to put the property
to alternative uses during the period prior to 1981 when all requested
105. Yardarm, 641 So. 2d at 1379-89.
106. Id. at 1379. The permit was issued based on a special-use exception to a height-
restrictive ordinance the City passed as result of pressure from nearby residents. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Yardarm, 641 So. 2d at 1379.
110. Id. at 1382.
111. Id. at 1384.
112. Id. at 1385.
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permits had been issued, precluded a finding that the City had denied "all
use" of the property."' As such, no taking had occurred.!14
However, the court went further and determined that even if the City's
actions constituted a taking, the four-year statute of limitations applicable to
takings claims expired prior to the property owner filing the takings
claim."' In so doing, the court rejected the owner's claim that it "could
not bring a taking case against [the City] because it kept winning."' 1 6
This case bodes a serious warning to those who believe they have such an
action, to bring it before the action expires.
In Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County,"7 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held a suit for inverse condemnation based on a conditioned
moratorium/delay in the County's issuance of building permits was not ripe
because: 1) the record revealed the County had not actually made a "final"
decision on the matter; 2) plaintiff had not taken sufficient steps to "alter"
the County's decision; and 3) plaintiff failed to establish the absence of any
alternative uses for the property during the temporary period in which the
permit did not issue."' The court also noted that plaintiff had not taken
sufficient steps to determine whether an alternative plan could have forced
the City into lifting the challenged moratorium on building permits." 9
The court found that a plaintiff in such a case cannot establish the "futility"
of taking such action, unless "at least one meaningful application has been
filed.""' The court then decided the absence of a firm determination by
the government as to the permissible uses of the property precluded any
inference that plaintiff has lost "all economically viable use" of the property
so as to constitute a taking.
12
'
113. Id. at 1386; cf. Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir.) (holding that denial of a
certain kind of permit insufficient to establish a taking when property owner retains right to
put property to multiple alternative uses), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988).
114. Yardarm, 641 So. 2d at 1387.
115. Id. at 1388. The court mentioned § 95.11(3)(f) and § 95.11(3)(p) of the Florida
Statutes which might govern such actions, both of which contain a four-year limitations
period. Id. at 1387.
116. Id. at 1388.
117. 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
118. Id. at 525-26.
119. Id. at 526-27.
120. Id. at 526 (citing Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990)).
121. Id.
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In Key West v. Berg," the Third District Court of Appeal held a
property owner's claim for regulatory taking was not ripe because the owner
had not even applied for a permit under the challenged plan." Noting
that the plan contained a "beneficial use exception," and rejecting the trial
court's determination that an application would be "futile," the court
concluded it was too soon to tell if the plan would actually deprive the
owner of all economical use of the property."
In February, of 1995, the First District Court of Appeal issued City of
Jacksonville v. Wynn. 2 In Wynn, the court reiterated the established
principle that a question of taking is not ripe for judicial resolution until the
property owner has received a "final" determination from the government
as to the permissible uses of the property. 6
In Wynn, several residential lot owners sued the City for a commercial
rezoning after their requests had been denied by the City for failing to
comply with its comprehensive plan. The circuit court found that the plan
had affected a taking, and the City appealed. 7 Amidst a host of other
issues, the appellate court discussed "ripeness" and the similarities between
due process and takings claims, and concluded that both require some sort
of "final" determination before they may be adjudicated." The court
found that the property owners had not received a "final" decision, in that
they had not submitted any specific plan to develop the property, or sought
any amendment to the comprehensive plan. 129 The court concluded that
a taking could not have occurred because the City had not even been
afforded the opportunity to apply its plan to the property in question.' 3
122. 655 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 663 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1995).
123. Id. at 196. The challenged portion of the plan restricted the development of
"wetlands." Id.
124. Id.
125. 650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
126. ld. at 188; see also Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990); Moviematic v. County
Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
127. Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 184.
128. Id. at 187. As Judge Kahn put it, "a court cannot determine that a regulation has
gone too far until the court actually knows how far the regulation goes." Id. (citing
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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D. The "Reservation Map" Cases
In Tampa-Hilisborough Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S.,"' the
supreme court held that the filing of a map of reservation, in and of itself,
does not constitute a per se regulatory taking, nor does it relieve the
petitioner of the burden of establishing that the mere filing of the map
effectively deprived it of all economically viable use of the land.132
However, if that fact can be established, the filing could constitute a
taking.13
3
In Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. Harrell,TM
the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a damage award given for a
temporary taking which had allegedly been caused by the Authority's filing
of a reservation map. 35  Relying on A.G.W.S., the court reminded the
petitioner that in order to establish a taking based on the filing of a map of
reservation, the affected landowner must first establish that the filing of the
map, in and of itself, denied the owner all economically viable use of the
property. 13
6
In an almost identical decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in
Department of Transportation v. Zyderveld, 37 added that the focus of such
inquiries should always be directed at "the extent of the interference or
deprivation of economic use. 138 In reaching this conclusion, the court
131. 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
132. Id. at 58. The court stated: "A taking occurs where regulation denies substantially
all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Id. at 58. The court also noted that
even a "temporary deprivation" may be compensable, but only when the deprivation is of
substantially all economic use. Id. (citing First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990)).
133. Id.
134. 645 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
135. Id. at 1027.
136. Id.
137. 647 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
138. Id. at 309 (citing Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), approved, 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994); Joint Ventures, Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990)).
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pointed out that it is the petitioner in such cases who has the burden of
establishing the debilitating effect caused by the filing of the map.'39
E. Miscellaneous
In November of 1994, the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided White
v. Department of Transportation," wherein it found that a trial court
erred by requiring a condemnee to publish a portion of a report prepared for
him by an appraiser he did not call to testify. 4' The court found it was
impermissible for the condemnor's attorney to cross-examine the condemnee
on the contents of this report, and thus create an inference for the jury that
the information was being "cover[ed] up.' 42
In Sarasota County v. Ex143 the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed a finding of inverse condemnation based on an allegedly "involun-
tary" dedication of land which had occurred some eight years before the
landowner filed the action.1"4 Noting that even the "longest" applicable
statute of limitations was no more than seven years, 45 the court found the
action time-barred.'4
The following month, in Heckman v. City of Oakland Park,47 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held the statute of limitations for an inverse
condemnation action grounded on an unlawfully-extracted dedication of
139. Zyderveld, 647 So. 2d at 308 (citing A.G.W.S., 640 So. 2d at 54). The court also
noted that a claim for severance damages, as alleged by the petitioner, only arises when there
has been a "partial" taking. In this regard, the court found that the trial court erred in
allowing the condemnee's expert to testify on the issue of severance because he had already
stated, quite contrarily, that the actions of the Department had caused the petitioner to incur
a total (albeit, temporary) taking, rather than a partial one. Il
140. 645 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
141. Id. at 115.
142. Id.; see Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 940-41 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (disallowing any inference that a party who hires, but fails to call,
an expert witness is covering up harmful evidence or concealing bad facts).
143. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
1995).
144. Id. at 10.
145. The court actually never stated which statute of limitations applies to eminent
domain cases, but it did cite § 95.14 of the Florida Statutes, which governs actions founded
on title to real property. Id.
146. Id. Although the court never stated it, the opinion implies that the petitioner's
cause of action began to run at the time of the "forced" conveyance.
147. 644 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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property begins to run at the time of the "forced" conveyance, 148 and not
at the time the resolution which requires the dedication is passed.
In a companion case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
city had not acted as an "agent" of the Department of Transportation by
requiring the property owners to dedicate the required easement in order to
get the permit-an easement the city then intended to turn around and give
to the Department. 49 Without sufficient record evidence to establish that
the city was actually acting as the Department's agent, the court refused to
allow recovery against the Department."5
In City of Jacksonville Beach v. Prom,' the First District Court of
Appeal reversed an order of regulatory taking because the property owner
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.' 52 The court discussed
the evolving nature of the "comprehensive plan," as outlined in Florida's
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, and concluded that the
owner's failure to request an amendment or conditional approval to the
City's comprehensive plan, which was also permitted under the local
municipal code, negated the trial court's finding that the owner had
exhausted all administrative remedies.'53 The case stands as a reminder
to condemnee's counsel to make sure to identify and exhaust all administra-
tive remedies before filing a suit for inverse condemnation.
At the same time, counsel must also be sure to file the "taking" action
in the right forum. In Ortega v. Department of Environmental Protec-
tion,I" the First District Court of Appeal affirmed a decision issued by the
Department of Environmental Protection which had dismissed a takings
claim for lack of jurisdiction.' Citing Key Haven Associated Enterprises,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund,'56 the
court pointed out that administrative agencies may not adjudicate takings
claims; rather, jurisdiction lies exclusively with the circuit court. 57
148. Id. at 527.
149. Department of Transp. v. Heckman, 644 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1995).
150. Id.
151. 656 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
152. Id. at 582-83.
153. Id. The court also found no support in the record to indicate that an attempt to
seek an exception or amendment to the plan would be "futile." Id. at 583.
154. 646 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
155. Id. at 797.
156. 427 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1982) (holding that circuit courts have jurisdiction over valid
takings claims).
157. Ortega, 646 So. 2d at 797.
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In Sarasota County v. Taylor Woodrow Homes Ltd.,"8 the Second
District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court's dismissal with prejudice,
whereby the County's attempted to specifically enforce a 1974 contract
dedication."5 9 The County brought suit for declaratory judgment and
specific performance after the property owner refused to effect the
dedication, claiming the 1974 exaction constituted an unauthorized taking
under current constitutional law.'" The circuit court dismissed the action
because the County failed to allege the existence of an enacting ordinance
or establish a "rational nexus" between the dedication and the "negative
impact" expected from the proposed development.' The circuit court
determined that the dedication was void ab initio based on 1974 law and the
current pleadings. 62
The Second District Court of Appeal, noting the absence of any
meaningful factual record, and the complicated nature of the issues raised
by those facts, was unconvinced that the dedication should be declared void
based solely on the pleadings, and-troubled by the lengthy delay by the
owner in asserting the taking-it refused to take such harsh steps.'63 The
court then skirted the constitutional question by finding that the County's
complaint established a right to declaratory relief, and that as such, the trial
court had erred in dismissing it. 6'
In addition, the court made sure to formally acknowledge the recent
line of opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States, which hold that
a property owner cannot be compelled to give up a constitutional right to
property in exchange for a discretionary benefit if the property sought has
little relationship to the benefit. 65 The court reconfirmed the notion that
a government cannot condition the issuance of a permit upon a specific
condition without (1) establishing an "essential nexus"' between the
condition and a legitimate state interest and (2) producing an individualized
158. '652 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
159. Id. at 1248.
160. Id. at 1250.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1251.
163. Sarasota, 652 So. 2d at 1250-51.
164. Id. at 1251.
165. Id.; see, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
166. The court actually found the "essential nexus" requirement was satisfied in 1974,
but was unable to determine the issue of "rough proportionality" without more facts.
Sarasota, 652 So. 2d at 1252.
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determination as to the "rough proportionality" existing between the
dedication and the nature and extent of the development's impact.' 67
Recently, in City of Dania v. Broward County,168 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal refused to allow the City to intervene in an eminent domain
action brought by the County against several properties located within the
boundaries of the City. 69 The City argued it should be permitted to
intervene in the taking because the County condemnation would effectively
cause it to incur a loss of tax base and other infrastructure expenditures. 70
Noting the City's failure to provide it with any legal authority which would
permit it to recover something in the eminent domain proceeding, the court
held the City had no grounds to intervene.'
F. Public Purpose
In Basic Energy Corp. v. Hamilton County,'72 the First District'Court
of Appeal found there was no "municipal purpose" in a municipality's
attempt to condemn land for subsequent donation to the state for use as a
state prison. 73 Acknowledging that such a donation might very well be
"incidentally relate[d]" to the protection and well being of the municipality's
residents, the court found the relationship was insufficient to establish a
primarily "municipal purpose," rather than one which would benefit the
citizens of the state as a whole. 74
167. Id. at 1251.
168. 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
169. Id. at 166.
170. Id. at 165.
171. Id. at 165-66. The court affirmed the trial court order which had denied the City
the right to intervene in the taking, but it did not rule out the possibility that the City might
be entitled to relief "in more appropriate proceedings." Id. at 166.
172. 652 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
173. Id. at 1239.
174. Id.; see State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1991) (holding that "[a]
municipality exists in order to provide services to its inhabitants"); State v. City of
Jacksonville, 50 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1951); City of Winter Park v. Montesi, 448 So. 2d 1242,
1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 456 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1984). The City argued,
quite unsuccessfully, that § 180.06 of the Florida Statutes, granting cities the authority to
construct and operate "jails," provided it with a valid "municipal" purpose. The court
rejected this contention by noting that the City never intended to operate a jail; it just
donated the land to the state so the state could use it for a prison. Basic Energy, 652 So. 2d
at 1238. The court also explained that the real question in these cases is not whether a
particular statute will permit the City to exercise a specific scope of authority, but whether
the exercise of authority is actually for "a valid municipal purpose." Id. at 1239 (citing City
of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992)).
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In JFR Investment v. Delray Beach Community Redevelopment
Agency,175 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found an "[i]ncidental
private use ... is permissible where the overall purpose of the taking is
clearly and predominately a public one. ' 176  In JFR, the municipality
declared a large tract of land to be blighted and a slum and in determining
it needed rehabilitation, created a community development agency to effect
that rehabilitation. 7 7 The project included a combination of public
facilities, retail and office space, and an entertainment center. The "taken"
property was acquired to serve, in part, as a parking lot for these facili-
ties.17 The court held that such "incidental" use can be permissible if the
overall purpose is "predominately a public one."'79
G. Valuation Issues
In Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation,8' the Supreme Court
of Florida answered a question certified to it' by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal concerning the relevance of environmental contamination
to issues of valuation. Not surprisingly, the court held evidence of environ-
mental contamination can be relevant if an appropriate factual predicate is
laid linking the contamination to value." Reminding the litigants that the
focus of opinion testimony in such cases must always be on "value," the
court held evidence of contamination can be relevant, but only if coupled
with expert testimony, based on hard data,8 3 all of which specifically
establishes the contamination resulted in a decrease in value.' The
175. 652 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
176. Id. at 1263.
177. Id. at 1262.
178. Id. at 1263. The taken property was also to be used as allocation for two publicly
owned "historic houses." l at 1262.
179. JFR, 652 So. 2d at 1263 (citing Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of Tampa,
115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959)).
180. 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
181. Id. at 922-23, 924. The Fourth District Court of Appeal certified a "question," but
the Supreme Court of Florida never received it. Instead, the court used a question formulated
by agreement of the parties: "Whether evidence of environmental contamination is relevant
and otherwise admissible in an eminent domain valuation trial." Id. at 922.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 925. The court stated: 'There must be a factual basis through evidence of
sales of comparable contaminated property upon which to base a determination that
contamination has decreased the value of the property." Finkelstein, 656 So. 2d at 925.
184. Id. The court noted that the condemnor in such cases has the burden of
establishing the effect of the contamination on value, and also emphasized the importance
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burden on establishing that decrease in value is on the condemning
authority.8 5
H. Business Damages
In a somewhat disturbing (for condemnees) statement of law contained
in Weaver Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee,186 the Supreme Court of Florida
held section 73.071(3) of the Florida Statutes only authorizes business
damages in cases where the damages have been incurred from a partial
taking of "land," as opposed to a taking of "access."' 87 Quoting directly
from its 1964 decision in State Road Department v. Lewis, 8  the court,
somewhat unnecessarily,' 89 reaffirmed its interpretation of the language of
section 73.071(3), by specifically holding that business damages may not be
recovered under this provision unless the condemnee can establish they were
caused by a partial taking of "land."''
Because the taking in Weaver was based solely on an alleged "loss of
access" caused by the construction of a traffic island on the publicly owned
right-of-way, the court concluded that no "land" had actually been
taken.'' Thus, while the City's action might have effectively diminished
the extent and nature of the property owner's access, it did not technically
constitute a taking- of "land," and as such, business damages were not
compensable under the strict wording of the statute."
In a business damage case of somewhat lesser significance, Department
of Transportation v. Manoli,9 3 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
that when a court awards business damages based upon lost profits to a
property owner running a "self-employed" business, it must be sure to
of "timing" in such calculations. Id. This would mean that the condemnor must establish
that the contamination existed "at the time of the taking," so as to link up with the
appropriate time of valuation (i.e., the "time of the taking"). See FLA. STAT. ch. 73 (1995).
185. Finkelstein, 656 So. 2d at 925 (citing City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty,
Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 652-53 (Fla. 1975)).
186. 647 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1994).
187. Id. at 822-23.
188. 170 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1964) (holding that a partial taking of access will not support
claim for business damages).
189. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court needed to make this finding after
having already found that there had been no taking at all. Weaver, 647 So. 2d at 822
(finding no compensable loss of access).
190. Id. at 822-23.
191. Id. at 822.
192. Id. at 822 n.1.
193. 645 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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deduct the reasonable value of the self-employed owner's services from the
profits-as it would with any other employee wages.' 94
I. Severance Damages
In Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority v. Latham, 195 the
Fifth District Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in excluding the
condemnor's expert testimony as to severance damages. 96  The court
determined that the proffered testimony concerning an alleged right to an
east-west arterial access was relevant, and thus concluded the severance
issue was not improperly presented below."9 In light of recent develop-
ments in Department of Transportation v. Gefen... and Broward County
v. Patel,'99 the court determined a remand would be the most appropriate
remedy under the circumstances. 2tu
In Brevard County v. Canaveral Properties, Inc.,"1 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal reversed an award of severance damages grounded on a
finding of a "parent parcel' 2° as is defined in Department of Transporta-
tion v. Jirik.03 The court found that the checkerboard-like, noncontiguous
nature of the 499 lots, the lack of any coventure or partnership agreement
between the various property owners, and the historical treatment of the lots
as individual parcels indicated a "diversity of ownership, diversity of usage
and an absence of contiguity."'' 4 The court noted that in cases where the
condemnee seeks severance damages, the burden is on the condemnee to
194. Id. at 1094-95.
195. 643 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
196. Id. at 11.
197. Id.
198. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
199. 641 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1994) (holding that possibility of securing future rezoning or
variance may be admitted on severance issue under certain circumstances).
200. Latham, 643 So. 2d at 11.
201. 658 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
202. Id. at 590.
203. 498 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1986). Jirik concerned three separate but contiguous parcels
of land-all owned by the same person. The sole issue in the case concerned "unity of use,"
which is the primary criteria used to determine whether contiguous parcels of land should
be considered as "one parcel" or separate and independent. l at 1255. If property is not
in use, however, "unity of use" becomes problematic. In such cases, there is a presumption
of "separateness" as to vacant platted urban lots, which can be rebutted by contrary evidence.
Canaveral Properties, 658 So. 2d at 590-91 (citing Jirik, 498 So. 2d at 1256-57).
204. Canaveral Properties, 658 So. 2d at 591.
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establish the basis for such damages. 5 In this case, the condemnee had
to show that despite the disparate ownership and physical separation of the
499 lots, their proximity and integration of use was so substantial, that the
lots were in effect "one lot."2°6 The court found the owners had not met
that burden.2 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida's appellate courts issued a number of interesting opinions in
condemnation law over the last year. Perhaps more importantly, however,
the legislature made sweeping changes in the ways fees and costs are
awarded in such cases. These changes are quite controversial and are sure
to be challenged. Next year should prove to be even more interesting.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The coasts of the United States, and of Florida in particular, have
created an intrigue in a way that no other geological region has. The
popularity created by this intrigue has created numerous problems for the
ecosystems of the coastal zone.
The coastal zone itself is a "critical interface between the land, the sea,
and the atmosphere."1 Far from being a stable and constant environment,
it is an ecosystem in a constant state of flux There is no permanence
1. ROBERT B. DITON ET AL., COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: BEYOND
BUREAUCRACY AND THE MARKET 2 (1977) [hereinafter DrITON].
2. Id. at 16.
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attached when the land itself can, and will, disappear with the water or the
wind.
The coastal zone is comprised of numerous habitats in which "commu-
nities of plants and animals that are endemic and that carry out the
functional activities of the system" exist.3 This includes the sandy beaches
with dune systems and barrier islands, and the estuaries and coastal
wetlands. Each one of these systems is fragile and unique, and contains its
own delicate balance. When this balance is disrupted by population growth
and development, danger can occur without stringent control mechanisms to
protect it.
It is estimated that by the year 2000, eighty-five percent of Florida's
population will be living in coastal counties.4 Florida will then have the
fourth largest population in the United States filled with 14,000,000
residents and 55,000,000 tourists per year, all of whom love the coasts.'
In addition, by that same year, 153,000,000 Americans will be boating
annually.6 What the state chooses to do today will determine whether this
population boom will overdevelop and destroy our coasts, or whether this
development will be sustainable, thus protecting the coasts for generations
to come.
Sustainable development has been defined as "the use of natural
resources to support economic activity without compromising the environ-
ment's carrying capacity, which is its ability to continue producing . . .
goods and services."7 When this carrying capacity can be quantified, the
limits of growth and development can be practically addressed.
According to one commentator, "[a]t a density of 1 person per square
kilometer little of the natural functioning of the environment [will] be lost,
(unless the person is using an off-road vehicle)... "At 10 persons per
square kilometer the likelihood of being alone and of seeing wildlife [is]
sacrificed.. 9 "At 100 persons per square kilometer most wildlife will
depart[, and] in the absence of any management intervention, there will be
3. Id. at 4.
4. RICHARD G. HAMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN LOCAL COASTAL RESOURCE
PROTECTION 1 (1986).
5. Id.
6. FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECREATIONAL MARINA SITING IN
FLORIDA 1 (1986).
7. Edward W. Manning & David T. Dougherty, Sustainable Tourism, CORNELL HOTEL
& RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., Apr. 1995, at 29, 30.
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id. at 40.
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visible pollution[] and noticeable ecological degradation.""° Finally, at a
capacity of "1,000 persons per square kilometer urban densities are reached,
and the experience is no longer a natural one[,] ... and intensive manage-
ment is needed to maintain the site and to remove trash and human
waste."" The state is going to be required to establish more maintenance
and preservation policies as the population and tourism intensifies and the
beaches all grow closer to this maximum carrying capacity.
Florida has established a system of protection for the coastal ecosys-
tems of the state. In doing so, the legislature has addressed several
problems which present themselves in separate and distinct ecosystems.
Methods chosen by the state to address these problems include establishing
protection from coastal construction on sandy beaches," establishing a
system by which the local government may acquire public beaches," and
allowing for establishment of renourishment and replenishment programs. 4
This article focuses on the impact that population growth has had on
Florida's coasts, what impact it may have in the future, and what the
legislature has done to alter this impact and rectify any damage that may
have occurred in the past.'" Distinct subsystems of the coastal zone
ecosystem will be examined in turn, along with the steps taken by the state
to protect or repair those systems. The first area examined is the sandy
beaches, including the dune system and barrier islands, followed by the
coastal estuaries and wetlands. Because both types of coastal areas,
although not thoroughly independent, are unique and precious in their own
way, each deserves and requires individual management techniques and
policies. To treat the coast as one entity is to ignore the dynamics that
make the coast important and special to both Floridians and persons
worldwide who associate Florida with its endless coasts.
10. Id
11. Id
12. FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (1995).
13. FLA. STAT. § 259.045 (1995).
14. FLA. STAT. § 161.082 (1995).
15. This article will not address federal coastal management programs, nor will it
address, more than briefly, county or municipal coastal management programs. While these
programs are integral to the functioning of coastal growth management as a whole, they are
beyond the scope of this article.
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II. BEACHES AND SANDY SHORES
A. Description of the Ecosystem and Problems Caused by
Development
The beach ecosystem includes not only the sandy coasts, but the beach
dune system and the barrier island system as well. The ecosystem is
probably the habitat which persons most immediately identify with the coast.
Because of its beauty and popularity, it is also where many people choose
to reside.
The sandy shore is an area in constant motion. This process begins
when suspended particles are carried by the rivers into the ocean.16 The
sediments and nutrients are then transported and dispersed by waves and
currents along the coast. 7 The process by which the beach is formed is
called littoral drift or longshore transport of sand. 8 This occurs when the
waves approach the coastline at an angle, both eroding and further
nourishing the shore. The sand particles which move within the waves are
then transported and deposited along the shore to form the beach.'
This cycle of erosion and accretion is what creates and transforms the
beach shores and the dunes. The wind is the greatest manipulator of these
landforms.2 The waves generated by the wind erode and accrete the
shore, while the wind action erodes and accretes the dunes.2' One large
storm may completely obliterate a dune.Y When a coastal area is undevel-
oped, the erosional phase of this cycle may completely eliminate the beach
and dune system.'
This unpredictability of the shoreline, which is completely natural and
would be acceptable for an undeveloped coast, is considered thoroughly
unacceptable where development has already occurred. The cyclic changes
of the shoreline can be hostile and dangerous to a landowner on the beach.
Most of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States are located within
the coastal zone. It is unlikely, therefore, that people will stand by and
16. DrrrON, supra note 1, at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Karl F. Nordstrom, The Concept of Intrinsic Value and Depositional Coastal
Landforms, GEOGRAPHICAL REV., Jan. 1990, at 68, 69.
21. id
22. Id
23. Id. at 70.
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watch their homes and buildings be destroyed by a natural erosion
process.24 Without human involvement in the natural processes, such as
beach erosion, little fundamental damage will probably occur to the geologic
system.25 Unfortunately, people have chosen to play a very active role in
manipulating the natural processes of the coastal system.
Some of the human influences which cause severe changes to beaches
and dunes include: houses, grading, or bulldozing; stabilization structures
(coastal armoring); beach and dune nourishment; sand fences; artificial
vegetation planting; and introduction of exotic species.26 Many other
invasions such as tramping and vehicular use can cause change, although on
a smaller scale.27 As a result of these alterations, a rate of landform
change occurs which exceeds that which existed prior to the changes made
by humans.28 Eventually, erosion caused by waves will have a greater
impact on the altered beaches than it had on the unaltered beaches. 29
Although shore protection efforts, such as seawalls and groins,30 are
established to prevent erosion, they seem to actually exacerbate the
process.3 Bulkheads and seawalls, which are parallel to the shore, tend to
prevent the coastal formations which supply sediment to the beach.32
Groins and jetties, which are perpendicular to the shore, tend to trap the
sand that moves parallel to the shoreline in the longshore-transport
system.33
Coastal barrier islands also are caused by accretion parallel to the coast,
and consist of shell, sand, and gravel. These islands are similarly damaged
by human alteration of the ecosystem. 4 Because these barrier islands are
24. DrrToN, supra note 1, at 45.
25. Onin H. Pilkey & Mark Evans, Rising Sea, Shifting Shores, in COAST ALERT:
SCIENTISTS SPEAK OUT 13, 30 (Thomas C. Jackson & Diana Reische eds., 1981).
26. Id.
27. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 69.
28. Id at 71.
29. Id. at 72.
30. A seawall is "a wall or embankment to protect the shore from erosion or to act as
a breakwater." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1035 (1973). A groin is "a rigid
structure built out from a shore to protect the shore from erosion, to trap sand, or to direct
a current for scouring a channel." Id. at 502.
31. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 72.
32. Id
33. Id
34. John R. Clark, Management of Coastal Barrier Biosphere Reserves, BIOSCENCE,
May 1991, at 331, 331.
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temporary and continually changing shape, many of the protection programs
that have been implemented to protect them have been unsuccessful. 35
Despite the number of protective measures, sandy beaches in the United
States are eroding at a phenomenal rate. Approximately ninety percent of
this country's beaches are eroding.36 Of Florida's 1000 miles of coastline,
440 miles are eroded, and 230 miles have an erosion problem deemed
critical by the state because the coastline has been threatened by develop-
ment and recreation. 37 As a solution to this problem, more than ninety
beaches throughout the United States have been "renourished"38 and Dade
and Broward Counties in Florida have undertaken seventeen renourishment
projects since 1970. 3 ' Renourishment, or replenishment, is the process by
which the sand on an eroded beach is artificially replaced with sand mined
from "backbays, inlets, offshore, and inland sources."' 4  Often, the sand
that is used is coarser than the natural sand. Furthermore, a nourished beach
often results in an unnatural, widened, and oversteepened upper beach. 4,
The rate of erosion of a nourished beach is much higher than the rate of
erosion of a natural beach due to the lack of equilibrium of the larger
foreshore.42 Eventually, the high erosion rate of the nourished beach slows
and conditions begin to resemble the natural processes once again.43
As a result of the large number of renourishment projects undertaken
in Florida, the supply of sand to renourish the Florida beaches is almost
depleted.' Dade County, for example, is now considering importing sand
from the Bahamas to fill eroded beaches. This action may have serious
repercussions, however, because Bahamian sand does not contain the same
type of material as Florida sand.4" Additionally, non-native sand may not
retain enough heat to allow marine turtles to reproduce adequately.4 6
35. Id.
36. Kathy Kiely, Letter From Kitty Hawk: Send for King Canute, MGMT. TODAY, Aug.
1989, at 15, 15.
37. Florida Running out of Sand, Engineering News-Rec., Mar. 6, 1995, at 19.
38. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 75.
39. Cyril T. Zaneski, South Florida Short of Sand? Believe it, TORONTO STAR, Dec.
4, 1993, at J12.
40. Nordstrom, supra note 20, at 75.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. lId
44. Zaneski, supra note 39, at J12.
45. Bahamian sand is made of argonite, "a dense crystallized mineral unlike common
Florida sand." Florida Running out of Sand, supra note 37, at 19.
46. Id
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Solutions which may appear simplistic and non-problematic may indeed
have severe consequences in an ecosystem so delicately balanced.
Therefore, a complex solution is needed to protect a complex ecosystem
such as the coast, particularly where past programs damaged the natural
processes instead of improving them.
B. The Regulation of Beaches, Shores, and Dunes
The Florida Legislature has recognized that coastal areas are "dynamic
geologic systems with topography that is subject to alteration by waves,
storm surges, flooding, or littoral currents[,]" and that "coastal areas are
among Florida's most valuable resources and have extremely high recre-
ational and aesthetic value which should be preserved and enhanced."47
Because of the extraordinary importance our beaches and shores hold,
Florida has enacted a series of elaborate coastal protection measures. These
measures include protection from construction of a variety of structures
landward of the mean-high water line,48 protection from vehicular traf-
fic,49 and specific enactments for barrier islands."
To Florida, beaches and shores hold unquestionable importance
economically. They are the "'backbone of tourism in the state of Flori-
da."'' Without specific protection, these economic resources would be
lost. The legislature has declared that the "highest and best use of the
seacoast of the state is as a source of public and private recreation[,]" and
that "such use can only be served effectively by maintaining the coastal
waters.... beaches, and public lands adjoining the seacoast in as close to
a pristine condition as possible .... ",2
1. Construction Controls
There are several mechanisms by which the state controls construction
and development of the beaches and shores. The primary mechanism by
which it undertakes this control is through the Beach and Shore Preservation
47. FLA. STAT. § 161.53(2), (3) (1995).
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.052, .053 (1995).
49. FLA. STAT. § 161.58 (1995).
50. FLA. STAT. § 161.55(5) (1995).
51. Zaneski, supra note 39, at J12 (quoting Lonnie Ryder, Florida Department of
Environmental Protection).
52. FLA. STAT. § 376.021(1), (2) (1995).
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Act ("BSPA")s3 and the Coastal Zone Protection Act ("CZPA"), 54 which
requires construction restriction lines. The Florida Legislature recognizes
the problem with "increasing growth pressures" upon the coastal regions of
the state. 6 The CZPA states that "unless these pressures are controlled,
the very features which make coastal areas economically, aesthetically, and
ecologically rich will be destroyed."57  Therefore, the CZPA sets forth
construction restrictions upon the coasts to protect them from the adverse
impacts which inevitably result from growth.
The primary impact which the CZPA protects against is beach erosion.
The legislature declared erosion to be a menace and an emergency to the
State of Florida, and stated that the government must protect the beaches
and shores. 8 The Florida Administrative Code states that further degrada-
tion of the coastal ecosystem must be prevented and promotion of existing
degraded portions of the coastal ecosystem must occur.59 The only way
to achieve these ends is to restrict coastal construction.6°
The state has established a fifty-foot setback line for coastal construc-
tion in section 161.052 of the Florida Statutes.6' By declaring the
construction site a public nuisance, the statute makes it a misdemeanor to
construct or excavate without a permit within fifty feet of the mean high
water mark at any riparian coastal location. 62 However, the statute does
not apply to any "vegetation-type nonsandy shores," such as estuaries.63
If the local construction restriction is stricter than the fifty-foot setback line,
the more stringent requirements shall prevail.'
Section 161.053 establishes coastal construction control lines ("CCCL")
''on a county basis along the sand beaches of the state fronting on the
Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the Straits of Florida.' 65 This
53. Chapter 161 of the Florida Statutes is the Florida Beach and Shore Preservation
Act. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.002(1) (1995).
54. Sections 161.52-.58 of the Florida Statutes are known as the "Coastal Zone
Protection Act of 1985." FLA. STAT. §§ 161.52-.58 (1995).
55. Id. § 161.55.
56. Id. § 161.53(1).
57. Id.
58. FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (1995).
59. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.005(1) (1995).
60. Id
61. FLA. STAT. § 161.052.
62. IU § 161.052(7), (8).
63. IU § 161.052(5).
64. Id. § 161.052(2)0b).
65. Id. § 161.053(1)(a).
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section authorizes the Department of Environmental Protection ("Depart-
ment") to establish CCCLs to protect the beach "from imprudent construc-
tion which can jeopardize the stability of the beach-dune system, accelerate
erosion, provide inadequate protection to upland structures, endanger
adjacent properties, or interfere with public beach access. 66 In addition,
the CCCLs do not apply to those coastal areas dominated by vegetation, but
only to those sandy beaches subject to erosion.67
Generally, the CCCLs are established to define the portion of the
beach-dune system subject to severe fluctuations based upon a 100-year
storm surge. 68 The method for determining the location of the CCCL is
extremely technical and involves "complex computer modeling and
extensive surveying."69 The construction line will be established only
where necessary to protect upland properties and prevent erosion.7° Under
section 161.053, it is a misdemeanor to construct or excavate seaward of the
line without a permit, and such construction or excavation is declared a
public nuisance. 1
Section 161.053 establishes that where a CCCL has not been designat-
ed, the fifty-foot setback line remains in place until the CCCL or a
municipal control line is established. 2 However, development and
construction under these two sections are not entirely precluded. The
Florida Administrative Code limits the construction and requires the person
applying for the permit to clearly justify the need for the construction. 3
Only the Governor and Cabinet, the Executive Director, and the Division
Director have the authority to issue a permit for excavation or construc-
tion.74
The Florida Administrative Code identifies several policy criteria to be
taken into account upon the application of a permit for construction or
excavation. If construction occurs seaward of either of the two lines, the
code requires the construction to conform to special siting, structural, and
other design considerations for the protection of the beach-dune system.75
66. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(1)(a).
67. Id § 161.053(1)(c).
68. Id. § 161.053(1)(a).
69. Deborah A. Getzoff & Kenneth G. Oertel, Beach, Shore, and Coastal Zone
Regulation, in II FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW, 14-1, 14-9 (2d ed. 1994).
70. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(2).
71. Id. § 161.053(7), (8).
72. Id. § 161.053(1 1).
73. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.005(1) (1995).
74. Id. at r. 62B-33.006(2).
75. Id. at r. 62B-33.005(2).
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In addition, elevated dune walkover structures are encouraged by the
Department to protect the dunes.76
The Department must also consider the cumulative effect of several
structures or activities having an adverse impact on the beaches and dunes,
even if the individual structure or activity alone may not have any adverse
impact.77  If, however, the "immediate contiguous or adjacent area"
contains a number of structures which have "established a reasonably
continuous and uniform construction line" closer to the high water mark
than either the CCCL or the fifty-foot setback line, whichever is in effect,
then a proposed structure may be built.7" This is contingent, however,
upon the existing structures not having been unduly affected by erosion and
upon approval of the Department. 79 However, under section 161.052, a
waiver or variance of the fifty-foot setback line is authorized. 0
Under section 161.053, this uniform construction line, described in
section 161.052, is one condition which may justify the granting of a permit
to construct beyond the CCCL.8' Other considerations under section
161.053 justifying the grant of a permit for construction seaward of the
CCCL include: 1) the "shoreline stability;" 2) the "[d]esign features of the
proposed structures;" and 3) the potential impacts, cumulative or individual,
upon the beach-dune system.82 In addition, construction of structures
which interfere with public access along the beach will be limited."3
Although the applicant must clearly state and justify the necessity of
the development, 4 the city need not demonstrate any other evidence to
prove its acceptance of the applicant's justification of this necessity other
than the application itself.8" In a hearing contesting the application, the
burden of proof is on the petitioner challenging it.8 6 The petitioner "'must
identify the areas of controversy and allege a factual basis for the contention
76. Id. at r. 62B-33.005(4).
77. Id. at r. 62B-33.005(7).
78. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.052(2)(b), .053(5)(b).
79. Id
80. Id § 161.052(2).
81. Id. § 161.053(5)(a).
82. Id
83. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(5).
84. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.005(1) (1995).
85. Woodholly Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 451 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
86. Id
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that the facts relied upon by the applicant fall short of carrying the...
burden cast upon the applicant.'
'
,17
Section 161.053 also provides that no permit will be authorized where
the proposed location for construction is seaward of the seasonal high-water
line within thirty years after the date of application for the permit."8 This
section defines "seasonal high-water line" as the "line formed by the
intersection of the rising shore and the elevation of 150 percent of the local
mean tidal range above local mean high water." 9 In determining this
thirty-year seaward area, the Department will not include any areas landward
of the CCCL. This restriction does not include some "coastal or shore
protection structure[s], minor structure[s], or pier[s]."'
Additional protective requirements are specified under the Florida
Administrative Code.91 For example, "[t]he proposed structure or other
activity shall be located a sufficient distance landward of the beach-dune
system to permit natural shoreline fluctuations and to preserve the dune
stability and natural recovery following storm induced erosion."'  In
addition, structures must be designed to "minimize any expected adverse
impact on the beach-dune system."93
The CZPA94 was created to protect coastal areas because of their
"important role in protecting the ecology and the public health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of the state . . . ."" The Act places requirements
and restrictions upon construction within the "coastal building zone.
96
This zone consists of:
the land area from the seasonal high-water line landward to a line 1,500
feet landward from the coastal construction control line as established
pursuant to s. 161.053 ... and not included under s. 161.053, the land
area seaward of the most landward velocity zone (V-zone) line as
established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency .... 17
87. d. (quoting Florida Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1981)).
88. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(6)(b).
89. l § 161.053(6)(a)2.
90. ICL
91. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.007 (1995).
92. Id. at r. 62B-33.007(1).
93. Id at r. 62B-33.007(2).
94. FLA. STAT. § 161.52.
95. Id. § 161.53(1).
96. Id. § 161.55.
97. Id § 161.54(1).
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Numerous requirements are established for construction within the
coastal building zone.98 The requirements for major structures99 include
anticipating loads resulting from a 100-year storm event when designing the
foundation and constructing the structure."° With regard to minor struc-
tures, 1 this section requires that structures be designed "to produce the
minimum adverse impact on the beach and the dune system ....
Generally, no structure may be constructed unless it is a "sufficient distance
landward of the beach to permit natural shoreline fluctuations and to
preserve dune stability," with the exception of "elevated walkways, lifeguard
support stands, piers, beach access ramps, gazebos, and coastal or shore
"7103protection structures ....
With regard to coastal barrier islands, all requirements which apply to
the coastal building zone apply to the barrier islands."°  However, the
zone for barrier islands is identified as "the land area from the seasonal
high-water line to a line 5,000 feet landward from the coastal construction
control line pursuant to s. 161.053, or the entire island, whichever is
less."'0 5 This subsection identifies specific zone requirements for certain
islands in identified inlets."06
In summary, the coastal construction control line, the fifty-foot setback
line, and the coastal building zone are methods whereby the state may
98. Id § 161.55.
99. A "major structure" is defined in § 161.54(6)(a) as: "houses, mobile homes,
apartment buildings, condominiums, motels, hotels, restaurants, towers, other types of
residential, commercial, or public buildings, and other construction having the potential for
substantial impact on coastal zones." FLA. STAT. § 161.54(6)(a).
100. Id. § 161.55(1)(e).
101. A "minor structure" is defined in § 161.54(6)(b) as:
pile-supported, elevated dune and beach walkover structures; beach access ramps
and walkways; stairways; pile-supported, elevated viewing platforms, gazebos,
and boardwalks; lifeguard support stands; public and private bathhouses;
sidewalks, driveways, parking areas, shuffleboard courts, tennis courts, handball
courts, racquetball courts, and other uncovered paved areas; earth retaining
walls; and sand fences, privacy fences, ornamental walls, ornamental garden
structures, aviaries, and other ornamental construction. It shall be a characteris-
tic of minor structures that they are considered to be expendable under design
wind, wave, and storm forces.
Id. § 161.54(6)(b).
102. Id. § 161.55(2).
103. Id. § 161.55(4).
104. FLA. STAT. § 161.55(5).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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protect the coast from encroaching development. Through these procedures,
the state agencies and officials have the discretion to permit development
based upon the ecological consequences to the beach and shore. Specified
nondiscretionary requirements and restrictions also exist. As long as this
discretion is used wisely and permits and waivers are issued only in
extraordinary circumstances, these systems will endure in protecting the
shores from encroaching development.
2. Coastal Stabilizing and Armoring
Neither the coastal construction control line"° nor the fifty-foot
setback requirement, 8 applies to shore protection structures or coastal
armoring. Section 161.041 of the Florida Statutes,"° as well as certain
rules in the Florida Administrative Code, 0 regulate these shore protecting
structures by restricting construction below the mean-high water
mark-those areas which constitute the sovereignty lands within the State
of Florida.
These shore protecting measures can broadly be described by the term
"rigid coastal structures," which is defined as "structures characterized by
their solid or highly impermeable design or construction.""' Included
within this definition are "groins, breakwaters, mound structures, jetties,
weirs, seawalls, bulkheads and revetments.""' "Armoring," on the other
hand, is a more limited term and is defined as the "placement of manmade
structures or devices in or near the coastal system for the purpose of
preventing erosion of the upland property or to protect upland structures
from the effects of coastal wave and current activity.""' This does not
include jetties, groins, and other structures which are implemented to add
sand to the beach or dune, alter natural coastal currents, or stabilize the
mouths of inlets." 4
The Florida Administrative Code states that these rigid coastal
structures can cause damage to the beach by exacerbating erosion. Under
the code, permits shall not be issued for this purpose "except as a last resort
107. Id. § 161.053(9).
108. Id. § 161.152(3).
109. FLA. STAT. § 161.041(1).
110. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.001 (1995).
111. Id. at r. 62B-41.002(56)(a).
112. Id.
113. Id. at r. 62B-41.002(5).
114. Id.
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to provide protection to eligible structures.... The code also requires that
construction shall be limited and fully justified" 6 because rigid coastal
structures "may be expected to have a long-term adverse effect on the beach
in the immediate vicinity."'
' 17
Therefore, coastal armoring is permitted only where several criteria are
met. The Department of Environmental Protection requires that: 1) the
structure to be protected is "vulnerable to erosion from a five (5) year return
interval storm event";' 2) "[a]ll other alternatives, including dune
enhancement, beach restoration, structure relocation, and modification of the
structure's foundation . . . are determined not to be economically and
physically feasible"; 1 9 and 3) there will be no significant adverse
impact."2° In addition, in reviewing applications for coastal armoring, the
Department considers the historic erosion rates and sea level rise,' and
"[w]hether a permit for beach restoration or nourishment project ... has
been applied for . . . ."2 It is important that the structure not interfere
with the use by the public of the beach seaward of the mean high-water line.
If this interference is unavoidable, the Department may require alternative
access to the beach area for the benefit of the public.
23
The effect on marine turtles also is a factor in granting an application
for coastal construction. All construction must be sited and designed so as
to minimize any expected adverse impact to the marine turtles in the
area.24 Armoring structures are prohibited entirely in a federally designat-
ed critical habitat for marine turtles at the Archie Carr National Wildlife
Refuge."z
The Florida Administrative Code allows for permits for experimental
coastal construction involving new technologies. 2 6 However, the criteria
for this project are very strict and limited. The construction must occur in
115. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.005(6) (1995).
116. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(2).
117. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(6).
118. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(6)(b).
119. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(6)(c).
120. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.005(6)(e) (1995).
121. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(7)(c).
122. Id. at r. 62B-41.005(7)(d).
123. FLA. STAT. § 161.041(1).
124. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.007(1)(a) (1995).
125. Id. at r. 62B-41.0055(4).
126. Id. at r. 62B-41.0075.
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an area of erosion 7 which is not considered environmentally sensitive by
the Department.12 Applicants also must demonstrate that the project "has
the potential to provide a positive benefit to the coastal system and is not
expected to result in a significant adverse impact."'2 9 A test plan and
mitigation program must be submitted for permit approval.'
The state also permits county control of construction of coastal
armoring and rigid shore protection measures under certain circumstances.
Under section 161.35, "the board of county commissioners may regulate and
supervise all physical work or activity along the county shoreline which is
likely to have a material physical effect on existing coastal conditions or
natural shore processes.'' This includes "installation of groins, jetties,
moles, breakwaters, seawalls, revetments, and other coastal construction..
" .13 The board of county commissioners must first have the consent of
the Department of Environmental Protection and of "any municipality or
other political authority involved," however, before assuming responsibili-
ty.1
33
Rigid shore protection measures and coastal armoring is truly a
pretentious idea. The idea that people can control the ocean and all the
force and power behind it must be thrilling to some, while ludicrous to
others. However, where mistakes upon the beaches and shores have already
been made-construction where construction should not have taken
place-perhaps rigid shore protection is the only solution. It is a solution,
however, which is short-sighted, and therefore, must be eliminated as soon
as possible.
3. State Acquisition of Beaches and Shores
Another method whereby the state undertakes protection of its beaches
and shores is land acquisition. This is perhaps the most basic of the growth
protection schemes. If the ever-growing population cannot own the lands,
they cannot harm them--at least to the extent that they might be harmed in
private hands. The state has established two major statutory schemes to
acquire beaches for the use of the public and for the purpose of conserva-
127. The erosion area must be one which is identified in the Department's beach
restoration management plan. Id. at r. 62B-41.0075(1)(a).
128. Id.
129. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.0075(1)(d) (1995).
130. Id. at r. 62B-41.0075(4).
131. FLA. STAT. § 161.35(1) (1995).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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tion. These are the Land Conservation Act, under chapter 259 of the
Florida Statutes,"M and the Outdoor Recreation and Conservation provi-
sions under chapter 375 of the Florida Statutes.'35
Chapter 259 identifies as the policy of the state an assurance to its
citizens that "public ownership of natural areas for purposes of maintaining
the state's unique natural resources" will be undertaken.'36 This chapter
identifies coastal areas as those areas to be acquired for the purpose of
conservation and protection. 37  It requires that lands acquired under
section 259.032 will be managed in such a manner as to "provide the
greatest combination of benefits to the public and to the resources."'38
Section 259.101 establishes the Florida Preservation 2000 Act, 139
which deals with the rapidly growing population contributing to the
degradation of the environment." The Act further states that "[i]mminent
development of Florida's remaining natural areas and continuing increases
in land values necessitate an aggressive program of public land acquisition
during the next decade to preserve the quality of life that attracts so many
people to Florida."' 4
1
Additionally, the Act establishes that fifty percent of the proceeds of
the Preservation 2000 Trust Fund will be given to the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection for the acquisition of public lands. 42  Of that
amount, one-fifth will be used for the acquisition of coastal lands. 43
Some of the criteria for acquisition include: 1) whether the land is in
"imminent danger of development"; 2) whether development is likely within
the next twelve months; and 3) whether a significant portion of the land will
protect valuable natural resources.'" The Act also specifies that in
acquiring coastal lands, parcels in highly developed urban areas should be
given special consideration.
45
134. FLA. STAT. ch. 259 (1995).
135. FLA. STAT. ch. 375 (1995).
136. FLA. STAT. § 259.032(1) (1995).
137. Id. § 259.032(3)(d).
138. Id. § 259.032(9)(a)1.
139. FLA. STAT. § 259.101 (1995).
140. Id. § 259.101(2).
141. Id. § 259.101(2)0b).
142. Id. § 259.101(3)(a).
143. Id.
144. FLA. STAT. § 259.101(4)(a)1.-3.
145. Id. § 259.101(4)(d)2.
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The Florida Preservation 2000 Trust Fund is established for the purpose
of carrying out section 375.031 of the Florida Statutes'46 and empowers
the Department of Environmental Protection to identify lands for acquisi-
tion.147 It specifies beaches as lands which may be acquired under this
section. 4 ' In addition, chapter 375 authorizes the Department to provide
financial assistance to local governments for the purpose of acquiring public
beach properties.'49 As specified in chapter 259, public beaches in urban
areas are to be given priority in the trust fund application process.'-
Although these beach acquisition programs are not complicated, they
can be significant. If the state gains control of the few remaining beaches
still in their natural state, their pristine condition may survive for future
generations-perhaps longer than if the beaches remain in private control.
In this manner, the state may be able to retain some of the beaches' natural
qualities which appeal to so many people.
4. Comprehensive Planning
Florida requires a comprehensive plan of development of all municipal-
ities "based on the area's needs, proposed improvements, and principles for
future development."'' In addition, the state has enacted a comprehensive
plan requirement to "provide long-range policy guidance for the orderly
social, economic, and physical growth of the state."'5 2 Each plan requires
protection from beach and shore growth to be identified through a coastal
element of the plan. 53 A major function of the comprehensive plan is the
protection of natural resources. Because the beaches have been identified
as a natural resource in great need of protection, they must be an integral
part of comprehensive planning.' 54
146. Id. § 259.101(3).
147. FLA. STAT. § 375.031(1) (1995).
148. Id. § 375.031(5).
149. FLA. STAT. § 375.065(1) (1995).
150. Id. § 375.065(4).
151. James Jay Brown, A Brief Guide to Understanding Planning and Zoning, in II
FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND UsE LAW 1-1, 1-17 (2d ed. 1994).
152. FLA. STAT. § 187.101(1) (1995).
153. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(6)(d), 186.009(2)(j) (1995).
154. The comprehensive planning statutes are extremely detailed and beyond the scope
of this article. For an in-depth analysis of all elements of the comprehensive planning
process, see Thomas Pelham et al., Managing Florida's Growth: Toward an Integrated
State, Regional, and Local Comprehensive Planning Process, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 515
(1985).
1996]
295
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
Section 163.3178 requires the local governments to include a coastal
management element into their comprehensive plan for the purpose of
protecting the "significant interest in the resources of the coastal zone of the
state."' This element must be based upon "studies, surveys, and da-
ta, ''156 and must include: a land use map of public access to beach and
shore resources; 7 an analysis of the effect of development upon the
barrier islands, including beach and dune systems, and other fragile coastal
resources;' 58 and "[a] component which outlines principles for protecting
existing beach and dune systems from man-induced erosion and for restoring
altered beach and dune systems.''5 9 The statute also requires counties to
establish a "process for identifying and prioritizing coastal properties so they
may be acquired as part of the state's land acquisition programs."' 
6
Additionally, the Florida Administrative Code implements this compre-
hensive planning requirement for coastal management by requiring an
inventory and analysis of beach and dune systems, "including past trends in
erosion and accretion, the effects upon the beaches or dunes of coastal or
shore protection structures, and identification of existing and potential beach
renourishment areas."'1
6 1
The Executive Office of the Governor is required to prepare a growth
management portion of the state comprehensive plan which is strategic in
nature. 62 This includes "[e]stablish[ing] priorities regarding coastal plan-
ning and resource management."'6'  The coastal element of the state
comprehensive plan includes: 1) accelerated public acquisition of coastal
land to protect resources or "meet projected public demand";' 64 2) ensur-
ing the public's right of access to beaches;6' 3) protection of coastal
resources and dune systems "from the adverse effects of development";
66
4) prohibition of "development and other activities which disturb coastal
dune systems"; 67 and 5) ensuring and promoting the restoration of
155. FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(1) (1995).
156. Id. § 163.3178(2).
157. Id. § 163.3178(2)(a).
158. Id. § 163.3178(2)(b).
159. Id. § 163.3178(2)(e).
160. FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(8).
161. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.012(2)(f) (1995).
162. FLA. STAT. § 186.009(1).
163. Id. § 186.009(2)0).
164. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(9)(b)1. (1995).
165. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)2.
166. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)4.
167. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)9.
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damaged coastal dune systems.'6' These comprehensive planning systems
are primarily a building block to positive action by the state and local
governments toward protecting the coast, and the beach and dune system.
5. Beach Renourishment and Replenishment
Beach renourishment or replenishment is not a protective measure, but
one which attempts to reverse the adverse impacts of existing overgrowth
and overdevelopment. Once the erosion process has occurred, either at its
natural pace or accelerated due to human intervention, there is little that can
be done to reverse this process. Renourishment of the beaches is one
method by which the state can physically replace the loss which has
occurred to the beach, thus possibly halting damage to structures upland and
minimizing impacts on tourism.
The primary mechanism the state implemented for renourishment is
codified in section 161.161 of the Florida Statutes.169 Under this section,
a comprehensive, long-term beach management plan must be adopted with
regard to renourishment projects.170 This section also establishes the
criteria for approval of a beach renourishment project,"' and establishes
how the project will be funded."7
The elements which the beach management plan must address include:
1) "long-term solutions to the problem of critically eroding beaches in this
state";173 2) whether each improved coastal beach inlet is a significant
cause of beach erosion;" 3) design criteria for renourishment pro-
jects;75 4) evaluation of "the establishment of feeder beaches as an
alternative to direct beach restoration"; 7 6 5) strategies for protection of
marine turtles and their nests;"7 and 6) "alternative management responses
to preserve undeveloped beach and dune systems, to restore damaged beach
and dune systems, and to prevent inappropriate development and redevel-
opment on migrating beaches."'7 As problems arise in beach renourish-
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 161.161 (1995).
170. Id. § 161.161(1)(c).
171. Id. § 161.161(2).
172. Id. § 161.161(6).
173. Id. § 161.161(1)(a).
174. FLA. STAT. § 161.161(1)(b).
175. Id. § 161.161(1)(c).
176. Id. § 161.161(1)(d).
177. Id. § 161.161(1)(i).
178. Id. § 161.161(1)0).
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ment projects, this section outlines additional criteria for the approval of the
project. The prospect for long-term success of the project, 7 9 total antici-
pated cost of the project,80 proximity of the source of beach-compatible
sand, and the sand quality are all considered.'' With regard to funding
of the renourishment project, section 161.161 indicates that if approval of
the project is granted by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, then seventy-five percent of the cost of the project will be
authorized from the Beach Management Trust Fund."8 2
The problem of locating sand for a renourishment project is partially
answered by section 161.042 of the Florida Statutes. This section is
implemented by the Florida Administrative Code, which identifies
authorized construction or maintenance dredging as a source of sand to be
used for renourishment projects. 1 3 When the sand has been determined
by the Department of Environmental Protection to be suitable for a
renourishment project, the sand will be deposited upon an adjacent beach in
a location determined by a beach management plan, as adopted under
section 161.161."84 Although this type of sand is probably compatible in
most instances, the state's supply is nearly depleted.
Another factor which must be taken into account when undertaking a
beach renourishment project is the effect upon the marine turtle population.
As stated previously, the temperature of the sand itself can have a huge
impact on a turtle's ability to procreate.8 5 The state, to this effect, has
established standards to protect turtles from devastating renourishment
projects. Under the Florida Administrative Code, "[b]each restoration,
nourishment and mechanical sand bypassing projects shall be designed to
provide habitat which is suitable for successful marine turtle nesting
activity."'18 6 This reproductive process is a delicate one and, therefore,
consideration must be taken prior to introducing foreign material into the
turtles' nesting environment.
The state also allows for a review of innovative beach renourishment
technologies. Under section 161.082, the Department of Environmental
179. FLA. STAT. § 161.161(2)(c).
180. Id. § 161.161(2)(e).
181. Id. § 161.161(2)(f).
182. Id. § 161.161(6). The Beach Management Trust Fund is enacted in § 161.091 of
the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 161.091 (1995).
183. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.005(15) (1995).
184. Id.
185. See Florida Running out of Sand, supra note 37, at 19.
186. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-41.0055(3) (1995).
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Protection may authorize, on a limited basis, and through the permitting
process, alternatives to the "traditional dredge and fill projects to determine
the most effective and less costly techniques for beach renourishment." '
In summary, Florida requires that many facets of beach renourishment
be taken into consideration prior to undertaking a project, thus demon-
strating an understanding of the unique nature of the undertaking. However,
introducing foreign substances into a delicate ecosystem is never a good
idea, and it is not always one which is going to be able to successfully
achieve the objectives for which it was designed. By utilizing the growth
management techniques to protect beaches and sandy shores in Florida, these
renourishment projects will not be needed as often. What is truly essential
for the beaches and shores of Florida is protection from growth and
development. By enforcing these established protection measures stringently
and allowing construction and armoring permits and waivers only in rare
circumstances, the state will have fewer erosion emergencies with which to
contend.
In. COASTAL WETLANDS AND EsTUARms
A. Description of the Ecosystem and Problems Caused by
Development
The coastal wetlands and marshes are a vibrant and complex ecosystem,
where fresh and salt water combine, nurturing incredible amounts of
wildlife. As one commentator notes "[a]ll organic life is beautifully and
variedly adjusted to the conditions of its environment, but it is doubtful if
in any other zone of the organic world the accommodations are more
exquisitely ordered than in the marshes of the ocean shore."'
88
An estuary is defined as "a semi-enclosed coastal body of water which
has a free connection with the open sea and within which seawater is
measurably diluted with fresh water derived from land drainage."'19 The
estuary is protected from the surge of the sea "by barrier islands, sand
dunes, submerged reefs, peninsulas, or rocky promontories .... ,1 Sea
187. FLA. STAT. § 161.082.
188. JOSEPH V. SIRY, MARSHES OF THE OCEAN SHORE: DEVELOPMENT OF AN
ECOLOGICAL ETHIC 3 (1984) (quoting James Morris, The Estuary: One of Nature's
Keystones, in ESSAYS IN SOCIAL BIOLOGY 243-45 (Bruce Wallace, ed. 1972)).
189. William C. Boicourt, Estuaries: Where the River Meets the Sea, OCEANUS,
Summer 1993, at 32 (relying on a definition provided by D.W. Pritchard, Professor of
Oceanography at Johns Hopkins University).
190. SIRY, supra note 188, at 3.
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water and fresh water combine in a dynamic circulation caused by the winds
and tides.'9 ' This flow causes the estuary to retain nutrients and sustain
its extraordinary productivity.' 92
Estuaries are bordered by coastal wetlands, a series of "low-lying,
water-tolerant vegetation" which includes salt marshes, tidelands, swamps,
and sloughs. 9 3 Tidal marshes are the "portions of the coastal wetlands
formed by tidal action and sedimentation in certain river mouths and
bays."'9' The marshlands of the estuarine system support greater numbers
of wildlife than any other type of marshland because the waters which drain
into the tidal marshes flow into the oceans. The tidal patterns distribute
food into the river mouth, while sending the wastes into the sea.'95
Because the estuary is where the ocean and river meet, the convenience
of access to inland areas caused commerce and cities to develop around
estuarine areas very early on in history.9 6 However, the mudflats which
occur along estuaries are where seagrass grows and traps silt. Because of
the possible hindrance to commerce, reclamation of coastal wetlands occurs
and, in turn, threatens estuarine and wetland productivity. 97
191. Boicourt, supra note 189, at 32.
192. Id. at 33.
193. SIRY, supra note 188, at 3. Section 373.019(17) of the Florida Statutes defines
wetlands as:
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface water or groundwater at
a frequency and a duration sufficient to support, and under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soils. Soils present in wetlands generally are classified as hydric or alluvial, or
possess characteristics that are associated with reducing soil conditions. The
prevalent vegetation in wetlands generally consists of facultative or obligate
hydrophytic macrophytes that are typically adapted to areas having soil
conditions described above. These species, due to morphological, physiological,
or reproductive adaptations, have the ability to grow, reproduce, or persist in
aquatic environments or anaerobic soil conditions. Florida wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bayheads, bogs, cypress domes and strands, sloughs,
wet prairies, riverine swamps and marshes, hydric seepage slopes, tidal marshes,
mangrove swamps and other similar areas. Florida wetlands generally do not
include longleaf or slash pine flatwoods with an understory dominated by saw
palmetto.
FLA. STAT. § 373.019(17) (1995).
194. SIRY, supra note 188, at 4.
195. Id. at 5-6.
196. Id. at 6; see also Boicourt, supra note 189, at 30.
197. SIRY, supra note 188, at 6-7.
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Because of the popularity of living in a coastal region, the wetlands and
estuaries are utilized for increased housing needs. 9 Dredge and fill
projects provide development-ready land parcels. These lands are located
near settled urban areas and are generally lower in cost."'
The effects of the urbanization of estuaries are widespread and
potentially disastrous. In their natural state, wetlands are able to filter and
cleanse runoff waters. When these wetlands are destroyed, they are unable
to filter this pollution. As a result, the adjacent waters are impacted by
increased pollution.2" The natural storage capacity for excess water is
likewise destroyed when a wetland is destroyed. This causes changes in
flooding patterns during storms which could cause damage to the surround-
ing homes and businesses.2"'
In addition to their ability to control floods, reduce pollution, and
produce enormous sources of food, wetlands are needed to maintain global
cycles of carbon, nitrogen, sulfur, and other vital elements.2 Studies
indicate that the methane produced by the wetlands plays an important role
in maintaining the earth's ozone layer as well. 3 The repercussions of a
destroyed wetland and estuarine system can be felt around the globe.
Estuarine damage and human impact are not quickly or easily detect-
able, though it may seem so.2"' The changes in the system, however, are
"typically subtle, creeping changes in sometimes unexpected indicators,
[which] slowly manifest over many decades."20' Human impact is not
limited to urban estuaries. Apparently pristine estuaries which may seem
untouched by humans are increasingly facing threats from human impact and
damage.206
The estuary and wetland systems are vibrant havens for biodiversity.
The competition for their resources, a long and endless battle,' is perhaps
becoming increasingly inevitable as the population increases. People will
utilize these ecosystems for their personal use as long as protection systems
198. DrrroN, supra note 1, at 45.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 26.
201. Id.
202. Eugene P. Odum, A New Ecology for the Coast, in COAST ALERT: SCIENTIsTS
SPEAK OUT 145, 149 (Thomas C. Jackson & Diana Reische eds., 1981).
203. Id.
204. Boicourt, supra note 189, at 34.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 31.
207. For a history of development of coastal wetlands and estuaries, see SIRY, supra
note 188.
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are not imposed. Thus, protective measures are essential to keep the coastal
wetlands and estuaries alive because, although man has historically
developed these areas, "'man's way is not always the best.' z208
B. The Regulation of Coastal Wetlands, Estuaries, and Marshes
The estuaries and coastal wetlands are vital to all parts of the Florida
ecosystem and are vulnerable to development. Therefore, they must be
protected as stringently as possible to avoid possible permanent loss.
Florida has taken several measures to protect and preserve the estuarine and
wetland system. These measures primarily entail selecting certain coastal
wetland systems for protection and conservation. This includes designating
certain Florida lands as areas of critical state concern, 2'9 and implementing
land acquisition programs.2 0 In addition, comprehensive planning statutes
signify the importance of the coastal wetland system, and identify it as one
in need of special protection and conservation.211
1. Areas of Critical State Concern
The "areas of critical state concern" program, enacted in section 380.05,
is a limited program whereby the state land planning agency may identify
up to five percent of the state's land as an area of critical state concern.2!
An area of critical state concern is one which contains or has a significant
impact on "environmental or natural resources of regional or statewide
importance ... ."23 This includes estuaries.
The criteria considered in designating an area as one of critical state
concern include: 1) "[w]hether the ecological value of the area . . . is of
substantial regional or statewide importance"; 24 2) whether the area is one
which is designated by any state or federal agency as one for threatened or
endangered plant or animal species;25 and 3) "[w]hether any existing or
planned substantial development within the area will directly, significantly,
and deleteriously affect any or all of the environmental or natural resources
208. SIRY, supra note 188, at 17 (quoting Paul Brooks, THE HOUSE OF LIFE: RACHEL
CARSON AT WORK 226 (1989)).
209. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1995).
210. FLA. STAT. § 259.01 (1995).
211. Id. § 163.3177.
212. Id. § 380.05.
213. Id. § 380.05(2)(a).
214. Id. § 380.05(2)(a)2.
215. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(a)3.
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of the area which are of regional or statewide importance." '216 No person
may undertake development in an area of critical state concern except in
accordance with the regulations established for these areas.2 17 The
affected local governments under this section must submit land development
regulations or a local comprehensive plan within 180 days following the
adoption of a rule designating an area under that government's control as an
area of critical state concern. If they do not, or if the regulation or plan
submitted does "not comply with the principles for guiding development set
out in the rule designating the area of critical state concern," within 120
days, regulations and a plan which is in compliance will be recommended
by the state land planning agency.218
In addition, a fund was established under section 380.0558 of the
Florida Statutes to reimburse "actual costs incurred by the Department of
Environmental Protection" for injury and damage to natural resources within
an area of critical state concern.219 This fund was established because
"natural resources within areas of critical state concern are subject to
instantaneous injury or loss from a variety of negligent and willful acts, in
ways that cannot be foreseen and provided for in the normal budget
process." 2" Therefore, under this section "extraordinary expenses" which
are incurred by the state from injury or damage to natural resources, such
as those within coastal wetlands and estuaries, may be reimbursed on behalf
of the residents of the state."1
The Florida Keys is one area which has been designated as an area of
critical state concern. This area, comprised of approximately 400 islands
and about 700 square miles, is an extremely fragile ecosystem and is
extremely vulnerable to development.'m Tourism is plentiful in the Keys
with 6,000,000 tourists in 1993 alone.'m In addition, the Keys held
78,000 residents in 1990.22 With these enormous numbers, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to sustain the attractive qualities which attracted these
people to the Keys in the first place.2" Problems from excessive salinity
216. Id. § 380.05(2)(a)5.
217. Id. § 380.05(16).
218. Id. § 380.05(8).
219. FLA. STAT. § 380.0558(4) (1995).
220. Id. § 380.0558(3)(a).
221. Id.
222. Patricia Bymes, In the Kingdom of the Keys; Ecoregion Destruction in the Keys;
The Bankruptcy Files, WILDERNESS, June 22, 1994, at 19, 19.
223. Id. at 20.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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in the Florida Bay, a result of diversion of freshwater from the Everglades,
has resulted in extreme destruction of seagrass in the Keys.226
The Florida Keys were designated as an area of critical state concern
by the Florida Keys Area Protection Act pursuant to section 380.0552.227
This Act was created to: "establish a land management system that protects
the natural environment of the Florida Keys, '22 "establish a land manage-
ment system that conserves and promotes the community character of the
Florida Keys, 229 and promote "orderly and balanced growth .... ,,210
The comprehensive plans implemented in the Florida Keys area must be
consistent with certain requirements. These requirements include protection
of "shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef forma-
tions, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. 231
The designated purpose of chapter 380 is to "provide optimum
utilization of our limited water resources, facilitate orderly and well-planned
development, and protect the health, welfare, safety, and quality of life of
the residents of this state ....232 With regard to areas within the areas
of critical state concern program, these purposes are achieved by designating
certain portions of the state as being entitled to special and specific
protection because of their importance and fragility. Where coastal wetlands
and estuaries are concerned, this is only one small piece in an important
puzzle which merely begins with identifying and protecting those areas in
the greatest danger.
2. State Acquisition of Coastal Wetlands and Estuaries
As was done with sandy beaches and shores, the state has established
a system whereby it may acquire parcels of land for the purposes of
conservation and the good of the public. As stated previously, this system
has its advantages because less damage will result to wetlands owned by the
state. The legislation implemented to achieve this purpose is: the Land
Conservation Act under chapter 259 of the Florida Statutes, 233 the Outdoor
226. George Barley, Integrated Coastal Management: The Florida Keys Example From
an Activist Citizen's Point of View, OcEANUs, Fall 1993, at 15, 18.
227. FLA. STAT. § 380.0552 (1995).
228. Id. § 380.0552(2)(a).
229. ld. § 380.0552(2)(b).
230. Id. § 380.0552(2)(c).
231. Id. § 380.0552(7)(b).
232. FLA. STAT. § 380.021 (1995).
233. Id. ch. 259.
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Recreation and Conservation provisions of chapter 375,"' and the Water
Resources provisions of chapter 373.235
Under chapter 259, money from the Conservation and Recreation Lands
Trust Fund may be allocated to protect coastal resources.35 In acquiring
these lands, priority will be given to counties of high population, as well as
those lands designated as areas of critical state concern.237 Under the
Florida Preservation 2000 Act, one-fifth of half of the proceeds under the
Trust Fund are designated for the acquisition of coastal lands.238 This
section also specifies that in the acquisition of coastal lands, "[t]he value of
acquiring identified parcels, the development of which would adversely
affect coastal resources" will be taken into consideration. 9 This would
include estuaries and coastal wetlands, as these are extremely valuable
coastal resources.
Section 375.031 of the Florida Statutes authorizes the Department of
Environmental Protection to acquire lands for the Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund.2' The lands which may be acquired
specifically include wetlands and water access sites." After acquisition,
the Department has authority to improve, maintain, sell, or develop the
land.242
Finally, chapter 373 provides for the acquisition of property for the
purpose of conservation of water-related resources.243 The policy specified
234. Id. ch. 375.
235. FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1995).
236. FLA. STAT. § 259.032(3)(d).
237. Id. § 259.032(1).
238. Id. § 259.101(3)(a).
239. Id. § 259.101(4)(d)3.
240. Id. § 375.031(1).
241. FLA. STAT. § 375.031(5). The Internal Improvement Trust Fund is established
under § 253.01, which states that:
So much of the 500,000 acres of land granted to this state for internal improve-
ment purposes by an Act of Congress passed March 3, A.D. 1845, as remains
unsold, and the proceeds of the sales of such lands heretofore sold as now
remain on hand and unappropriated, and all proceeds that may hereafter accrue
from the sales of such lands; and all of the swampland or lands subject to
overflow granted this state by an Act of Congress approved September 28, A.D.
1850, together with all the proceeds that have accrued or may hereafter accrue
to the state from the sale of such lands, are set apart, and declared a separate and
distinct fund called the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the state ....
FLA. STAT. § 253.01(1)(a) (1995).
242. Id. § 375.031(1), (2).
243. FLA. STAT. § 373.139 (1995).
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by the legislature includes: providing "for the management of water and
related land resources; '' 4 promoting "the conservation, development, and
proper utilization of surface and groundwater;" ' 5 and preserving "natural
resources, fish, and wildlife . . . .'" Section 373.139 specifies that
wetlands specifically may be acquired by the governing board of the water
management district. 7 Any lands acquired through the methods in this
section may also be open to recreational use by the public whenever
practicable.'
Preservation of lands for the enjoyment and pleasure of the growing
population can be positively achieved through these land acquisition
programs. Once held in public trust, the wildlife and plant life which exists
in such huge quantities in estuaries and wetlands can be protected to some
extent from human development. However, the undertaking must be
cautious. Keeping the land for the benefit of the public cannot mean
excessive use by the public or the purpose of conserving these lands will be
lost. The coastal wetlands' and estuaries' extraordinary practical benefits
must be weighed against their equally extraordinary aesthetic benefits.
3. Comprehensive Planning
As previously discussed in Section II, the comprehensive plan is the
means by which the state and local governments may identify and plan for
problems in growth and development which would threaten the standard of
life desired by the residents of that area. In the case of coastal wetlands and
estuaries, planning for the future is needed to prevent possible irrevocable
damage to these fragile ecosystems today. The state requires a coastal
element of the local comprehensive plans. Thus, local comprehensive plans
must necessarily include the estuaries and wetlands which lie on the coast.
The state comprehensive plan identifies that Florida must ensure that
development does not negatively impact natural resources along the
coast. 9  To this end, the state's policies regarding the coast include:
avoiding expenditures which "subsidize development in high-hazard coastal
areas";' protecting coastal and marine resources "from the adverse effects
244. FLA. STAT. § 373.016(2)(a) (1995).
245. Id. § 373.016(2)(b).
246. Id. § 373.016(2)(f).
247. Id. § 373.139(2).
248. Id. § 373.139(5).
249. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(9)(a).
250. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)3.
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of development";25 encouraging "land and water uses which are compati-
ble with the protection of sensitive coastal resources"; and avoiding "the
exploration and development of mineral resources which threaten marine,
aquatic, and estuarine resources. ' 53
Chapter 163 requires that a coastal element be integrated into every
local government's comprehensive plan when that local government exists
in a coastal area.' 5 This element must be implemented with respect to:
"[m]aintenance, restoration, and enhancement of the overall quality of the
coastal zone environment, including, but not limited to, its amenities and
aesthetic values";255 "[c]ontinued existence of viable populations of all
species of wildlife and marine life"; 6 "[a]voidance of irreversible and
irretrievable loss of coastal zone resources";' and "[e]cological planning
principles and assumptions to be used in the determination of suitability and
extent of permitted development." ' In addition to the coastal element of
the plan, the plan must also include "[a] conservation element for the
conservation, use, and protection of natural resources in the area, including
... wetlands, ... [and] estuarine marshes." 9 A land use map must also
be integrated into the plan which identifies and depicts estuarine systems
and wetlands."
The local comprehensive plan must include an inventory and analysis
of estuarine pollution conditions and actions needed to maintain estuar-
ies. This includes the impacts of future development as proposed in the
future land use element and the impacts of sewage, drainage, and natural
groundwater aquifer recharge elements upon water quality of the estu-
ary2 62 This element must also identify action needed to correct existing
pollution problems, as well as local programs which are going to be used to
maintain the quality of the estuary.2 63
251. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)4.
252. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)6.
253. Id. § 187.201(9)(b)8.
254. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g).
255. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g)1.
256. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g)2.
257. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g)4.
258. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g)5.
259. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d).
260. Id. § 163.3177(6)(d)2., 4.
261. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.012(2)(d) (1995).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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The state must also inventory and analyze the effect of future land use
on wetland areas, areas subject to coastal flooding, wildlife habitats, and
living marine resources.2" Maps of these areas which are of special
concern to the local government must also be prepared for the plan.265
Provisions must be made in the plan for wetlands and estuaries which have
* already been damaged. A policy must be made and management techniques
identified for "[r]estoration or enhancement of disturbed or degraded natural
resources including ... estuaries, wetlands .... and programs to mitigate
future disruptions or degradations." 26
6
Protection of wetlands and estuaries which are not damaged or pristine,
are addressed by the conservation element of the plan. The Florida
Administrative Code requires identification and analysis of wetlands and
estuaries under this portion of the plan.267 Under this rule, policies
regarding wetlands are specifically addressed. This rule indicates that
wetlands must be protected and conserved. This "shall be accomplished
through a comprehensive planning process which includes consideration of
the types, values, functions, sizes, conditions and locations of wetlands..
.,268 Land use planned for the future must be "directed away from the
wetlands" and be designed for minimal impact on wetlands. 269 This rule
also allows for mitigation "as one means to compensate for loss of wetlands
functions" where incompatible land uses are allowed to occur.27
If a coastal wetland or estuary is within one or more local govern-
ment's jurisdiction, each government must provide policies and management
techniques within their plan for protecting that wetland or estuary.27 This
includes "methods for coordinating with other local governments to ensure
adequate sites for water-dependent uses, prevent estuarine pollution, control
surface water runoff, protect living marine resources, reduce exposure to
natural hazards, and ensure public access .... ,272
In summary, the coastal comprehensive plan with regard to estuary
systems and coastal wetlands consists of the objectives needed to protect
these regions and the resources within them from growth. The potential for
264. Id. at r. 9J-5.012(2)(b).
265. Id.
266. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.012(3)(c)2. (1995).
267. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(1)(a)l.
268. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(3)(a).
269. Id. at r. 9J-5.013(3)(b).
270. Id.
271. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.012(3)(c)14. (1995).
272. Id.
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state and local plans that would be sufficiently protective of coastal wetlands
and estuaries is created by the provisions established by the state. These
governments must first, however, choose to take these steps.
IV. CONCLUSION
The coastal regions over the years have come to represent more than
merely the freedom and power of the ocean. They have emerged as a place
which we have the power and ability to destroy. Yet we now begin to fear
the repercussions of what we would lose if the ecosystem is destroyed.
Hopefully, years of pollution and development of the coasts have begun to
teach us some lessons.
The importance and use of our coasts has grown as our country has
grown. The early setters saw little need for coastal development, as they
anxiously explored the new world. Coastal villages were primarily
established for fishing.273 Shortly after the American Revolution, some
coastal communities developed around ports.274 Wetlands and estuaries
were long viewed as wastelands.275 As the population began to concen-
trate in the cities, development on the coasts began to grow. However,
depleting and developing these "wastelands" was not seen as problemat-
ic.276 An appreciation of coastal wetlands only emerged later, as natural-
ists and poets romanticized a region of the coast never before romanticized.
Sydney Lanier described, in the poem The Marshes of Glynn:
Sinuous southward and sinuous northward the shimmering band
Of the sand-beach fastens the fringe of the marsh to the folds of the
land.277
This romantic notion of the coast will only serve to protect the shores,
however, if it is accompanied by a practical plan of action for their
protection. As the economic value 6f coastal lands rises, forced protection
of them is necessary to avoid damage from development. Realism, as well
as an understanding of the implications of population growth, will save our
273. DIrroN, supra note 1, at 6.
274. Id.
275. SiRY, supra note 188, at 4.
276. DrrToN, supra note 1, at 6.
277. SIRY, supra note 188, at 60 (quoting Sydney Lanier, The Marshes of Glynn (1868),
reprinted in AMERiCAN POETRY AND PROSE: PART H, SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 1059-61
(Norman Foerster & Houghton Mifflin eds., 1934)).
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coasts from having the sickly state which they are in now to be worsened.
Scientific insights have led to the conclusion that:
The coast body is sick. Most of its systems function weakly, or not at
all. The coast no longer protects us from storms and floods in many
places, cannot provide suitable habitats for many of its creatures.
Consistently, sandy beaches disappear, salt marshes vanish, species
decline; some have ended their time on earth. Poisons, penetrating deep
in estuaries and offshore water, affect the entire food chain, man
included.278
In Florida, where the coasts are particularly popular, a special challenge
emerges. Florida is not famous for its industry or its sprawling cities, but
rather for its beauty and its beaches. Ecological consequences aside, the
destruction of the coasts would cause a significant financial impact on
Florida. This is apparently recognized and understood by the Florida
Legislature, as the legislation enacted identifies a specific need to keep these
beautiful areas open for the public to enjoy and use with as little destruction
as possible.
However, the financial future of Florida is not the only area jeopardized
should development continue to destroy the coasts. If coastal governments
do not take an aggressive approach to systematically address these problems,
the damage will be beyond imagination. If we do manage to kill the natural
shore and its biodiversity along with it, it is not the ocean nor the earth that
will die, but we as human beings.
Joy R. Brockman
278. Anne W. Simon, Foreword to COAST ALERT: SCIENTISTS SPEAK OUT vii, vii
(Thomas C. Jackson & Diana Reische eds., 1981).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's explosive population increase over the last few decades has
necessitated a new outlook on how state and local governments plan for and
control their future. With the many different types of land within the state,
the need for an overall coherent plan, which provides for the needs of each
locality, is obvious. In response to this issue, the Florida Legislature
adopted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act ("Act").'
One of the major legal doctrines arising in the context of the Act is the
law of concurrency. Concurrency is "land use regulation which controls the
timing of property development and population growth. Its purpose is to
ensure that certain types of public facilities and services needed to serve
new residents are constructed and made available contemporaneously with
the impact of new development."2 It has been described as the "teeth" of
Florida's growth management system.3 In other words, concurrency
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (1995).
2. H. Glenn Boggs, II & Robert C. Apgar, Concurrency and Growth Management: A
Lawyer's Primer, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 1 (1991) [hereinafter Boggs & Apgar].
3. Id.
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regulations set minimums for developments as to what public service
infrastructure must be in place, or planned to be in place, to compensate for
the burdensome impact caused by the new development. These concurrency
requirements are set forth in the Florida Statutes.
4
This article will begin by examining the history and development of the
law of concurrency in Florida which includes an overview of the relevant
Florida Statutes. Part II will follow with a detailed analysis of the landmark
case of Golden v. Planning Board.5 From this decision, the emphasis will
turn to Florida case law of the taking remedy and how it applies to the law
of concurrency. Finally, this paper will conclude with a discussion of the
problem of overcrowded schools plaguing Florida, and the possibility of
adding a mandatory capital school element to Florida's concurrency law.
II. HISTORY
During the early years of Florida's population explosion of the 1950s
and 1960s, little was done by the Florida Legislature to regulate land use on
a state-wide basis.6 Instead, the state relied on the municipalities' authority
to exercise their police power to regulate local land use.' However, in
1969, the Florida Legislature attempted to create more consistency in land
use decisions by giving local governments the option to participate in
comprehensive land use planning, but it did so without providing state-
sponsored funding to finance the initiative! Without this funding, uniform
land use controls were slow to develop and as late as 1973, "two-thirds of
the state had no land use controls whatsoever and ad hoc decision-making,
regarding development, predominated throughout the state." 9
In 1972, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Environmental
Land and Water Act."° With it came the creation of the "Critical Area"
program and the "Development of Regional Impact" program, two state-run
4. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
5. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
6. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (authorizing use of police power to restrict use of land); see also Cooper v.
Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702, 705 (Fla.) (holding land use regulation adopted municipality to be
valid as a "reasonable exercise of police power"), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
8. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting Terrell K. Arline, The Consistency
Mandate of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, 55 FLA. B.J. 661, 661 (Oct.
1981)).
9. Id.
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1972).
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programs designed to monitor Florida's local growth management and land
use regulation in certain areas of "critical concern" and major develop-
ment." Through these programs, the state gained valuable insight into the
impact of development on local infrastructure. It used this insight to
develop initiatives designed to coordinate development with the implementa-
tion of municipal services and facilities. 2 These initiatives were later
reflected in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act.'
3
Arising from the efforts of the legislature to address these land use
regulations problems, Florida passed the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act in 1975." This statute required every local government in
Florida to "adopt and implement a comprehensive plan to guide and control
future development."' 5  The statute did not, however, set forth any
"concurrency" requirements. It did, however, provide that any land use
regulations adopted or amended by a Florida municipality must be consistent
with the state's adopted comprehensive plan.'
6
In 1985, following a substantial overhaul of the state's growth
management section of the statutes, the legislature renamed the Act as the
"Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
Regulation Act" ("1985 Act"). 7 The 1985 Act provided that each of the
municipalities adopt a comprehensive plan and submit it to the state for
approval, 8 and its adopted local plans must comply with the State
Comprehensive Plan ("Plan").' 9 It further defined and distinguished the
state's and the municipality's authority and responsibilities.2° In addition,
the legislature added provisions making it possible for any "aggrieved or
adversely affected party" to challenge the validity of the local comprehen-
sive plan, the land development regulations, and the local government
development orders.2' The 1985 Act required the local plan to include a
capital improvements element and an established level of service standard
11. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 4 nn.19-20.
12. I at 4.
13. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161.
14. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257.
15. Boggs & Apgar, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting Arline, supra note 8, at 661).
16. I
17. Ch. 85-55, § 1, 1985 Fa. Laws 207, 207 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 163.3161
(1995)).
18. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184.
19. Id. § 163.3177.
20. Id § 163.3167(1).
21. IM § 163.3215.
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for certain public facilities and services.' The 1985 Act also prohibited
local governments from issuing a development order for any development
which would reduce the number of available public service facilities to a
level below the minimums set by the comprehensive plan.23
The Plan' was enacted to preserve the state's natural resources and
enhance the quality of life by directing development to areas which already
have in place, or have agreements to provide, "the land and water resources,
fiscal abilities, and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environ-
mentally acceptable manner. '2' The Plan provides that existing facilities
should be preserved and that new facilities be planned for and financed "to
serve residents in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner."26 The 1985
Act, working in conjunction with the State Comprehensive Plan, seemed to
accomplish the overall goal of increasing the consistency of land use
planning decisions in the state, while still reserving some discretion for each
locality. Thus, with this legislation came Florida's foundation for stability
in land use decisions as well as an opportunity for growth in a more
responsible and efficient manner.
Although the 1985 Act clearly seemed to require a certain level of
"concurrency," the term itself was not expressed in the statutes until it was
included in the 1986 amendment's legislative "intent" language:
It is the intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services
needed to support development shall be available concurrent with the
impacts of such development .... In meeting this intent, public
facility and service availability shall be deemed sufficient if the public
facilities and services for a development are phased, or the development
is phased, so that the public facilities and those related services which
are deemed necessary by the local government to operate the facilities
necessitated by that development are available concurrent with the
impacts of the development.27
While this newly adopted language sheds some light on the legislature's
intentions implicit in the two sections of the statutes, it left some confusion
as to the specific requisite public services. Because of this, the Department
22. d. § 163.3177(3)(a).
23. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g).
24. See FLA. STAT. §§ 187.101-.201 (1995).
25. I § 187.201(16)(a).
26. IU § 187.201(18)(a).
27. d § 163.3177(10)(h) (1986) (emphasis added).
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of Community Affairs ("DCA")28 was left to develop the concurrency
doctrine through its interpretation of local land use regulations.
Much of the law of concurrency, as interpreted by the DCA, was
confirmed by the legislature in 1993.29 The legislature provided that, as
a matter of state law, concurrency applies to seven forms of public
infrastructure: 1) potable water; 2) sanitary sewer; 3) solid waste; 4)
drainage; 5) parks and recreation facilities; 6) roads; and in certain
jurisdictions, 7) mass transit.30 In other words, these are the only public
services which must comply with the minimum level of service standards set
forth in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Develop-
ment Regulation Act before a municipality may issue a development order.
III. CASE LAW
A. Golden v. Planning Board
Several years prior to Florida's adoption of the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, a small
town in New York adopted an ordinance outlining a specific plan to provide
for the capitalization and implementation of all public service facilities
within the town to be completed within an eighteen year period.3 To aid
in the construction of this plan, Ramapo conducted studies of the town's
"existing land uses, public facilities, transportation, industry and commerce,
housing needs and projected population trends" and these studies were
ultimately reflected in the plan.32 In essence, the Ramapo ordinance
imposed restrictions on residential development that corresponded to the
availability of the specified public service facilities.33 In other words, the
restriction effectively precluded landowners from developing their property
until the necessary municipal services were provided.
The ordinance required that in order to develop land in Ramapo,
developers must apply for and receive a "special permit" for new residential
28. This state agency, established by the Florida Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 1972, ch. 72-317, §1, 1972 Fla. Laws 1162, 1162 (codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1972)), was created to implement the Development of Regional
Impact program and made recommendations of specific statewide guidelines based on studies
of the impacts of development on the local environment. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2) (1995).
29. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
30. Id. § 163.3180(1).
31. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 294-95 (N.Y. 1972).
32. ld at 294.
33. Id- at 294-95.
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development.34 To receive the "special permit," the proposed development
must have accrued a certain number of points based on the availability of
certain public-service facilities.35 Points were assigned to the proposed
development depending on its distance from requisite public service
facilities.36 The five required public facilities were: "(1) public sanitary
sewers or approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public
parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) State, county, or
town roads--major, secondary or collector; and, (5) firehouses. 37
In Golden, a facial attack against the validity of the ordinance was
brought by property owners who were denied approval of an application for
a special permit to develop a subdivision on their property, because the city
lacked the time and money to provide necessary public services and
facilities at a pace commensurate with increased public need.3 ' Although
the special term sustained the ordinance, the appellate division treated the
proceeding as an action for declaratory judgment and reversed.39 The
decision was then appealed by the town to the Court of Appeals of New
York Court.n
The Court of Appeals of New York first noted that the ordinance was
designed with certain "savings and remedial" provisions to protect the
restrictions from being potentially unconstitutional for unreasonableness.41
For example, the planning board could issue special permits, vesting a
present right to develop at some future date when development is scheduled
to meet its minimum point criteria.42 Accordingly, these special permits
were assignable. The board also deemed improvements scheduled for
completion within one year complete and developers always had the option
of providing the necessary improvements themselves to meet the requisite
point minimums.43 Variances on point requirements were also available
upon application to the board so long as the variance would be consistent
with the ongoing plan.'
34. Id. at 295.
35. Il
36. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 295.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 301.
39. Golden v. Planning Bd., 324 N.Y.S.2d 178, 186 (App. Div. 1971).
40. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 291.
41. Id. at 296.
42. Id.
43. I4
44. Id.
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Notwithstanding these options to circumvent the restrictions imposed
by the ordinance, the landowners argued that these restrictions were intended
to control population growth within the town, and thus an ultra vires
objective of the zoning enabling legislation. The court of appeals disagreed,
however, stating that although there is no express authorization in the zoning
enabling legislation for the land use controls adopted:
The power to restrict and regulate conferred [by the Town Law] in-
cludes ... by way of necessary implication, the authority to direct the
growth of population for the purposes indicated, within the confines of
the township. It is the matrix of land use restrictions, common to each
of the enumerated powers and sanctioned goals, a necessary concomi-
tant to the municipalities' recognized authority to determine the lines
along which local development shall proceed, though it may divert it
from its natural course. 45
From this language, it appears that the court allows the town a
significant amount of leeway in exercising its zoning power. Further, by
deferring to the quasi-legislative nature of Ramapo's Planning Board, the
court is implying that the local government is best suited to establish
boundaries and guidelines for development, while still requiring that the
ordinance finds it basis within the perimeters of current zoning enabling
legislation.
The landowners' next argument was that recent shifts in population,
combined with inconsistent land use policies, resulted in distorted growth
patterns and undermined efforts in solving regional and state growth control
problems. 6 The court dealt with this argument by emphasizing the
seemingly obvious fact that undirected growth does not necessarily lead to
controlled growth patterns 7 The court reasoned that even if it did strike
the ordinance, as the landowners would have it do, the absence of such an
45. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 297.
46. l at 299. The state and regional growth control problems asserted by the
landowners included: pollution controls, adequate housing, and public transportation. Id
The Florida Legislature seemed to avoid this problem by adopting the State Comprehensive
Plan and requiring each municipality to adopt a comprehensive plan that conforms with it.
This conformity requirement creates consistency throughout the state and allows local
governments to have a real chance of controlling and alleviating some of the problems
purported by the landowners in the instant case.
47. Id at 300. Another common misconception is that adequate public service facilities
in a growing area are implemented as a matter of course.
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ordinance would not guarantee that problems of broad public interest would
be solved.48
For example, suppose that a community suddenly attracts an influx of
new citizens requiring new residential development and it has no land use
controls to delegate which public facilities must be in place and how they
should be placed in accordance with the population distribution. Suppose
further that the local government has only one fire truck available to the
entire community, and it is called to three different fires at the same time.
The community may be perfectly constructed so that a car can travel from
one side of the community to the other without delay, however, even if the
fire truck can get to the first fire immediately, the other two fires will have
burned the houses to the ground. If a community has a local comprehensive
plan which requires a certain number of fire stations be in place prior to, or
in conjunction with, new development then this disaster will not occur.
Consider another example involving public parks. Suppose that on a
beautiful fall afternoon a large number of the citizens decide to spend the
day at the community park. What if the local government has not provided
adequate park space under its comprehensive plan to handle all of its
citizens? Obviously, the local citizens will be subject to overcrowding and
all of the problems that accompany it.49 From the preceding examples, it
is obvious that land use controls, such as the ones adopted by the town of
Ramapo, serve distinct advantages and perhaps should be included in every
town's comprehensive plan.
The Golden court subjected the ordinance to rational basis scrutiny.
The court renewed its deference to the "considered deliberations" of the
plan's progenitors, deeming matters of land use and development particular-
ly suited to the "expertise of students of city and suburban planning and thus
well within the legislative prerogative." 50 Accordingly, the ordinance is
presumed to be a valid exercise of police power." Therefore, the burden
of proving the ordinance's unconstitutionality rests with the challengers to
prove that the ordinance fails to advance a legitimate state interest.5 2
It was agreed that the ordinance advanced legitimate zoning purposes
because it assured that any newly built residence would have adequate
public facilities. The landowners conceded that the zoning power,
48. Ud at 299-300.
49. Examples of overcrowding problems are: increased littering, traffic congestion in
and around the park, and injuries related to overcrowding within the park.
50. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
51. Id.
52. 11
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incorporated by the ordinance, included reasonable restrictions on private
property, exacted to further a well-conceived plan and to benefit the public
welfare.53 However, they argued that this ordinance went too far, in that
the city was seeking to avoid the financial burden and responsibility of
providing public services when needed.'
The court upheld the ordinance.55 It reasoned that it is in "the nature
of all land use and development regulations to circumscribe the course of
growth within a particular town or district... [which] invariably impede the
forces of natural growth."'56 So long as the regulations are reasonable and
necessary to benefit the welfare of the community, such regulations have
been sustained. 7 The court put this "zoning ordinance" into context by
holding it to be "inextricably bound to the dynamics of community life and
[that] its function is to guide, not to isolate or facilitate efforts at avoiding
the ordinary incidents of growth."58 However, the court's determination
of a restriction's validity was determined based on its purpose and its
impacts on the community and the general public. The court concluded
that:
where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the
community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational
basis for "phased growth" and hence, the challenged ordinance is not
violative of the Federal and State Constitutions. 9
Thus, the ordinance passed constitutional muster.
Due to the constitutional nature of the decision, authority to implement
such programs within a municipality's growth management scheme became
apparent under standard zoning enabling legislation.' However, the court
did not rule on the ordinance's validity as applied. Thus, while the authority
existed implicitly in standard zoning enabling legislation to adopt such an
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05.
56. Id. at 301 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 302.
59. Id. at 304-05. Ironically, the town of Ramapo was forced to abandon this plan due
to a series of natural disasters which overburdened its financial resources. DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
612 (3d ed. 1990).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243.
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ordinance, it seems that an aggrieved landholder may still challenge such
ordinance, as applied to his property, as an arbitrary and unreasonable
restriction. In other words, such regulations may not be used to mask an
exclusionary scheme such as preventing low income or minority groups
from moving into an area. It seems clear that such regulation would be
stricken. 1
B. Florida Law
1. Standard of Review
This author has discovered no current Florida appellate decisions which
have specifically ruled on the constitutionality of Florida's concurrency
statute. However, Florida appellate decisions, examining zoning regulations,
seem to indicate a strong tendency in favor of the validity of comprehensive
plans by requiring strict compliance.62 For instance, in Machado v.
Musgrove,63 where landowners sought to have their land rezoned to allow
for office buildings, the court held:
The test in reviewing a challenge to a zoning action on grounds
that a proposed project is inconsistent with the comprehensive land use
plan is whether the zoning authority's determination that a proposed
development conforms to each element and the objectives of the land
use plan is supported by competent and substantial evidence. The
traditional and non-deferential standard of strict judicial scrutiny
applies."4
Accordingly, the court placed the burden of proof on the party seeking
the zoning change to show that the proposed development strictly conforms
with the elements of the local comprehensive plan.6 ' Furthermore, in
determining whether the evidence provided by that party is actually
61. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (indicating where immediate
harm is suffered by members of minority group attempting to attain housing in an area which
they are illegally excluded, they may have standing to challenge zoning regulation). It is also
possible that such a regulation may be deemed as a taking of the landowner's property. See
discussion infra part III.B.2.-3.
62. E.g., White v. Metropolitan Dade County, 563 So. 2d 117, 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
63. 519 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla.
1988).
64. Id. at 632.
65. Id.
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consistent with the plan, the court required the stricter standard, not the
traditional "fairly debatable" standard.66 The court reasoned that to truly
be consistent with the plan, the regulation should not "deviate or depart in
any direction or degree" from the parameters set by the plan, and thus an
increased standard is necessary.67
In essence, this type of judicial scrutiny affords much respect to a local
comprehensive plan. By requiring strict conformity with each element of
the local comprehensive plan, and placing the burden of proving consistency
with the plan on the rezoning applicants, the court is implying that the plan
is an essential element of the growth management process not to be easily
overcome. More importantly, it seems to further expand a municipality's
authority to regulate zoning through its local comprehensive plan. The
plan's drafters already have the ability to (and presumably do) perform in-
depth studies of the community's land use and growth management
needs.61 Once they have evaluated these needs, they can incorporate
appropriate regulations in their comprehensive plan to help correct localized
problems. The state has thus provided the municipalities with a powerful
pen. However, by retaining the right to review each plan, the state has also
secured overall conformity. In so acting, the legislature has recognized
these plans as having the utmost significance in local land use decision-
making, which is a strong indication that local comprehensive plans are
valid.
This judicial approach toward local comprehensive plans by the court
makes sense. While some would argue that a strict type of scrutiny by the
courts is just another governmental intrusion further burdening the typical
landholder, the opposite may in fact be true. First, land use problems
typically arise at the local level. If land use regulations are controlled
strictly at the state level, adequate protection of local interests may not be
realized, and the burden on local landowners would seemingly increase.
Next, by allowing local governments to play an active role in land use
decision-making, specific locally-based problems may be addressed without
66. lIL at 633.
67. Id at 634 (quoting City of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985)).
68. In Machado, Dade County's land use plan required a neighborhood area study to
guide where, when, what kind, and what amount of nonresidential uses would be allowed in
a specified residential zone. Machado, 519 So. 2d at 635. Dade's mandatory element of
neighborhood study solidified the implication in the Golden opinion that it is most suitable
to leave the details of a local land use plan to the "expertise of students of city and suburban
planning." Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
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wasting state funds to research issues which are relevant only to a particular
locality. Similarly, local governments are saved from dealing with
burdensome regulations which should not have been applied to their area in
the first place. Accordingly, the resources saved by the local governments
may be better used to study and evaluate issues which are relevant to their
area.
Since a local comprehensive plan is specific to one area, and is tailored
by the people it affects the most, these plans should be firmly upheld.
Furthermore, when a municipality has discovered, researched, evaluated, and
adopted a plan to remedy a local land use problem, landowners should be
required to strictly comply with the program in order to give the program
a chance to succeed. Requiring such strict compliance is not unreasonable
because a landowner has other remedies available to challenge the
application of an ordinance to his property.69 Therefore, requiring .strict
conformity of a developer's compliance with the comprehensive land use
plan is a must for consistent and efficient land use regulation.
2. Takings
One of the most prominent challenges of land use regulations is that the
regulation constitutes a taking without just compensation. One of private
property's most fundamental protection is against its seizure for public use
without "just" and "full" compensation. The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, embodies this protection by prohibiting the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation." This principle may
also be found in the Florida Constitution which provides that "[n]o private
property shall be taken except for public purpose and with full compensation
therefor paid. ... "7
The question that arises from these provisions is how far does the
government have to go to have committed a taking. To answer this question
one must begin with one of the landmark cases in land use taking challeng-
es, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.7" In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court was asked to determine whether Pennsylvania's Kohler Act was
constitutional because it was alleged to have destroyed certain contract and
69. An example of an alternative remedy is a taking claim. See discussion infra part
ILI.B.2.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
72. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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property rights of a property owner protected by the Constitution."3 The
Court initially recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law." 4 Accordingly, the Court held
that the general rule is, although "property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 5
Although not stated as such, the Court seemed to use a balancing test,
weighing the harm suffered by the property owner against the societal gain,
which requires an independent analysis of the facts and circumstances
relevant to each case. 6  Unfortunately, this rule does not provide a
concrete test upon which valid land use regulations may be distinguished
from invalid regulations.
In a more recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of the United
States Court of Appeals reversed a federal magistrate's decision that the
adoption of a comprehensive land use plan effectuated a taking against the
property owners entitling them to just compensation." The case involved
approximately forty acres of waterfront land which the property owners
sought to develop for single-family residences. However, in 1984, Lee
County adopted a comprehensive land use plan which classified the
Reahard's property as a "Resource Protection Area" and limited develop-
ment of the parcel to a single residence." The Reahards did not challenge
the plan's classification of their property, conceding that it was a valid
exercise of police power; however, they did allege that the classification
interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectations entitling
them to monetary compensation. 9
As a threshold issue, the court noted that the monetary compensation
claim must be ripe for review.'O Specifically, the landowner must have
obtained a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to his
property, and he must have exhausted all state procedures available for
73. l at 412.
74. Id. at 413.
75. Id. at 415.
76. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(discussing balancing of interests in takings cases).
77. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1693 (1995).
78. Id. at 1133.
79. Id. at 1135. It is interesting to note that the Reahards inherited the property from
Mr. Reahard's parents who were not parties to the suit. Id at 1133.
80. Id at 1135 n.7.
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obtaining just compensation."1 Once the threshold questions were satisfied,
the court employed the two tests to determine whether a land use regulation
is a taking. 2 First, the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate
state interest.83 Second, the regulation must not deny an owner all "econo-
mically viable use of his property." 4  The court bypassed the first test
because Reahard conceded that Lee County's comprehensive plan was a
valid exercise of police power which substantially advanced a legitimate
governmental interest.
The second test of whether the owner has been denied economically
viable use of his property is more difficult. The two factors that the court
determined must be analyzed by the fact finder are "(1) the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant; and (2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with investment-backed expectations."8'5 The court remanded
the case for further proceedings to analyze the above factors.8 6
It would seem then that the two-part test as illustrated in Reahard,
provides us with the type of analysis which would be applied in a concur-
rency challenge. Concurrency regulations are essentially land use regula-
tions which can be so restrictive on a property as to render a taking. For
example, consider a situation in which a developer would like to construct
single-family residences on a forty-acre parcel of raw land, zoned residen-
tial. The municipality, in which the land is situated, has just adopted a
comprehensive land use plan in which one of its mandatory elements
requires that a public elementary school be located within two miles of
every new development. Unfortunately for our developer, though, the
nearest public elementary school is five miles away. Accordingly, the
developer's permit is denied. What is the developer to do now? Should she
have to build the school herself? What if there is no land within two miles
which would be suitable for an elementary school? Should she have to
dedicate part of her land for its construction? May she bring suit for a
taking?
81. Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 n.7.
82. These two tests originated in the opinion of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
83. Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834).
84. Ia
85. Id. at 1136 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606 (1986)). The court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for new proceedings because the findings of fact by the
magistrate were insufficient to make a proper taking analysis. Id. at 1137.
86. This case was later vacated on ripeness grounds. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30
F.3d 1412 (1lth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995).
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If she challenges the ordinance as a taking without just compensation,
then according to the Reahard court the two part takings test will apply. 7
The first part of the test involves a determination of whether the concur-
rency regulation "substantially advances a legitimate state interest."8" The
state's "legitimate interest" in educating the children of the state is arguably
"substantially advanced" by the concurrency element requiring public
elementary schools to be located within two miles of the new development.
Thus, the first prong of the test should be satisfied.
The second prong requires that, for a taking to occur, the developer
must be denied all, or substantially all, economically viable use of her
property. She would claim that the regulation precludes her from building
any houses on it which happens to be its highest and best use and, therefore,
the regulation denies her the right to all economically viable use of her
property. However, the court would probably consider several factors
centering on the nature of the property itself. For instance, how has the land
previously been used? For what other uses could it be developed? What
is the history of its zoning? What were the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the landowner?
In this hypothetical, the court will probably not deem the regulation a
taking because of the mere fact that the property owner could not put her
land to its highest and best use. So long as she can make some economical-
ly viable use of her property, there will be no taking. However, the
preceding factors must also be considered.
For example, suppose she purchased this forty acres while it was being
used as a private hunting ground. Notwithstanding its present use, because
the property's zoning classification allows single family residences to be
built, the change in the nature of its use alone does not present a problem.
However, the ordinance requiring the elementary school imposes a factor
which could substantially affect the value of the property. But, the
requirement itself does not change the nature of the property to the extent
that it precludes the development of new homes. Thus, it would be difficult
to establish a taking on this basis alone.
The history of the property's zoning is another important consideration
as well. Suppose the property has been zoned residential and subject to the
ordinance for several years, but the growth of the surrounding community
had only recently reached this property necessitating its development. It
would seem that the lack of development could be attributed to the lack of
87. Of course, she would first have to satisfy the threshold requirement by exbausing
all procedural options. See Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 n.7.
88. Id. at 1135.
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demand for new housing in the community, not the ordinance. However,
once the community's growth reaches the property, the ordinance will be a
significant factor in the property owner's decision of whether to build.
Similarly, if the property is zoned residential concurrent with the need
for new housing in the community, and the ordinance is in effect when the
property is purchased, then the regulation has not imposed any new burden.
Moreover, this ordinance should have been factored into the development
costs and the purchase price. Thus, if these considerations were ignored by
our developer, then her error could be financially devastating, and it would
be unlikely that the court would force the government to account for her
mistake via a taking.
Next, when considering a landowner's "reasonable investment-backed
expectations," the effect of the regulation on the property after it is passed
plays a very important role in the analysis. As previously indicated, if a
purchaser of land ignores existing regulations in his or her computation of
property value, the consequences could be financially devastating. However,
assuming our developer purchased the property prior to the ordinance's
adoption, the effect on her "reasonable investment-backed" expectations
generated by the ordinance must be determined.
Suppose she financed the property with a thirty-year amortized,
"interest-only" loan, with a balloon payment due in five years. It is quite
possible, that the county will not build an elementary school within the
requisite radius in the next five years. Accordingly, she will be unable to
develop her property in time to make her balloon payment. In other words,
the ordinance would preclude her from developing her property because
without the construction of the school, she will not be given a development
order; and as she is unable to develop her land, she will probably be unable
to meet her loan obligations. Consequently, if the ordinance was imposed
after she purchased (and financed) the property, her reasonable investment-
backed expectations presumably did not include factoring for the existence
of an elementary school. Thus, in this situation, her reasonable investment-
backed expectations appear to have been abrogated which bodes strongly in
favor of the premise that the government has imposed a taking of her
property.
Another factor to consider is the alternative development options
available to her. Obviously, she could continue to operate the property as
a private hunting ground, but this is not the reason she purchased it. One
option she may have, depending on road locations and the zoning classifica-
tions of the surrounding area, is to attempt to rezone the property or apply
for a variance. Secondly, she could hold the property until a school is built
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within the requisite radius, and then develop or sell at a higher price. 9 A
further option is for her to build the school herself. This, however, is a very
unlikely option due to the relatively small piece of land she is developing.
Considering the high cost of constructing a school, it is improbable that she
will be able to build enough homes on forty acres so that she could allocate
the school's cost into the purchase price of each new home and still make
a profit. On the other hand, if a developer purchases one thousand acres to
develop single family homes, it seems much more probable that he will have
the resources necessary to construct the school(s), and that, due to the
volume of homes that can be built on one thousand acres, he could allocate
the cost of the school(s) into the purchase price of each new home and still
realize a profit.
In sum, when purchasing a piece of property, it is important for the
developer to consider all regulations which currently affect the property and
all possible development alternatives, because that is what a "reasonable"
developer would do if he or she expects to make a profit; and perhaps most
importantly, that is what a court will consider in determining the developer's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations."
Next, suppose that the municipality has recently allocated capital
expenditures in its long-term budget for the school to be built five years
from now, and the property is otherwise in compliance with all concurrency
requirements. May she commence with her development? Should she have
to wait an interim period? What if the budget included no time frame of
when the school would be built? How long would be reasonable? These
questions involve temporary takings as discussed in the next section.
3. Temporary Takings
The leading Supreme Court case in this area is First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.9' In this case,
89. However, due to the substantial risks involved, such as the county not building a
school, this is probably not an advisable action. Arguably, though, if the school is built, the
property value will rise as there is one less hurdle to overcome in the development process.
Accordingly, she could realize a profit by selling the property if she is willing to take the risk
of playing the "waiting-game." If, however, the ordinance was not in existence when she
bought the property, then it was presumably not a factor in the purchase price. Thus, once
the school is built (after the adoption of the ordinance), the value of the property (everything
else remaining the same) should equal her purchase price, and she will break even. The
"waiting-game" option, in the opinion of the author, is a very risky one and not advisable
to the "reasonable" developer.
90. 482 U.S. 304 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
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the church owned land in a canyon along the banks of a natural drainage
channel for a watershed area which it used as a retreat known as "Luther-
glen." Much of the watershed area burned in a forest fire creating a serious
flood risk. Such flooding soon occurred destroying the entire site.
Consequently, Los Angeles County enacted an ordinance prohibiting
construction or improvements on property located within the outer boundary
lines of the interim flood protection area, which encompassed Lutherglen,
to prevent further loss of property or life.91
The church filed suit against the county claiming, inter alia, that the
ordinance denied the church of all use of its "Lutherglen" property.92 The
issue which ultimately arose was whether the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay for "temporary"
regulatory takings.93 Specifically, the Court had to decide whether, when
an ordinance denies a property owner all use of its property and the
ordinance has yet to be declared unconstitutional, the government must
compensate the landowner from the initial point of deprivation.94
The Court initially examined the relevant language of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution: "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation."95 Indicative in this
language, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit takings of property;
however, it does condition such governmental action on the provision of
"just compensation" being paid to the affected landholder.96 It also noted
that the Fifth Amendment was not designed to limit valid governmental
interference in private property rights.97
The Court restated the general rule laid down in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 98 Furthermore, when enforcing
such a valid regulation, the government should not force individual property
owners to "bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
91. ld at 307.
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id at 314.
94. Id. at 312. The court does not actually answer the questions of whether the property
owner was denied all use of the land or whether the ordinance was unconstitutional. It
merely determines whether such a remedy exists. First English, 482 U.S. at 312.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. First English, 482 U.S. at 314-15.
97. Id. at 315.
98. Id at 316 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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borne by the public as a whole."99 It seems, then, that regulations imposed
on land will not be deemed a taking so long as they are reasonable.
However, once a taking has been established, the government still has
the ability to amend the ordinance, repeal it, or actually pay just compensa-
tion. But merely exercising its ability to amend or repeal the ordinance does
not eliminate the fact that the property was subject to a "taking" while the
ordinance was in effect. Accordingly, the First English Court held that once
an ordinance has been found to effect a "taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."' °
This decision has been followed by the state and federal courts in
Florida. In Villas of Lake Jackson v. Leon County,'' the district court
ruled that the Florida courts have construed the First English decision as
mandating a compensation remedy for cases to the extent that a taking has
been found to result from the enforcement of a confiscatory ordinance."
It concluded that after First English, "it is now certain that a property owner
in Florida has a state remedy for compensation for the period of the taking
until the regulation is amended or withdrawn."' 3
Similarly, in J.T. Glisson v. Alachua County,"° the court upheld the
constitutionality of an amendment to Alachua County's Comprehensive Plan
which placed significant development restrictions on certain environmentally
sensitive property owned by the appellants. 5 The court stated that for a
landowner to show that a taking exists, he must have "no available
beneficial use of his property under the land use ordinance."'' 6 Moreover,
the court cited First English when it noted that once *a taking is found the
government has a duty to compensate an aggrieved landowner for the period
that his property was affected by the ordinance, even if the ordinance is
repealed.' ° Accordingly, it seems clear that a remedy for a temporary
99. l- at 319 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
100. Id. at 321.
101. 796 F. Supp. 1477 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
102. Id, at 1482.
103. Id. at 1483.
104. 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla.
1990).
105. Id. at 1032-33, 1038.
106. Id. at 1036 (citing Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830
F.2d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 1987)).
107. Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 321). The court treated this case as a facial
challenge, however, because the property owners had not satisfied the threshold issue of
ripeness. The record reflected that "no individual appellant-landowner ha[d] applied for or
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taking exists in Florida, and may therefore be used when challenging a
concurrency regulation. Thus, to successfully challenge a concurrency
regulation via a takings claim, the landowner must demonstrate to the court
that the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental
interest or that the ordinance denies him all economically viable use of his
property.
By applying the rationale of the above decisions to our hypothetical,
the first question to ask in challenging the ordinance is whether, by not
making a provision for the construction of an elementary school within a
reasonable period of time, the municipality has effected a taking against the
developer. Assuming that it has effected a taking, and the municipality does
not amend or repeal the ordinance, the municipality must pay the developer
the reasonable value for the use of all her property.
However, once the city amends its budget to provide for the construc-
tion of the school, the question is, how much of a delay to the developer
before a development order is issued is reasonable? The case law seems to
indicate that this question will be answered on a case by case basis,
depending on the circumstances.'O' If the delay is determined to be
unreasonable, then there is at least a temporary taking and the government
must pay just compensation for the period beginning with when the
regulation took effect against our developer's property. However, if the
delay is deemed reasonable, then no taking has occurred and she is entitled
to no compensation.
C. "Even-Swap"-A Landowner's Option to Circumvent
Concurrency?
A new option available to a landowner in the concurrency context has
reared its head and requires the landowner to bargain with government
officials in order to gain development rights. An example of this is seen in
Jacksonville in a "swap" made between the city and a family owning several
hundred acres within the city." In exchange for the city crediting four
been denied a development proposal, rezoning request, or variance from the development
regulation[s]" since the adoption of the amendment. Id. at 1036. See generally City of
Jacksonville v. Wynn, 650 So. 2d 182, 187-88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
landowner must obtain final judgment regarding application of challenged ordinance to
property and must utilize all state procedures providing relief for a taking without
compensation, before inverse condemnation claim is ripe for review).
108. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 302 (N.Y. 1972).
109. Kathy Horak, Skinners Give City 150 Acres, BuS. J.-JACKSONVILLE, Nov. 26, 1993,
available in WL, ALLNEWS Directory, 1993 WL 3026987.
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thousand vehicle trips on "busy" nearby roads to a 460 acre parcel of
undeveloped land owned by the family, the family donated a 150-acre piece
of property to the city as right-of-way for the extension of a state road.110
Although this family had no immediate plans to develop the 460 acres, the
property's value was increased and it was easier for them to sell the
property to a developer as an important concurrency requirement was now
satisfied.'
This does not appear to be an isolated incident. This family alone had
several other similar deals planned with the city, and apparently has set a
precedent because many other landowners are freely negotiating with the
city to bargain for development rights."
2
This type of bargaining seems to directly contradict the intent of the
legislature in adopting the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Act ("the Act")." 3  To illustrate, if the purpose of
concurrency is to time the growth of development to the government's
provision of certain facilities and services, i.e., roads, then how is this
purpose furthered by allowing a property owner to develop property that
does not have roads capable to support the increase in traffic? Increasing
the capacity of roads in another area seems to condone a theory of "no-net-
increase" to the overall usage of the city's roads; however, it does not seem
wise or synonymous with the Act's intent to sacrifice the resources of one
area of the city merely to benefit another area of the city.
Suppose, for example, that a property owner wants to develop a certain
piece of property and the roads supporting it are capable of a capacity of up
to 5000 "trips ' " 4 attributable to this property. If the property owner's
proposed development will create 10,000 trips, then the development order
will presumably not be issued until the roads are capable of handling the
extra 5000 trips. Suppose instead that the landowner donated a piece of
property to the city on the other side of town for the construction of a new
road which will have no effect on the capacity of the roads supporting the
proposed development in exchange for a credit of 5000 trips being allocated
to his development. He is now free to secure a development order
(assuming all other permit obstacles are met) even though the surrounding
roads will be subject to double their intended capacity.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1995).
114. For example, one single family home could be classified as creating 2.5 "trips."
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This option does not make sense to this author. We cannot allow one
part of the city to benefit at the expense of another part of the city and still
maintain consistency with a local comprehensive plan. Even if the city
officials claim that their actions were in conformity with the local compre-
hensive plan, who is to be the judge? Can we really expect the general
public, in a public hearing, to be able to distinguish between the pitfalls of
a "no net-increase" in overall usage and the statute's true intent, that each
area of the community be treated consistently and in conformity with the
local comprehensive plan?"'5 What if the area which will suffer is
composed of citizens unable to afford adequate representation while the area
which will benefit is composed of affluent citizens able to afford the best
representation?
D. Should the State Impose a Mandatory Concurrency Element
for Schools?
Due to the continuing population growth of Florida, several school
systems throughout the state have been forced to consider several alterna-
tives to counter-act the effects of over-crowding in schools." 6 Many
options have been suggested, ranging from increasing sales taxes to
scheduling school days in double sessions."7 Perhaps the most dynamic
suggested alternative would be to include schools as a mandatory element
in the state's concurrency requirements. The problem this brings, though,
is who pays for these new schools?
One possibility, which has been proposed in Pasco County, entails the
exaction of school impact fees being imposed against the development of
any new homes."' In general, this would entail a fee being charged for
the construction of new homes; and such fees would be earmarked
115. It is entirely possible that a trade for development rights could be in conformity
with the local comprehensive plan, but there should be a clear relationship between the
private and governmental action. In other words, the compensation given to the city in
exchange for development rights should have a direct relationship with the benefit to the
immediate community. For example, if in the Jacksonville example, the land donated by the
family would have extended a highway to compensate for the increased travel created by
developing that property, then the exchange would seem to be justified.
116. Peter Mitchell, After Funding Setbacks, Schools Prepare Painful Lessons for
Parents, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at Fl, available in WL, ALLNEWS Directory, 1995
WL-WSJ 9907304.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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specifically for the construction of new schools necessitated by the new
development." 9 This proposal, however, is not a novel one.
In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n,"1 ' the court
considered "whether St. Johns County could impose an impact fee on new
residential construction to be used for new school facilities."'' After
conducting a careful study calculating how to maintain an acceptable level
of public facilities in the county, including schools, a method of allocating
the cost of providing these new school facilities to each unit of new
residential development was proposed. " Incorporating this proposal, an
ordinance was enacted which specified that:
no new building permits will be issued except upon the payment of an
impact fee. The fees are to be placed in a trust fund to be spent by the
school board solely to "acquire, construct, expand and equip the
educational sites and educational capital facilities necessitated by newdevelopment. ' 3
The ordinance recited that it would be applicable within both incorpo-
rated and unincorporated areas of the county, but not in municipalities in
which an interlocal agreement to collect the impact fees had not been
entered into with the County.
To determine whether the imposition of this impact fee was valid, the
court invoked the "dual rational nexus test."'" As the name indicates, two
requirements must be satisfied:
There must be a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the
need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population
generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of
the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. In
order to satisfy this later requirement, the ordinance must specifically
119. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 (Fla.
1976) (authorizing municipality to exact impact fees to meet proportion of costs of expanding
public facilities attributable to new development, so long as fees are limited to meeting costs
of expansion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
120. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
121. Id. at 636. This is an issue of first impression for the court. ICE at 638.
122. Id. at 637.
123. Id. (quoting ST. JOHNS CoUNTY, FLA., ORDNANCE 87-60, § 10(B) (1987)).
124. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 637.
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earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring capital facilities to
benefit the new residents."
The court, in considering the first prong of the test, determined whether
St. Johns County demonstrated that there was a reasonable connection
between the need for more schools and the growth in population attributable
to the new development. 26 The parties did not dispute that the county
must expand its facilities commensurate with the rate of new development
to maintain its current levels of service. 7 However, the challengers to
the ordinance argued that not all new residents will have children who will
benefit from the new schools. The court countered this argument by
pointing out that even though benefits from fire protection and parks will
not be used by every citizen, the city must still be in the position to serve
every dwelling unit.129 Thus, the court held that the ordinance met the
first prong of the rational nexus test.1
30
However, the court determined that the second prong of the test was
not met because the ordinance did not specifically earmark the funds
collected for use in acquiring capital facilities strictly to benefit the new
residents who actually paid the fees. 3 ' In other words, there was no
express provision in the ordinance ensuring that the impact fees would be
kept from being spent for the construction of new schools to accommodate
new development in municipalities which have not entered into the interlocal
agreement. 32 For example, if a municipality within the county chose not
to impose this impact fee on its citizens by not entering into a collection
agreement with the county, then under the ordinance, it is entirely possible
that fees collected in another part of the county will be spent to build a new
school in the municipality which is exempt from the impact fees. This
possibility, the court decided, was not acceptable. Consequently, it held that
no impact fees could be collected under this ordinance until "substantially
all of the population of St. Johns County is subject to the ordinance.' '133
The St. Johns County ordinance also included a provision that
essentially allowed a development to be exempt from the impact fee if it
125. Id.
126. Id. at 638.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 638.
130. Id. at 639.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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could show that it would be comprised totally of families without children
attending public schools, that is, families with children attending private
schools only, families without children, adult communities, etc."M
However, due to the requirement that these families would have to pay the
impact fees if they subsequently have children who will attend public
schools while residing in their homes, the court determined that the impact
fees had the potential of being "user fees" in that the fees seemed to be
based solely on whether any children attending public schools resided on the
property. 35 Thus, invoking the severability clause, the court struck this
provision from the ordinance, because the court determined that imposing
"user fees" on public education collides with Florida's constitutional
requirement 136 of free public schools) 31
It seems that the St. Johns ordinance failed on a mere technicality.
However, by imposing this strict test, the court insured that impact fees may
not be imposed at the whim of government officials. Ironically, instead of
attempting to accommodate every party who "perhaps" should not be subject
to the fee, if the County would have been more aggressive in drafting the
ordinance, i.e., eliminating the exceptions and requiring no interlocal
agreements, the ordinance apparently would have survived. From this
opinion, however, it seems clear that impact fees earmarked for construction
of new schools to keep up with the demands caused by new development
may be exacted against new home construction with a carefully drafted
ordinance.
Although this decision seems to have provided a supplementary means
of providing revenue to construct new schools, it did not solve the potential
for intergovernmental conflicts. As pointed out by C. Allen Watts, if
municipal consent is required to impose a county-wide school impact fee,
then a 51 percent majority of a small municipality's voters could effectively
veto this type of fee county-wide. 3' However, if there is no procedure for
collecting the fees, then the government will not receive the revenue. Thus,
134. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640.
135. Id.
136. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
137. St. Johns County, 583 So. 2d at 640. The court did note that it would have no
problem with an exemption for residential adult facilities in which land use restrictions were
placed on the property that prohibited minors from residing within the community. Id. at 640
n.6.
138. C. Allen Watts, Beyond User Fees? Impact Fees for Schools and.... 66 FLA. BJ.
56, 59 (Feb. 1992).
1996]
335
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
there must be a next step. Is this next step a state-wide mandate for schools
as a mandatory concurrency element?
IV. CONCLUSION
It is quite apparent that Florida's Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act is appropriately named.
The substance embodied from its original form and subsequent amendments
reflect many years of study, experience, and planning. As a state growing
at such an explosive pace, land use controls are imperative to Florida and
its government officials. The legislature has provided a means by which
each local government entity is assured of its ability to diagnose a problem
and remedy it according to its individual needs. At the same time, however,
Florida as a whole is assured of consistency and uniformity throughout its
land use decisions.
The legislature has mandated that certain elements be included in each
local government's comprehensive plan. Of course, this does not preclude
a plan from including other elements not in the state's plan. Rather, the
plan must merely be consistent with it. Presumably, the mandatory elements
found in Florida's concurrency statute 139 are what the legislature has
determined to be absolutely necessary on a statewide basis for a communi-
ty's health, benefit, and welfare. However, as with anything else, with
changing conditions comes changing needs. Thus, the logical reason the
legislature withheld some control over local comprehensive plans is so that
it retains the ability to make changes whenever a statewide need arises.
It is becoming all too obvious that the conventional approach of hoping
that government will expand its facilities in time with the needs of the
community is not working."4 It seems that it is time for the legislature
to look at this problem and consider the concurrency alternative. Although
concurrency regulations have been criticized as overly bureaucratic and
time-consuming for the developer, should the prospect of our children's
139. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180.
140. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 116. A sign at Suntree Elementary School in
Melbourne, Florida warns newcomers to the area that this new school is overcrowded and
enrollment is capped so any new students must be bused to other schools. The school district
in Broward County, Florida is forced to consider a year-round calendar, double sessions,
busing students to distant schools, and hauling in portable classrooms to be placed on playing
fields and parking lots due to a growth of 10,000 students per year. The school district in
Leon County, Florida, by redrawing boundaries to ease school overcrowding, could mean
eliminating drop-out prevention and advanced-study programs to accommodate the influx of
new students.
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education be undermined at the expense of "progress"? Accordingly, this
author proposes a statewide mandate be included in Florida's concurrency
law that requires capital expenditures for schools be provided prior to the'
construction of new residential development.
Craig A. Robertson
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I. INTRODUCnON
Wal-Mart Stores, the world's largest retailer, is experiencing opposition
to the execution of its expansion plans from citizens' groups in different
areas of the country, particularly in the northeast United States.' In
Hornell, New York, a group called "Taxpayers Against Floodmart" obtained
a court order to stop construction on a partially completed 125,000 square-
1. See David Morris, Superstore Invasion Provides a Good Test of Local Democracy,
BuFF. NEws, Feb. 14, 1995, at C3.
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foot Wal-Mart store.2 Wal-Mart also faced opposition in several other New
York towns, namely East Aurora, Lake Placid, and Catskill Wal-Mart
expansion plans have also been hindered in towns in several New England
states.4
In fact, until recently, Vermont was the only state in the Union without
a Wal-Mart store.' However, that may be changing according to one media
article entitled Wal-Mart Breaks Vermont Barrier.' The report explained
that Wal-Mart will take over a 50,000 square-foot property in Bennington,
Vermont, which was formerly operated by F.W. Woolworth.7
This article will introduce the reader to the tangible legal opposition
which Wal-Mart has faced from these citizens' groups in the northeast. Its
purpose is to expose what is referred to as the "Vermont barrier" through a
case study of the opposition faced by Wal-Mart in one particular communi-
ty. Furthermore, this article will discuss how Wal-Mart was excluded from
St. Albans, Vermont through the practical application of the Vermont Land
Use and Development Act, commonly referred to as Act 250.'
Part II of this article provides a background explanation of Act 250 and
its application and execution by the several district environmental commis-
sions ("commission") and the Vermont Environmental Board ("Board"), the
governmental bodies charged with executing the provisions of Act 250. Part
I explores how Act 250 was applied in the Board's recent decision to void
a land use permit granted to the retailer by one of the commissions.9 The
Board's decision was primarily based on its belief that the project would
result in a net job loss for the local region and adversely impact the tax base
of local municipalities."0
2. Sharon Linstedt, Citizens Group Blocks Hornell Project for Wal-Mart, Wegmans,
BU1FF. NEws, Feb. 1, 1995, at C6.
3. Id.; see also Peter P. Donker, Chain's Decision to Locate in Sturbridge Splits Tourist-
Dependent Town, SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Worcester, Mass.), Mar. 26, 1995, at El.
4. Linstedt, supra note 2, at C6. These towns include Bath, Maine; North Kingston,
Rhode Island; the Connecticut towns of Cromwell, Plainville, New Milford, Newington, East
Windsor, and Branford; the Massachusetts towns of Greenfield, Westford, Quincy, Plymouth,
Saugus, Lee, Billerica, Somerset, and Sturbridge; and the Vermont towns of Williston and
St. Albans.
5. Donker, supra note 3, at El.
6. Wal-Mart Breaks Vermont Barrier, PALM BEACH POST, June 4, 1995, at 2E
[hereinafter Wal-Mart].
7. Id.
8. 1969 Vt. Laws 250 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6021, 6026 (1993)).
9. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 1, 3, 60 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
10. Id at 27-29.
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Part IV explains some of the arguments which the retailer is making in
the pending appeal in the Supreme Court of Vermont. Part V analyzes the
effect of Act 250 as an economic barrier in light of our nation's ambitions
of achieving economic union. Finally, part VI submits that it is the practical
application of Act 250 which is the "Vermont barrier" and that Wal-Mart
cannot break this barrier by opening a store in an existing retail property.
II. LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN VERMONT
Commonly referred to as Act 250," Vermont's law governing land
use and development requires a permit" before commencing land develop-
ment.13 The power to issue permits 14 is vested in nine commissions 5 and
the Board. 6 The Board is vested with the authority to promulgate rules
governing the proceedings before itself and the several commissions.
Persons seeking a permit must first file an application with the appropriate
commission in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Board.'8
Once a decision is made by a particular commission, the Board hears
appeals of those decisions. 9
A. Composition of the Commissions and the Board
Through Act 250, the Vermont Legislature created the nine commis-
sions and the Board. The Governor of Vermont is vested with the power
to appoint members and alternates to each of these bodies.2" Appointments
11. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6001-92 (1993); In re Presault, 292 A.2d 832, 833
(Vt. 1972). The court observed that it was interpreting "the Vermont Land Use and
Development Act passed by the 1969 Adjourned Session of the Legislature as Act No. 250."
Id.
12. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6081.
13. Id. § 6001(3). This section defines development as "the construction of improve-
ments on a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, involving more than 10
acres of land within a radius of five miles of any point on any involved land, for commercial
or industrial purposes." Id.
14. Id § 6086.
15. Id § 6026. This section divides the state into nine numbered districts and creates
a district environmental commission for each district. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6026.
16. Id § 6021 (creating the State Environmental Board).
17. Id § 6025(a). This section directs the Board to "adopt rules... to interpret and
carry out the provisions of this chapter ...." Id
18. Id § 6083.
19. VT. STAT. ANN,. § 6089(a).
20. Id §§ 6021, 6026(b).
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of Board members are made "with the advice and consent of the senate. 21
Thus, the members of the commissions and the Board are political
appointees of the governor, not officials popularly elected by the citizen-
ry,22
The several commissions are composed of three members from the
district in which the particular commission sits.23 One of the three
members of each commission is appointed as the chair and serves a term of
two years, while the other two members are appointed for terms of four
years. 24  The chair of each commission serves "at the pleasure of the
governor" while the other two members can be removed only with a
showing of cause.25
The Board, on the other hand, is composed of nine members.26 The
chair is appointed for a term of two years, while the other eight members
are appointed for terms of four years. 27 As with the commissions, the
chair serves "at the pleasure of the governor" while the other eight members
can be removed only for cause.28
B. Permit Applications and Their Evaluation
As noted above, parties required to obtain a permit to lawfully execute
their development plans must file an application with the appropriate
commission. 2' Notice of the application must be given by the applicant on
or before the date of filing to specifically enumerated parties including the
municipality, and municipal and regional planning commissions where the
proposed development is located.3" Notice must also be provided to the
Board, as well as any state agency directly affected, and any other
municipality or state agency, or person the commission or Board deems
31appropriate. Such notice includes sending a copy of the application tothe appropriate parties and publication in a local newspaper.32
21. Id. § 6021(a).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 6026(b).
24. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6026(b).
25. Id. § 6026(c).
26. Id. § 6021(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 6021(c).
29. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6084(a).
31. Id. § 6084(b).
32. 1&.
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The Supreme Court of Vermont has observed that "processing a permit
application first involves consideration... of the ten criteria of 10 V.S.A.
§ 6086(a), each of which involve myriad subcategories of concern."33
These criteria address several concerns including water or air pollution, soil
erosion, and traffic.34 In turn, as alluded to above, some of these criteria
have "myriad subcategories of concern."35  For example, under the
criterion addressing water or air pollution, the Vermont Legislature has
addressed issues concerning headwaters, waste disposal, water conservation,
and any relevant wetland rules.36
One might naturally expect all of the criteria cited thus far to be
included within the statutorily vested province of such bodies designated as
a district environmental commission or a State Environmental Board.
However, Act 250 includes other criteria which the uninitiated might be
surprised to see included within the province of such bodies. For example,
Act 250 includes other criteria addressing impact on schools and local
government services, impact of growth, costs of scattered development,
public investments and facilities, and conformance with local and regional
plans.37 The Board has labeled these as fiscal criteria.3"
These fiscal criteria are particularly interesting because they have been
interpreted by the Board to justify an investigation into not only the effect
of a proposed development upon the ecological environment, but also its
effects upon the economic environment.39 Such conclusions by the Board
concerning the relevance of a proposed development's competitive effects
on the economy are especially significant since the Supreme Court of
33. In re Wildlife Wonderland, Inc., 346 A.2d 645, 653 (Vt. 1975). These criteria are
often referred to by a number which corresponds to their respective codification as
subdivisions under § 6086(a), followed by a parenthetical indication of what the particular
criterion relates to. For example, at § 6086(a)(8), the district commissions and Board are
charged by statute not to grant a permit before finding that the proposed development "[w]ill
not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area, aesthetics,
historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas." VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(8). Accord-
ingly, this subdivision has been referred to as criterion eight (historic sites). In re Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 4 (Vt.
Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
34. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a).
35. In re Wildlife Wonderland, 346 A.2d at 653.
36. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(1).
37. Id.
38. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 26 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
39. Il at 27.
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Vermont has "accorded 'a high level of deference' to the interpretation of
Act 250 by the Board." 4
Act 250 dictates that the applicant does not have the burden of proving
compliance with all ten criteria.4 Depending on the particular criterion in
controversy, the burden of proof may be on either the applicant or the party
opposing the applicant.42 However, the Supreme Court of Vermont has
noted that:
Nothing in the language of the statute prevents the Board from finding
against the applicant on an issue even though the applicant does not
have the burden of proof on that issue. In fact, the statute requires the
Board to make a finding on each factor . . . irrespective of the
placement of the burden of proof.43
Furthermore, permits may be granted with certain conditions prescribed
by the issuing authority." The Vermont Legislature has directed that
applications should not be denied by the Board or commissions unless those
bodies find that the proposed development plan, if realized, would be
detrimental to public health, safety, or general welfare.45
C. Procedures Before the Commissions and Board
The Board is vested with the authority to promulgate rules to execute
the provisions of Act 250.46 Accordingly, the Board has issued rules
governing the presentation of evidence and the proceedings generally before
the Board and the several commissions.47 The Environmental Board Rules
contemplate several methods for the presentation of evidence to the Board
including prehearing conferences, prefiled testimony, and live hearings
before the commissions or Board.48 Also, the Board may conduct site
40. In re Denio, 608 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Vt. 1992) (citing In re Vitale, 563 A.2d 613,615
(Vt. 1989)).
41. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6088.
42. Id
43. In re Denio, 608 A.2d at 1170 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)).
44. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(c).
45. Id § 6087(a).
46. Id § 6025(a) (directing the Board to "adopt rules... to interpret and carry out the
provisions of this chapter .... ).
47. See ENvTL. BD. R. 17 (1993).
48. Id. at 16-18.
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visits to observe the location of the subject development. 4 9 Thus, brief
discussion of some of these rules will reveal how the proceedings before the
Board and commissions are conducted.
One forum contemplated by the Environmental Board Rules for the
expedition of proceedings before the commissions and the Board is the
prehearing conference, governed by Environmental Board Rule 16.0 Rule
16 states that the purposes behind prehearing conferences are to clarify
issues in controversy, identify relevant sources of evidence which may be
presented at hearings, and obtain appropriate stipulations of the parties."
Prehearing conferences are conducted by a delegate authorized by the
commission or Board who, if an actual member thereof, may make
preliminary rulings regarding scheduling, party status, and other preliminary
matters.5 2 Thus, the prehearing conference presents a method used by the
commissions and the Board to expedite Act 250 proceedings.53
Environmental Board Rule 17(D) also allows parties to submit prefiled
testimony in writing. 4 However, prefiled testimorqy is intended only to
facilitate the presentation of the direct testimony of the particular witness.55
The witness must be present at the hearing to present the written evidence,
to affirm its truthfulness, and to remain available for cross-examination. 6
To further expedite proceedings, if the other parties have received copies of
the written testimony, the Board or commission may dispense with direct
examination and order that cross-examination of the witness proceed
immediately.57
Hearings are available upon request by those parties required by statute
to receive notice of the permit application." However, hearings are not
required if not requested by any such party.59 Rule 18 addresses the
conduct of hearings, setting a quorum requirement of more than half the
49. See, e.g., In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 580 A.2d 957, 962 (Vt. 1990) (concluding that
"the Board's partial reliance on knowledge garnered from the site visits was not erroneous").
50. ENVTL. BD. R. 16.
51. Id. at 16(A)(1)-(3).
52. hid at 16(B).
53. Id. at 16(A).
54. IU. at 17(D).
55. ENVTL. BD. R. 17(D)(2).
56. IM.
57. Id.
58. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6085.
59. See id.
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members of the relevant body which may be waived by agreement of all
parties.60
The order of the presentation of evidence is within the discretion of the
commission or Board as it deems expeditious and equitable.6' The
admissibility of evidence presented at hearings is governed by the Vermont
Administrative Procedure Act.62
Act 250 also contemplates the creation of Environmental Board Rules
concerning the acceptance of certain permits issued by other state agencies
as evidence which creates a rebuttable presumption of compliance with
certain Act 250 criteria.63 For example, under Environmental Board Rule
19(E), the issuance of a Discharge Permit or a Water Supply and Waste-
water Disposal Permit creates a rebuttable presumption that waste materials
can be disposed of without resulting in undue water pollution.' The
issuance of these permits creates a rebuttable presumption of compliance
with the criteria concerning waste disposal and streams.6
D. Party Status to Proceedings Before the Commissions and
Board
Party status is desirable because it enables individuals or groups with
such status to present evidence to the commission or Board.6 6 Party status
to the proceedings before the commission can derive directly under statute
or indirectly from the rules promulgated by the Board.67 The Board is
charged with making rules concerning party status to the proceedings before
the commissions and itself.6 Act 250 directs that "[p]arties shall be those
who have received notice, adjoining property owners who have requested a
hearing, and such other persons as the board may allow by rule."69
Pursuant to the legislative charge, the Board has addressed party status
through Environmental Board Rule 14. Rule 14(A), which addresses parties
60. ENVTL. BD. R. 18.
61. Id. at 17(C).
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3 § 810 (1993).
63. Id. tit. 10 § 6086(d).
64. ENvTL. BD. R. 19(E).
65. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 12, 13, 15 (Vt. Envfl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
66. See ENvTL. BD. R. 17. This particular rule is written, like many of the others, in
terms of what "parties" may do. d.
67. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6085(b).
68. Id. § 6085(c).
69. Id.
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by right, closely follows the statutory language of Act 250 outlined above
and does not broaden the class of persons or groups eligible for party
status.
70
Through rule 14(B), the Board uses its statutorily granted rule-making
authority to broaden the prospective class of parties to the proceedings
before the Board or several commissions.' Rule 14(B) allows the Board
or commission to grant party status to a petitioner in either of two ways.
First, party status may be granted if the Board or commission is persuaded
by the petitioner that the proposed development will affect the petitioner's
interest under any of the several Act 250 criteria.72 Second, party status
may be granted if the petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the petition-
er's participation will materially assist the Board or commission through
presenting evidence or argument.73
Through rule 14, the Board uses its rule-making authority to create a
class of individuals and groups contemplated, but not specifically addressed
by the Vermont Legislature, who may participate alongside those parties
statutorily defined.74 Other provisions of rule 14 address the procedural
requirements for obtaining party status.75 These procedural requirements
differ according to whether the individual or group seeks to implement party
status accorded by statute or seeks a permissive grant of party status.76
E. Appealing Commission Decisions: The Province of the Board
Decisions of the commissions are appealable to the Board.77 Parties
wishing to appeal the decisions of the commissions must file a notice of
appeal with the Board within thirty days of that decision." The notice of
appeal must include a statement of the issues to be addressed in the appeal
as it79 controls the scope of the appellate hearing before the Board."0
70. ENVTL. BD. R. 14(A); VT. STAT. ANN. § 6085(c).
71. ENvTL. BD. R. 14(B).
72. IM at 14(B)(1)(a).
73. Id at 14(B)(1)(b).
74. See VT. STAT. ANN. § 6085(c).
75. ENVTL. BD. R. 14.
76. Id.
77. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6089(a).
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id; see also In re Taft Comers Assocs., 632 A.2d 649, 653 (Vt. 1993).
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The Board conducts a de novo review on all findings requested by any
party that files an appeal or cross-appeal.8' In its "first confrontation with
the Vermont Land Use and Development Act,"8' the Supreme Court of
Vermont commented on the de novo nature of appeals to the Board, stating:
A de novo proceeding at an appellant level commonly designates a
hearing as though no action whatever had been instituted in the District
Environmental Commission below. A de novo proceeding is one in
which all the evidence is heard anew, and the probative effect thereof
determined. A de novo proceeding contemplates those parties who had
an interest in the original proceeding being allowed to appear and
participate as proper parties at the second set of hearings. 3
However, while the Board may scrutinize and even disregard the factual
findings of the commissions, the Board has no jurisdiction to decide issues
not raised before the district commission. 4
Act 250 expressly makes the factual determinations of the Board
conclusive, provided only that such determinations are supported by
substantial evidence. 5 Substantial evidence is that which is, "relevant and
which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion. ,86
F. Appealing Board Decisions to the Supreme Court of Vermont
Decisions of the Board can be appealed to the Supreme Court of
Vermont.87 The right to appeal decisions of the Board to the supreme
court is reserved for those parties whose status as such in the lower
88proceedings was derived directly from the statute. Those receiving
81. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6089(a).
82. In re Preseault, 292 A.2d 832, 833 (Vt. 1972).
83. Id. at 835 (citations omitted).
84. In re Taft Corners Assocs., 632 A.2d at 650.
85. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6089(c).
86. In re Denio, 608 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Vt. 1992) (citing In re McShinsky, 572 A.2d
916, 919 (Vt. 1990)).
87. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6089(b).
88. ld This section provides that appeals to the Supreme Court of Vermont shall be "by
a party as set forth in section 6085(c) of this title." Id. Section 6085(c) dictates that parties
to hearings before the commissions and Board:
shall be those who have received notice, adjoining property owners who have
requested a hearing, and such other persons as the board may allow by rule. For
the purposes of appeal only the applicant, a state agency, the regional and
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permissive grants of party status before the district environmental com-
mission or Board are excluded from the class of parties eligible to appeal
Board decisions to the Supreme Court of Vermont. 9
Appeals of decisions of the Board are reviewed under a more
deferential standard before the supreme court than the de novo nature of
review by which appeals of district environmental commission decisions are
conducted.9' Because Board findings of fact are expressly made conclusive
by Act 250, the supreme court will not reweigh conflicting evidence."
Thus, on appeal before the supreme court, evidence is viewed in a light
most favorable to the prevailing party below.92 Therefore, Board decisions
are not easily set aside by resorting to the supreme court.
IIl. THE ST. ALBANS CASE
A. The Setting, the Parties, and Their Positions
The proposed Wal-Mart store was to be erected in the town of St.
Albans, Vermont.93 The town is a different political entity from the city
of St. Albans. 4 The proposed site is located about two miles from the
city's downtown.95 Both the town and the city are located in Franklin
County, near the northeast arm of Lake Champlain.9 6 Because the pro-
municipal planning commissions and the municipalities required to receive
notice shall be considered parties.
Id. § 6085(c). Thus, the Supreme Court has commented that:
"appeal" is used in two different senses in 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c). One refers to
the transfer from the District Commission to the Environmental Board ....
However, "appeal" is also used with reference to appellate review, and.., this
statute limits those eligible to come to this Court.... Viewing the statute any
other way makes it internally inconsistent, if not incomprehensible.
In re George F. Adams & Co., 353 A.2d 576, 577 (Vt. 1976).
89. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6089(b).
90. See In re Wildlife Wonderland, Inc., 346 A.2d 645, 648 (Vt. 1985).
91. Iad
92. In re Hawk Mountain Corp., 542 A.2d 261, 263 (Vt. 1988) (citing In re Brileya, 515
A.2d 129, 131 (Vt. 1986)).
93. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 7-8 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
94. IU at 8.
95. IR
96. I&
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posed development involved forty-four acres, more than the ten acre
threshold under Act 250,"7 a permit was required.
Several parties participated in the proceedings before the District Six
Environmental Commission and the Vermont Environmental Board
regarding the proposed development.98 The permit applicants included the
St. Albans Group, which owns the land upon which the store was to be
constructed, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.99 Opposing the applicants before
the Commission, and again on appeal before the Board, were the Frank-
lin/Grand Isle County Citizens for Downtown Preservation ("Citizens") and
the Vermont Natural Resources Council ("VNRC").' The parties
advocated their positions before the Board for much of 1994, until the Board
eventually issued its order, finding against the applicants, and voiding Land
Use Permit No. 6F0471 on December 23, 1994.01
The Citizens initially attacked Wal-Mart along several fronts, peti-
tioning the Commission for party status with respect to many Act 250
criteria, including: waste disposal, streams, wetland rules, soil erosion,
traffic, impact on schools and local government services, historic sites,
impact of growth, costs of scattered development, public investments and
facilities, and conformity with local plan."° The Commission granted the
Citizens party status on the criteria addressing local government services,
historic sites, impact of growth, costs of scattered development, and public
investments and facilities, while denying the group party status on the
remaining criteria. 3
VNRC's attack on Wal-Mart, on the other hand, was not as widespread
as that of the Citizens. VNRC petitioned the Commission for party status
on fewer criteria: historic sites, impact of growth, costs of scattered
development, public investments and facilities, and conformity with local
plan."°4 The Commission denied VNRC's petition for party status on all
these criteria." 5
97. See VT. STAT. ANN. § 6001(3).
98. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 3-4 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
99. Id4 at 8.
100. Id. at 3, 4.
101. Id. at i.
102. Id. at 4.
103. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 4 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Despite this opposition, the applicants initially succeeded in obtaining
a permit. 6 On December 21, 1993, a Land Use Permit was issued by the
District Six Environmental Commission, authorizing construction of a
126,090 square-foot Wal-Mart Store. 7 However, Wal-Mart could not rest
upon its initial success because on January 20, 1994, the Citizens and
VNRC filed appeals with the Board, excepting to the Commission's
decisions regarding all the criteria for which they sought party status.08
The groups also appealed the District Commission's refusal to grant them
party status on the relevant aforementioned criteria."0 9
On February 2, 1994, the applicants filed a cross-appeal in which they
excepted to the Commission's grant of party status to the Citizens on all
relevant criteria except the criterion addressing conformance with the
relevant local plan and argued to sustain the Commission's denial of party
status to VNRC." 0
B. The Proceedings Before the Board
On April 15, 1994, the Board issued a memorandum of decision
addressing party status.' The Board denied party status to both the
Citizens and VNRC on the criterion addressing historic sites."' However,
the Board denied the balance of the applicants' cross-appeal, granting both
the Citizens and VNRC party status regarding the other criteria on which
they sought status as such.' Thus, the Board conducted a de novo
review of a multitude of Act 250 criteria." 4
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 3 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
109. Id. at4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 4-5 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Later, on May 11, 1994, following motions
presented by the applicants for reconsideration of the party status issues, the Citizens, and
VNRC, the Board stood by its April 15, 1994 ruling concerning party status. I
114. Id. Specifically, review was conducted under those criteria addressing water
pollution, soil erosion, traffic, impact on schools, local governmental services, impact of
growth, costs of scattered development, public investments and facilities, and conformity with
local plan. Id. The Board further limited the water pollution criterion issues to headwaters,
waste disposal, streams, and wetlands. Id. at 5.
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During June and July of 1994, the parties met for prehearing confer-
ences and filed prefiled testimony."' The Board convened hearings on
July 7, 13, and 14. Also in July, the Board visited the site of the proposed
Wal-Mart store.1 1
6
The Board conducted deliberations to consider the evidence on several
dates from August until December, when the Board issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on December 23, 1994.17 This
document exposes much of the "Vermont barrier" because the document
reveals the deliberations of the Board in evaluating permit applications. In
particular, the Board's concerns for the protection of the St. Albans
economy from the competitive force which Wal-Mart presents are expressly
and openly confessed.'
C. Ecological Concerns Allayed
The ecologically-related criteria under which the Board reviewed the
St. Albans' Wal-Mart permit application were those criteria addressing
headwaters, waste disposal, streams, wetland rules, and soil erosion. 9
Many of the Board's findings of fact supported its conclusions of law
regarding compliance with multiple criteria.' 20 The Board found that the
proposed Wal-Mart project complied with each of these ecologically-related
Act 250 criteria.121 The fact that the Board found for Wal-Mart on these
criteria supports the conclusion that the "Vermont barrier" has been erected
from the mortar of economic protectionism rather than from truly environ-
mental or ecological concerns.
115. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 5 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). These maneuvers included the filing of
prefiled direct and rebuttal testimony, lists of witnesses and exhibits, and written evidentiary
objections, pursuant to Environmental Board Rule 17(D) (prefiled testimony) and 17(E)
(prehearing submissions). ENVTL. BD. R. 17.
116. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 5 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
117. Id. at i.
118. See id. at 27-29.
119. Id. at 4-5.
120. Id. at 7. The Board instructed that its findings of fact "should be read as
cumulative," stating "[w]here findings from the general category or another specific category
are relevant, they are assumed and are not repeated." In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 7 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23,
1994).
121. Id. at 11-16.
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In evaluating the permit under the ecologically-related criteria
addressing waste disposal and streams, the Board expressed concern for the
excessive amounts of plant nutrients, particularly phosphorus, in St. Albans
Bay, which is located in the northeast arm of Lake Champlain near the town
and city of St. Albans." Excessive amounts of phosphorus promote
blooms of algae, which can negatively impact water quality." St. Albans
Bay has for many years contained excessive amounts of phosphorus, and
despite millions of dollars of public investment to reduce nutrient loading,
water quality in the Bay has not been "significantly improved."' 24 Stevens
Brook, a tributary of the Bay, is suspected of carrying a prominent amount
of phosphorus into the Bay."2 The fact that stormwater runoff from the
proposed St. Albans Wal-Mart would be guided into Stevens Brook made
the Board's concerns regarding the phosphorus levels in St. Albans Bay
relevant to the subject case. 26
The site of the proposed Wal-Mart was being used as a corn field, and
the Board recognized that after completion, the proposed development would
122. Id. at 8-12. The criterion addressing waste disposal required that the applicants
prove that, "the development or subdivision will meet any applicable health and environ-
mental conservation department regulations regarding the disposal of wastes, and will not
involve the injection of waste materials or any harmful or toxic substances into ground water
or wells." VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(1)(B).
The criterion addressing streams required that the applicants prove that "the
development or subdivision of lands on or adjacent to the banks of.a stream will, whenever
feasible, maintain the natural condition of the stream, and will not endanger the health,
safety, or welfare of the public or of adjoining landowners." Id. § 6086(a)(1)(E).
123. In.re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 9 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). The Board noted that algal blooms often
negatively impact water quality by decreasing water transparency and producing noxious
odors, which fosters a "corresponding significant decline in recreational values." Id. The
Board recognized that agriculture, which is not regulated by Act 250, is a major source of
the excessive levels of phosphorus and other plant nutrients in the Bay. Il
124. Id. at 9-10.
125. Id. at 10. The highest concentrations of phosphorus in the Bay have been
measured where Stevens Brook flows into St. Albans Bay. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
6F0471-ER, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 10 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23
1994).
126. Id. at 9. On January 9, 1994, the applicants obtained Discharge Permit No. 1-1159
from the Wastewater Management Division of the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion of the State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. Id. This permit authorized the
applicants to discharge stormwater runoff in the manner described in the permit:
"Stormwater runoff from the access roadway, parking and building roofing via catch basins
and a closed collection system to a sedimentation/detention basin. The basin discharges via
a stabilized outlet to an existing grassed drainageway to Stevens Brook." ld
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actually result in less phosphorus discharge into Stevens Brook than pre-
development levels.127 The fact that post-development phosphorus flows
would be reduced by development helped the applicants obtain a discharge
permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation of the State of
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources ("ANR").
The city's wastewater treatment plant had also been a major contributor
of plant nutrients into St. Albans Bay until a major 1987 upgrade of the
facility resulted in a striking reduction in its contribution of plant nutrients
into the bay.129 On September 9, 1993, the applicants obtained a Water
Supply and Wastewater Disposal Permit which approved connecting the
Wal-Mart project to the city's existing wastewater facilities. 30
Pursuant to Environmental Board Rule 19, the applicants created a
rebuttable presumption of compliance with the criteria addressing waste
disposal and streams.' The Citizens sought to rebut the presumption of
compliance with these criteria by arguing that although the project would
reduce the pre-development amount of phosphorus discharge, the continued
discharge would constitute undue water pollution of St. Albans Bay because
the applicants had not gone far enough in designing their project to reduce
the projected phosphorus discharge.'32
The Citizens also criticized ANR's Draft Stormwater Procedures, which
guided that agency's decision to issue the Discharge Permit.'33 The
Citizens felt that ANR's draft procedures were inadequate to protect the
environment because rather than setting a "natural state" design standard, the
127. Id. at 10.
128. See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-ER, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order at 9-11 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994); see also infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
129. See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order at 9-10 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
130. See id. at 8-9. The applicants obtained Water Supply and Wastewater Disposal
Permit No. WW-6-0229 from the Department of Environmental Conservation of the State of
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. Id. at 9. The permit allowed a maximum of 9731
gallons per day to be discharged into the city's system. Id.
131. Id. at 12-15.
132. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 13-14 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). The Citizens contended that the projected
levels of phosphorous discharge were unduly high because the applicants had "not taken all
feasible and reasonable measures to reduce the level of phosphorous in the project's
stormwater runoff." Id. at 14.
133. Id.
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draft procedures merely required that the proposed development not increase
the levels of plant nutrient discharge. 134
Addressing the Citizens' arguments, the Board noted that it could
properly consider the adequacy of ANR's draft procedures because of the
Board's "supervisory role over ANR.', 135  The Board stated concern that
because the existing site was used for agricultural purposes, and that
agriculture is a major source of the plant nutrients in St. Albans Bay,136
pre-development nutrient contribution levels may be an inadequate
benchmark. 1
37
Despite the Board's concerns regarding the phosphorus contribution
levels expected from the project, the Board believed that it would be unfair
to find the relevant compliance presumptions rebutted by the Citizens since
the applicants had designed the project in accordance with the regulations
134. Id. at 10-11, 13-14. ANR's Draft Procedures state that "[t]he control of stormwater
runoff requires the use of detention structures such that the post-development peak flow from
the site does not exceed the pre-development peak flow based on the runoff from a 10-year,
24 hour design storm." IU at 10-11.
135. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 14 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Here, the Board cited In re Hawk Mountain
Corp., 542 A.2d 261, 264 (Vt. 1988). In that case, the Supreme Court of Vermont observed
that:
The legislative scheme [of Act 250] indicates that the legislature intended to
confer upon the Board powers of a supervisory body in environmental matters.
For example, although 10 V.S.A. § 6082 provides that the permit required under
Act 250 does not replace permit requirements from other state agencies, 10
V.S.A. § 6086(d) provides that the Environmental Board is not bound by the
approval or permits granted by the other agencies. Permits and Certificates of
Compliance from other agencies create a presumption that the project satisfies
the relevant 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(1) criteria; however, the Board must conduct
an independent review of the proposed development and may deny the Act 250
permit if it finds the Certificate of Compliance or other required permits were
improvidently granted.
Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, the Board could properly disregard ANR's issuance of the discharge permit in
evaluating the proposed St. Albans Wal-Mart development's compliance with Act 250.
136. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
137. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6FO471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 10 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Here, the Board stated that "[u]sing such
as a benchmark clearly presents little or no real potential of improving the Bay's water
quality." Id. at 14. The Board noted that other states have required that projects be designed
to achieve "natural state" nutrient contribution levels, and that such a standard may be best
suited to improve the water quality in St. Albans Bay. Id. The Board also criticized ANR's
use of draft procedures which by definition have not been finalized as a basis for permit
issuance standards. Id. at 15.
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then being used by ANR. 38 Based on these conclusions, the Board found
the St. Albans Wal-Mart project complied with the criteria addressing waste
disposal and streams.'39
The Board also evaluated the Wal-Mart project under the criterion
addressing soil erosion, noting that the project was designed in accordance
with ANR's Vermont Handbook of Soil Erosion and Sediment Control.1"
The design called for the construction of sedimentation basins and silt bar-
riers. 14 1  The Board was convinced that the applicants had sufficiently
discharged their burden of proof and that the St. Albans Wal-Mart project,
as designed, complied with the criterion addressing soil erosion.142
The issues before the Board in its evaluation of the St. Albans Wal-
Mart application also included the criteria addressing headwaters and
wetland rules. 143 Because the Board found that the project would not
affect any relevant headwaters or wetlands, the project was deemed to
comply with both of these criteria."4
138. Id. The Board warned that future conclusions on future applications might be
different regarding design according to existing regulation. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 15 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23,
1994).
139. Id. at 15-16.
140. See id. at 4, 11, 16. This criterion directed the Board not to issue a permit unless
it found that the proposed St. Albans Wal-Mart would "not cause unreasonable soil erosion
or reduction in the capacity of the land to hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy
condition may result." VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(4).
141. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 11 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). As an example of other soil erosion control
measures, the Board noted that the project designers envisioned that upon completion,
"[d]rainage paths with slopes greater than five percent will be stone lined. Drainage paths
with slopes between one percent and five percent will be seeded and protected with erosion
matting. Drainage paths with slopes that are less than one percent will be seeded and
mulched." Id. Thus, it is clear that the Board paid detailed attention to the applicants' plans
to control soil erosion.
142. Id. at 16.
143. Id. at 5, 8, 11-12, 16.
144. Id. at 11-12, 16. The criterion addressing headwaters involves:
the quality of the ground or surface waters flowing through or upon lands which
are not devoted to intensive development, and which lands are:
(i) headwaters of watersheds characterized by steep slopes and shallow
soils; or
(ii) drainage areas of 20 square miles or less; or
(iii) above 1,500 feet elevation; or
(iv) watersheds of public water supplies designated by the Vermont
department of health; or
(v) areas supplying significant amounts of recharge waters to aquifers.
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Thus, the Board found that the St. Albans Wal-Mart project complied
with all of the ecologically-related criteria under which review was
conducted.14 This finding supports the conclusion that the construction
of the "Vermont barrier" is justified by protectionist concerns for the local
economy rather than ecologically-grounded concerns for the environment.
D. Protectionist Fears Displayed
The Board conducted a review of the St. Albans Wal-Mart project
under several fiscal criteria: impact on schools and local government servic-
es, impact of growth, costs of scattered development, and public investments
and facilities. 46 The Board found against the applicants on all but one of
these criteria, finding compliance with the criterion addressing public
investments and facilities.1 47
As with the ecologically-related criteria under which the Board
reviewed the project, many of the Board's findings of fact supported its
conclusions of law regarding compliance with multiple criteria."'8 The
Board considered both direct and indirect growth caused by the project, as
well as the associated public benefits and costs. 149 The Board found the
effect of the project on retail competition to be a common issue relevant to
all these fiscal criteria."5 The Board concluded that "the competitive
effect of a project on existing businesses is relevant to the Act 250
criteria."'' The Board elaborated, stating that:
VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(1)(A). The Board made specific factual findings regarding the
characteristics of the site of the project in relation to this statutory description of headwaters,
and found that none would be affected by it. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 8, 12 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
The criterion addressing wetland rules directs a determination prior to permit issuance
that "the development or subdivision will not violate the rules of the water resources board,
as adopted under section 905(9) of this title, relating to significant wetlands." VT. STAT.
ANN. § 6086(a)(1)(G). As with the criterion addressing headwaters above, the Board made
specific factual findings and determined that "the proposed project will not violate the
Wetland Rules." In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order at 16 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
145. Id. at 11-16, 27-29.
146. Id. at 16-53.
147. Id. at 34, 48, 51-53.
148. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
149. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 17-26 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
150. Id. at 27-29.
151. Id. at 27.
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[t]he issue is protection of the tax base. It is clear to the Board that
... the General Assembly intended that the Board and district commis-
sions consider that part of the economic impact of a development is any
reduction in the tax base caused by a proposed development. For
example, [the] Criteria [addressing impact on schools and local
governmental services] . . . speak in terms of the "ability" of a local
government to provide services, which can only be determined by
reference to the available tax base. Similarly, Criterion 9(A) [address-
ing impact of growth] speaks of the impact of a project on a town's
"financial capacity." Also, Criterion 9(H) [addressing costs of scattered
development] refers to a project's "indirect" costs. 52
Here, the Board confessed that its objections to the St. Albans Wal-Mart
project were driven by protectionist concerns for the local economy.'15 3
Deeming the effects of the St. Albans Wal-Mart upon retail competition
relevant to these fiscal criteria, the Board endeavored to determine just what
these effects would be. 154
The Board first discussed its findings under the criterion addressing
impact of growth. 5 The applicants bore the burden of proof on this
152. Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id.
154. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 19-24, 42-49 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
155. Id. at 17-19, 29-34. The Vermont Legislature has directed in the criterion
addressing impact of growth that:
In considering an application, the district commission or the board shall take
into consideration the growth in population experienced by the town and region
in question and whether or not the proposed development would significantly
affect their existing and potential financial capacity to reasonably accommodate
both the total growth and the rate of growth otherwise expected for the town and
region and the total growth and rate of growth which would result from the
development if approved. After considering anticipated costs for education,
highway access and maintenance, sewage disposal, water supply, police and fire
services and other factors relating to the public health, safety, and welfare, the
district commission or the board shall impose conditions which prevent undue
burden upon the town and region in accommodating growth caused by the
proposed development or subdivision. Notwithstanding section 6088 of this title
the burden of proof that proposed development will significantly affect existing
or potential financial capacity of the town and region to accommodate such
growth is upon any party opposing an application, excepting however, where the
town has a duly adopted capital improvement program the burden shall be on
the applicant.
VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(9)(A). Because the town of St. Albans had such a duly adopted
plan, the burden of proof was on the applicants. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-
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criterion." 6 The project would result in little direct population growth, as
all but about five of the employees at the St. Albans Wal-Mart would be
hired from the local labor market.'57 These five employees would bring
six children.'58 Thus, the direct population growth expected from the
project was minor. The Board, however, expressed more concern for what
it called secondary growth than the direct growth mentioned above. 159 As
had occurred in other New England communities where Wal-Mart had
located, the project was likely to cause the development of other "highway-
oriented businesses in the area."'' On this issue of secondary growth, the
Board found that the applicants had provided no specific evidence concern-
ing the anticipated public costs and public benefits caused thereby, and had
simply argued that "the proposed project will have an unquantified but
positive impact on the ability of the Town of St. Albans and the Franklin
County region with regard to the costs of development caused by the
project..'' Such an argument was inadequate to sustain their burden of
proof under this criterion, and the application was denied pursuant
thereto. 6
2
The Board next considered the application under the criterion
addressing costs of scattered development. 63 First, the Board held that
EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 30 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 17.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 18-20, 30-34.
160. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 18 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Here, the Board elaborated on what it meant
by highway-oriented development, stating "[t]hese types of stores are generally highway-
oriented development, and typically can include fast-food franchises such as Burger King and
Kentucky Fried Chicken, pizza and sandwich shops, gas stations, banks, video rental stores,
new shopping centers, and expansion of existing shopping centers." Id.
161. Id. at 33. Consultants from RKG Associates, Inc., testified on behalf of the
applicants in this regard. Id. at 18. Their testimony was deemed not credible, supposedly
because they accounted for "only public benefits from secondary growth in the form of
increased tax revenues and [did] not consider any public costs." Id. at 19. The Board
believed that such a credible numerical study was feasible. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 19 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23,
1994).
162. Id. at 33-34. Here, the Board declared that it needed "specific projections as to the
total growth and rate of secondary growth to be caused by the proposed project and the
anticipated costs and benefits associated with such growth." Id.
163. Id. at 19-26, 34-49. This criterion directs that:
The district commission or board will grant a permit for a development or
subdivision which is not physically contiguous to an existing settlement
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this criterion was applicable to the St. Albans Wal-Mart project application
because the project indeed constituted scattered development since it was not
physically contiguous to an existing settlement.' 6  Evaluation under this
criterion involves a determination of whether the public benefits outweigh
the public costs, in which case the project is in compliance.161 Thus, the
Board attempted to discern just what these costs and benefits were.' 66
As one might have expected, conflicting evidence was presented to the
Board concerning the issues of public costs and public benefits. 67 The
whenever it is demonstrated that, in addition to all other applicable criteria, the
additional costs of public services and facilities caused directly or indirectly by
the proposed development or subdivision do not outweigh the tax revenue and
other public benefits of the development or subdivision such as increased
employment opportunities or the provision of needed and balanced housing
accessible to existing or planned employment centers.
VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(9)(H).
164. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 34-42 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Four Board members, including the
chair, dissented from this finding. Id. at 42. The Board undertook a lengthy discussion of
the term "existing settlement" as used in the statutory language of this criterion, concluding
that:
the phrase "existing settlement" as used in that criterion means an extant
community center similar to the traditional Vermont center in that it is compact
in size and contains a mix of uses, including commercial and industrial uses,
and, importantly, a significant residential component. It is a place in which
people may live and work and in which the uses largely are within walking
distance of each other. The term specifically excludes areas of commercial,
highway-oriented uses commonly referred to as "strip development."
The Board further concludes that, to be contiguous to an existing
settlement, a proposed project must be within or immediately next to such a
settlement and must be compatible with the settlement buildings in terms of size
and use.
Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). This discussion by the Board will likely haunt, or at least
hinder, future attempts by Wal-Mart to enter the Vermont market because this definition of
"existing settlement" seems tailor-made to exclude Wal-Mart's characteristic superstores.
One is unlikely to find many other buildings which are compatible with the firm's superstores
in terms of size and use. The exclusion of their superstores from this definition means this
criterion should always be held applicable, and the firm will need to overcome the burden
of proof by presenting inherently intangible and conjectural public cost and benefit
estimations.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 19-24, 42-48.
167. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 43-45 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Testifying for the applicants were the
consultants RKG Associates, Inc. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. Elizabeth
Humstone and Thomas Muller testified on behalf of the Citizens and VNRC. In re Wal-Mart
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Citizens and VNRC filed a joint set of fiscal impact charts." Reportedly
due to significant differences in accounting for particular items in the
calculations, the Board found the numbers presented by the Citizens and
VNRC more credible.'69 Siding with the Citizens and VNRC on the
accounting, the Board commented on the significance of the differences in
the fiscal calculations:
All of this means that many more existing businesses will suffer or go
out of business from competition with the proposed Wal-Mart, and
therefore many more jobs will be lost, than projected by the Applicants.
The loss of such businesses and jobs is likely therefore to have a much
more negative effect on the tax base of the Franklin County towns than
the Applicants project. Accordingly, the public costs of the proposed
Wal-Mart are likely to be much higher than the Applicants estimate. 7°
Again, the Board openly revealed its protectionist concerns for the local
economy.
Using the numbers provided by the Citizens and VNRC, the Board
calculated the net annual public benefit to be approximately $109,000 in
1995 dollars, countered against and outweighed by $315,000 in total annual
Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 43-45 (Vt.
Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). As one might further expect, RKG testified that the proposed
project would result in a net public benefit, while the opposition testified that the project
would result in a net public loss. Id.
168. Id. at 6. This was most likely a tactical decision, as the credibility of both the
Citizens' and VNRC's numbers would be reduced if they stood in conflict with each other.
169. Id. at 43-44. The Board observed that the differences in the projections were
caused by conflicting assumptions made by the parties regarding three factors which affected
their projections:
(a) the annual average sales per square foot for the proposed Wal-Mart; (b) the
recapture of "leakage," that is purchases by Franklin County residents presently
made in other places such as Chittenden County that would be made at the
proposed Wal-Mart; and (c) the percentage of total sales that would be made to
Canadian citizens.
Id. at 43.
The Board noted that RKG used a sales per square foot number which was less than
the national average at Wal-Marts, which Muller and Humstone used, and ultimately found
the Muller/Humstone assumptions more credible on all three assumptions. In re Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 43-44 (Vt.
Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
170. Id. at 45.
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costs.' Of the public cost figure, $129,000 was attributed to losses in tax
receipts caused by competition from the Wal-Mart store."7 Here again,
the failure of the applicants to offer specific calculations concerning public
benefit from secondary development hurt their cause because without any
credible numbers for this factor, the Board could not establish a higher
estimated total net annual public benefit figure. 73 The absence of these
numbers also precluded imposing mitigating conditions, such as impact
fees.
174
171. Id. at 45-48. The Board explained the benefit figure, stating "[tihe benefits will
consist of approximately $77,000 in property tax revenues to the Town and approximately
$32,400 in increased state aid to education to the City of St. Albans and the Towns of
Enosburg and Swanton." Id. at 45. On the cost side, the Board gave a detailed, itemized
accounting:
The annual costs to governments caused by the proposed project will include,
in 1995 dollars:
(a) approximately $61,000 in state aid to education which the Town will
lose;
(b) approximately $25,000 in operating costs caused by the addition of
six students to the school system;
(c) as much as approximately $110,000, representing lost revenue to the
relevant municipalities due to changes in the Grand Lists caused by competition
from the proposed project;
(d) as much as approximately $19,000, representing lost revenue because
of job loss in the region;
(e) approximately $11,500, representing the cost to the Town of direct
services to the proposed project;
(f) approximately $88,000, representing the public funds which have
been invested in the City's historic downtown. This investment is likely to be
lost if the proposed project has the projected negative impact on the City.
Id. at 46.
172. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 46 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
173. Id. at 48. The Board stated, "[s]uch information is necessary not only to reach a
positive finding under Criterion 9(A) [addressing impact of growth], but is also necessary to
reach a positive finding under Criterion 9(H) [addressing costs of scattered development],
which addresses both direct and indirect costs." Id.
174. Id. at 49. The Board commented that it had considered the possibility of imposing
conditions to secure compliance with the criterion addressing costs of scattered development,
but that:
because of the absence of information concerning the public costs and benefits
associated with the secondary growth discussed above, and because the present
record contains little focus on such remedies by the parties, the Board is not
persuaded that it can arrive at an amount for an impact fee or a bond with
sufficient precision to ensure that the impacts of the proposed project will
actually be ameliorated.
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The Board concluded that "the ratio is approximately three dollars of
public cost for each dollar of public benefit."'75 Drawing such a conclu-
sion, the Board had no choice but to deny the permit application under the
criterion addressing costs of scattered development.'76
Next, the Board revealed its conclusions regarding compliance of the
St. Albans Wal-Mart with the criterion addressing impact on schools.1"
The burden of proof on this criterion is placed on the parties opposing the
project.178
Reviewing the permit application under this criterion, the Board found
that the project would add six children to the school system, which already
lacked "the physical capacity to accommodate the projected six additional
school children., 179  Financially, the proposed project would directly add
an additional $25,000 in annual operating costs to the relevant municipali-
ties, and again, insufficient figures regarding secondary growth precluded
imposing mitigating conditions.180  As a result of the increase in the an-
Id. Thus, the St. Albans Wal-Mart permit application was unconditionally denied under this
criterion. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order at 49 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id. at 49.
177. Id. at 23-24,49-52. This criterion involves a determination by the body reviewing
the permit application that the project "[w]ill not cause an unreasonable burden on the ability
of a municipality to provide educational services." VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(6).
178. Id. § 6088(d). Although not outcome-determinative in the present case, a permit
may not be denied solely for failure to comply with this criterion. Id § 6087(b). The same
is true of the criterion addressing public investments and facilities, under which the
application in the present case was also reviewed by the Board. Id
179. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 50 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
180. Id at 50-51. The Board commented on the insufficiency of data, concluding "if,
as concluded above, insufficient information has been provided concerning the impact of
secondary growth on the area governments, then the Board cannot reach a conclusion
concerning how such growth may affect the ability of those governments to provide
educational services.' Id at 51. Regarding the possibility of imposing mitigating conditions,
the Board commented that due to the lack of sufficient information concerning secondary
growth, "the Board is unable to fashion a reasonable permit condition to alleviate the burden
to be caused by the proposed project." Id After noting that it could not deny the permit
application on the basis of this criterion alone, the Board stated, "[i]f the Board did not find,
as it does elsewhere in this decision, that the application must be denied under other criteria,
the Board would consider re-opening the hearing to take evidence regarding permit
conditions under [this] Criterion ... designed to mitigate the burden created on the relevant
educational systems." Id. Thus, the question of permit conditions under this criterion
became moot by the Board's conclusion regarding other fiscal criteria.
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nual operating costs, the Board found against the applicants on this criteri-
on.
18 1
Next under review was the criterion addressing local government
services." 2 Incorporating its relevant findings of fact concerning the other
previously discussed fiscal criteria, the Board denied the permit application
on the basis of this particular criterion.'83
The last fiscal criterion under which the permit was reviewed was that
addressing public investments and facilities.1 84  A significant historic
district, containing over one hundred buildings on the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior's National Register of Historic Places, is located within
the city of St. Albans. 185  Although most of the buildings in the historic
district are in private use, millions of dollars in public money have been
invested for their preservation. 6 The permit opponents argued that due
to these public investments, the city's historic district was a relevant
181. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 51 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
182. Id. Review under this criterion requires that before granting a permit the issuing
body be convinced that a proposed project "[w]ill not place an unreasonable burden on the
ability of the local governments to provide municipal or governmental services." VT. STAT.
ANN. § 6086(a)(7).
183. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 52 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
184. Id. at 52-54. This criterion dictates that:
A permit will be granted for the development or subdivision of lands adjacent
to governmental and public utility facilities, services, and lands, including, but
not limited to, highways, airports, waste disposal facilities, office and mainte-
nance buildings, fire and police stations, universities, schools, hospitals, prisons,
jails, electric generating and transmission facilities, oil and gas pipe lines, parks,
hiking trails and forest and game lands, when it is demonstrated that, in addition
to all other applicable criteria, the development or subdivision will not
unnecessarily or unreasonably endanger the public or quasi-public investment in
the -facility, service, or lands, or materially jeopardize or interfere with the
function, efficiency, or safety of, the public's use or enjoyment of or access to
the facility, service, or lands.
VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(9)(K).
185. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 24-25 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Also considered by the Board under this
criterion was the question "whether the traffic impacts of the proposed project will materially
jeopardize or interfere with the function, safety, or efficiency of Route 7." Id at 53. This
question and the concerns relevant to both this criterion and that addressing traffic were
addressed in the Board's written opinion in the portion discussing the criterion addressing
traffic. See id.
186. Id. at 24-25, 53.
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consideration for review under this criterion."87 The Board disagreed on
this point, and found overall that the project complied with this criteri-
on.
88
Thus, the St. Albans Wal-Mart permit application was denied on all but
one of the fiscal criteria under which review was conducted by the Board.
The Board acknowledged that the effect of retail competition from the
proposed St. Albans Wal-Mart was an issue common to its deliberations
under all these fiscal criteria."8 9 However, the Board distinguished
between the protection of existing businesses from new competition and
protection of the tax base of the relevant governments:
[W]e wish to make clear that our concern under Act 250's criteria is
exclusively with the economic impact of a proposed development on
public, not private entities. A proposed development may have a direct
and substantial adverse economic impact on one or more existing
businesses; however, that impact on competing private entities is
irrelevant to our analysis under Act 250 unless it can also be shown that
there is a resultant material adverse economic impact on the ability or
capacity of a municipality or other governmental entity to provide
public services."9
Whether the Board felt it was protecting governments, businesses, or both,
the result was the same for Wal-Mart--no store in St. Albans, Vermont.
E. Other Issues
The Board also considered the St. Albans Wal-Mart project in light of
the criteria addressing conformity with the relevant local plan and traf-
fic.' 9 ' The criterion addressing conformance with the local plan was not
187. Id. at 53.
188. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 53 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). Here, the Board commented that "[p]ublic
funds, however, potentially may be invested in many private structures or enterprises." Id.
However, the expected public costs associated with detrimental effects to the city's historic
district were considered by the Board in its review of the project under the criterion
addressing costs of scattered development, and estimated at $88,000 of annual costs in 1995
dollars. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
189. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-ER, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 26-29 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
190. Id. at 29 (citing In re Pyramid Co. of Burlington, No. 4C0821, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order at 8 (ENVTL. COMM'N OCr. 12, 1978)).
191. Id. at 4-5, 16-17, 21-22, 54-57.
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applicable to the permit application for want of a town or regional plan with
which to conform.'9 Regarding the criterion addressing traffic, the Board
would have issued the permit with mitigating conditions if it were not
denying the permit application for lack of compliance with other Act 250
criteria. 93
IV. THE PENDING APPEAL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT
The applicants have taken appeal of the Board's decision to the
Supreme Court of Vermont.' 94 The case has been completely briefed, and
as of the printing of this note, the case has not been scheduled for argument
before the court.1" Among other things, the applicants are arguing on
appeal that the Board erred in basing its decision on the anticipated effects
the proposed development would have on local retail industry competition
and that the alleged secondary impacts of competition are too speculative for
consideration. 1
96
Regarding effects on retail competition, the applicants allege that "[b]y
its actions, the Board is regulating market competition."' 97 The applicants
urge that such considerations are outside the scope of Act 250, which
192. Id. at 16-17, 54. The criterion addressing conformance with the local plan dictates
that to obtain a permit a project must be "in conformance with any duly adopted local or
regional plan or capital program under chapter 117 of Title 24." VT. STAT. ANN. §
6086(a)(10). No such plans were in effect at the time the application was filed. In re Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 17,
54 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994). The town of St. Albans' plan took effect only eight days
after the filing date, a fact which most likely influenced the decision to file sooner rather than
later. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 54-57. The criterion addressing traffic requires a finding before permit
issuance that the project "[w]ill not cause unreasonable congestion or unsafe conditions with
respect to use of the highways, waterways, railways, airports and airways, and other means
of transportation existing or proposed." VT. STAT. ANN. § 6086(a)(5). Interestingly, the
applicants proposed to pay for several improvements to U.S. Route 7 near the project,
including installing a traffic signal at the intersection of routes U.S. 7 and Vermont 207, and
the construction of an additional lane of traffic. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 54-55 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
194. Telephone Interview with Peter M. Collins, Appellate Counsel for Wal-Mart and
the St. Albans Group (Nov. 19, 1995).
195. Telephone Interview with Jane Fitzpatrick, Docket Clerk for the Supreme Court
of Vermont (Feb. 11, 1996). Oral argument was requested by Mark G. Hall, counsel for the
appellants. Id.
196. Appellants' Brief at 5-17, In re Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB (Vt. Envtl. Bd.
Dec. 23, 1994) (No. 95-398).
197. Id. at 5.
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focuses on and is triggered by changes in the use of land and the accompa-
nying effects on the environment. 198  In support of this position, the
applicants note that were Wal-Mart to move into an existing retail site, the
same economic factors which concerned the Board would be present, yet no
permit would be required because no change in the use of the land had oc-
curred.' 99 The applicants accuse the Board of creating "an anomalous
situation in which Wal-Mart cannot obtain a permit due to impacts that
would not, in themselves, trigger Act 250 review.... To the contrary, free
market competition, being divorced from actual physical changes in the use
of land, does not warrant consideration under Act 25o.22200
The applicants have also argued that the Board erred in relying on
"impacts arising from market competition [which] are too speculative and
inherently inaccurate to provide the degree of certainty necessary to
adjudicative action."' The applicants have cited expert studies which
conclude that studies of secondary impacts are not reliable.2  Such
speculative evidence, it is argued, is inappropriate for consideration under
the Act 250 process, which "is a highly adversarial process in which
evidence is presented and credibility determinations are made by a quasi-
judicial tribunal. If a permit is denied, fairness dictates that there be some
degree of certainty that an alleged impact will in fact occur."'
V. PROPOSAL
Wal-Mart has experienced opposition to its plans to enter many
communities in the northeastern United States. 204 The St. Albans, Ver-
mont case is just one example of this opposition. As the St. Albans case
illustrates, much of the motivation for this opposition is protectionist fear for
the local retail industry. The Vermont Environmental Board was candid in
basing its denial of the St. Albans Wal-Mart Act 250 permit application on
the motivation of pure and simple economic protectionism.
198. Id. at 6-7.
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id. (citations omitted).
201. Appellants' Brief at 13, In re Wal-Mart, Inc. (No. 95-398).
202. Id. at 13-17 (citing ROBERT W. BURCHELL & DAvID LIsToKIN, THE FISCAL
IMPACr HANDBOOK 2 (1980); JOHN M. LEVY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR
CrrIEs & TowNs 137 (1990); Ervin G. Schuster & E. Lee Medema, Accuracy of Economic
Impact Analyses, J. FORESTRY SERVS., Aug. 1989, at 29).
203. Appellants' Brief at 17, In re Wal-Mart, Inc. (No. 95-398).
204. See Donker, supra note 3, at El.
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Wal-Mart's motivation for placing its superstores in small-town
business communities has been criticized as predatory. The popular CBS
television news magazine 60 Minutes recently presented a report on the
opposition to Wal-Mart. 5 In that piece, Mr. Glenn Falgoust, a former
store owner, criticized the retailer, stating "[tihey moved into towns all
across the South because the easiest person they could put out of business
was mom and pop.''2'
It is axiomatic that our nation's strength, our position of world
leadership, and our status as the richest nation in the history of the world are
the fruits of a capitalist economy driven by the market forces of competi-
tion. Our capitalist roots are as much a reason for the existence of the
proverb declaring America to be "the land of opportunity" as any other fiber
in our social fabric. However, our experience as such a nation has also
demonstrated that market forces, left unchecked, can and often do produce
unfair, inefficient economic conditions.
Addressing these concerns, Congress and many states, including
Vermont, have enacted laws to guard against monopolies, predatory pricing,
price fixing, and other inefficient economic conditions and practice.2
These laws, in part, were created for the protection of the consumer, not the
tax base.208 These laws, like all human creations, are imperfect. Howev-
er, many afford remedies to those who can allege and prove in a court of
law, not in the media, that they have been unlawfully wronged. 2" If Wal-
205. 60 Minutes: Profile: Up against the Wal-Mart; citizen grass-roots activists fight
movement of Wal-Mart chain into small town areas (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 30,
1995), available in WL, ALLNEWS Directory, 1995 WL 2729677. This interview was
conducted by 60 Minutes co-host Morley Safer.
206. Id. Safer did not disguise the implication that Wal-Mart was responsible for
Falgoust's status as a former store owner when he told the audience that:
Angela and Glenn Falgoust once owned a store in Donaldsville, Louisiana,
population 8,000. They sold a bit of everything: bikes, toys, lawn mowers.
Business was thriving until Wal-Mart arrived in 1983 .... The bitter fact was
the Falgousts couldn't buy bikes wholesale for what Wal-Mart was selling them
retail. Wal-Mart's enormous purchasing power is the reason. Also, the
Falgousts say, they reduce prices to purposely put competitors like themselves
out of business.
Id. When asked if he and his family shopped at Wal-Mart, Falgoust replied "Yes. We have
to-not that we like to." Id
207. See generally WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR., STATE ANTITRUST LAw 75, 78 (1989);
WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 1995 EDITION §§ 2.03, .05, .07 (1995).
208. See generally MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER (EN-
FORCEMENT) 57-58 (1956).
209. See generally HOLMES, supra note 207, § 8.10.
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Mart, or any other business entity, operates in violation of these laws to the
injury of any persons, let it be for the wronged to advocate their own rights
and protect their own interests. Otherwise, let American consumers choose
how best to protect their interests by spending their own money wherever
they lawfully elect.
The notion of state and local governments protecting their economies
as a means of protecting their own tax bases (as the Vermont Environmental
Board candidly admitted to doing in denying an Act 250 permit to the St.
Albans Wal-Mart project) should alarm the people and lawmakers of the
United States as well as Vermont. Domestic economic protectionism of this
sort presents a threat to the very fabric of which our Union is woven. The
words of Justice Cardozo are as profound now as in 1935: "[t]he Constitu-
tion was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial
in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.""21
The Vermont Legislature should examine decisions of the Vermont
Environmental Board, such as in the St. Albans' Wal-Mart case, closely and
consider if the responsibilities and powers of that body and the several
district environmental commissions should be modified. If they are
unwilling to do so, parties such as Wal-Mart should consider challenging the
constitutional validity of these state-imposed commercial restrictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wal-Mart's struggle in St. Albans, Vermont supports the conclusion
that the "Vermont barrier" has been constructed from protectionist fears for
the local economy. The Board found that the St. Albans project complied
with all of the ecologically-related criteria under which the application was
reviewed.211 Ironically, Wal-Mart's strong record in the retail industry
proved to be the firm's undoing before the Board.21 This barrier consti-
tutes economic protectionism of the local economy in a manner which
should concern the people of Vermont as well as the rest of the United
States. The Board candidly announced its protectionist fears for the local
210. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935); see also C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkson, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 ("The Commerce Clause presumes a
national market free from local legislation that discriminates in favor of local interests.").
211. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6F0471-EB, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order at 11-16 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994).
212. dLa t 26-53.
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economy as a common factor in its denial of the application on several
fiscal criteria.213
One is left to ponder the veracity of that headline announcing "Wal-
Mart breaks Vermont barrier.' 2 14 Inasmuch as Act 250 is that barrier,
Wal-Mart cannot break it by taking over existing retail space as it did in
Bennington, Vermont, because such a maneuver does not require an Act 250
permit.215 The final chapter to the tale of Wal-Mart's struggles to break
the Vermont barrier has yet to be written.
Michael A. Schneider
213. Id.
214. See Wal-Mart, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
215. See VT. STAT. ANN. § 6081(a) (requiring permits to "commence construction on
a subdivision or development").
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I. INTRODUCrION
The cost of expanding Florida's over-crowded urban traffic ways is
skyrocketing. The Florida Department of Transportation's ("FDOT") actual
total expenditure for right of way production and eminent domain litigation
for June 1994 through May 1995 was $271.1 million,' up from $243.5
million the previous year.2 According to these figures, $166.1 million was
spent for production costs, including purchasing right of way and paying
severance and business damages to landowners and tenants.3 An additional
$105 million was spent litigating FDOT's takings state-wide.4 One writer
anticipates that over the next ten years, Florida will spend $44.3 billion to
1. Figures provided by the Cost Management Systems Department, State of Florida
Department of Transportation, District IV, June 9, 1995 [hereinafter Costs]. During the first
11 months of fiscal year 1994-1995, i.e., June 1994 through May 1995, Florida Department
of Transportation District IV, encompassing Broward, Palm Beach, Martin, and St. Lucie
Counties, spent a total of $22.9 million, compared to $64.3 million spent by District VI,
comprised of only Dade County.
2. See Erik Milstone, Roadblock, FLA. TREND, Mar. 1995, at 56, 59 (citing statistics
provided by the Center for Urban Transportation Research in Tampa, Florida).
3. See Costs, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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expand its roadway system.5 This estimate is $9 billion more than the state
will have available at current tax rates.6 Faced with the challenge of
balancing Florida's constitutional guarantee of "full compensation"7 against
a rapidly expanding eminent domain program and its increasing cost, the
Florida Legislature has taken steps to decrease the state's eminent domain
litigation exposure.8 Florida's courts, however, have been reluctant to
follow the legislature's lead.
One of the many factors contributing to the increase in state-wide right
of way costs is environmental contamination. Environmental contamination
takes many forms including asbestos, urea-formaldehyde foam insulation,
lead in drinking water, and petroleum hydrocarbon.9 The Federal Highway
Administration ("FHWA"), which contributes up to ninety percent of the
funds spent by FDOT to revamp its overburdened state roads, often requires
FDOT to clean up contamination prior to construction of federally-funded
state roadways.1" This cost traditionally has been paid by the FDOT and
the FHWA. The cost of clean-up, however, ultimately falls on the taxpayer.
5. See Milstone, supra note 2, at 60.
6. id.
7. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a), which states that "[n]o private property shall be taken
except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or
secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner." See also Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950) (stating that test for full compensation is not
met if landowner is required to pay attorney fees and costs out of damages awarded for value
of property taken).
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1995) (restructuring attorney's fees awarded in
eminent domain cases and generally limiting such awards to percentage of benefit obtained
for condemnee/client); see also FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
9. See generally James R. Arnold, The Appraisal and Valuation of Contaminated
Properties, C643 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 405 (1991), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, ALI-ABA
Database; Vincent D'Elia & Catherine M. Ward, The Valuation of Contaminated Property,
111 BANKING L.J. 350 (1994); John D. Dorchester, Jr., Environmental Pollution: Valuation
in a Changing World, 59 APPRAISAL J. 289 (1991); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of
Contaminated Properties, 56 APPRAISAL J. 7 (1988) [hereinafter Patchin, Valuation]; William
B. Johnson, Annotation, State and Local Government Control of Pollution from Underground
Storage Tanks, 11 A.L.R.5TH 388 (1994); Gregor I. McGregor, Some Practical Suggestions
for Valuing Contaminated Real Estate, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 21, 1994, at 40, available
in WL, TP-ALL Directory, LP Database (providing general discussions on numerous types
of contamination).
10. Telephone Interview with Paul Lampley, District Contamination Impact Coordinator,
District IV, Florida Department of Transportation Environmental Management Office (June
26, 1995). Mr. Lampley also indicated that an agreement between the FDOT and the Florida
Highway Contractor's Association states that the FDOT will not send construction personnel
onto the right of way, if contaminated.
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In the recent first impression case of Finkelstein v. Department of
Transportation (Finkelstein I1)," the Supreme Court of Florida answered
a question of great public importance. The court answered in the affirmative
the question whether evidence of contamination was relevant to property
value. 2 The decision has the potential to slow cost increases attributable
to contamination because real estate appraisers may now consider the
negative effect of contamination on the value of property acquired in
eminent domain actions." The Finkelstein II decision also gives the FDOT
the authority to present evidence of contamination and its corresponding
negative effect on fair market value at trial. 4 Full compensation is linked
to an estimate of fair market value." Because fair market value may now
reflect the negative impact of on-site contamination, 6 it is possible that
FDOT could pay less for property negatively "stigmatized" by contami-
nation. In the end, FDOT's exercise of this newly-granted authority should
help to control a portion of Florida's rising eminent domain costs.
This comment examines the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
in Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation. Part II presents the facts of
the case, the procedural history, and a summary of the supreme court
decision. Part III of this comment discusses the relevance of evidence of
contamination in eminent domain valuation proceedings and current
appraisal valuation methodology, 7 as a result of the Finkelstein II decision.
11. 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
12. Id. at 922.
13. IM at 924.
14. Id. at 925.
15. See generally FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(a) (1995) (giving ajury of twelve persons the
power to determine "the amount of compensation to be paid, which compensation shall
include... [t]he value of the property sought to be appropriated"). Additionally, Jackson-
ville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958), states:
[w]e feel our constitutional provision for full compensation requires that the
courts determine the value of the property by taking into account all facts and
circumstances which bear a reasonable relationship to the loss occasioned the
owner by virtue of the taking of his property under the right of eminent domain.
Id. at 291.
16. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922.
17. See id. at 923.
1996]
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II. FINKELSTEIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
A. Facts of the Case
In March 1990, the FDOT filed a petition to condemn Parcel 239, a
whole taking of an environmentally contaminated gasoline service station
located at Davie Boulevard and Interstate 95 in Fort Lauderdale, Broward
County, Florida, as a part of the Interstate 595 expansion project.1 The
parcel was owned by Ida Finkelstein and Alice Fox and was leased to
Tenneco Oil Company ("Tenneco").' 9 The petition stated a good faith
estimate of value for the property of $642,650.0 After the Order of
Taking hearing was held May 1, 1990, FDOT deposited $642,650 into the
registry of the court, and title to the property vested in the FDOT.21
Finkelstein and Fox answered the petition in May and June of 1990,
respectively, and no other pleadings were filed until April 3, 1992, when a
pretrial order setting the cause for trial was filed.22
Prior to December 1988, Tenneco discovered petroleum groundwater
contamination beneath the service station site.23 According to the supreme
court, Tenneco reported the contamination to the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation ("DER") 24 as encouraged by Florida law,25 and began
monitoring the contamination.26 The parties agreed that the DER had
determined the site was eligible for Florida's Early Detection Incentive
18. ld; State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein (Finkelstein 1), 629 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (certifying question to Supreme Court of Florida), review granted, 648
So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1994), aft'd, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995); Amended Brief of Petitioners at
1, Finkelstein v. Department of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995) (No. 83,308).
19. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 1, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
20. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d at 932; Petition, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No.
90-06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. Mar. 1, 1990).
21. See Certificate of the Clerk, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19)
(Fla. Broward County Ct. May 1, 1990); see also discussion infra note 185.
22. Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 932.
23. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 921, 923 (Fla. 1995).
24. Id. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation is now known as the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
25. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(b) (1995).
26. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308). Subsequently, FDOT
investigated this matter and discovered that Tenneco, in fact, had not begun on-site
remediation; rather, it was the FDOT itself who had begun the clean-up. See Transcript of
Hearing on Remand at 29, Department of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-6563(19) (Fla.
Broward County Ct. October 9, 1995).
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("EDr') program.27  The EDI program encouraged early detection,
reporting, and clean-up of contamination from leaking petroleum storage
systems through state reimbursement of clean-up expense.28 Under the
EDI program, only qualified sites were eligible for reimbursement, not
qualified landowners. 29 Through a memorandum of understanding between
the DER and the FDOT, the FDOT became the beneficiary of the site's EDI
eligibility and state reimbursement of remediation costs. 30 Prior to the June
1992 trial, FDOT worked closely with the DER to quickly remediate the site
to meet FDOT's construction schedule for the road improvement project."
B. Procedural Background
On June 12, 1992, FDOT filed a motion in limine seeking a pretrial
determination of the admissibility of evidence that the property taken was
contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbon and the cost of remediation.32
27. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 923.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(a)-(b), (12)(b); see also Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at
923; Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aft'd, 656 So. 2d 921
(1995); Puckett Oil Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 549 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (determining eligibility for gasoline service station site under EDI program);
Commercial Coating Corp. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 548 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1990) (defining mineral spirits as
"petroleum product" under EDI statute to find site eligible for remediation cost reimburse-
ment); Amended Brief of Petitioners at 1-2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Johnson, supra note
9, §§ 3-5, 13-15, at 402-12, 428-37.
Prior to June 1995, only sites with leaky underground storage tanks were eligible to
participate in the EDI program. FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9)(a)-(b), (12)(b). The majority of
sites with this contamination problem are gasoline service stations. Reforms to the problem-
laden EDI program limit eligibility for reimbursement of remediation costs to sites which
score more than 50 under a new ranking system. Prakash Gandhi, Critics: State Tank
Program Revised But Not Repaired, THE FLORIDA SPECIFIER, June 1995, at 1, 23. Of the
12,000 sites eligible for the EDI program, only 2300 score 50 or greater. Id. See S. 2578,
1995 Fla. Reg. Sess. (1995) for changes to Florida's EDI program.
29. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9) (1987).
30. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2, Finkelstein (No. 83,308). FDOT filed for EDI
reimbursement on September 5, 1995, after the original application had been lost. Letter
from Paul A. Lampley, District Contamination Impact Coordinator, District IV Florida
Department of Transportation Environmental Management Office, to Charles Williams,
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement Section
(Sept. 5, 1995) (on file with author).
31. Id.; see also Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, Administrator of Eminent Domain,
District IV, Florida Department of Transportation, in Plantation, Fla. (June 20, 1995).
32. Finkelstein I1, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Petitioner's Motion in Limine, State
Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 12, 1992).
19961
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The FDOT took the position that evidence of contamination was relevant to
the issue of full compensation and should be admitted.33 The defendants
argued that the evidence was not relevant because remediation costs were
not fully ascertained at the time of trial and because the amount of the EDI
reimbursement was not determined. Following argument, the trial judge
denied the FDOT's motion," later confirming that counsel for the parties
would not be permitted to comment upon contamination during opening
statements.36 The FDOT then proffered the contamination and remediation
testimony of its environmental consultants, who were responsible for
assessing the contamination, designing a remediation plan, and implementing
the plan.37 The FDOT also proffered the testimony of its appraiser.3" In
sum, the FDOT contended that the testimony of its experts would have
established that: 1) the property was contaminated at the date of taking; 2)
remediation costs ranged between $750,000 and $800,000; 3) buyers, sellers,
and lending institutions routinely request contamination assessments of real
property; 4) banks are reluctant to finance "dirty" property or take such
property back in default; and 5) contamination "stigmatizes" real property
and affects the marketability and desirability of the property and would have
a negative effect on the value of the subject property of at least twenty to
twenty-five percent.39 Defendant's counsel objected to FDOT's proffer.'
The trial court sustained the objection.41
33. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 656 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1995).
34. Il
35. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; Trial Proceedings at 7, State Dep't of Transp. v.
Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 30, 1992).
36. Hearing on Petitioner's Motion in Limine at 13, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkel-
stein, No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 29, 1992).
37. Brief for Respondent at 2-4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); see also Swift & Co. v.
Housing Auth., 106 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that trial court should
have allowed jury to do its duty after hearing testimony regarding possible zoning changes
and value of site as phosphate mine).
38. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Brief for Respondent
at 4-5, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Trial Proceedings at 2, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein,
No. 90-06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 30, 1992).
39. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; Brief for Respondent at 2-5, Finkelstein (No.
83,308); Petitioner's Motion in Limine, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-
06563(02) (Fla. Broward County Ct. June 11, 1992).
40. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), af'd, 656 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1995).
41. Id
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The case was tried as if the property were "clean" on the date of
valuation.42 At trial, the parties agreed that the value of the improvements
located on the subject site was $350,000. 4" The FDOT's appraiser testified
at trial that the land, as if it were clean on the date of deposit, had a value
of $300,000. a' The owner's appraiser testified that the land had a value of
$567,000.! 5 The range of testimony on full compensation ranged from
$650,000, according to the FDOT's estimate, to $917,000, by the owner's
estimate.46 All of the comparable sales used to estimate the site's value
were uncontaminated.47 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
landowners for $525,000 for the value of the land plus the stipulated
$350,000 for the improvements, a total award of $875,000.48 Final
judgment was entered in the amount of the verdict on July 27, 1992.!9 The
FDOT filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 1992.50
In Finkelstein I, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
record and concluded that the proffered contamination, remediation, and
stigma evidence had been improperly excluded by the trial judge.5 ' Based
primarily on another case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida,52 the
district court held that evidence of contamination and cost of remediation
were relevant to the value of the property and that these issues should have
gone before the jury.53 The appellate court reversed the final judgment,
remanded the cause for a new trial on the valuation issues, and certified the
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public impor-
tance.54
42. Iad
43. IU
44. Id.; Testimony of Edward N. Parker, State Dep't of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-
06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. May 1, 1990).
45. Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 933.
46. Id.
47. IU
48. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 933.
49. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 4, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Brief for Respondent
at 7, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
50. Brief for Respondent at 7, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
51. Finkelstein 1, 629 So. 2d at 934-35.
52. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987) (stating
that "any factor, including public fear, which impacts on the market value of land taken for
a public purpose may be considered to explain the basis for an expert's valuation opinion").
53. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1995); Finkelstein I, 629 So. 2d at 934.
54. Finkelstein A1, 656 So. 2d at 922. The lower court did not construct a certified
question for the supreme court. Instead, the supreme court had to "glean" the certified
question from record, as phrased by the parties. Id
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C. The Supreme Court of Florida Decision
Justice Wells, writing for the majority,55 began the opinion by
quashing that portion of the district court's ruling that reversed the trial
court's ruling that testimony concerning remediation costs was not
admissible.5 6 The court found from their review of the record that there
was no factual issue as to the contamination of the property, the liability for
the contamination, or the payment for the remediation costs under the EDI
program. 7 Based on the FDOT's statements that the purpose for the
remediation testimony was to show the basis for its expert valuation
opinion,58 the court held that the evidence of contamination and remedia-
tion costs was not relevant to the valuation of the subject site.59 The court,
however, limited this holding to the facts of this case where there was a
program for reimbursement of the remediation costs, such as EDIw The
court further declined to decide whether remediation costs would be relevant
in a valuation proceeding involving property for which reimbursement for
remediation costs was not available.61
The court next agreed "with the district court that evidence of the fact
that property is or has been contaminated is relevant to the market value of
property in an eminent domain valuation proceeding." 62 The court relied
on several sources to support its position. First, the court noted, based on
an eminent domain law treatise,63 that contamination can "stigmatize" a
property thereby creating a reduction in value resulting from the increased
risk associated with contaminated property.' Second, the court noted that
the issue of valuing contaminated property has been the subject of articles
by real estate appraisers, which recognize contamination as a factor that
55. Justice Wells delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Grimes,
Justices Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923-26. Justice
Anstead concurred specially with an opinion. Id. Justice Overton recused himself. Id.
56. Id. at 923.
57. Id-
58. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 923; see also Brief for Respondent at 11, Finkelstein
(No. 83,308).
59. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id (citing 8 MELVIN A. REsKIN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NIcHOLs' THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14C.06[1] (1994)).
64. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
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experts consider in the valuation of property.' Finally, the court found its
decision to be consistent with two other cases66 holding that factors
affecting market value are relevant in valuation proceedings. 67
By analogizing to Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, the court
reasoned that if the fear of power lines was relevant to explain a decrease
in value to the property in Jennings, evidence of contamination was a
reasonable explanation for the decrease in value of the subject property.6
In a quote from Jennings,69 the court narrowed this reasoning by explaining
that valuation experts routinely rely on sales of comparable property when
valuing property.7" Thus, the court stated, the focus of opinion testimony
in a valuation proceeding must be value.7' With regard to contaminated
property, the court stated that "[e]vidence of contamination, because of its
prejudicial nature, should not be a feature of a valuation trial beyond what
is necessary to explain facts showing a reduction in value caused by
contamination."72
Returning to the facts of the case, the court recalled that the trial court
had limited the FDOT's proffer of evidence that the contamination stigma
reduced the property value by twenty to twenty-five percent.73 The court
then noted that at oral argument, the FDOT's counsel did not know whether
its appraisal expert based his opinion on comparable sales of other
contaminated property.74 The court pointed out that for an appraiser's
opinion of a reduction in market value to be admissible it must have a basis
65. Il The court specifically cites a recent article appearing in the Appraisal Journal.
See James A. Chalmers & Scott A. Roehr, Issues in the Valuation of Contaminated Property,
61 APPRAISAL J. 28 (1993), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, JLR Database.
66. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987); see
also Department of Agric. & Consumer Serv. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990) (stating that
fair market value is that on which willing buyers and sellers agree only when they both are
aware of all relevant facts regarding property at issue).
67. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
68. Id But see Chappell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 458 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1995)
(holding that owner's testimony as to damages resulting to remainder property following
condemnation for high voltage power lines was inadmissible).
69. See Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 898 (stating that eminent domain valuation trials
"[typically... involve[] real property brokers or appraisers who give valuation testimony
based on, e.g., the current or potential use of the property in question, the population growth
and development of the surrounding area, and sales of similar property").
70. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924-25.
71. Id.; see also infra part HI.
72. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
73. Id.
74. IL
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in facts and data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of property
valuation.75 In addition, the court stated that such opinion testimony must
pass the evidentiary test set forth in section 90.705(2) of the Florida
Statutes.6  The court held that there "must be a factual basis through
evidence of sales of comparable contaminated property upon which to base
a determination that contamination has decreased the value of the proper-
ty."" The court took this reasoning one step further by stating that if no
evidence exists upon which a fact-finder could determine the decrease in
property value, then the landowner would be entitled to fair market value of
the property valued as uncontaminated." After assigning to the condemnor
the burden of proving decrease in value of contaminated property, the court
found that because the Finkelstein property was in the process of being
cleaned, it should be valued as if successfully cleaned on the date of
taking.79 In doing so, the court suggested that the FDOT's appraiser base
his opinion on sales of comparable properties which also have been
successfully cleaned."0
Finally, the court rejected the landowner's argument that because the
stigma of contamination is temporary, it should not be admissible.81
Relying on its previous discussion, the court concluded that if an expert's
opinion meets the evidentiary test described, then whether stigma is or is not
temporary would be addressed during direct and cross examination. 2
75. Id. Section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes provides:
[t]he facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by, or made known to, him at or before the trial. If the facts
or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support
the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1995).
76. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925. Section 90.705(2) of the Florida Statutes states:
[pirior to the witness giving his opinion, a party against whom the opinion or
inference is offered may conduct a voir dire examination of the witness directed
to the underlying facts or data for his opinion. If the party establishes prima
facie evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the
opinions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering
the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.
FLA. STAT. § 90.705(2) (1995).
77. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. lad
82. Finkelstein I1, 656 So. 2d at 925.
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In closing, the court declined to decide whether the FDOT's proffered
evidence was admissible because the trial court so severely limited the
proffer. 3  The court, however, repeated its holding that evidence of
contamination is relevant to market valuation and is admissible upon
meeting an adequate factual predicate. 4 This holding, however, was
further limited to the particular circumstances of this case, where the site
qualified for EDI reimbursement.8" Accordingly, the supreme court
approved of the district court's reversal of the trial court's ruling. The court
then remanded the case for a determination by the trial court, upon a
complete proffer of the FDOT's appraisal expert's testimony, of whether the
evidence is admissible based on the analysis announced in the opinion. 6
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Anstead expressed uncertainty
about the majority's imposition of additional restrictions on evidence of
valuation.87 While Justice Anstead stated that he would answer the
certified question in the affirmative, he also stated he would "leave the
issues of evidence and valuation to be resolved according to prevailing
law. 88
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Relevance of Contamination to Property Value
Article X of the Florida Constitution guarantees that "[n]o private
property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensa-
tion therefor paid to each owner . ,,.9 Full compensation made to the
landowner should be the "fair actual market value at the time of the lawful
83. Id.
84. k
85. Id. at 925 n.1.
86. Id. On remand, the FDOT made its complete proffer, including the testimony of
Edward N. Parker, the FDOT's appraiser, and Douglas R. Ashline, one of the FDOT's
consultant environmental engineers. See Hearing Transcript at 2, 31-99, Department of
Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19) (Fla. Broward County Ct. Oct. 9, 1995). Following
FDOT's complete proffer and argument by counsel, the trial court denied FDOT's Motion
in Limine and signed a final judgment presented to the court by defense counsel. Id. at 118,
120. Upon making his decision, the trial judge asked FDOT counsel "[y]ou want to take that
up and see what happens on that?" Id. at 120.
87. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 926 (Anstead, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 6(a).
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appropriation."'  Fair market value is the amount a willing purchaser,
under no compulsion to buy, would pay for the property. 91 Determining
full compensation, fair market value, and the value of the property taken and
damages 92 to the property remaining, is the primary purpose of an eminent
domain valuation trial.93 Typically, this process involves real estate
appraisers or brokers who give testimony on a variety of factors affecting
value, including the current or potential highest and best use of the property,
90. See Sunday v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 57 So. 351 (Fla. 1912); see also United States
v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. See Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972); see also
State Road Dep't v. Stack, 231 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court in Stack
defines fair market value as the amount of money that a purchaser willing but not obliged
to buy the property would pay an owner willing but not obliged to sell, taking into
consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might be applied in reason. Id.
at 860. The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, now known as the Appraisal
Institute, defines market value as:
[t]he most probable price in cash, terms equivalent to cash, or in other precisely
revealed terms, for which the appraised property will sell in a competitive market
under all conditions requisite to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting
prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is
under undue duress.
Fundamental assumptions and conditions presumed in this definition are[:]
1. Buyer and seller are motivated by self-interest.
2. Buyer and seller are well informed and are acting prudently.
3. The property is exposed for a reasonable time on the open market.
4. Payment is made in cash, its equivalent, or in specified financing terms.
5. Specified financing, if any, may be the financing actually in place or on
terms generally available for the property type in its locale on the effective
appraisal date.
6. The effect, if any, on the amount of market value of atypical financing,
services, or fees shall be clearly and precisely revealed in the appraisal
report.
The AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS,
THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 194-95 (1984) [hereinafter DICrIONARY].
92. See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1958). "We are persuaded to the view that the facts of this case, viewed in the light of our
constitutional guaranty of full and just compensation, call for a positive assertion of
appellee's right to reasonable compensation for the cost of moving its personal property."
Id. at 292.
93. See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3).
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population and development trends of the subject neighborhood, and recent
sales of similar property. 94
Eminent domain defense attorneys argue that full compensation is
limitless and, therefore, testimony regarding factors negatively affecting
value necessarily should be restricted. 95 This argument likely stems from
the constitutional protection afforded to landowners from the state's
wrongful exercise of its eminent domain police power.96 Because of these
constitutional guarantees, the supreme court also has been hesitant to place
quantifiable limits on full compensation.97 The supreme court, however,
has held that "[a]lthough fair market value is an important element in the
compensation formula, it is not an exclusive standard in this jurisdiction.
Fair market value is merely a tool to assist us in determining what is full or
just compensation, within the purview of our constitutional requirement.""
In the wake of Finkelstein II, contamination has become another part of the
94. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1987); see
also Boynton v. Canal Auth., 265 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (approving
appraisal testimony based on the "development approach" where appraiser considered profit
ratio, time to sell lots, price of lots, and present value of lots); Division of Admin. State
Dep't of Transp. v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (stating that "value in use" appraisal approach, rather than market valuation predicated
on use for residential purposes, was proper standard of valuation to be used for park
property).
95. See, e.g., Amended Brief of Petitioners at 14-15, Finkelstein (No. 83,308) (stating
that the admission of contamination evidence in condemnation valuation would thwart full
compensation). This argument is based primarily on Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602
(Fla. 1950), which states that the test for full compensation is not met if a landowner is
required to pay attorney fees and costs out of damages awarded for the value of property
taken.
96. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Due Process Clause) (providing that "[n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.. . "). Daniels v. State
Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964), states that the legislature cannot diminish the
concept of full compensation as defined by the courts. The legislature, however, may require
more than the amounts required by judicial interpretation. See also De Soto County v.
Highsmith, 60 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952) (holding that except as limited by the constitution,
proceedings for the acquisition of property by eminent domain shall be prescribed by law).
97. See Daniels, 170 So. 2d at 848 (concluding that both the United States and Florida
Constitutions contain express provisions to safeguard private rights); see also Peavy-Wilson
Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1947) (stating that the unrestrained
power of eminent domain is one of the harshest proceedings practiced in the law).
98. See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 291
(Fla. 1958); see also Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897 n.2 (stating "[tlhere is no single test for
determining what is full compensation").
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full compensation formula and a tool by which Florida's definition of full
compensation will be refined.
The starting place for determining full compensation in an eminent
domain valuation proceeding is the appraiser's estimate of fair market
value.99 As stated above, fair market value reflects what willing buyers
and sellers in the market place would pay for the property being ac-
quired."° Numerous factors can affect this willing-buyer-seller test of fair
market value."°' Among them, physical characteristics of the property, use
of the property, recent sales of other similar property, and improvements on
the property are the most recognizable. 2 Until Finkelstein II, however,
the list of judicially-recognized factors in Florida did not include evidence
of contamination, even though buyers, sellers, appraisers, and mortgage
lenders consider this important. 3
As applied to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Florida
rendered a narrow and limited decision in Finkelstein II. The broader
holding, however, is that evidence of contamination is relevant to market
value."' The decision requires condemnors to: 1) meet a factual predi-
cate prior to introducing evidence of value decrease resulting from
contamination;0 5 2) carry the burden of proof on this issue;" and 3)
keep the focus of the eminent domain valuation proceeding on value."
Finally, the decision leaves open questions as to the legal requirements of
the condemnor's appraiser in determining the effect of contamination on
market value.
Applying the law announced in the decision to the facts of the case, the
court specifically limited its holding in Finkelstein H to a site which had
obtained EDI eligibility at the date of taking.0 8 The decision, therefore,
also is necessarily limited to the Finkelstein site, which was in the process
99. Du Pree, 108 So. 2d at 292.
100. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 116, 194-95.
101. See William G. Earle et al., Compensation, FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 175, 231-32 (4th ed. 1988) (providing a list of factors affecting the willing
buyer-seller relationship and a list of factors that a willing buyer and seller probably would
consider).
102. Id.
103. See State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1995).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 922-25.
107. Id. at 925.
108. Id.
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of being cleaned."' In Finkelstein II, the parties agreed that the site was
contaminated and was eligible under the EDI program."' Remediation
costs, however, were contested."' Because reimbursement for on-going
remediation was available under the 1990 EDI program,"' the supreme
court found no factual issue regarding contamination and remediation
costs."' The court also reasoned that to prevent the landowner from being
prejudiced by the timing of FDOT's taking (during the clean-up process, for
which the landowner would be reimbursed), the site should be assumed to
be cleaned and valued as such." 4 Based on the facts of the case and the
court's narrow application of the law to the specific facts presented,
Finkelstein II would appear applicable only to sites with EDI eligibility and
on-going remediation at the date of taking.
The broad holding of Finkelstein II, however, is that evidence of
contamination is relevant to value."5 The supreme court limited this
broad holding only when applying it to the facts of this case. 6 Despite
its narrow application here, Finkelstein II has the potential to apply in a
variety of situations: 1) where any type of contaminant is present on a
property; 2) alternate appraisal techniques are applied in valuing contami-
nated property; 3) in non-eminent domain valuation proceedings; and 4)
where no EDI program or reimbursement plan exists. It is this broad
holding regarding Florida valuation law which has the potential to impact
the development of this continually evolving area of law.
The decision imposes a factual predicate on testimony regarding
decrease in property value resulting from contamination.' 17 Though the
factual predicate, reflected in sections 90.704 and 90.705 of the Florida
Statutes, is similar to evidence law throughout the nation,"' the court
articulated that to meet the predicate in this case, the appraiser "must [have]
a factual basis through evidence of sales of comparable contaminated
property upon which to base a determination that contamination has
decreased the value of the property.""' 9 The court then assigned the
109. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
110. Id. at 923.
111. Amended Brief of Petitioners at 2-3, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
114. Id. at 925.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 925 n.1.
117. Id. at 922.
118. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704, 705.
119. Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 925.
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burden of meeting this evidentiary threshold, in addition to proving decrease
in value, upon the condemnor. 20 Accordingly, the broad holding of
Finkelstein II applies when a party meets the factual predicate set forth by
the court and contained in the Florida Statutes.
The supreme court also stated that, in this case, the condemnor must
prove value decrease based on market data.' Conversely, the condemnee
would have to rebut with proof of no decrease or a lesser decrease,
presumably based on market data.'2 In effect, parties must necessarily
argue about market data and its effect on market value. Though the court
stated that the focus of an eminent domain valuation proceeding must be
value,'2 the court may not have realized the inherent difficulties associat-
ed with locating and analyzing sales of comparable contaminated property
(market data).n 4 As discussed in detail below, the difficulty with the
court's approach is that if sales of contaminated sites are located at all, an
appraiser may not be able to isolate a specific and quantifiable value
decrease based on the data.2' The court's decision, however, also is
broad enough to allow for alternate methods of valuing contaminated
property. These alternate methods would meet the factual predicate
articulated by the supreme court and indicate that contaminated sites, or sites
in the process of being cleaned, sell for less than uncontaminated sites.
Without meeting the factual predicate, however, an appraiser's testimony
would not be admissible. This result is consistent with the evidentiary
threshoid contained in the Florida Statutes, and with Jennings, holding that
all factors relevant to value must be considered.1
2 6
Finally, the decision states that evidence of contamination should not
become a central "feature" of an eminent domain valuation trial.' 7 The
court reasoned that the focus of an eminent domain valuation proceeding is
value.' 2 This rationale is supported by the court's reliance on Jennings.
In Jennings, the supreme court articulated the issue in eminent domain
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 1987). The
landowner introduced expert testimony against a condemnor to rebut the condemnor's
representation that potential buyers are knowledgeable about the alleged adverse effects and
would depreciate the land adjacent to a power line before they would buy it. Id.
123. Id.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 265-76.
125. Id.
126. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 899.
127. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 924-25 (Fla. 1995).
128. Id. at 925.
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proceedings is to be full compensation to the landowner for the property
taken. 9 In Jennings, the court disapproved of the landowner's use of
expert witnesses to explain complex scientific evidence about alleged long-
term medical effects from proximity to high-voltage power lines.130 The
court stated that "[a]llowing such scientific testimony into evidence... is
irrelevant to the issue of full compensation."13' The court further stated
that "[t]he introduction into evidence of independent expert's scientific
evidence is ... unnecessary and only serves to confuse the actual issue
before the jury."'32
Based on Jennings, it is reasonable to believe that the court would
similarly disapprove of complicated, technical evidence regarding contami-
nation and cost of remediation in an eminent domain valuation proceeding,
if full compensation and value are the focus of an eminent domain valuation
proceeding."3 It logically follows that the valuation expert (appraiser)
should be the only expert witness required to testify regarding contamina-
tion. In addition, the valuation expert's testimony must necessarily be
limited to the market-based effects of contamination on value, if any."
In this way, the "expert's valuation opinion is based on reasonable factors
[which] may be determined by the jury without resort to other expert
witnesses' testimony or documentary evidence concerning the reasonableness
of the buying public's fears," as held in Jennings.3 The supreme court's
rationale is that this restriction should prevent eminent domain valuation
proceedings from becoming a forum in which to resolve complicated
environmental issues and present lengthy and complex expert testimony,
both of which may be only peripherally related to value or full compensa-
tion. Finally, this limitation reserves for the jury, rather than for technical
experts, the exclusive decision-making power with regard to the effect of
contamination on value,3 6 assuming that a trial court first permits the
testimony.
From the condemnor's perspective, Finkelstein II has the potential to
create conflict with the line of cases where landowners with contaminated
129. Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 898.
130. d. at 899.
131. Id. at 897-98.
132. Id. at 899.
133. Id.
134. The Jennings court did not approve of the landowner's scientific experts' testimo-
ny. However, the court accepted the appraiser's testimony. Jennings, 517 So. 2d at 896.
135. Id. at 899.
136. See id. at 899. "We believe that a jury is certainly capable of determining whether
an expert's valuation opinion is reasonable .. " Id.
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property seek tax abatement because of the contamination.' 37 For exam-
ple, a landowner may believe that his contaminated property is worth five
dollars per square foot for tax purposes. Were this same landowner to
become a condemnee, however, it is possible that the owner could assert
that based on Finkelstein II, the property should be valued as if cleaned at
fifteen dollars per square foot, leaving the condemnor to pay the clean-up
bill. Because the taxing authority and the condemnor likely are not the
same entity, 13 there is the potential for a landowner-turned-condemnee to
"double-dip" and gain an incongruous advantage (or a fuller measure of
compensation) in the combined tax abatement/condemnation situation.
Almost all condemnees are taxpayers. 39 The converse, however, is not
true. To prevent this result, Finkelstein II must necessarily cross litigation
boundaries and be given full precedental effect in all types of valuation
proceedings, including tax abatement cases.
Finkelstein II also encourages landowners of contaminated property to
begin remediation quickly to gain the advantage of the decision, should they
become a condemnee. For instance, if a landowner of contaminated
property immediately begins environmental assessment or remediation and
subsequently becomes a condemnee, it is likely that courts would find a
factual similarity with, and therefore, reason to apply, Finkelstein I."4°
The decision, however, does not state in what stage of the remediation
process the site must be to gain this valuation advantage. For example, the
landowners of the Finkelstein site had "begun remediation" at the date of the
taking.141 It is uncertain as to how far into the remediation process the
137. See, e.g., Robert I. McMurry, Treatment of Environmental Contamination in
Eminent Domain Cases, C975 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 237, 251-53 (1995), available in WL, TP-ALL
Directory, ALI-ABA Database [hereinafter McMurry, Treatment] (presenting case law and
an analysis of valuing contaminated property for tax purposes with an extensive bibliogra-
phy); see also University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993).
138. In Florida, the Department of Transportation is authorized to condemn property to
widen state roads. FLA. STAT. chs. 73, 74, 334-39 (1995). County government is responsible
for real estate taxation.
139. It is generally known that examples of tax-exempt owners are not-for-profit
corporations, charitable organizations, property owned by the state, county, or city, churches,
libraries, and schools, and other public buildings.
140. Finkelstein I held that because clean-up on the site was under way at the date of
taking, the site should be valued as if the clean-up were completed. Finkelstein II, 656 So.
2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1995).
141. Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, supra note 31; see also supra text
accompanying note 26.
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site was at the date of the taking.142 Conversely, if a landowner in a
similar factual setting had not begun remediation prior to the taking, it is
likely that the Finkelstein II decision would require denial of a landowner's
request to limit expert testimony on the effect of contamination on the value
of the site.
The Finkelstein II decision also leaves open several other avenues for
broader application. It would be reasonable for the decision to apply in
cases where sites suffer from contamination other than underground
petroleum hydrocarbon. Because of the court's reliance on Jennings, it is
possible that Finkelstein II could apply in cases litigating the value of sites
contiguous to contaminated sites, but which may not themselves be
contaminated. 43 This also seems reasonable considering the court's
reference to "stigma" created by the increased risk associated with
contaminated property. 144 Appraisal professionals generally agree that
stigma accrues to property that adjoins contaminated property, as well as to
the contaminated property itself.145 Finally, because value is the focus of
any type of valuation proceeding, evidence of contamination also would be
relevant in non-eminent domain valuation proceedings.
This is as far as the Supreme Court of Florida has gone. Until recently,
little, if any, case law on this issue had emerged nationwide. Like
Finkelstein II, however, a handful of courts in other states recently have held
that evidence of contamination is relevant to market value." 6 These cases
142. See supra text accompanying note 26.
143. See Lorraine Lewandrowski, Toxic Blackacre: Appraisal Techniques & Current
Trends in Valuation, 5 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 55, 87-92 (1994), available in WL, TP-ALL
Directory, JLR Database (discussing valuation techniques applicable to property near or
adjacent to contaminated sites).
144. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
145. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 89; see also Howard R. Cabot, Post-
Remediation 'Stigma' Damages Hinge on Hard Evidence of Residual Risk, INsIDE LrIG.,
Oct. 1994, at 28, available in WL, Law Reviews, Legal Texts and Periodicals Directory,
Journals and Law Reviews Database; Arnold, supra note 9, at 415-16.
146. See Redevelopment Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that evidence of contamination is just one of many factors that jury may consider
in determining fair market value in eminent domain proceeding); Murphy v. Town of Water-
ford, No. 520173, 1992 WL 170588, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 9, 1992) (holding that
locality cannot reduce amount payable to landowner as just compensation for taking for
cleanup expenses, because Connecticut statute provides for reimbursement of such expenses);
Department of Transp. ex rel. People v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that state may not introduce cost required to remediate contaminated property in eminent
domain proceeding because such costs are not condition influencing property's value); City
of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993) (holding that in eminent domain proceeding,
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are similar to Finkelstein II in that each involved condemnation of
contaminated property where the court addressed the question of whether
evidence of contamination was relevant to value. 47 Of these few cases,
those involving mass acquisition of uranium mines,148 as well as tax
abatement cases,149 are not as analogous to Finkelstein II as are the
following cases. Though considering the broad holding of Finkelstein II, the
factually distinguishable uranium mine and tax abatement cases provide a
valuable comparative source for case law addressing collateral issues such
as appropriate and/or admissible appraisal methodology. 5
In State v. Brandon,' the issue before the court was whether
evidence of contamination and remediation costs were relevant in determin-
ing the fair market value of a property being acquired under eminent
domain.'52 The Tennessee appellate court held that evidence of contami-
nation and the cost to remediate it was relevant in determining the fair
market value of a property being acquired under eminent domain. 53
The Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT"') acquired a
portion of a bulk oil distributorship and gasoline service station in December
1991 .'" After the court transferred title to the state, the state's contractor
found underground petroleum hydrocarbon contamination.'55 Between
evidence of contamination is admissible for purpose of determining fair market value); State
v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that trial court erroneously
excluded environmental contamination evidence which was relevant to issue of valuation in
eminent domain proceeding). All of these cases involve condemnation of contaminated
property where relevance of evidence of contamination was questioned.
147. See cases cited supra note 146.
148. See, e.g., Department of Health v. Hecla Mining Co., 781 P.2d 122 (Colo. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that jury may consider present and future use and condition of condemned
land for purpose of determining value after state has exercised its power of eminent domain
pursuant to Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act); see also State Dep't of Health v.
The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2612 (1995).
149. See McMurry, Treatment, supra note 137, at 251-53.
150. See, e.g., Westling v. Mille Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R,
C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *2-*3 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL
39626 (Minn. 1996) (holding that value of property for tax assessment purposes should
account for negative "stigma" which attaches to previously contaminated property);
University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993).
151. 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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January and April 1992, the state began to remediate the site.1 56 In June
1992, the property owner was notified by TDOT of the contamination and
was ordered to conduct additional pollution surveying and abatement proce-
dures. 57 The landowners denied the existence of contamination and did
not acquiesce to the state's demands to clean up the site. 151 The state
subsequently completed the contamination remediation, at a total cost of
$64,525.58.' Acting on the motion of the landowners, the trial court
ordered the state, its attorneys, and expert witnesses, not to mention at trial
the existence of the contamination nor to reveal the cost of remediation.' 60
The valuation experts were forced to testify on the value of the land as if it
was uncontaminated.6  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
landowners. 62 After the jury retired, TDOT attempted to proffer evidence
concerning the contamination on the property and the cost of remedia-
tion.163 The court stated that the proffer could be made at a later date."6
TDOT then filed a Motion for Remittitur, or offset of remediation costs
against the verdict and requested a new trial. 65 The trial court denied the
motions and TDOT appealed. 1'
Relying on the Tennessee Rules of Evidence,'67 which state that
relevant evidence is generally admissible, 6 1 the court held that the
contaminated nature of the property is relevant to the issue of valuation
because it tends to make a lower market value more probable than it would
without the evidence.' 69 The court also reasoned that the form of proper-
ty, or a property characteristic, is relevant to valuation. 70 In reviewing
the facts of the case, the court looked to the testimony of two experts.' 7'
An affidavit from a banker stated that banks generally will not finance
156. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 225.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 225-26.
167. See TENN. R. EVID. 401, 403.
168. Id.
169. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 227.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 226-27.
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contaminated property or take back contaminated property, and that the
subject site was the type of site which typically required an environmental
assessment.'72 Similarly, the appraiser stated in an affidavit that some
offset for remediation was required and that stigma was the detrimental
effect of contamination on property value. 7 3  The court finally found
support for its decision based on three cases from other jurisdictions,174
including Finkelstein L 7' In applying the law to the facts, the court found
evidence of contamination relevant, but rejected a pure "1 to 1 offset" of
remediation costs to land value.
17 6
Brandon is consistent with Finkelstein II. However, Brandon is
broader than Finkelstein II because it holds remediation costs, in addition to
evidence of contamination, to be relevant to value." The case is distin-
guishable on its facts because in Brandon, the contamination was not known
at the date of the taking. 7 s However, the balance of the factual circum-
stance is strikingly similar. Also, by relying on Tennessee evidence rules
and case law, 179 the court's reasoning is similar to that utilized in Finkel-
stein II. At the time briefs for Finkelstein II were submitted to the Supreme
Court of Florida,80 Brandon had not yet been decided.' If it had, it
is likely that the Tennessee decision would have bolstered the FDOT's
position in Finkelstein I.
Likewise, the issue presented in Department of Transportation ex rel.
People v. Parr,82 also was whether evidence of contamination and
remediation costs are relevant in determining the fair market value of a
property being acquired under eminent domain.8 3 However, the Illinois
appellate court held that under the facts of the case, evidence of contamina-
172. Id. at 226.
173. Id. at 226-27.
174. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 227.
175. 629 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
176. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 228.
177. Id. at 226-28.
178. Id. at 225.
179. Id. at 225-28.
180. The Amended Brief of Petitioners was submitted July 7, 1994 and Respondent's
Brief was submitted July 26, 1994. See Amended Brief of Petitioners at 30, Finkelstein (No.
83,308); Brief for Respondent at 25, Finkelstein (No. 83,308).
181. Brandon was decided on December 30, 1994. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 224.
182. 633 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
183. Id. at 21.
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tion and the cost to remediate was not relevant to the fair market value of
a property being acquired.'
At the same time that the Illinois Department of Transportation
("IDOT") notified the landowner that his property would be required to
construct a bridge, IDOT informed the owner that he owed $100,000 for the
property's environmental remediation costs."' Subsequently, IDOT filed
a complaint to condemn the property via Illinois' "quick-take' statute.8 6
At the quick-take bench trial, IDOT presented evidence that the property's
value was zero due to the alleged presence of contamination and because of
remediation costs."s The court awarded possession of the site to
IDOT.' Pursuant to the Illinois "quick-take" law, the court's written
order following the trial stated that evidence of environmental contamination
was not admissible in an eminent domain proceeding.8 9 The trial court
further found that IDOT failed to prove the existence of an "unsafe or
unlawful condition" on the property, according to Illinois law."9 IDOT
undertook to remediate the site. 9' At the valuation trial, the landowners
filed a motion to bar all testimony concerning environmental contamina-
tion."g The trial court held a hearing and ordered the parties to submit
briefs and argument addressing: 1) whether evidence of environmental
contamination and remediation costs was admissible; and 2) whether such
evidence would implicate the landowner's procedural due process rights. 93
After both parties submitted briefs, the trial court granted the landowner's
Motion to Bar Testimony on Contamination and Remediation194 The trial
court certified the question to the Illinois appellate court. IDOT filed a
Motion for Leave to Appeal. 195 The appellate court granted IDOT's mo-
tion. 196
184. Id.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id. The "quick-take" statute described is similar to that outlined in chapter 74 of
the Florida Statutes, where a condemnor may take property under an expedited, or shortened,
schedule.
187. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 20.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 21. The court refers to § 7-119 of the Illinois Eminent Domain Act.
191. Id.
192. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 21.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Though the court in Parr held that, based on the facts of the case,
evidence of contamination was not relevant to value,197 Parr also is
consistent with Finkelstein H. If the IDOT had proved that the contamina-
tion constituted an illegal condition affecting the value of the property, it is
likely that the court would have found the contamination relevant to
value, 98 in accord with Illinois' Eminent Domain Act.199 Similarly, the
Illinois court held that without proving the existence of the illegal condition
(contamination), evidence of remediation costs also was not relevant to
value.' ° This is not unlike the holding in Finkelstein H that because the
site was eligible for EDI reimbursement, evidence of remediation cost also
was not admissible."z ' The Illinois court, however, took this rationale a
step further. It declared that evidence of remediation costs, if admissible in
this case, would violate the procedural due process rights of the landowner
because IDOT did not follow the procedural safeguards set forth in the
Environmental Protection Act. 2 Specifically, DOT failed to notify the
landowner of the nature or extent of the environmental hazard on the
property. 3 IDOT also failed to inform the landowner that it sought to
hold them liable for remediation costs. 204 Because of these failures, the
landowner's procedural due process claim succeeded.205 Such a claim
would not have been viable in Finkelstein H because the tenant was aware
of the contamination and had taken steps to remediate it prior to the
taking.206 Aside from this constitutional claim, Parr also stands for the
197. 633 N.E.2d at 21.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 21-22 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/7-119 (West 1992)).
Paragraph 5/7-119 provides that:
[e]vidence is admissible as to . . . (2) any unsafe, unsanitary, substandard, or
illegal condition, use or occupancy of the property;... and (4) the reasonable
cost of causing the property to be placed in a legal condition, use or occupancy.
Such evidence is admissible notwithstanding the absence of any official action
taken to require the correction or abatement of such illegal condition, use or
occupancy.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/7-119.
200. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 22.
201. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922-24.
202. Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 22-23.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995); Amended Brief of Petitioners
at 1, Finkelstein (No. 83,308); Interview with Linda Ferroli Nelson, supra note 31.
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proposition that given the correct evidentiary predicate, evidence of
contamination would be relevant to value.
A third case, similar to Finkelstein II, was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in City of Olathe v. Stott.2 7 Like Finkelstein II, the court
in Stott considered the relevance of contamination to value and, also like
Finkelstein II, concluded that the Kansas underground storage tank
reimbursement program did not prohibit evidence of the effect that
contamination and stigma had on the subject property's value. °3
In mid-1990, the city of Olathe, Kansas condemned eight tracts of land
to expand the intersection at 119th Street and Interstate 352' Two of the
tracts had been operated as service stations for twenty-five years.210 Each
site had leaking underground gasoline and diesel fuel storage tanks.2 1 At
the eminent domain valuation trial, the appraisers for the city were allowed,
over the landowners' objections, to testify to the impact of the contamina-
tion on value.2 2 The landowners sought to introduce testimony that on
previous occasions, the city had acquired contaminated sites without
investigating the contamination.2 13 The landowners also proffered testimo-
ny to impeach the credibility of the city's appraisers."4 The trial court
ruled that the landowners' evidence was not admissible because it was not
relevant.21s After the trial was concluded, the court inquired of the jury
about how it considered the evidence of the contamination in reaching its
verdict.216 The juror who responded indicated that the jury did, in fact,
consider the contamination and that it reduced the property's value by ten
percent.217 The landowners appealed claiming that the trial court erred by
excluding their proffered testimony and by inquiring of the jury.218
The pertinent part of the decision presents a detailed look at the Kansas
Storage Tank Act ("Act"), 219 which is similar in structure to Florida's EDI
207. 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993).
208. Id. at 1289.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1289.
213. Id. at 1290.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1290.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1289-93 (citing IAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-34,100 to 65-34,212 (1993)).
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program.22° In brief, the Act provides for reimbursement of remediation
costs for qualified sites.2 ' The landowners' primary argument was that
the Act preempted all other law that might address funding the clean-up
costs required from the contamination.22 In addition, the landowners
argued that because of the Act, the impact of contamination on property
value should not be an issue in an eminent domain valuation proceed-
ing.2 The court, however, sided with the city, stating that the Act did
not specifically address reduction in property value attributable to risk or
stigma associated with contamination."2 4 Furthermore, the court held that
the Act did not address what appeared to be primarily a cost issue--the
reduction in value attributable to risk and stigma associated with the
contamination.225 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the appraisers' testimony that risk and stigma
associated with the contamination had a negative effect on the properties'
value because their opinion was formed over time after market investiga-
tion.26
The reasoning used in Stott is strikingly similar to that found in
Finkelstein H. In effect, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the EDI
program, like the Kansas Storage Tank Act, did not provide the only remedy
for matters associated with on-site contamination and that any consideration
of the issue is otherwise improper in an eminent domain valuation
proceeding. 7 Like the Florida court, the Supreme Court of Kansas also
recognized that a negative stigma attaches to property even after it has been
cleaned.' Consideration of this issue in an eminent domain valuation
proceeding, as noted by both courts, is proper because stigma has a direct
bearing on, and is relevant to, property value.229 Finally, it is interesting
to note that the Stott decision was available to the Supreme Court of Florida
at the time its decision in Finkelstein H was rendered. 3' The Stott
decision, despite its similarities, is not mentioned in the Finkelstein H
220. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
221. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1290-93.
222. Id. at 1292.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1293.
226. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1298.
227. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995).
228. Stott, 861 P.2d at 1293-98.
229. Id.; Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924.
230. Stott was decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas on October 29, 1993. Stott, 861
P.2d at 1287.
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decision, however. Perhaps the Supreme Court of Florida was not
compelled to place reliance on Stott, particularly because of the availability
and applicability of Jennings, a Florida case.
Finally, a California Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in
Redevelopment Agency v. Thrifly Oil Co.23' The claim arose in an
eminent domain proceeding involving the condemnation of a petroleum
hydrocarbon contaminated gasoline service station 32 In recognizing that
evidence of contamination is relevant to value, the court rejected the
condemnee's contention that remediation costs were not properly before the
jury.233 The court stated that contamination was considered by all experts
in determining the fair market value of the property acquired.3 The court
in Thrifty, unlike the court in Finkelstein II, also stated that remediation was
a characteristic of the property which would affect its value. 5 Despite
the broader holding in Thrifty, the thrust of the decision is quite similar to
and supportive of the reasoning announced in Finkelstein IL
Because only a handful of cases of this type exist, it would be
somewhat premature to state that a trend in the law has developed. It is
possible, however, to draw several distinct conclusions from a comparison
of these cases. First, most courts seemed willing to recognize that given the
proper factual predicate, evidence of contamination is relevant to value3 6
This evidence, in the form of a properly-qualified appraiser's testimony,
could include the risk and stigma associated with the contamination" 7 and
remediation costs where a plan of clean-up was not already under way or
completed3 8  Second, it is apparent that courts favor a "back-door"
approach to admitting evidence of the effect of contamination on property
value. In each case, the evidence sought to be admitted came from a
valuation expert, not a contamination or environmental expert.3 9 Accord-
ingly, the relevant factors related to the contamination and effecting market
231. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992).
232. Id. at 688.
233. Id. at 689 n.9.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1995); Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
689; State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 224 Cenn. Ct. App. 1994). But see Department of
Transp. ex rel. People v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19, 22 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
237. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925; Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689; Brandon, 898
S.W.2d at 225. These cases describe factors which generally make up stigma.
238. See Finkelstein 11, 656 So. 2d at 924; Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 21-23.
239. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 924; Thrifty, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689; Brandon, 898
S.W.2d at 226; Parr, 633 N.E.2d at 20.
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value should be addressed by a single valuation witness, such as an
appraiser testifying on the question of "stigma." In this way, eminent
domain valuation proceedings also do not become environmental trials. By
following the courts' suggestions, a host of environmental technicians and
expert witnesses would not dominate the trial, prejudice the defendant,2'
or confuse the jury.24 1 Finally, those courts which have admitted evidence
of remediation cost, have also disfavored "l-to-l" remediation cost to value
set-offs.z4 Presumably, if an appraiser employs a valuation approach
considering "stigma,"243 the problem of a "1-to-l" set off can be avoided.
Finkelstein II declares that evidence of contamination is relevant to
value.'" Though the decision seems to be limited to the facts of the case,
its broader holding should apply to the many situations where contamination
and value intersect. The decision also is consistent with case law in other
jurisdictions. Finally, Finkelstein II suggests a plan by which a condemnor
may litigate both issues without prejudicing the defendant and without
creating a highly technical environmental proceeding with the potential to
confuse the jury.
B. Methods of Valuing Contaminated Property
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the issue of valuing contami-
nated property has been the subject of much recent discussion within the
appraisal profession.4 Particularly, the court noted that these sources
recognize contamination as a factor considered by appraisers.2' The court
did not, however, stop at merely recognizing that the appraisal profession
is developing techniques by which appraisers may estimate the value of
contaminated property. In applying the law to the facts of the case, the
court stated, based on Florida evidence law,247 that a proper factual basis
on which to base an opinion of the effect of contamination on property
240. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925 (stating that evidence of contamination, by its
nature, is prejudicial).
241. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987).
242. See Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 226; see also University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City
of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J.
1993); Inmar Assoc., Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 549 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1988); see generally
McGregor, supra note 9.
243. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
244. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 922.
245. Id. at 923.
246. Id.
247. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.703, .705 (1995).
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value is through reliance on evidence of sales of comparable contaminated
property.24 Based on the court's statement, it would seem that such an
approach is only one method of valuing contaminated property. Since the
late 1980s, new approaches to valuing contaminated property have emerged
from within the appraisal community. Prior to discussing these new
approaches to valuing contaminated property, however, a brief discussion of
general appraisal practice is appropriate.
The Unifonn Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice requires
appraisers to consider the three traditional approaches to valuing proper-
ty. 9 These approaches are the cost approach, the income approach, and
the market or sales comparison approach.2" The outcome of each
approach is weighed by the appraiser when making her final estimate of
market value.251
The cost approach is a specialized set of procedures in which an
appraiser derives a value indication by estimating the current cost to
reproduce or replace the existing structure, deducting for all accrued
depreciation in the property, and adding the estimated land value. 2 The
cost approach is particularly useful in valuing new or nearly new improve-
ments and properties that are not frequently exchanged in the market. 3
Specialty properties, like gasoline service stations, are particularly suited to
being valued by the cost approach because of the absence of a significant
market and comparable sales data.' In developing the cost approach for
a Finkelstein-like site, the appraiser would be required to locate sales of
comparable contaminated vacant land.2 55 The appraiser also must develop
248. Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d at 925.
249. UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACrIcE 13-15 (Appraisal
Foundation ed., 1995). Rule 1-4 sets forth the standards.
250. APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 71 (10th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter APPRAISAL TEXT].
251. Id. at 553-60.
252. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 75.
253. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 80. Gasoline service stations are
generally considered to be "special purpose" properties. Special use properties, or limited
market properties, are properties that are not frequently exchanged in the market because of
unique physical design, special construction materials, specialized use improvements, or
layouts that restrict their utility to the use for which they were originally built. Id. at 21; see
also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Kiernan, 366 N.E.2d 808, 811 (N.Y. 1977) (holding
that special purpose properties are those which are uniquely adapted to business conducted
upon them, or use made of them, and cannot be converted to other uses without expenditure
of substantial sums of money); Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 59.
254. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 23.
255. See id. at 298-310 (discurssing land valuation techniques).
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a market-based rate of depreciation for any improvements on the proper-
ty. 6 If the appraiser cannot locate comparable sales, she would have to
employ an alternate appraisal method257 which, if speculative or un-
tried" within the professional appraisal community, may not satisfy the
proper factual predicate.
The income approach is a set of procedures which an appraiser uses to
derive a value indication for income-producing property by converting
anticipated income benefits into an indication of present value. 59 Specifi-
cally, an indication of value is derived by capitalizing the property's net
income based on a market-derived overall capitalization rate, which
considers the risk associated with the investment.260 For contaminated
property, the income approach should consider factors including: 1) the
extent and nature of the contamination, which may result in unmarketability
or reduced marketability; 2) the type of contaminated property involved; 3)
the presence of assumable financing; and 4) demand for alternative uses.26'
Most appraisal methodologists agree that the presence of contamination
increases the risk associated with an investment-type, income-producing
property.262  Increased risk typically translates into less value. 63  In
addition, factors including remediation costs, lost rental or investment
256. Id. at 243-65.
257. See, for example, Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, which presents three different
approaches to valuing contaminated property and frequently recognized as the seminal article
addressing valuation of contaminated property. See also Peter J. Patchin, Contaminated
Properties-Stigma Revisited, 59 APPRAISAL J. 167 (1991) [hereinafter Patchin, Stigma
Revisited] (continuing the development of innovative valuation analyses and techniques).
258. See Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, New Developments for Environmental
Practitioners in Hazardous Materials Litigation, C750 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 343, 371-73 (1992),
available in WL, TP-ALL Directory, ALI-ABA Database [hereinafter McMurry & Pierce,
New Developments]; Anthony J. Rinaldi, Contaminated Properties-Valuation Solutions, 59
APPRAISAL J. 377 (1991). But see Westling v. Mille Lacs County, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-
94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *1 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17,
1995), afftd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996) (approving of an appraiser's use of the cost,
market, and income approaches to reach correlated opinions of "unimpaired value," then
deducting a stigma factor and cost to cure from the unimpaired values to reach final
conclusions of market value).
259. See DICIONARY, supra note 91, at 159.
260. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 409.
261. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 60-61.
262. See, e.g., Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 13 (advancing modified income
capitalization method as most reliable approach to valuation of contaminated investment
properties).
263. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 415-19.
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income, and "down time" during clean-up, also can negatively impact on an
income stream and translate into less value.' 6
The market approach, or sales comparison approach, is a set of
procedures by which an appraiser derives a value indication by comparing
the property being appraised to similar properties that have recently been
sold.26 The appraiser then analyzes the appropriate units of comparison,
and makes adjustments, based on the elements of comparison, to the sales
prices of the comparable sales.26 An appraiser considers factors including
property rights conveyed, financing terms, conditions of sale, market
conditions, location, physical characteristics, economic characteristics, use,
and other non-realty components of the sale price.267 The sales compari-
son approach is particularly appropriate and persuasive when sufficient
market data, or recent sales of similar properties exist.2 6 This approach,
however, is rarely applied to specialty properties, such as gasoline service
stations, because few similar properties may be sold in a given market, even
one that is geographically broad.269 In such a case, the market approach
may establish only a broad limit for the value of the property being
appraised and help to verify the findings of the other approaches to
value.2 70
Most appraisal methodologists agree that the market approach has
limitations which render it virtually ineffective when appraising contami-
nated property. 7 The ineffectiveness of this approach primarily arises
due to the lack of market data.2 Because the nature and extent of
contamination on a property is unique to that parcel, it is all but impossible
264. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 11-13.
265. See DICTIONARY, supra note 91, at 268; D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9, at 357.
266. See APPRAISAL TExT, supra note 250, at 371.
267. See id. at 367.
268. Id. at 368-69; see also Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63.
269. Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63.
270. Id.
271. See D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9, at 359; McMurry, Treatment, supra note 137,
at 249 (discussing petroleum contaminated properties); Arnold, supra note 9, at 418; Robert
I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Environmental Contamination and its Effect on Eminent
Domain, C791 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 133, 162 (1993); McMurry & Pierce, New Developments, supra
note 258, at 343; Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Environmental Remediation and
Eminent Domain, C709 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 105, 135 (1992), available in WL, TP-ALL Directory,
ALI-ABA Database.
272. APPRAISAL TExT, supra note 250, at 368-69; see also Lewandrowski, supra note
143, at 63; Chalmers & Roehr, supra note 65, at 36. But see McMurry, Treatment, supra
note 137, at 249 (indicating that some appraisers have had success with appraising petroleum
contaminated sites because such contamination is so common among the property type).
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to locate sales of property similarly contaminated.273 In addition, because
the degree and nature of contamination is unique to each property, it also is
difficult to compare remediation plans and costs.274 Similarly, the owner's
liability stemming from the contamination may vary from site to site,
thereby making unit to unit comparison virtually impossible. 75 Even if
market data exist, the amount of adjustment required to make a sale of
contaminated property similar to the contaminated property being appraised
may make any value indication highly speculative.276
Since the Finkelstein case was first litigated, advances in appraisal
methodology have lead to the development of several new and innovative
approaches to appraising contaminated property.2' The income approach
is particularly well-suited to modification for use in valuing contaminated
property. Once the income stream to the property is estimated, a complex
series of mathematical calculations and income valuation models may be
employed. Because of the appraiser's ability to more realistically and
accurately quantify the effects of contamination through these models, the
most promising advances in appraisal theory in regard to appraising
contaminated property have developed here. At best, these new models are
complex, intricate, and likely difficult for the average juror to understand.
Though these methods are gaining industry approval, courts are likely to
disfavor them as being complicated and too technical.
273. See Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 63. On remand, the FDOT made its
complete proffer, including the testimony of Edward N. Parker, MAI, the FDOT's appraiser.
See Hearing Transcript at 48-99, Department of Transp. v. Finkelstein, No. 90-06563(19)
(Fla. Broward County Ct. Oct. 9, 1995). During FDOT's proffer, Mr. Parker testified to the
information and data available to him since the time of trial and at the time of the hearing.
Id. at 49. As to market data found after the trial, Mr. Parker discovered only seven case
studies of Florida properties which were either contaminated or in the process of clean-up
at the time of sale. Id. at 70 (case studies on file with author). Mr. Parker also testified to
the extreme difficulty and time consuming process involved in locating this type of market
data. Id. at 66, 69. The data indicated that "stigma" attaching to contaminated property
ranged from 26 to 94%. Id. at 68.
274. See Arnold, supra note 9, at 418.
275. See Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 10-12.
276. See APPRAISAL TEXT, supra note 250, at 373-74.
277. See, e.g., Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9; Lewandrowski, supra note 143, at 74-88
(describing the application to contaminated properties of such valuation techniques as future
benefit analysis, discounted cash flow method, modified income approach, discounting for
remediation costs, nominal value to site, and sales method); Rinaldi, supra note 258, at 377
(asserting as preferable a form of depreciation which involves appraisal of property as if
uncontaminated, followed by appraisal which accounts for existence of contamination).
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One of these new valuation approaches is a modified version of the
income approach. The approach adjusts the overall capitalization rate to
reflect higher risk associated with the contaminated site.27 The higher
capitalization rate, when applied to the property's income stream, indicates
a lower overall value.2 79 Another method, proposed by the same appraisal
theorist, is to appraise the property as clean, then re-appraise it as dirty, and
subtract the value indication of the latter from the former for an indication
of damages to the property resulting from the contamination and clean-up
costs.280 Yet another approach is based on the premise that the contamina-
tion changes the highest and best use of the site, thereby resulting in
reduced value."' Despite the emergence of these new methods, the
appraisal community, as well as the courts, continues to struggle to find a
way to quantify the effect that contamination has on market value.2
Perhaps the most frequently approved means of quantifying this effect
is through testimony of "stigma." '283 Stigma has been defined as the
impact on property value stemming from the increased risk associated with
the property and the effect of this risk on marketability and financeabil-
ity.28 4 One author suggests that stigma contains seven elements including
disruption, concealability, aesthetic effect, responsibility, prognosis, degree
of peril, and level of fear.28 5 This author also suggests that these seven
278. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9, at 13-14; see also Chalmers & Roehr, supra note
65. But see University Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 624 A.2d 1000 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 634 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1993) (disapproving of a landowner's
appraiser's use of a discounted cash flow valuation technique). For another article discussing
this topic see Richard A. Newstein, Estimating Value Diminution by the Income Approach,
60 APPRAISAL J. 293 (1992).
279. Patchin, Valuation, supra note 9 at 13-14.
280. Id. at 14.
281. Id.
282. See generally D'Elia & Ward, supra note 9.
283. See Finkelstein II, 656 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1995); see also Westling v. Mille
Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R, 1995 WL 128511, at *1
(Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996) (approving of
appraiser's testimony that stigma associated with the contamination had a negative effect on
property value); City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993). See generally D'Elia
& Ward, supra note 9 (stating that judicial recognition of reductions in market value because
of the existence of contamination has been slow in coming).
284. Chalmers & Roehr, supra note 65; see also Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General
Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Patricia R. Healy & John J. Healy, Jr.,
Lenders' Perspectives on Environmental Issues, 60 APPRAISAL J. 397 (1992).
285. Bill Mundy, Stigma and Value, 60 APPRAISAL J. 7 (1992).
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criteria are used to evaluate and determine the degree of stigma. 86
Determining stigma, however, ultimately boils down to extensive research
because appraisers will seldom find this type of market data in recorded
transactions. 28' Not only does stigma attach to property that is contami-
nated, appraisers now contend that stigma also remains after the property has
been cleaned.288 Despite the difficulties inherent in quantifying stigma in
the marketplace, courts seem willing to accept testimony regarding stigma
if the appraiser supports an estimate of stigma based on reasonable appraisal
methodology, including the methodology outlined above.2 89 In addition,
the logical simplicity of the "stigma approach" may make it more attractive
and appeal to both judges and jurors who likely are unfamiliar and
uncomfortable with complicated and highly technical valuation techniques.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida held in FinkeIstein II that evidence of
contamination is relevant to market value. At first glance, the decision
appears to be limited to eminent domain valuation proceedings in which the
value of whole takings of contaminated sites with EDI eligibility is
determined. Finkelstein II, however, presents a broader holding that
transcends the factual limitations of the case. The decision expands the list
of factors admissible when valuing all types of contaminated property. The
decision is consistent with Florida case law and the law developing in other
jurisdictions. Finally, the decision also suggests a means through which
testimony regarding the negative effect of contamination on property value
may be presented.
Evidence of contamination has only just begun to make its way into the
courtroom. In the future, appraisers, attorneys, and courts will continue to
struggle with this topic. Though Finkelstein II may appear to be a small
286. Id. at 9.
287. Patchin, Stigma Revisited, supra note 257, at 172.
288. See Cabot, supra note 145, at 27; see also Bradford D. Roth & Neville M. Bili-
moria, "Post-Cleanup Stigma" Claims: It Can Happen to You, ENVTL. PROTECriON, June
1995, at 52.
289. See Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Westling v. Mille Lacs, Nos. C4-93-504-R, C2-94-379-R, C9-94-380-R, C5-93-706-R,
1995 WL 128511, at *1 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), aff'd, 1996 WL 39626 (Minn. 1996);
City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287 (Kan. 1993); see also James D. Masterman, Opinion
Testimony in Eminent Domain Trials, C975 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 87 (1995), available in WL, TP-
ALL Directory, ALI-ABA Database (listing other cases in which appraiser testified regarding
stigma).
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step toward resolving the countless issues this type of litigation raises, it is
a measured step in the right direction. It is logical to hold that evidence of
contamination is relevant to value. Future decisions should begin to clarify
this general logical basis and provide the legal and appraisal communities
with specific guidance on this important, emerging area of law.
Michael T. Sheridan
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with our
Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land because we regard it as a
commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to
which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. There
is no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized man, nor
for us to reap from it the esthetic harvest it is capable, under science,
of contributing to culture. That land is a community is the basic
405
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concept of ecology but that land is to be loved and respected is an
extension of ethics ....
Indifference has the potential for placing growth management on the
cusp of catastrophe. Growth management is a land use control approach
that aspires to govern the character, rate, and site of growth and develop-
ment.2 The primary purpose of growth management in Florida is to balance
the influx of individuals pouring into the state with the vital need to protect
natural resources.3 The term growth management is interchangeable with
ecosystem management in the context of environmental protection.' An
ecosystem is defined as "[a]n ecological community together with its
environment, functioning as a unit."'  Therefore, a key component of
growth management is the necessity for local governments to establish land
use patterns and intensities that are consistent with the protection of wildlife
habitats.6
Part II of this article analyzes Florida's growth management back-
ground, and how this state established important precedents in the early
1970s. Florida's ability to maintain effective growth management has been
attributed to factors such as citizen support, political and administrative
guidance, and "[t]he state's growth management watchdog group, 1000
Friends of Florida. 7  However, the state must maintain vigilance and
continually persist in struggling for new sources of revenue so a cohesive
and balanced infrastructure can be sustained.'
Part III explains the concept of concurrency as it relates to traffic
congestion and overcrowding of schools. The human factor is paramount.
Attention should be given in devising sound plans to effectively utilize
1. LUTHER J. CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE: LAND AND WATER POLICY IN A
GROWTH STATE 337-38 (1974) (quoting ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC x
(Oxford Univ. Press 1966)). Aldo Leopold was one of the Wilderness Society organizers and
the founder of scientific wildlife management in the United States. Id. at 200.
2. Quintin Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major
Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 416 (1994). Although growth management
resembles zoning, it relies more on comprehensive planning and significant direction by state
governments. Id.
3. John M. DeGrove, State and Regional Planning and Regulatory Activity: The Florida
Experience and Lessons for Other Jurisdictions, C930 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 397, 427 (1994).
4. Interview with Richard Grosso, Legal Director of 1000 Friends of Florida, in Fort
Lauderdale, Fla. (July 12, 1995).
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 435 (3d ed. 1993).
6. Interview with Richard Grosso, supra note 4.
7. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 448.
8. Id. at 449.
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concurrency requirements as a growth management tool in Florida and other
states.
Part IV focuses on the connection between the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") and, more specifically, Florida's legal requirements under growth
management. The ESA ensures the continued existence of threatened or
endangered species by conserving "the ecosystems upon which... [they]
depend."9 This section will also discuss North Key Largo, Florida, which
contains the highest concentration of listed endangered species.'0 A unique
program established by the state for the continued survival of the Key Deer,
found predominantly on Big Pine Key, will be examined.
Part V discusses the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("COE"), regarding their attempts
to safeguard and manage Florida's prevailing wetlands. Advance identifica-
tion ("ADID"), which permits the EPA to gather data on the inherent value
of wetlands, in cooperation with the COE and the state, is examined.
Information gleaned from such studies is of merit to the community, local
governments, environmental organizations, and conservation groups in
taking preventative measures and in planning for the future.11 For
example, benefits may be conferred respectively upon project planning, land-
use management, and wetland protection activities." The concepts of
cumulative and secondary impacts"3 are also discussed as they relate to the
future of wetland protection and conservation.
The growth management statutes of Oregon and Vermont are the
central focus of Part VI. This section also investigates how Florida
fashioned its growth management statutes after both the Oregon and the
Vermont models. While Florida and Vermont fall under the Model Land
Development Code ("MLDC") for state growth management regulation,
Oregon functions as the leading example for the "Planning Consistency"
model ("PC").14
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
10. Interview with Richard Grosso, supra note 4.
11. Eric Hughes, The Role of Planning in Wetland Permitting: Advanced Identification,
Special Area Management Plans, State Wetland Management Plans 1.1 (Dec. 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Environmental and Land Use Law Section Public
Interest Representation Committee).
12. lal
13. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
14. James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model
for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 489, 490 (1994).
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Part VII explores other states that have passed growth management
statutes based on the PC model. They include Georgia,1
5 Maine,16
Maryland, 17 New Jersey, 8 Rhode Island, 9 and Washington." This
article concludes by reiterating the importance for involvement in growth
management at all levels of government. For example, private individuals
must also aid the government in the process of implementing land-use plans.
In summary, growth management must balance the rights of landowners
with the numerous threatened species, the primary reason behind the ESA.
I. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA'S GROWTH
MANAGEMENT
Florida's natural environment has undergone a significant metamorpho-
sis with individuals manipulating the land to make it more desirable for
colonization.2" As a result, mangrove flats and salt marshes were frequent-
ly saturated and enveloped within seawalls.2z  Interior wetlands were
depleted in order to build and develop roads, and water in Florida was
identified as the "common enemy" in the courts of law.23 Rivers were
"channelized" for controlled navigation and usefulness, and to promote the
elimination of flood waters.24 The environment was otherwise molested
through water pollution, the cutting of forests, and degradation of habitat for
various species of wildlife who were, in turn, forced into unstable re-
treats."
Florida has one of the most comprehensive systems for handling rapid
growth and development.2 6 This system includes involvement from three
governmental tiers at the state, regional, and local levels.27 Together, these
governmental entities implement permitting and regulatory programs which
15. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-70, 50-8 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
16. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4311-4344 (West Supp. 1993) (amending and
repealing Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act, 1989 Me. Laws 104).
17. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 5-701 to 5-7A-02 (Supp. 1993).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-196 to -207 (West Supp. 1993).
19. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
20. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
21. CARTER, supra note 1, at 4-5.
22. Id at 5.
23. 1d&
24. Id.
25. Id,
26. David L. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth: The Next Generation, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 223, 227 (1993) [hereinafter Powell, Managing Florida's Growth].
27. Ma.
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include land planning, developments of regional impact ("DRIs"), and state
supervision of distinctive areas.28
The growth problem in Florida did not emanate from a shortage of
space for newcomers to the state.29  Rather, it occurred because these
individuals were inclined to inhabit the identical land spaces as previous
settlers.30 The growth problem was exacerbated by steadfast population
resulting in overdevelopment of specific areas.31
Florida's growth management concerns began in 1970-71 as a result of
a serious drought in the Southeast and Tampa Bay areas.32 Then Governor
Reubin Askew arranged for deliberations on water management which
necessitated regulation of Florida's growth.33 Subsequently, the Governor
enlisted a task force which presented the following:' the Environmental
Land and Water Management Act,35 the Water Resources Act,36 the State
Comprehensive Planning Act,37 and the Land Conservation Act.38 A
companion law was also proposed which mandated that local governments
accept plans approved by the 1975 legislature.39
Within a decade, the shortage of capital was evident, thus, it became
essential that the cost of Florida's growth management status be evaluat-
ed.4° In 1978, a reappraisal of the system commenced4 which continued
until widespread growth management legislation was enacted by Congress
in 1984 and 1985.42 Upon his election, Governor Bob Graham established
a task force on resource management which resulted in the enhancement of
section 38.05 of the Florida Statutes.43 This was accomplished by institut-
ing a method "for defining areas of critical state concern... [whereby the]
28. Id. at 228.
29. CARTER, supra note 1, at 11.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 427.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1995).
36. FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1995).
37. FLA. STAT. ch. 186 (1995).
38. FLA. STAT. ch. 259 (1995).
39. See FLA. STAT. ch. 163 (1975).
40. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 427.
41. Id at 428.
42. Id
43. Id
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new law, featuring resource planning and management committees, became
the state's most effective growth management tool." 44
Consequently, the Environmental Land Management Study Committee
II ("ELMS I") was created.45 It provided suggestions and a blueprint for
Florida's future in growth management.46 As a result, a second generation
of growth management programs were enacted47 including: the State
Comprehensive Plan s the Omnibus Growth Management Act of 1985,49
and the Florida State and Regional Planning Act of 1984.'o
In 1986, the "glitch bill" was passed.5" It specified obligations for
assigning concurrency levels of service, consistency requirements for local
government plans, and altered windload criteria for the coastal zone." On
May 11, 1993, Governor Lawton Chiles signed House Bill 231513 into law.
All of the provisions contained in the 1993 Act were to serve a function in
Florida's future growth management, specifically, in the fields of land, air,
water resources, and public utilities. 4
The state planning system was directed to provide a portion of the State
Comprehensive Plan that included the preparation of growth management.
Six substantive growth areas recognized in the 1993 Act include: classifica-
44. d.
45. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 428.
46. L
47. Id. at 430.
48. Id. This strategic plan focused on the means and ends of achieving goals, as
opposed to a traditional plan. Id. However, this plan comprised a significant framework and
set the stage for the rest of the system. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 430.
49. Id. The objective of this law was to require the governor's office to provide a state
plan which was to be introduced to the 1985 legislature, and for regional planning councils
("RPCs") to furnish comprehensive regional policy plans. Id. In turn, the legislature was
to allocate funds, in the amount of $500,000, in support of the plan. Id. Additional funds
were appropriated in order to reinforce the State Land Planning Agency segment of the
Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") by expanding the amount of available positions
and further monetary functions. Id.
50. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 430. This law aimed at improving the growth
management system through the inclusion of a provision requiring all local governments to
prepare new or revised comprehensive plans, in association with the goals of the state and
regional plans. Id. In doing so, a "critical link" was produced between the state, regional,
and local levels, placing Florida in a managerial capacity in terms of growth. Id.
51. Id. at 432.
52. Id
53. 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 93-206 (West).
54. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 233.
55. Id. at 238 (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009 (Supp. 1994)).
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tion of urban and metropolitan growth centers16 and standards for ascertain-
ing favorable future urban growth; 7 recognition of sections of state and
regional environmental importance, including the implementation of
strategies for preservation; s planning policies regarding the state's future
transportation infrastructure; 9 effecting policies that positively advance
land acquisition programs; 6° establishing priorities in reference to coastal
planning resource management; 6 and addressing the demand for affordable
housing.6
2
In conclusion, the success of a growth management portion of the State
Comprehensive Plan necessitates maintaining a delicate balance among all
levels of government. 3 Such intergovernmental coordination also aids in
the exchange of information between the various agencies whose jurisdic-
tions and responsibilities may differ.' For continuation of future success
in growth management, "'[r]egulatory policies must be matched with
practical encouragement for economic growth, incentives for particularly
desirable types of growth, and strong direction to streamline regulatory
approval processes.'
65
JI. THE GROWING PAINS OF CONCURRENCY
"Defining 'quality of life' ... [relates to] philosophy and esthetics,"
however, many individuals fail "to ask the fundamental question: 'What
kind of place do we want this to be?"'" Aiding in our quest for a utopian
society is the concept of concurrency. Concurrency may be defined as a
56. Id, at 243 (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)(b)).
57. Id (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)(e)).
58. Id, at 244 (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)(c)).
59. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 244 (citing FLA. STAT. §
186.009(2)(f)).
60. Il at 244-45 (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)(g)).
61. Id. at 245 (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)0)).
62. IM (citing FLA. STAT. § 186.009(2)(h)).
63. Id at 246.
64. Interview with Richard Grosso, supra note 4.
65. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 246 (citing Robert M. Rhodes
& Robert C. Apgar, Charting Florida's Course: The State and Regional Planning Act of
1984, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 583, 604 (1984)).
66. David J. Russ, How the "Property Rights" Movement Threatens Property Values in
Florida, 9 FLA. ST. U. J. LAD USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 395 (1994) (citing Carter, supra note
1, at 14).
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"land use regulation which controls the timing of property development and
population growth."67
Concurrency requirements seek to acquire an efficient chain of
community growth.68 This is accomplished by guaranteeing that infrastruc-
ture is obtainable upon demand.6 ' For example, in order for a developer
to construct, the required public services must be readily available.70
Primary areas of concern entail transportation, water and stormwater
management, sewer, solid waste, and parks and recreation.71
While the notion of concurrency is wrought with good intentions, there
appears to be a catch twenty-two since the more that is built, the greater the
number of individuals who will invade the land space. Some perceive
growth as decreasing the "quality of life," in that it creates traffic congestion
and overcrowding of schools. Therefore, this presents a down-side to
growth.
A. Concurrency in Florida-"Build It and They Will Come"
Concurrency in Florida acted as the most dominant policy requirement
for the 1985 growth management system.7" This evolved from the extreme
proposal that Florida's growth should become a "pay as you grow" system,
with infrastructure added to sustain such development.73 Thus, concur-
rency has been referred to as the "'teeth' of Florida's growth management
system.s
74
Dade County, Florida, has been labeled as the county with the fourth
worst traffic congestion problems in the nation.7 ' According to a survey
of local governments conducted for the Florida League of Cities, seventy-
five percent of the respondents classified state roads as currently encounter-
67. H. Glenn Boggs, II & Robert C. Apgar, Concurrency and Growth Management:
Lawyer's Primer, 7 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 1 (1991).
68. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 510.
69. David L. Powell, Recent Changes in Concurrency, 68 FLA. B.J. 67, 67 (Nov. 1994)
[hereinafter Powell, Concurrency].
70. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 510.
71. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 434.
72. ld.
73. Id.
74. Powell, Concurrency, supra note 69, at 67 (quoting Letter from Thomas G. Pelham,
Secretary, Department of Community Affairs, to Senator Gwen Margolis, North Miami Beach
1 (Mar. 7, 1988), quoted in DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, THE EVOLUTION AND
REQUIREMENTS OF THE CMS RULE, TECHNICAL MEMO 4 (Aug. 1991)).
75. Greg Jaffe & Christina Binkley, Growing Pains: Counties Rue the High Price of
Success, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at S1.
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ing a facility deficit, or envisioning one at a later date.76 In attempting to
handle traffic problems, transportation acts as the most important focus of
Florida's novel concurrency requirements."
As a result, studies were performed to determine "potential refinements
of transportation concurrency and additional sources of funding to provide
needed facilities. 78  The resulting legislation was amended to include
"compromise provisions" founded upon various suggestions by the above
studies.79 Subsequently, in 1993, local governments were permitted by the
legislature to employ "a long-term transportation concurrency management
system with a planning period of up to 10 years."80
The first city in Florida to implement concurrency in the school arena
was Coral Springs." The City Commission is scheduled to recommend a
plan ordering developers to build an adequate number of schools in order
to accommodate the growing number of children moving into the neighbor-
hood.82 Similarly, such growth management criteria are presently in place
regarding various public facilities in the area.83
Because school districts are regarded as separate from municipalities,
they did not fall under the guise of the 1985 Growth Management Act.
84
Thus, builders suggested that the only pragmatic solution was to impose
taxes, paving the way for more schools to be built.8" Many builders
contend that overcrowding is not their fault; rather, they claim the escalating
number of births, in addition to immigrants pouring into the state on a daily
basis, cause the high student body in the school system.
8 6
On September 19, 1995, Broward County voters rejected what was
known as the "penny tax," which was to be used for school construction.87
The proposal was struck down by "an overwhelming vote of no confidence
76. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 301.
77. Powell, Concurrency, supra note 69, at 68.
78. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 301.
79. Id. at 302.
80. Powell, Concurrency, supra note 69, at 68.
81. Elaine Walker, Bill: No School Fees Forced on Developers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
20, 1995, at B2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. John Maines, Builders Say Taxes Are Key: Group Says Schools Need The Money,
SUN SENTINEL, June 29, 1995, at 3B.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Move On From Penny Tax Defeat, Address Reasons for Its Rejection, SUN
SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 1995, at 12A.
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in the school system's leaders, their credibility and their money management
skills.""8 Yet, it was suggested that voters must come to the "realiz[ation]
that there is no free lunch ...and that until the tax base is broadened,
school property taxpayers will continue to pay the lion's share of the
cost."8 9
Since the penny tax was declined, the Broward school district devised
a new plan adding a requirement that classroom seats become part of the
planning process of concurrency. Developers fear that this would affect
new construction. However, new construction would not necessarily be
halted until the existing schools become significantly overcrowded. 91 For
example, in elementary schools, overcrowding is not considered serious until
the capacity reaches 175% or greater. Still, school construction has slowed
due to the lack of sufficient revenues. 92 While most builders oppose the
plan, the school district maintains that "[t]his is not a building moratorium"
since builders may either construct the schools themselves, or provide the
land in order for an adequate number of classrooms to be built.93
Unfortunately, Florida's public school system has been labeled as
having one of the highest dropout rates in the country.94 Florida's low
graduation rate has been attributed to the growing number of students
occupying classrooms. 95 For instance, individuals coming from various
cultures, speaking different languages, do not have much of an opportunity
to excel in a classroom that is significantly overcrowded. 96
While Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") scores have managed to
remain stagnant or escalate somewhat over the last ten years,97 success on
high school exams has diminished.98 Reports also indicate that over the
last three years, fourth graders did twenty percent better on a writing
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Lisa Arthur, Schools Try Again to Link Development, Classrooms, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 28, 1995, at 1BR.
91. id,
92. Id. at 7BR.
93. IM
94. Ron Wiginton, Adult Ed: Night School for the '90s, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 18,
1993, at G4.
95. Id.
96. I
97. Id.
98. Bill Hirschman, State Issues Report on County Schools: Class Sizes Higher than
Florida Average; Test Scores Down in High Schools, SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 1995, at lB.
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assessment test and five percent better on a nationwide math test.99
However, students seem to have a problem with absenteeism, which has
increased in 1995."0
As a result of the problems facing students, Hallandale, Florida, experi-
mented with and implemented a year-round attendance policy.01 In the
summer of 1993, students began to attend classes in split sessions. While
some students are on vacation, others are in school." Specifically, the
students are given four three-week vacations, alternating among the
groups. 3 This means that the rooms are being utilized 220 days of the
year, with thirty or fewer students at a time.1" Even though this attempt
at year-round schooling has been quite successful, there are still those
parents who oppose the idea.' 5 Nevertheless, there may not be much of
a choice in areas that are becoming increasingly inhabited. With the influx
of ex-Dade residents moving "west" to Broward, areas such as Weston are
becoming congested. Although some relief is expected in the fall of 1996,
when a new high school will be constructed in Pembroke Pines, Weston
students are currently having to undertake courses at Western High School
in Davie.'O'
In an attempt to handle the extra class load, Western High School has
devised a plan to limit classes to four per semester as opposed to the usual
seven.'" With only four classes, each class session will last longer
affording teachers more time for preparing lesson plans. ' The rationale
behind the above proposals should work well in the students' favor by
furnishing them with increased individualized attention in the hopes that test
scores will be positively affected.
The examples provided indicate that the human factor must be
considered in weighing the demand for growth with overcrowding of certain
areas. While concurrency seems to furnish an invisible hand in aiding
expanding communities, there are those individuals who may have purposely
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Year-Round Schooling Experiment Gets Results Worth Expanding On, SUN
SENTINEL, Feb. 13, 1995, at 6A.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Sarah Talalay, Weston Crowd Demands Answers From School Chief, SUN
SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 1995, at 7B.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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moved into an area for the serenity which is now lost. In the end, future
generations will be negatively affected if today's growth is left uncurbed.
B. Implications of Growth Explosion in Other States
In Gwinnett County, Georgia, 85,000 students cram into schools
constructed for 73,000."'° School officials fear that residents will follow
the lead of Florida's citizens by refusing to foot the bill."' Until more
schools are built, approximately 500 portable classrooms are being utilized
to teach the increasing number of children in Gwinnett County."'
In the meantime, it is imperative that states such as Florida and Georgia
look to other states which may provide valuable information regarding the
management of concurrency. For example, in North Carolina, Dick
Ludington formed 1,000 Friends of North Carolina when the population
grew by thirty percent from 1970 to 1990.112 Ironically, this organization
was modeled after the one in Florida, as well as ones in Georgia, Massachu-
setts, and Oregon."' However, as Jim Wahlbrink, executive officer of the
Homebuilders Association of Raleigh-Wake County noted, "'[i]t created
more problems than it solved in Florida' .. . [because] too many decisions
were made by people too far away from local issues."..4 Instead, it was
suggested that "those decisions .. .[should] be left at the local level."' 15
Moreover, "economic development should be used as a tool to good growth
• .. [by] attracting appropriate industries and protecting the quality of
life.""
6
Another region hit hard with growing student enrollments is Los
Angeles, California."' Because of overcrowding, thousands of students
are bused to schools in other districts."8 Those close to the problem have
blamed busing for the increase in high school dropouts, since travelling to
109. Jaffe & Binkley, supra note 75, at S1.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Sally Hicks, Group Forms to Help Manage N.C. Growth, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar.
11, 1995, at B3.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Jim Wahlbrink, executive officer of the Homebuilders Association of
Raleigh-Wake County).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Elaine Woo, School Dropouts: New Data May Provide Elusive Clues, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1989, at 1.
118. Id.
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other districts dissuades students who may already be borderline drop-
outs.
19
In 1993, the Ventura Unified High School District reported that scores
on the verbal portion of the SAT rose by seven points."' However, scores
on the math portion declined by eighteen points.' Again, the slippage
in the scores was attributed to overcrowded classrooms, ranging from forty
students per class, and to gang violence."
One area aspiring to raise the graduation rate is St. Louis, Missou-
ri." A 1988 report demonstrated that out of ten incoming freshman in
the St. Louis public school system, only three will graduate. 24 Due to
such staggering numbers, various programs were organized. They included:
Continued Education (furnishing pregnant girls with classes in medical care,
nutrition, and parenting); Attendance, Attitude and Academics ("Tri-A")
(providing an alternative high school atmosphere, concentrating on students
with behavioral problems); Adopt-A-Student Program (assigning an adult to
act as mentor for students who need a positive role model); and truancy
centers (permitting police to fine parents who allow their children to
continuously skip classes)."'
Coloradans also appear to be concerned over the diminishing quality
of life.'26 Residents believe that the steadfast rate of new inhabitants will
ultimately lead to problems such as crime, higher housing costs, and
pollution. 27  However, the number one concern was traffic conges-
tion. In a poll, forty-six percent of Coloradans stated that they would
support impact fees on new homes, if they were used for new schools, new
highways, and more police officers' 9 In addition, fifty-one percent of
119. Id.
120. Stephanie Simon & Brenda Day, Ventura Math Scores Drop 18 Points on SAT
Education: Verbal Skills Numbers Show Improvement. The District's High Schools Remain
Above the State and National Average, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Virginia Hick, Schools Trying to Stem High Dropout Rate, ST. LoUis POST-
DISPATCH, May 24, 1992, at IA.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Mark Obmascik, Poll: State Growing Too Fast, DENVER POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at
A01.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Coloradans agreed that a one-cent sales tax on building materials would be
beneficial if used for construction of new roads and schools. 30
The Denver Public Schools released statistics revealing that since 1991,
the number of students graduating from high school has dropped by seven
points.'13 It was reported that school officials were actually relieved that
the figures were not lower. 32 Some of the factors contributing to the
decrease were the "rising poverty among Denver families and the flight of
the middle class from the schools."'13
3
In July of 1995, Colorado passed their version of a concurrency
management system." The standards established for classrooms were an
average of twenty-five students, and limits were set at 715 students per
elementary school, 1238 per middle school, and 2150 per high school. 35
Finally, if developers fail to satisfy the above criteria, their building
applications could be denied or economic sanctions could result. 36
In Williamson County, Tennessee, residents have become disillusioned
with their recent growth since Saturn moved its company headquarters into
Spring Hill in 1990. 37 While the "[g]rowth has brought wealth to the
Southeast... it also has brought traffic, bursting schools, higher taxes and
an uneasy relationship between longtime residents and newcomers attracted
by the promise of prosperity.,'138  However, Williamson County has
handled some aspects of growth better than other areas by building thirteen
new schools and funding the preservation of historic buildings. 39 Still,
many oldtimers remain disheartened when they remember the historic barns
and rolling pastures that once made up the county's landscape."
In conclusion, it is evident that the growth explosion occurring
throughout the United States is causing severe overcrowding, especially in
130. Id.
131. Romel Hemandez, Graduation Rate Sparks Call for Reform: 67.8% Figure
Concerns Denver School Officials, Who Say They're Relieved It Didn't Drop Further, ROCKY
MTN. NEWs, Dec. 1, 1994, at 4A.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Shelley Gonzales, Douglas Commission Oks Service Rules Before the Bulldozers
Appear, the Developer Must Show Project Will Have No Adverse Effects, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Aug. 1, 1995, at 14A.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Jaffe & Binkley, supra note 75, at S1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the school system. Something must be done-and quickly. If educators and
community members unite to form programs, as did St. Louis, students will
benefit tremendously. Moreover, by adding schools to the list of require-
ments of concurrency, states will be more apt to manage their growth before
the dilemma intensifies. While the problem of overcrowding cannot be
rectified overnight, concurrency in the school arena is one way to ensure
that enough schools will be built to meet the demand in the first place. In
doing so, the quality of life for those involved should also be elevated.
IV. GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 is evolving as a meaningful
constraint on land use development.' Growth management relates to the
ESA, in that its purpose is to preserve and conserve wildlife habitat, water
resources, park land, and roads. 42 Therefore, a major component of
growth management requires consideration of wildlife43 and their existing
ecosystems.' 44
Although Florida has not endured the same extent of ESA scrutiny as
California,45 the area of North Key Largo'" has met with adversity in
the generating of adequate biological data. 47 The site of projected
development is the habitat for the Key Largo Woodrat and the Key Largo
Cotton Mouse. 48  Insufficient available resources by local governments
and small developers may be contributing factors to the origination of prob-
lems. 149 Their ability to properly research and prepare the necessary
141. Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging
Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
1 (1991).
142. Telephone Interview with Jim Antista, General Counsel of the Florida Game &
Fresh Water Fish Commission (July 27, 1995).
143. Id.
144. Arnold, supra note 141, at 5 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988)).
145. The first area in the United States subject to a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP")
was the development of the San Bruno Mountain in California, and it serves as a model in
evaluating future HCPs. hid at 24.
146. This area is "a barrier island in the northern Florida Keys." J.B. Ruhl, Regional
Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Legal and
Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SMU L. REV. 1393, 1405 (1991). In 1989, an
HCP consisting of twelve miles of hardwood hammock forest island habitat was developed
by the Growth Management Division of Monroe County. Id. at 1405-06.
147. Arnold, supra note 141, at 29.
148. Id. at 28-29.
149. Id. at 29.
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comprehensive reports for an incidental taking permit and an HCP was
impaired.15 However, various rigid requirements imposed by the ESA
correspond to Florida's environmental statutes and regulations, which
implies a "pre-ESA check" on growth in environmentally susceptible
areas.
151
Currently, the Clinton Interior Department is working with landowners
in order to devise HCPs specifically designed to suit both the needs of
wildlife and the landowner. 52 If these plans become widely accepted,
they will offer owners greater management flexibility, and simultaneously
safeguard the endangered species. Said HCPs provide a mechanism under
the ESA by which developers may receive incidental taking'53 per-
mits."s The Department of Committee Affairs has the authority to require
such set-asides of habitat. 155 This mitigation program relates to "incidental
[taking] permits" '56 under the section 10(a) provision. 57 Regarding
these conservation areas or reservations, counties have an affirmative
responsibility to designate such viable areas for development.'58
For example, but for the woodrat, if a contractor could develop an area,
such a permit may be granted if the taking itself does not jeopardize the
survival of the species and alternative measures will not offset the dam-
age.' 59 This balance between conservation and development appears to
protect the species, as well as allow for continued growth of the land. Thus,
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Eric Pryne, High Court's Decision on Habitat Protection: Ruling of the Decade?,
THE SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at BI.
153. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2412 (1995) (holding the word "harm" to include habitat modification).
The majority also reasonably construed Congress' intent as prohibiting indirect, as well as
direct, takings of the land used by wildlife. Id. at 2408. Although the landmark ruling of
Sweet Home is a victory for environmentalists, the future of the ESA may run into difficulty
since the Republican-run Congress is scheduled to rewrite the act. Brent Walth, An
Environmental Landmark, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 30, 1995, at Al.
154. Telephone Interview with Jim Antista, supra note 142.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Arnold, supra note 141, at 13. "Incidental take" is defined by the Fish & Wildlife
Service ("FWS") as a taking resulting from, but "not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful
activity." Id. at 14 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990)).
158. Telephone Interview with Jim Antista, supra note 142.
159. Id.
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saving and protecting endangered species is a national concern.' 6° Howev-
er, with adequate participation at the state level, successful remedies may
cure ailments and act as models for other states.
161
A. Habitat Depletion in North Key Largo
North Key Largo is comprised of 12,000 acres of mangrove wetlands
and hardwood hammock.' 6 Enclosed by park land, it is situated in close
proximity to one of the greatest reef systems in existence today. 63  The
island and adjacent islands are facing critical loss of habitat due to rapid
development." This has resulted in a depleted habitat for the various
endangered species' 65 including the woodrat, cotton mouse, Schaus swal-
lowtail butterfly, American crocodile, and wading birds, such as the little
blue heron, ospreys, and the snowy egret. 166
B. Extraordinary Measures in Protecting the Key Deer
An example of local governments successfully taking part in a rescue
program for endangered species involves the Key Deer. 67 These deer are
found in the lower Florida Keys, primarily on Big Pine Key.161 The Key
Deer is a small subspecies of the Virginia white-tailed deer 69 which
gained notoriety in 1934, when a well-known biologist and artist, J.N.
160. Senate Subcommittee of Environment and Public Works Hearing of Water, Fish,
Wildlife, and the Endangered Species Act (C-SPAN television broadcast, July 13, 1995)
(statement of Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior).
161. Id.
162. Ann Banks, Conscience of the Keys: Vietnam Veteran Ed Davidson Thought His
Fighting Days Were Over. Then Came the Battle to Save North Key Largo, SUN SENTINEL,
July 22, 1990, at 6.
163. Id.
164. Telephone Interview with James Bell, Interpretative Specialist for the Florida Keys
National Wildlife Refuges (July 28, 1995).
165. Id.
166. Telephone Interview with Jim Antista, supra note 142.
167. Jeffrey Schaeffer, Local Government and the Protection of an Endangered Species:
The Florida Key Deer, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Sept. 1988, at 1, 1.
168. Mary Tebo, Florida Key Deer: Can the Florida Key Deer Be Saved?, FLA.
WILDLIFE, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 26, 26. Big Pine Key supplies stable sources of fresh water and
its pine/palm communities and tropical hardwood hammocks supply suitable food. Id. at 27.
169. Schaeffer, supra note 167, at 1.
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"Ding" Darling, portrayed the predicament of the Key Deer in a national
cartoon.1
70
In 1957, a bill was passed by Congress which created the National Key
Deer Wildlife Refuge.77 However, for the past ten years, their death rate
has risen by sixty to sixty-five deer annually. 72 Currently, approximately
250 to 300 Key Deer remain in the area.77 The following factors have
contributed to their demise: road deaths, disease, inappropriate nutrition,
social disorders, and stress.' Additionally, development alters their
natural environment which, in turn, reduces habitat quality. 75 The FWS,
in connection with conservation groups, has endeavored to obtain acreage
to add to their refuge. 76 Also, refuge personnel employed various land
management procedures, such as designated burning, which intensify and
promote the native vegetation growth.'
Monroe County executed an innovative land use plan on September 15,
1985, which emphasized improvements for safeguarding the deer and their
habitat.17 1 Certain bans on the development of wetlands were instituted
along with the requirement that landowners reserve vital parcels of their land
in a natural state.17 9 In addition, residential density requirements were
changed to limit growth and fences were reconstructed so as not to trap and
entangle deer. 80
It appears clear that local governments should share responsibility with
state and federal agencies in protecting threatened and endangered spe-
cies."' The distribution of building permits by local governments gives
them jurisdiction over habitats.' The dilemma of the Key Deer may be
viewed as an illustration whereby local governments initiate programs for
the continued survival of such threatened species.
170. Tebo, supra note 168, at 27. Specifically, the Key Deer were shown fleeing from
poachers and large dogs. Id.
171. Id.
172. Dan Keating, Spots Before Your Eyes on Big Pine Key: Deer Babies Arrive Late
This Year, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1993, at lB.
173. Id.
174. Rick Sullivan, Killing Wildlife with Kindness, THE SKIMMER, Fall 1988, at 1, 1.
175. Tebo, supra note 168, at 27.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Schaeffer, supra note 167, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id.
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V. FLORIDA'S CONNECTION TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS
The EPA and the COE are uniting to preserve and manage prevailing
wetlands.' 83 The information obtained from such "ecologically high
value" areas is gathered through ADID. s ADID'85 is a planning mech-
anism which permits the EPA and the COE to collaborate.186 The infor-
mation is then published and made accessible to the managed community
in order to countervail future ecological impacts from potential development
in low quality wetlands.' 87
Because wetlands are viable ecosystems, the EPA is interested in
conducting studies where the strain of urban development clashes with the
protection and conservation of the wetlands.' The EPA is committed to
working with local governments, state governments, and environmental and
conservation groups.'89 In certain circumstances, the EPA will also
interact with private organizations. 90
Regarding human growth, Florida's population is increasing at a
projected rate of sixteen million by the year 2000.' Over the last fifty
years, more than eight million acres of forest and wetland habitats (24% of
the state) were appropriated in order to adjust to such human demands.'9
Therefore, if plant and animal populations are to survive as a result of these
drastic alterations, habitats able to withstand future population increases
must be identified and preserved at an early stage. 93
183. Hughes, supra note 11, at 1.1. Such collaboration entails execution of section 404
of the Clean Water Act which requires a permit subsequent to conducting projects on
wetlands. Id
184. Id.
185. ADID programs in Florida include: the Northeast Shark River Slough (East
Everglades), West Broward County, Southwest Biscayne Bay in Dade County, St. John's
Forest in St. John's County, the Florida Keys, and Rookery Bay in Collier County. IM at
1.3-1.5.
186. Id-
187. Hughes, supra note 11, at 1.3-1.5.
188. Id. at 1.6.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. James Cox, Identification of Important Habitat Areas in Florida 2.1 (Mar. 18, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Environmental and Land Use Law Section Public
Interest Representation Committee).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Although they are not prescribed in rule form, the concepts of
cumulative and secondary impacts have been notable regarding wetland
permitting. 9 a Cumulative impacts are those "of a similar nature in the
same geographical area to those at issue in a specific project." '95  In
addition, this type of impact can be anticipated "as a result of other,
unrelated projects."1 96 Consideration of these impacts was the result of a
Department of Environmental Regulation ("DEW') policy to ensure that
individuals reviewing the permits take environmental effects into account
where the permit functions as a precedent for corresponding permits in the
future. 19
7
Secondary impacts are those anticipated to follow as a result of the
project at issue.' 98 However, they are not the immediate result of the
contemplated project. 99 Consideration of these impacts transpired through
DER non-rule policy.20° This policy was exemplified in del Campo v.
State Department of Environmental Regulation,20' in which the court
reversed a permitting decision where conceivable environmental impacts of
an island development were declined.2"
Wetlands are critical elements of the water resource because they act
as a means of reproduction, nursery, and nourishment habitats for various
species of fish and wildlife.20 3 In addition, they supply significant food
storage, detrital production, nutrient cycling, and recreational and water
quality functions.2 4 Therefore, standards of water quality in suitable
194. Peter B. Belmont, Cumulative and Secondary Impacts 3.1 (Mar. 18, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Environmental and Land Use Law Section Public
Interest Representation Committee).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 3.2.
198. Id. at 3.1.
199. Belmont, supra note 194, at 3.1.
200. Id. at 3.2-3.3 (citing Dougherty v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 4 Fla. Admin.
L. Rep. 1079-A (1982)) (stating DER based its classification of impacts upon presumed
conditions of full development of project and upon all impacts directly or indirectly related
to establishment which may include pollution repercussions).
201. 452 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Id. at 1005; see also Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc. v.
Cape Cave Corp., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 317, 382-83 (1985) (granting a permit to construct
supplementary phases of residential development using septic tanks which would generate
secondary water quality impact issues on condition of installing central sewage collection
system).
203. Belmont, supra note 194, at 3.23.
204. Id.
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wetlands and additional surface waters is crucial to their capability of
providing these operations. 5
VI. OREGON AND VERMONT IN RELATION TO FLORIDA'S
GROWTH MANAGEMENT
In the early 1970s, growth management statutes were enacted by
Florida, Oregon, and Vermont, thus, shifting "regulatory power... to the
state or regional level' 2 in order to regulate the opposing intentions of
economic development and protection of the environment.2" First, it is
important to note that Florida has drawn on both Oregon and Vermont in
devising sound growth management regulation. The MLDC was inspired
by the Vermont statute, which later became the model to the Florida
statute.2"8 The PC model, influenced by Oregon, acted as the prototype
for a second surge of growth management statutes across the United States
during the mid-1980s through 1993.2'9
Florida and Vermont possess certain common attributes, such as
demanding state or regional level consent for significant development
projects which removes authoritative control away from municipalities.210
The Florida statute also empowers "state and regional agencies to identify
certain natural areas of critical concern, in which local regulations can be
superseded. 2 . Because both states rely heavily on tourism and have
experienced a marked population increase, they endorse state supervision
over growth management.212
The competence of significant project provisions in both states have
been commended.213 However, Florida has been criticized for its large
threshold size, allowing voluminous projects to escape scrutiny.214 While
Florida's regional planning agencies ("RPAs"), including representatives
from local governments, have been denounced for insufficient oversight,
Vermont's regional commissions have been applauded for their citizen
205. Id.
206. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 512.
207. Id. at 489.
208. Id. at 490.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 512.
211. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 512.
212. Id. at 513.
213. Id. at 518.
214. Id.
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involvement and cooperation.2 5 In addition to efforts by local citizens,
Vermont requires the state government to emphasize information sharing and
mediation.1 6
With respect to Florida's future in growth management, the state
prepared four novel plan provisions to be utilized by land development
regulations ("LDRs") by December 31, 1997.27 They are comprised of
an intergovernmental coordination element ("ICE") which includes:
ascertaining whether a proposed development, which may or may not
constitute a DRI-scale project, would significantly impact other local
jurisdictions, state or regional facilities, or resources; supplying procedures
for mitigating notable extra-jurisdictional impacts in the developing
jurisdiction in agreement with local plans; employing the regional planning
council's dispute resolution process for controversies regarding significant
impacts on suggested development; and permitting development orders to
be modified for approved DRIs compatible with new plan policies on
mitigation of significant impacts.2"'
With reference to the intergovernmental workings of such plans, the
ICE must exhibit concern over affected local governments by being mindful
of the consequences of the local plan upon such development.2 9 In the
fulfillment of this goal, the proposed ICE rule renders three alternatives
whereby a local government may select "to work toward compatible
resource and facility identification, definitions of significant impact, and
mitigation standards."2' Therefore, Florida is continually preparing for
the next generation of growth by enhancing its intergovernmental affairs.
Additionally, Florida repealed its DRI program after twenty successful
years which led to the supremacy of the PC model over the MLDC.2 '
The PC model guarantees that all projects will be submitted to the state for
review.' Additionally, the projects must conform to an approved local
215. Id. at 518-19.
216. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 7 (1994).
217. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth, supra note 26, at 275.
218. Id. at 273-75.
219. Katherine Castor, New Requirements of the Intergovernmental Coordination
Element of Local Government Comprehensive Plans and the Replacement of the Develop-
ment of Regional Impact 1.1 (Jan. 28, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee).
220. Id. at 1.5.
221. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 519.
222. Id.
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plan by the state.2" Therefore, the trend toward state oversight of growth
management activities is evident.
The planning program of Oregon was adopted in 1973'2 and dictates
that all cities and counties prepare comprehensive land use plans for
evaluation and endorsement, thereby, maintaining unanimity with state
objectives.' Oregon has the oldest comprehensive state growth manage-
ment program in the United States. 6 Rather than relying on direct state
or regional supervision of major projects or critical areas, Oregon's statute
involves oversight of local planning and zoning by the state. 7  In
addition, like Florida and Vermont, Oregon demonstrated several features
motivating environmental reform, such as an exceedingly increasing
population growth and development, abundant natural resources, and
dependence upon tourism and outdoor entertainment.2'
Oregon is one of the legislatures to approve a state planning com-
mission ("SPC") or advisory council.229 A primary function of the SPC
is to serve in an advisory capacity to the state government to formulate
growth management goals.23 Through distinctive membership of the
SPC, success in achieving state planning laws was also realized. 3 Aiding
further in Oregon's success of its SPC was a local advocacy group called
1000 Friends of Oregon which furnished vital public support. 2 This was
accomplished by promoting growth management goals by applying political
pressure and engaging in litigation.233
In contrast, Florida has a state planning agency ("SPA") called the
Department of Community Affairs which answers to the governor.21 Its
current productivity is largely due to a slate of governors who can take
personal credit for contributing to various planning issues.235 Oregon's
SPC serves as an example of achieving success because it does not impose
223. Id.
224. Id. at 523 (citing Oregon State Land Use Act, 1973 Or. Laws 80 (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 197 (1993))).
225. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 450.
226. Id. at 453.
227. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 522-23.
228. Id. at 523.
229. Id. at 526.
230. Id. at 527.
231. Id.
232. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 527.
233. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 420 n.149.
234. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 527.
235. Id.
1996] 1009
427
: Nova Law Review 20, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
an administrative and financial hardship upon the state.236 As previously
mentioned, Florida also has a state growth management "watchdog" group
called 1000 Friends of Florida which has survived due to exuberant support
from a broadly representative board of corporate, developmental, and
environmental groups. 237 Even with a severe recession and the failure of
the state to finance its share of the implementation effort, this "stakeholder"
affiliation remains strong.238
Furthermore, Oregon may be viewed as an effective model for both
environmental protection and financial prosperity. 23 9 The "jobs-vs.-owls
debate" concentrated on whether significant decreases in jobs for loggers
would result from preservation of the northern spotted owl's habitat."4
However, in April 1993, a forest plan was revealed by President Clinton
which provided $1.2 billion in federal resources.24' The purpose of this
plan was to retrain forest workers during a five-year period in order to shift
the economic burden away from distressed areas.242 As a result, there has
been a "quantum leap in forest management" in Oregon. 43
For example, clear-cutting has diminished and "no-cut buffer areas
around streams are commonplace. ' 2" This has resulted in Oregon's
industry becoming more productive and resourceful.2 45 However, the
continued economic stability will be dependent upon individuals protecting
the environment as opposed to sacrificing it. 46 Summarily, the time has
come for communities to consider the accessible resources and devise
alternatives for the good of the environment.247
Recently, Florida engaged in an unprecedented conservation agreement
with a timber company. 24' The purpose was to permanently enjoin fifty
236. Id.
237. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 448.
238. Id.
239. Daniel Glick, Having Owls and Jobs Too, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Aug.-Sept. 1995, at
9,13.
240. Id. at 12.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 13.
244. Glick, supra note 239, at 13.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 11.
248. Michael Browning, A Forest Forever: Deal Protects Woodland from Development,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 1995, at IA.
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square miles of woodland in North Central Florida from development.249
The above-mentioned area includes other parcels of land known as Alachua
County's Payne's Prairie and an expansive tract of wet hammocks in
Volusia County's Tomoka Wildlife Management Area.' These "large
patches of near-wilderness will be preserved forever, both as scenery and as
vital catchment areas for water flow and purification."'
Although logging is still permitted, the restrictions involve limiting
clear-cutting to 2000 acres on each plot of land yearly and in 200-acre
portions at a time.252 Also, timber contained on wetlands may be clear-cut
in fifty-acre sized portions exclusively. 3  Since these areas contain
wildlife such as bald eagles, deer, wild turkeys, and various songbirds and
wading birds,' this deal also stimulates preservation of endangered or
threatened species.
The PC model introduced in Oregon requires that individual develop-
ment projects be approved to conform with local plans.255 Therefore, the
state continues to supervise and oversee major projects25 6 This is also
true of the smaller scale development patterns which escape the MLDC
model. 7 In line with Oregon's statute, Florida and Vermont enacted their
planning consistency statutes in the late 1980s.25 The Oregon statute has
persisted, in spite of three repeal attempts, and continues to prevail
today259 because of ample public support.' 6 Therefore, a change in
development patterns is suggested in order to satisfy environmental
protection goals while still promoting economic development.26'
249. Id.
250. Id. at 17A.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Browning, supra note 248, at 17A.
254. Id.
255. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 547.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 522.
259. Id. at 524.
260. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 453.
261. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 546.
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VII. EMERGENCE OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT STATUTES ACROSS
THE UNITED STATES
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, various states looked to both Florida
and Oregon for approaches in fashioning their growth management
strategies. 2 ' The following six states have recently passed growth
management statutes:263 Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, and Washington. 26' A total of nine state growth management
statutes, including local planning provisions compatible with statewide goals,
further exhibit the superiority of the Oregon model for state growth
management laws. 265  Together, these states represent a wide array of
techniques used in managing urban development through state guidance and
intergovernmental coordination.2 66
Growth management programs encounter a myriad of difficulties in
such areas as funding, goal coherence, division of power, and coordination
of governmental entities.267 Urban land control programs are intergovern-
mental in nature because governmental economic assistance is a necessi-
ty.268 Participation from all levels of government is considerable.
269
Such intergovernmental endeavors have been successful in Oregon and
favored, in terms of "operational structures," in Florida, New Jersey, and
Vermont.270
Although the particulars of growth management statutes vary, it is a
standard requirement of local governments and, in most cases, regional and
state agencies, to provide plans that comply with state goals and proce-
dures.2 7" ' This is true in every state except New Jersey and Rhode Is-
land.272 Moreover, the legislation that Oregon passed in 1973 included
fourteen goal statements with a subsequent addition of five coastal manage-
ment goals.2 73  Florida passed legislation ordering the preparation of a
262. DeGrove, supra note 3, at 447.
263. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 525.
264. See sources cited supra notes 15-20.
265. Wickersham, supra note 14, at 525. These nine states include: Florida, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
266. Douglas R. Porter, State Growth Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment,
13 PACE L. REV. 481, 481 (1993).
267. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 434.
268. Id. at 437.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 434.
271. Porter, supra note 266, at 482.
272. Id. at 484.
273. Id.
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comprehensive statewide plan encompassing twenty-five topic areas
comprised of goal and policy statements.274 Also, the Maryland statute
exemplifies seven "visions" which serve as guiding policies to be
achieved. 5
Some states require consent of local plans, such as New Jersey which
includes specified procedures for the negotiation of growth management
agreements between the state and local governments. The failure of
local governments to observe such requirements may result in sanctions
involving denial of specific state grants.2' In Rhode Island, the state will
provide a comprehensive plan if a local government declines to do so.278
In Georgia, "[tihe governing bodies of municipalities and counties are
authorized ... [t]o develop ... a comprehensive plan"279 which executes
regulations of land use compatible with such a plan.8 Maine's statute
also asserts that each municipality should provide a local growth manage-
ment program.28 In addition, participation by the citizens is encouraged
by inviting public examination and commentaries in an unbiased man-
ner.282  This subsection aimed at obtaining a broad distribution of the
following: recommendations and options, written communication of
observations, public debates, dissemination of information, and interest in
and rebuttal to suggestions by the public.283
The Washington statute requires each county to select an urban growth
area or areas in order to stimulate such growth.2 Currently, in Washing-
ton, voters are confronted with a "race against the clock and government
regulations" involving the "property rights referendum., 25 In what has
been called a "veiled attempt to further the Republican agenda to dismantle
government," the proposed legislation would establish national standards
increasing landowners' rights and decreasing governmental regulatory
274. Id. at 484-85.
275. Id. at 485.
276. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 424.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-70-3(1) (1995).
280. Id. § 36-70-3(2).
281. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4324(1) (West 1994).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.1 10(1) (West 1994), amended by 1995 Wash.
Legis. Serv. 400 (West).
285. Vincent J. Schodolski, Property Vote Causes Split in Northwest Owners' Rights at
Issue in Washington State Initiative, CHI. TRM., Aug. 20, 1995, at 17.
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control.286 Therefore, individuals would be able to seek reimbursement for
any ensuing property loss.
2 7
Specifically, state agencies, in attempting to restrict the ability of
landowners to use their property as they desire, would be administered
demanding tests.2 88 In addition, government would have to recognize that
no less burdensome alternatives exist and that the regulation is in the
public's best interest.289 However, critics state the proposal would injure
all levels of government in their ability to effectively manage environmental
protection.290
As illustrated, there is often a tug of war between the objectives of the
state and local governments. This struggle combined with inherent problems
tends to make the growth management process more difficult. However, it
has been suggested that if the various states can minimize significant
problems, they may develop into the most influential bodies of American
government in their attempts to manage urban land.291
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the future success of growth management rests upon the
individual states. While growth itself is not the root of the problem, the
quality of life must be maintained through concurrency requirements. It
must also be emphasized that there is a drastic need for uniformity of HCPs
across the United States. In working together, both environmentalists and
landowners can maintain a firm grip on growth management with careful
consideration placed upon the numerous threatened species. Finally, these
endangered species cannot be adequately protected if we allow the
degradation of their habitat to continue.
While the environmental pendulum has swung to and fro, it is suffi-
ciently clear that time cannot be wasted in resolving the problem of growth
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Schodolski, supra note 285, at 17.
291. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 434.
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management in Florida and other states. By studying and applying the
principles and guidelines which have proven to be effective, reliable, and
successful, Florida can avoid the dirge of disaster. Time is of the essence.
Vanessa Steinberg-Prieto
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